CHAPTER XVIII.

Earl Russell's Despatch.--Its Effect.--"Taking the

Offensive."--Official Reports.--General Staveley.--Attacks the

Ti-pings.--General Ward.--Hope and Ward repulsed.--Che-poo

attacked.--Its Capture.--Loot Regulations.--Kah-ding

attacked.--Its Capture.--Ti-ping Loss.--Newspaper

Comments.--Tsing-poo besieged.--Inside the City.--Ti-ping

Losses.--Na-jaor besieged.--Cho-lin besieged.--Ti-ping

Bravery.--Cho-lin captured.--The Chung-wang.--Kah-ding

evacuated.--Consul Harvey's Despatch.--Despatch

reviewed.--Ningpo threatened.--Captain Dew at Ning-po.--His

Despatch.--The Reply.--Captain Dew's Rejoinder.--Preparation to

attack Ning-po.--Captain Dew's Inconsistency.--His

Ultimatum.--Official Despatches.--Ning-po attacked.--Ning-po

evacuated.--Newspaper Reports.

After hostilities had been commenced by Admiral Hope, and upon hearing

of the capture of Ningpo by the Ti-pings, Earl Russell endorsed the

violation of British faith by approving the hostile maintenance of

Shanghae and the other treaty ports against the Ti-ping belligerents, in

the following despatch to the Admiralty, dated, "Foreign Office, March

11, 1862":--

"I have, therefore, to signify to your Lordships the Queen's

commands that Vice-Admiral Hope should be instructed to defend

Shanghae, and to protect the other treaty ports not in the hands

of the rebels, so far as it is in the power of Her Majesty's

_naval forces_ to do so."

Before, however, these instructions were received (they bearing date

March 11, and occupying at least three months in reaching Mr. Bruce at

Pekin, and being by him communicated to Admiral Hope at Shanghae), the

war was carried far into the interior and thoroughly established,

although, in the first instance, it had been pretended that the

operations were only undertaken in defence of Shanghae.

Mr. Bruce having stated his opinion by the following passage in a

despatch, dated March 4, 1862:--"Shanghae is threatened, and its

supplies cut off, and the insurgents will be emboldened by our

passiveness and their success at Ningpo to press us still closer. I have

stated to Sir J. Hope that, in my opinion, we are perfectly justified in

taking the offensive against the insurgents;"--Lord Russell again

approves of the disobedience of his former orders, by stating in a

despatch, dated "Foreign Office, June 2, 1862:--"I have to convey to you

my approval of the views expressed in your despatch of the 4th of March,

with regard to the course to be pursued towards the Taepings." This

sanction for the British authorities in China to take "the offensive"

was, of course, tantamount to a declaration of war against the

revolutionists; yet Earl Russell and his co-adjutors preferred working

in secrecy, the approval of Parliament was not sought, neither did Her

Majesty's Ministers ever deign to trouble themselves by announcing their

policy. This, however, can hardly be a matter of surprise, considering

that they had no _casus belli_ to set forward as a justification--the

multitude of excuses sent home by those who violated solemn pledges in

China no more constituting one than a number of petty faults would

justify hanging a man in England.

Admiral Hope having reported his breach of faith and neutrality by the

murderous raid upon Kao-kiau, which he termed "certain _moral_ support;"

and having requested the shadow of the Ministers' countenance and

support in these words, "I therefore strongly recommend that the French

and English commanders should be required by yourself and M. Bourboulon

to free the country from the rebels within a line commencing at Kading

on the Yang-tze above Woo-sung, through Tsing-poo to Sung-kong on the

Woo-sung river, and thence across to a walled town opposite on the

Yang-tze;" he received full approval from Mr. Bruce to continue as he

had commenced, at his own goodwill and pleasure.

In his despatch, authorizing the very course he had previously stated

would be more calculated than any other "to lower our national

reputation," Mr. Bruce, with his usual bad memory and inconsistent

policy, states of Ti-pingdom and the people "that its sources are

exhausted; that neither money nor supplies are to be drawn from the

_deserts_ to which the provinces overrun by them are reduced;"

completely oblivious of the "85,000 bales" of silk he had declared, only

a few months previous, were drawn from the producing districts--the

_deserts_ of his vivid though forgetful imagination.

The report of the Admiral and the reply of the Minister each discuss the

radius project shortly established against the Ti-ping belligerent only,

and the further increase and support of Ward's and fresh legions of

mercenaries. This is the first official mention of those now notorious

schemes.

