POST-MORTEM
The daggers of Brutus, Cassius, and their allies, on the Ides of
March, 44 B.C., avenged the republic which they were too late to save.
It thus chanced that the details of the new imperial government were
in the main arranged not by Julius Cæsar but by his great-nephew,
Gaius Octavius Cæsar, who succeeded both to the private fortune and
the public office of the usurper. It was, however, only after another
period of civil warfare that the new Cæsar came into his possessions.
The story of this civil war belongs to the history of the Roman empire
rather than to that of the Roman republic, and will be referred to
only briefly. Octavius Cæsar was in Illyricum at the time of the
assassination of his uncle. Hastening to Rome, he found the city
divided into two factions, one led by Brutus and Cassius, composed of
those who desired to restore the republic; and the other, the old
adherents of Cæsar, under the leadership of Mark Antony.
Octavius had perhaps more to fear from the friends of his uncle than
from his assassinators, as the latter, while they would have prevented
him from assuming the political powers of his uncle, would probably
not have opposed his taking possession of the latter's private
fortune; while Mark Antony, who had possession of Cæsar's papers and
money, was probably intending to seize both the powers and property of
Julius Cæsar. Octavius Cæsar, however, was possessed of a fair share
both of his uncle's ability and perfidy, and proved himself more than
a match for all his enemies, both in open warfare and in secret
treachery.
At first Octavius seemed inclined to enter into an alliance with
Cicero and some of the other senators against Antony, but finding that
Cicero sought to restore the republic and could not be used as his
tool, Octavius reached an agreement with Antony, and the two, together
with Lepidus, formed the second triumvirate.
The immediate result of this coalition was another proscription,
recalling the days of Sulla; the condemnation of all the assassinators
of Cæsar by the Senate; and extensive military preparations to
overthrow the armies which they had collected.
The ancient historian Appian of Alexandria thus describes the terrors
of the proscriptions:
"The proscription being published, guards were forthwith
placed at the gates and all the avenues of the city, at the
seaports, and in the marshes, and in all places where there
was any likelihood an unhappy man might shelter himself;
besides, centurions were commanded abroad, to make search in
the country, which was done all at an instant; so that both
within and without the city many persons died suddenly
several kinds of deaths. The streets were filled with the
sad spectacle of heads carrying to the triumvirs, to receive
the reward; and every step some person of quality,
endeavoring to save himself, was met shamefully disguised;
some running down into wells, and others into privies; some
hiding themselves in the tops of the chimneys, or under the
tiles, where they durst not utter a sigh or a groan; for
they stood in more fear of their wives, or children, or
freedmen, or slaves, or debtors, or neighbours that coveted
some of their goods, than of the murderers themselves.
"All private grudges were now discovered; and it was a
strange change to see the prime men of the senate,
consulars, prætors, tribunes, or pretenders to these
dignities cast themselves at the feet of their slaves with
tears in their eyes, begging and caressing them, calling
them their saviours and patrons; and, which is most
deplorable, not to be able with all these submissions to
obtain the least favour. The most pernicious seditions and
cruellest of wars never had anything in them so terrible as
the calamities wherewith the city was now affrighted; for in
war and tumult none but enemies were feared, and domestics
were confided in; whereas now domestics were more dreaded
than enemies, because having no cause to fear for
themselves, as in war or tumult, from familiars they became
of a sudden persecutors; either out of a dissembled hate, or
out of the hope of recompense publicly proposed, or because
of some silver or gold hid in the house; so that no person
found himself secure in his house, servants being ordinarily
more sensible of profit than of the affection they owe to
their masters; and though some might be found faithful and
kind, yet they durst not assist a proscript, nor conceal
him, nor so much as stay with him, for fear of falling into
the same misfortune.
"There was now much more danger than when the seventeen
first proscribed were fallen upon; for then no person being
publicly proscribed when on a sudden they saw some killed,
one man defended another, for fear lest the same should
happen to him. But after the proscription was published
those comprised in it were presently forsaken by all the
world; some that thought themselves secure, having their
minds bent on profit, sought them to deliver them to the
murderers, that they might have the reward; others pillaged
the houses of those that had been killed, and with the
present gain comforted themselves against the public
misery.
"The most prudent and moderate, surprised at a thing so
extraordinary, stood like men astonished, considering that
other cities turmoiled with divisions were re-established by
the concord of their citizens; whereas the Romans, already
afflicted with civil dissensions, completed their ruin by
this reconciliation. Some were killed defending themselves;
others, who thought themselves not condemned, without any
defence; some let themselves die with hunger, or hanged, or
drowned themselves, or threw themselves headlong from the
tops of houses, or cast themselves into the fire, or ran to
meet their murderers; others again sought to protract the
time; and either hid themselves, or begged shamefully, or
fled, or offered money to save their lives. Many likewise
were slain contrary to the intention of the triumvirs,
either by mistake, or out of some particular grudge; but the
bodies of the proscripts might be known from the others,
because they wanted the head, which was cut off, and carried
before the tribunal for orations, where they paid the
reward. On the other side, wonderful examples were to be
seen of the affection of wives, children, brethren and
slaves; who found out a thousand inventions to save their
husbands, fathers, brethren, or masters; died with them when
they were discovered, or killed themselves upon those bodies
they were not able to defend.