When the Kao-kiau massacre, the radius plan, and the organization of

foreign-disciplined filibustering corps, _a la_ Ward, were reported to

him, Earl Russell again followed the path already laid out by his

subordinates in China--a system of policy that could not be defended on

principle, and still worse in execution.[4] The officials in China

always acted directly against the spirit and letter of their _public_

instructions; then reported what they had done, and obtained the

sanction of the British Government.

Admiral Hope, immediately upon receiving the support of Mr. Bruce,

gathered together his well-armed sailors and marines, his big guns and

his little guns, and, assisted by the French Admiral, Protet, and

Brigadier-general Staveley in command of the British troops, eagerly

continued "taking the offensive" against the badly-armed Ti-pings. The

war upon those to whom England was pledged to observe neutrality--a war

never stated to the British Parliament--and, moreover, a war never even

declared to the Ti-pings themselves, was rapidly prosecuted. General

Staveley having assumed chief command of the allied Anglo-Franco-Manchoo

filibuster operations, did so entirely against the spirit of the orders

of his Government, for not until some months later did the approval of

Admiral Hope's conduct (bearing date, "Foreign Office, June 12, 1862")

reach China, and even these instructions only referred to the _naval

expeditions_, already authorized by the despatch of March 11, 1862.

Mr. Bruce admits this in a despatch to General Staveley, dated "Pekin,

April 23, 1862," although at the same time he prompts him to join the

Admiral's raids. He thus states:--

"It is clear that, at that date, Her Majesty's Government had

not resolved on doing more than aiding in the defence of the

treaty ports by means of the naval forces on the station."

Now, it is utterly impossible that Mr. Bruce can have received the

instructions to _employ_ the naval force so soon as the 23rd of April.

The first despatch of Lord Russell, authorizing Admiral Hope to defend

the treaty ports against the Ti-pings bears date March 11, and has

already been noticed; but even supposing it left England on the same

day, it could not have reached Pekin when Admiral Hope and General

Staveley had taken the offensive, and made incessant attacks upon every

Ti-ping position within some thirty miles of Shanghae. The last

instructions from Earl Russell were those suppositional ones, dated 7th

September, 1861:--

"It _might_ be expedient to defend the treaty ports, _if_ the

Chinese Government would consent not to use them."

Referring back to the only definite order of Her Majesty's Government at

the time of the unparalleled breaches of neutrality, we find it to be

that bearing date August 8, 1861:--

"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain, as they have done

hitherto, _neutrality_ between the two contending parties in

China."

Thus, it cannot fail to be seen that hostilities were established

against the Ti-pings, not only in violation of the pledged faith of

England, but also in direct opposition to the _public_ orders of her

Government. Eventually the Government sanctioned and authorized a

continuance of these raids, although they carefully avoided making any

straightforward announcement of their policy. Their plan was always to

approve the aggressive action of the officials in China, but never to

order them publicly. The despatches approving General Staveley's

unjustifiable attack upon innocent men respectively bear date--"Foreign

Office, July 7, 1862," and "War Office, July 23." These documents,

however, which take the odium and responsibility of the massacres from

the active agents, and place them upon the British nation, could not

have reached Pekin, and been communicated to the naval and military

commanders at Shanghae, until late in September. We shall see what

unauthorized and unnecessary hostilities were perpetrated previous to

their arrival.

General Staveley, having assumed the principal command of the raiding

expeditions, finding that the friendly Ti-pings would not come and fight

him, went to fight them. Upon the 3rd of April a strong force of 2,207

British and French troops, with naval detachments under command of

Admirals Hope and Protet, and thirteen pieces of artillery, moved out

from Shanghae to continue "taking the offensive." The place doomed to

destruction was a large, and for Chinese warfare, strong, entrenched

Ti-ping camp at Wong-ka-dza, garrisoned by about 4,000 men. After a hot

day's march, the whole force, including some hundreds of Imperialists

dragging the guns, carrying portable bridges, extra loads of ammunition,

and every requisite appliance of modern warfare, arrived at a deserted

village within twelve miles from Shanghae, and about two from the

Ti-ping camp. Here they encamped for the night. Early on the following

morning the combined forces,[5] taking advantage of the cover afforded

by a thick mist, moved on the position of the Ti-pings, establishing

themselves within a few hundred yards of the defences just as the fog

cleared away. The entrenched camp consisted of some ten or twelve

stockades, each surrounded by a ditch, yet communicating with the

others. The Ti-pings, as usual, waited for those they invariably looked

upon as "foreign brethren" to take the offensive. They had not long to

wait. Having taken up a position fairly within range of their Enfield

rifles and artillery, but safely out of range of the useless gingalls

and matchlocks of the Ti-pings, the "foreign brethren" opened a

murderous fire upon the line of entrenchments. The devoted defenders

replied as well they could, without artillery or effective fire-arms,

and bravely held their stockades for nearly an hour, amid the storm of

shrapnel-shell, rifle-balls, &c., poured in upon them with terrible

effect. At length the irresistible foreign artillery drove them from the

stockades with heavy loss, and played upon their retreating columns with

deadly accuracy. During the attack and retreat the Ti-pings lost upwards

of 600 killed and wounded (the wounded falling into the hands of the

Imperialists were all put to death), while the allies had _one_ man

killed and another wounded.

Admiral Hope, who grounded his precious _casus belli_ upon the

_possible_ destruction of supplies _by the Ti-pings_, states in his

report of this and the following actions:--

"All these camps, which contained large quantities of rice

collected from the surrounding country, were burnt, AND THE

GRAIN DESTROYED."

A few days before the attack upon Wong-ka-dza, H.M. gunboat _Flamer_

attacked and destroyed a fleet of 300 Ti-ping boats, "_deeply laden with

rice and live stock_." Who, then, proved to be the devastator and

marauder; the uncivilized Chinese, or the civilized Christian? Yet the

principal pretence given for attacking the Ti-pings was that they

_might_ do what Admiral Hope and his colleagues so effectually _did_.

After chasing the fugitives so long as the Enfield would reach them, the

allied force gave up the pursuit, and retired to the village of Che-poo,

where they had rested the previous night. Meanwhile, those who escaped

from this slaughter met with another enemy, in the shape of a strong

contingent of the filibuster Ward's disciplined Chinese. This ally of

Admiral Hope, chagrined at having lost this opportunity, determined to

attack another fortified camp with his own men. The position assigned to

this respectable person during the first engagement was to cut off and

kill the Ti-pings as they fled from the fire of the British and French

artillery. Fortunately for those unoffending people he arrived too late.

When he did honour his worthy friends with his presence, history telleth

not whether they were tired, or engaged looting, or making merry; but

certain it is that they let him make his attack unassisted, except by

Admiral Hope.

This PAR NOBILE, on valorous deeds intent, heedless alike of mud, heat,

and fatigue, marched for several miles by intricate pathways, through

creeks, ditches, and swampy paddy-fields, to the rebel camp near the

village of Lu-ka-kong; and elated, doubtless, by the Admiral's narration

of his chivalrous deeds at Wong-ka-dza, and assured by his loss of only

one man, halted in front of the Ti-ping stockade.

Drawing his mercenary sword, and brushing back the Yankee locks, General

Ward gave the word to assault in a tone of assured victory. The

disciplined Chinamen, led by their foreign officers, rushed forward

bravely enough; but the Ti-pings had not been half destroyed by shot and

shell; neither at that time had they lost their best troops in conflict

with the British and French, nor the moral effect of their former

triumphs. Consequently, after three attempts to storm the stockade, when

five officers and seventy men were placed _hors de combat_, Admiral Hope

advanced to call off the men, and was rewarded with a Ti-ping bullet

lodged in the calf of his leg. Ward, having none of the resistless

artillery to mow down the patriotic Ti-pings, found them more than a

match for his men--disciplined, led by foreigners, and well armed as

they were. A retreat was therefore sounded, and the British Admiral was

ignominiously carried away upon a litter borne by sundry cursing

Celestials.

To avenge the glaring insult and audacity of those rebels who had dared

to deposit a bullet in the calf of a leg of a British Admiral, who was

doing his utmost to kill them, the next morning the allied forces

brought their artillery to bear, and without a single casualty succeeded

in driving the Ti-pings from this and several neighbouring

entrenchments, killing some 300, and burning and destroying the large

quantities of grain, as stated by Admiral Hope. Not only in this

instance, but very many others, the allies acted with far more wanton

destructiveness than ever the Ti-pings did.

The next attack upon the Ti-pings by the gallant allies came off on the

17th of April. Upon this occasion the redoubtable Admiral was unable to

act, in consequence of his injured limb. The place at which the combined

English, French, and mercenaries gathered fresh (Chinese) laurels, was

the village of Che-poo, with its defences, situated about 18 miles S.E.

of Shanghae. The attacking force mustered some 2,500 strong, with 14

pieces of artillery, the whole commanded by General Staveley and Admiral

Protet, assisted by Captain Borlase, R.N., and the filibuster Ward.[6]

These troops were embarked in a flotilla of British and French gunboats,

and carried up the Shanghae river, to cause as much devastation and

bloodshed as they had already created elsewhere.