"Of those that escaped the proscription, some pursued by
their ill fortune, perished by shipwreck; others saved
beyond all probability, came afterwards to exercise
dignities in the city, to have command of armies and arrive
at the honour of triumph. Such wonderful things were to be
seen in those days which do not happen in an ordinary city,
or in a small kingdom but in the mistress of the world, as
well by sea as land; Providence disposing it so to reduce
things to that excellent order wherein you now see them. Not
but that Rome felt the same miseries under Sulla, and before
him under Marius; and we have in writing of them reported
many actions of cruelty, even to the depriving their enemies
of burial; but what passed under the triumvirs made much
more noise, because of the height of their reputations; and
particularly the valour and good fortune of him, who having
fixed the foundations of this empire, has left it to those
of his race and name, even to this present."
Among those murdered at this time was the greatest of all Roman
orators, Marcus Tullius Cicero.
An interesting incident connected with the raising of the money for
the campaign against Brutus and Cassius was the refusal of the Roman
women at this time to pay their share of the taxes demanded of the
Roman citizens for the support of the armies to be raised against
Brutus and Cassius.
Hortensia, the daughter of a great orator, was their spokesman. The
burden of her plea was that this was a family quarrel, a civil war,
not one for the defense of Rome. "Let war with the Gauls or the
Parthians come," she said, "and we shall not be inferior to our
mothers in zeal for the common safety, but for civil wars may we never
contribute nor even assist you against one another. Why should we pay
taxes, when we have no part in the honors, the commands, the
statecraft for which you contend against one another with such harmful
results?"
The campaign resulted in the complete destruction of all the armies
opposed to the triumvirate, the most decisive battle of the campaign
being that at Philippi. How Antony and Octavius again quarreled after
their common enemy had been overthrown, how the destruction of Antony
resulted from his infatuation for Cleopatra, and how Octavius at
length secured the undisputed rule of the Roman world need not here be
described.
The date of the beginning of the reign of Octavius Cæsar as Emperor of
Rome is generally taken as 31 B.C. Like his predecessor, Octavius
Cæsar endeavored to preserve as far as possible the empty forms of
republican rule.
In the overthrow of the early Roman kingdom the power of the kings had
mainly passed to the consuls, but partially to other officials, and
some of the powers possessed by the early consuls had been gradually
taken away from them and given to other newly created officials, such
as the censors and prætors. For centuries there had been a continued
policy of division of powers; this policy was now suddenly reversed,
and governmental powers of all kinds reunited in a single official.
This was accomplished by conferring upon Octavius Cæsar, for life,
each of the various offices known in the government of the Roman
republic. Octavius Cæsar became life censor, life consul, and life
tribune. The appointment of his colleagues in all these offices was
likewise in his power. The cycle of governmental change had now been
completed, and the Roman emperor possessed all the old powers of the
Roman kings. In the field of legislation it is indeed probable that
the power of the emperor was greater than that of his early
predecessors.
"The old popular assemblies for a period after the
establishment of the Empire still went through the form of
passing acts, which had been prepared by the real governing
power, but in addition to this the Emperor was given the
power of direct legislation by his own authority.
"Laws which owed their force to the authority of the Emperor
were known as Constitutiones and may be divided into four
principal classes, as follows:
"1. Edicts, which were public ordinances, of universal
application throughout the Empire. These had the authority
of laws, inasmuch as they were generally enforced and
applied to all. In the earlier reigns they were frequently
renewed, and they derived their authority from the Emperor
as the prætorian edict did from the prætor. Gradually they
came to be held as permanently binding the real ground of
their permanent force, custom was overlooked, and the
imperial authority was regarded as such ground.
"2. Decrees, which were decisions in judicial cases brought
before the Emperor as final court of appeal. Inasmuch as
they were interpretations of law, they were regarded as
binding upon all courts.
"3. Rescripts, which were decisions upon questions of law
submitted by courts and private persons. They were closely
connected with the pontifical interpretations.
"4. Mandates, which were directions to officials in the
exercise of their offices. These, by repetition in the
various instructions sent out from time to time by the
Emperor, became a source of general law. They were
theoretically in force only during the lifetime of the
Emperor from which they proceeded; but they became of
permanent force because of repetition and custom." (Lee's
_Historical Jurisprudence_.)