It was a splendid morning, and the landscape seemed beautiful, as the

troops, after landing in the neighbourhood of Chee-poo, marched forward

on their mission. Through fields rich with the ungathered crops, which

it was pretended the Ti-pings might devastate, over seven or eight miles

of smiling and profusely-cultivated country they wound their way. Upon

arriving within a mile of the village, they halted for their guns to

come up, and rested preparatory to the coming attack.

The guns having arrived, at 2 p.m. were in position, and opened a most

destructive fire at 500 yards, and in half an hour the rebels were in

full retreat. The poor fellows endeavoured to face the overwhelming hail

of shot and shell; and, as one official report states, "returned a

desultory fire, _but without doing any mischief_, while the allies made

dreadful havoc amongst them." Driven from their works by the

irresistible artillery, the Ti-pings retreated in three columns in the

direction of the walled city, Chan-za, when, as the official report

states, "the Royal artillery and naval guns were brought to bear upon

the retreating mass with terrible effect." The loss of the Ti-pings, out

of a total strength of less than 4,000, amounted to more than 600 killed

and 300 taken prisoners, who were, of course, cruelly executed by the

Manchoo mandarins; the allied loss was _nil_!

The Ti-pings had not expected any attack upon that day, and when the

camp was entered, their dinners were found smoking in the cups, while

half-finished letters were lying on the chiefs' table.

The report published in the _Shanghae Daily Shipping List_ states:--

"As the houses were _ransacked_, great quantities of valuable

jewels, gold, silver, dollars, and costly dresses were found,

which was fair (?) _loot_ to the officers and men. One

blue-jacket found 1,600 dollars, and several soldiers upwards of

500 each, while many picked up gold bangles, earrings, and other

ornaments and pearls set with precious stones. _It was a

glorious day of looting for everybody_, and we hear that one

party, who discovered the Ti-ping treasury chest with several

thousand dollars in it, after loading himself to his heart's

content, was obliged to give some of them away to lighten his

pockets, which were heavier than he could well bear--a marked

case of _l'embarras des richesses_. The rebel stud of ponies was

well supplied also, and many of the soldiers rode back with

their booty."

All this _looting_ and butchery of unresisting men (it would be absurd

to term the defence of the Ti-pings, resulting in one Englishman

wounded, but hundreds of themselves killed--a resistance according to

military _parlance_) was executed, we must particularly remember,

because their cause, which had for its sole object expulsion of the

foreign Manchoo and establishment of Christianity, _might_ interfere

with British commercial interests, and that "temporary one arising out

of the indemnities!"

The _Shanghae Daily Shipping List_, just quoted from, was the paid

official organ of the British Government, and when it stated the above,

it may easily be imagined what the disgraceful scene really was. This

journal, under a variety of style and title, has been repeatedly quoted

in the Blue Books upon China, issued by Her Majesty's Government, as the

opinion of the press in China. Its truthfulness may fairly be estimated

from the following comparison of a statement which appeared in its

columns upon the massacre at Wong-ka-dza, and another upon the one at

Che-poo. Both places are situated in the same tract of country, and only

a few miles apart. In its detail of the first affair, the official

organ, speaking of the slaughter of the Ti-pings, terms it:--

"A just retaliation on those wretches who had made their smiling

land _a scene of misery and desolation_."

Reporting the second affair, it states:--

"_The aspect of the country looked charming_, as the expedition

threaded its way among _cultivated fields covered with the green

crops_ sown by the industrious inhabitants."

Like all other unscrupulous sources of opposition to the revolutionists,

the _Shanghae Daily Shipping List_ is sufficiently condemned by its own

words. It needeth not a partizan to advocate Ti-pingdom; any person not

blinded by prejudice or dollars, and who will take the trouble to study

both sides of the question with proverbial English fair-play, cannot

fail to become favourably interested in the insurgents, simply through

the rabid diatribes which prove the bigotry of opponents and the

inadvertent contradictions which prove their falseness.

In order to avoid quarrelling about the plunder, General Staveley and

the Admirals entered into the following agreement with regard to the

future freebooting exploits. Immediately after the heavily laden heroes,

sailors, soldiers, marines, and all had deposited their _loot_ in safe

quarters, the triumviri, in solemn conclave, assembled upon the 22nd of

April, and made the following formal regulations:--

"Previous to the capture of Kah-ding and the other towns from

the rebels, proper arrangements shall be made ... to collect

whatever may be of value, in order to its fair distribution

amongst the troops, to whom the same is to be made known before

the commencement of the operations."

Eager to try the merit of their regulated loot hunting, on the 27th of

April, the allies again set forth to attack the Ti-pings. Upon this

occasion their looting propensities were indulged in at the town of

Kah-ding, situate about 30 miles to the N.W. of Shanghae. The allied

force consisted of nearly 4,000 men, with 30 pieces of artillery,[7]

assisted by an army of Imperialist _braves_, under the command of Le, a

Chinese general.

The advance guard of the allies having been arrested by two small

stockades, defending the water approach to Kah-ding, upon the morning of

the 29th, the artillery was brought into play and the defenders of the

outwork driven back upon the city, losing some 50 men during their

resistance and retreat, the European enemy following in rapid pursuit up

to the walls of Kah-ding without a single casualty.

The last day of April was spent by the allies in reconnoitering the city

and landing the heavy guns, which had been brought in boats from

Shanghae. Before dawn on the morning of May the 1st, the whole of the

guns were in position, and the troops safely under cover in the ruined

suburbs, ready to pick off the defenceless Ti-pings with their

far-reaching rifles. The country traversed during the preceding days is

thus spoken of in the _China Mail_, a paper bitterly hostile to the

insurgents:--

"After marching along a good road, and through _a beautiful

country with fine thriving crops_, the troops reached the

southern suburb of Kah-ding."

Daylight of the 1st of charming May was ushered in by the roar of a

large park of foreign artillery. Kah-ding, although a walled town, was

undefended with cannon, and its garrison of some 5,000 or 6,000 men

were, for the most part, armed with bamboo spears. The European troops

having invested three of the city gates, the fourth, the only way of

retreat for the besieged, was watched by the Imperialist _braves_,

commissioned to cut up the Ti-pings as they fled from the British and

French artillery. To the concentrated and terrific fire of thirty pieces

of large ordnance, the defenders of the city replied with a brisk though

totally ineffective discharge of gingalls. The storm of iron poured upon

them soon silenced their fire and drove them from the walls, and with a

loss of several hundred, they fled from the town, cutting their way

through the Imperialist troops, who watched their only line of retreat.

In order to delay the storming of the city, and so afford time for its

evacuation, a small body of the Ti-ping soldierly nobly remained and

sacrificed themselves for their comrades. This devoted band, numbering

about 130, held their post at the south gate, the principal point of

attack, until the European stormers were on the walls, three little

2-pound Chinese guns on the gate tower having been worked till the

parapet, overthrown by the crushing fire of the siege train, fell upon

and buried the gunners beneath the _debris_.

Driven back by the overwhelming advance of the storming party, the

heroic few retired to the north gate, through which the garrison had

made their escape; here to a man they fell, while courageously placing

themselves between the foe and their retreating comrades. The greater

number of them were mere boys, and from the richness of their dress,

evidently of good position among their friends. Three little fellows,

each armed with a small matchlock, were seen by a friend of mine to rush

forward directly a large shell would knock down a portion of the parapet

and fire off their puny weapons at the foe. They were too small to reach

the loop-holes, and so waited till the 32-pound shot of the besiegers

made a hole for them to use. To avoid the deadly rifles they never used

the same hole twice, but nevertheless were all killed, for my friend,

when passing round the walls, found their bodies lying close together

and crushed by a mass of fallen stonework.

The _China Mail_, in its account of the assault, states:--

"The scene was now most picturesque. A shell had set fire to

part of the city close at hand; the early morning sun was

shining pleasantly upon the fields, _rich with ungathered

crops_, and the French band played as the troops scaled the

walls."

The loss of the Ti-pings at the capture of Kah-ding was nearly 500

killed in the city; 2,000 slaughtered while escaping from the murderous

artillery, by the Manchoo troops under Le, who had the bodies mutilated,

and offered to produce their ears to General Staveley; and about 1,000

taken prisoners, who, although captured by the assistance of British

soldiers, perished in the Manchoo execution shambles.

The stolen property agreement proved very useful at the capture of

Kan-ding, nearly 200,000 dollars' worth having been seized in that city

without the loss of a single life to the brave allies.

The _China Mail_, in its issue, "15th May, 1862," although mistakenly

considering the Ti-ping revenue (obtained from taxation, silk, &c.) as

"the poor people's property," very rightly condemns the wholesale system

of brigandage practised by the allies. After referring to the

"mercenary" and "sordid" nature of the intervention, it states:--

"There is another matter of regret, and that is, that while we

are stigmatizing the rebels as robbers and bandits, we should

take their treasures and divide it among ourselves."