There are writers who look with favor upon this establishment of the
Roman empire, just as there are those of the same caliber who, if
some form of a dictatorship should be substituted for our present
republican form of government, would be loudest in their approval of
the change. Dr. Hirschfeld, of the University of Berlin, gives us the
following roseate picture of the benefits which Rome received from the
change:
"The reorganization of the government by Augustus, open to
criticism as it is in many respects, was a blessing to the
Roman empire. The view which prevailed under the republic,
that the provinces had been conquered only to be sucked dry
by senators and knights, governors, and tax-farmers in
league or in rivalry of greed (we have one example out of
hundreds in Verres, condemned to immortality by the
eloquence of Cicero), this view was laid aside with the
advent of the empire, and even if extortion did not wholly
cease in the senatorial provinces, yet the provincial
administration of the first two centuries A.D. is infinitely
superior to the systematic spoliation of the republic. The
governors are no longer masters armed with absolute
authority, constrained to extort money as fast as possible
from the provincials committed to their charge in order to
meet debts contracted by their own extravagance and, more
especially, by that bribery of the populace which was
indispensable to their advancement. They are officials under
strict control, drawing from the government salaries fully
sufficient to their needs. It was a measure imperatively
called for by the altered circumstances of the time and
fraught with most important consequences to create, as
Augustus did, a class of salaried imperial officials and
definitely break with the high-minded but wrong-minded
principle of the republic by which the higher posts were
bestowed as honorary appointments, and none but subordinate
officials were paid, thus branding the latter with the
stigma of servitude.
"It is true that the cautious reformer adopted into his new
system of government the old names and the offices which had
come down from republican times, with the exception of the
censorship and the dictatorship, which last had long been
obsolete. But these were intended from the outset to lead
but a phantom existence and to take no part in the great
task of imperial administration. Augustus drew his own body
of officials from the knightly class, and under the
unpretentious titles of procurator and præfect practically
committed the whole administration of the empire to their
hands, reserving, apart from certain distinguished sinecures
in Rome, and Italy, for the senators the præfecture of the
city, all the great governorships except Egypt, and the
highest commands in the army. The handsome salaries--varying
in the later days of the empire from £600 to £3,600 ($3,000
to $18,000)--and the great influence attached to the
procuratorial career, which opened the way to the lofty
positions of præfect of Egypt and commander of the prætorian
guards at Rome, rendered the service very desirable and
highly esteemed.
"While the high-born magistrates of the republic entered
upon their one year's tenure of office without any training
whatsoever, and were, of course, obliged to rely upon the
knowledge and trustworthiness of the permanent staff of
clerks, recorders and cashiers in their department, there
grew up under the empire a professional class of government
officials who, schooled by years of experience and
continuance in office and supported by a numerous staff
recruited from the imperial freedmen and slaves, were in a
position to cope with the requirements of a world-wide
empire. These procurators, some as governors-in-chief of the
smaller imperial provinces, some as assistants to the
governors of the greater, watched over the interests of the
public exchequer and the emperor's private property, or
looked after the imperial buildings and aqueducts, the
imperial games, the mint, the corn supply of Rome, and the
alimentary institutions, the legacies left to the emperors,
their castles and demesnes in Italy and abroad,--in short,
everything that fell within the vast and ever widening
sphere of imperial government. Meanwhile the exchequer of
the senate dwindled and dwindled, till it finally came to be
merely the exchequer of the city of Rome."
There is scarcely any event which takes place upon this earth which
produces unmixed evil or unmixed good. There is some slight element of
truth in some of the statements of the last quotation. There was some
temporary restraint placed upon the dishonesty and cruelty of the
Roman tax collectors; and there was undoubtedly a permanent
improvement in the ability of the men holding the minor positions
under the Roman government, through the introduction of what may be
called a civil-service system. But the contention that the
establishment of the empire was for the benefit either of the Roman
citizens or of the Roman subjects is too ridiculous to merit even a
denial. To show the ridiculousness of such a statement it is only
necessary to point to the history of the Roman empire during the half
century following the death of Octavius Cæsar. Corrupt as the
administration of the government often was under the republic, and
cruel as were the successful factional leaders on a few occasions,
such conditions as existed in Rome under the emperors Tiberius,
Caligula, and Nero could never have existed under the republic.
The character of the Roman empire was a most anomalous one. In the
history of the empire we find the unparalleled situation of an
absolute despotism without any hereditary nobility and even without
any well-established principle as to the descent of the royal power to
the children of the deceased emperor. Under the most despotic days of
the empire any Roman citizen might rise to any position of power or
dignity under the emperor; nay, more than this, any subject of the
Roman empire, no matter how low his origin or condition in society,
might be thrust, by a lucky turn of the wheel of fortune, into the
imperial purple itself.
The Roman emperors came from every strata of society, and from every
portion of the Roman empire. At different times we see the son of a
slave, a Syrian sun priest, a Dacian peasant, seated in the chair of
the Cæsars; but this state of affairs in no way alleviated or excused
the evils which the empire brought upon its subjects. The exploitation
of the millions at the hands of a favored few is not rendered more
defensible by the fact that any individual has the chance, by
extraordinary ability, extraordinary dishonesty, or extraordinary good
fortune, to raise himself out of the ranks of the exploited into those
of the exploiters.
The history of Rome, therefore, cannot be so perverted as to teach the
lesson which some seem to draw from it, that the substitution of a
despotism for popular rule may, under some circumstances, be a
benefit to the community. It is never by the destruction of liberty
that the evils of popular rule can be eliminated. In the past, in the
present, and in the future, the only remedy for the evils of liberty
is more liberty; and the lesson which should be learned from the fall
of the Roman republic is that any country, where the privileged
classes are suffered to retain their unjust privileges at the expense
of the community, must in the end suffer some such terrible penalty as
that paid by Rome under the tyranny and misrule of the Roman empire.