Again it continues:--

"It would be difficult to say which are the more shameless

robbers of the two, the Taepings who spoil the people, or the

English forces who retake the spoil and share it among

themselves, while those originally robbed are famishing in

Shanghae. It may well be questioned whether the whole history of

warfare can record a parallel example of forgetfulness, utter

forgetfulness, of all propriety to this loot-hunting game which

Admiral Hope is now engaged in. An expedition against the rebels

is now shown to be so harmless to those engaged in it that we

may expect to hear of gentlemen giving their wives and sisters a

picnic in front of the next town that is besieged, when we have

no doubt that much amusement could be had among the engineers

and artillery by allowing the girls to point the guns. And this

is the sort of warfare in which the heart of the jaded and

harassed soldier is to be cheered with _loot_!... There is every

reason to believe that England's chivalry is likely to be kept a

profound secret from the people of China so long as her affairs

are under the present guidance."

Such is the opinion of a journal always hostile to the Ti-pings.

Having loaded their boats with plunder, and placed a garrison of some

500 European troops in Kah-ding, the British and French warriors

returned to Shanghae and vain-gloriously displayed their evilly acquired

riches about the rum-shops of that model settlement, while their worthy

allies, the _braves_, made a gallant and triumphant entry, with

trophies of Ti-ping heads, cruelly hacked from the men vanquished by

British and French artillery. When these heads became unpleasant to

parade about the foreign settlement, and the _loot_ became exhausted, or

the allied commanders eager for more, the combined forces were mustered

together for another desolating raid into a country that would have been

happy and peaceful but for their wicked interference.

The city of Tsing-poo, situated close upon 32 miles to the west of

Shanghae, although falsely represented by officialdom as "in the

neighbourhood," was next selected for sack and pillage.

Starting from Shanghae in British gunboats (which, by the by, always

returned towing long tiers of loot laden boats) upon the 7th of May, the

expedition, after being placed in country boats about twenty miles up

the river, arrived before Tsing-poo on the evening of the second day.

General Staveley was Commander-in-chief, assisted by the French Admiral,

while the English Admiral, in spite of his wound, was present as an

admiring non-effective.

The combined force comprised 2,613 British and French troops, with

nearly forty pieces of artillery; about 1,800 of Ward's filibusters; and

an Imperialist army of 5,000 to 7,000 men, under their general, Le.[8]

Tsing-poo was garrisoned by some 4,000 Ti-pings, very few of whom

escaped.

Before daylight on the 12th of May, the besieging forces, with guns and

ladders, covering and storming parties, were in position. They moved up

silently in the dead of night and early morning, and were in their

places by 4 a.m. Then came a short half-hour of the peculiar suspense

before battle, while all those valiant British and French well-armed

troops lay flat on their faces, safely under cover, and breathing not a

word, for fear the doomed Ti-pings _might_ by a singular piece of good

fortune manage to hurt some of them. By this time, however, the warm

summer day was dawning, and the beleaguered garrison, discovering the

formidable array against them, opened fire with the few small guns they

possessed, sending their uneven roundshot whizzing over the heads of the

crouching enemy.

Almost at the same moment the besiegers opened fire from their numerous

and overwhelming artillery. Armstrong guns, naval 32-pounders, French

rifled guns and mortars (with one French 68-pounder, rifled piece,

mounted on board a light draught gunboat) in breaching and enfilading

batteries, commenced a terrific bombardment of the south gate and wall.

The city, during the night, had been surrounded by the Chinese _braves_;

no hope of escape presented itself, and the besieged fought as desperate

men will fight for their lives. Amid the torrent of shells, shrapnel,

Moorsom, conical, diaphragm, Armstrong, and other scientific engines of

destruction crashing and continuously exploding among them, they bravely

stood to their four or five 2-pounders, and resolutely manned their

walls under the fearful and murderous fire. The poor Ti-pings, in order

to protect themselves from the irresistible foreign shell, or "twice eye

shot," as the Cantonese in their _pidgeon_ English term it, had built a

sort of stockade all round the city wall; this, with the parapet, formed

a passage, which was covered in with a beamed and tiled roof. Instead of

affording safety to them, however, this work added to the

destructiveness of the enemy's fire, though it would have been better

for the doomed men to have been killed outright by British shot than be

captured and tortured to death in the execution grounds of the Manchoos.

A battery of four Armstrong guns enfilading the wall sent almost every

shell through the roof, to burst between the parapet and stockade,

thereby inflicting fearful havoc among the crowded defenders.

After about an hour's bombardment, two practicable breaches were

effected by the besiegers; the English and French storming parties then

advanced, protected by strong covering parties, who kept up a deadly

rifle fire on the besieged, while the field-pieces being dragged forward

enfiladed the parapet and breaches, mowing them down by dozens as they

courageously crowded behind their broken wall to repel the stormers. The

two snake flags of the Chief were planted on the summit of the breach,

while his bravest men surrounding him did their utmost to drive the

assaulting column back. The carnage at this point was immense; the

defenders no sooner rushed into view than withering volleys of musketry

and a storm of grape and canister destroyed them. The principal Ti-ping

chiefs were killed at the head of their men; still, a smart fire from

jingalls was kept up till the stormers gained the top of the breach and

effected a lodgement; and then, it is sufficient to say, the defenders

were attacked with the British bayonet. Even when driven from the wall,

several hundred of the Ti-ping soldiery rallied at its foot, and

fruitlessly sacrificed themselves in attempting to expel the successful

enemy.

The Ti-pings lost upwards of 1,000 men in their obstinate defence, the

Allies 2 killed and 10 wounded! About 2,000 were taken prisoners, the

greater part of whom supplied the Shanghae execution ground, while the

remnant of the garrison succeeded in cutting their way through the

hostile lines. Not more than half of the prisoners were fighting men.

Whether the most Christian and civilized allies had not obtained

sufficient loot, or killed enough fellow-creatures to satisfy them, I am

unable safely to state, but I opine that in neither particular were they

satiated. At all events, after sacking Tsing-poo and delivering up their

unfortunate captives to the tender mercies of the merciless

Imperialists, General Staveley and his co-adjutors started off in quest

of further glory, dollars, and Ti-pings. These noble crusaders at

length came to the fortified village of Na-jaor, where one of the

_triumviri_ met with his death.

Na-jaor was simply a village, but a wall having been built around it, a

small outwork erected, and the whole surrounded by dykes and dry

ditches, with _chevaux de frize_ and pallisades between them, it would

have been a difficult place to capture without artillery. The outwork

mounted three small guns, and a few others were divided between the

usual square flanking defences of a Chinese wall. The garrison of this

place can scarcely have numbered 1,000, all told.

The Armstrong guns and other artillery of the British and French opened

fire and shelled the defenders out of the small redoubt, upon the

afternoon of the 17th of May. While this was going on the garrison of

the village made a spirited sortie, but, with only an armament of bamboo

spears and rusty jingalls, were of course driven back with great loss.

At last the fire of the besieged seemed silenced, while their wall was

breached and crumbling in every direction. The stormers now rushed

forward with their usual bravery, sword in hand and bayonet to the

charge, to assault a Ti-ping post that had been thoroughly shelled for a

couple of hours, and in which nought but a few frightened fugitives and

the bodies of the slain were likely to be found. In the case of Na-jaor,

however, there was more courage required than the attacking force

imagined, for, instead of finding the walls deserted except by the

killed and wounded, and the garrison in flight, they were suddenly faced

by an ambuscade which had been concealed under comparative protection at

the interior slope of the wall during the bombardment. The British and

French were rushing forward at the double, their leading files had

already reached the ditch at the foot of the rampart, when the Ti-pings,

starting from their cover, remanned the walls and opened a sharp fire

with jingalls, matchlocks, and the few European-made fire-arms which

they possessed. Cheering vigorously, or rather yelling, the defenders

maintained a well-directed fire for some little time, killing the French

Admiral with a ball through his heart, and wounding about a dozen other

of the assailants. The allies experienced a momentary check, but the

whole resistless array of artillery having swept the walls with their

iron tempest, the storming parties again rushed forward and succeeded in

establishing themselves upon the walls before the defenders were able to

re-man them. Then the work of slaughter was continued with the rifle,

the unwieldy bamboos, with iron spikes at the ends, proving a worse than

useless defence.

Mercy seems never to have entered into the minds of those Christian

warriors, who loudly inveighed against the Ti-pings as "bloodthirsty

monsters," &c., &c.; for when victory crowned their unparalleled feats

of arms, no effort to save the defenceless and unresisting fugitives was

ever made, but while those who had thrown down their arms were vainly

trying to hide or flee from the deadly rifle, or stood blocked in a

gateway of the tower, the valorous conquerors calmly and easily

continued to shoot them down so long as they remained within range.

The total loss of the Allies at the capture of Na-jaor was, the French

Admiral killed, and sixteen men wounded. The Ti-pings left dead at their

posts, which they had _really_ bravely though fruitlessly striven to

defend, upwards of 500 men, more than half their whole force. Directly

the place was fairly in their possession the respectable victors

dispersed in search of plunder; as one report has it, "looting parties

were formed, the French looting one half and the English the other."

The ill-gained spoil having been stowed away in the boats, the Allies

marched on for the next Ti-ping position devoted to destruction, leaving

a strong detachment in charge of Na-jaor. The place which had now

attracted the cupidity, love of military _glory_, or some unknown

sentiment of the Allies, was a small town named Cho-lin, situated about

six miles from Na-jaor, 26 miles to the S.S.W. of Shanghae, and within

two miles of the sea.

Having arrived before Cho-lin during the night of May 18, the Allies

began to establish their powerful batteries, and on the morning of the

19th opened fire upon the town. The Ti-pings in garrison, some 2,000 or

3,000 strong, replied to the best of their resources with a few pieces

of immoveable Chinese artillery, jingalls, and matchlocks. At noon the

besiegers ceased firing and refreshed themselves with _chow-chow_ and

brandy. Meanwhile, a Ti-ping chief performed an act of the most daring

courage with remarkable coolness and audacity. Having observed the

occupation of the besiegers, this chief, leaving the town by the

opposite side, made a circuit, and coming upon the rear of the enemy's

position, calmly rode right through it with a few followers, satisfying

himself as to their composition and numbers. "Everyone took him for an

Imperialist and allowed him to pass on. When he got near the town he

rode for his life, and got to his friends inside the city." So reported

one of the officers engaged in the attack. Undaunted by the powerful

artillery and formidable array of the European troops, the Ti-ping chief

determined to hold and defend his trust against them, even although he

must have been convinced that he had no effectual means by which he

could repel or reply to their attack. The day passed on and with it the

last hope of the beleaguered garrison, who scorned to take advantage of

the opportunity to evacuate the town and save their lives.

At daylight on the 20th all the Allies' guns, being in position, opened

fire again, the Armstrong guns and field pieces sweeping the defenders

from the walls, and the hoarsely-roaring 32's steadily firing to effect

a breach. Storming, covering, and sharpshooting parties waited around

the devoted place until the murderous shelling should subdue all

opposition to their heroic advance. At length, two practicable breaches

were effected, the enfilading batteries, established on either flank,

poured their crushing _mitraille_ along the parapet, sweeping away every

man who dared to show himself, and the assaulting column pushed forward

to the breaches. The Ti-pings had in this case been able to maintain a

small number of troops on the wall by means of some ingeniously

contrived bomb-proofs. A few narrow pits were dug behind the parapet and

covered in with planks overlaid with earth, under which some hundred or

two found shelter. When the artillery ceased its fire as the stormers

mounted the breach, these men made a desperate defence, while the rest

of the garrison, emerging from their places of concealment, rushed to

man the walls and assist them. But what could these miserably armed men

effect against the hundreds of perfectly equipped Europeans pouring over

their shattered walls? They fell bravely, disputing every inch of

ground.

The defenders driven from the ramparts or killed, the gallant Allies

rushed through the small town, _indiscriminately massacring every man,

woman, and child within its walls_. The Ti-pings had so earnestly

endeavoured to shut out the besiegers that they had most effectually

blocked themselves in, and were consequently butchered almost to a man.

After the massacre was over, an officer of the force, writing to the

_North China Herald_, stated, "Almost every house we entered contained

dead and dying men."

The _China Mail_, in its report of the affair, terms it: "A most

indiscriminate carnage on the part of our Allies at the taking of

Cho-lin." The _Overland Trade Report_, in its issue of June 10,

states:--

"Since the death of Admiral Protet the French troops have been

behaving like fiends, killing indiscriminately men, women, and

children. Truth demands the confession that British sailors have

likewise been guilty of the commission of similar revolting

barbarities--not only on the Taepings, but upon the inoffensive

helpless country people. It is a most singular circumstance, but

no less strange than true, that the Taepings _have never yet

committed an act of retaliation_ upon any European who may have

fallen into their hands."

Cho-lin captured and the _loot_ safely packed up, the conquerors, who

only lost _one_ killed and four slightly wounded, proceeded to destroy

the town itself.

The correspondent of the _North China Herald_, in his report, says:--

"At two o'clock the order was given to set the city on fire,

which was executed with such rapidity that the Sikhs had hardly

time to get the ponies out of the town, and most of the last

collected had to be abandoned."

The poor horses were admittedly roasted alive; but, when the writer goes

on to state "a great many dead bodies" were left in the fired city, he

forgets the wounded and "dying men" whom he found in "almost every

house," and who no doubt perished in the flames.

With the destruction of Cho-lin the murderous and desolating track of

the British and French was for a time arrested. Hitherto, without

exception, they had, in Mohawk Indian style, surprised and captured

isolated towns and villages. Nothing but the garrisons of these places

had opposed them. Upon the day of their last exploit, however,

intelligence reached General Staveley that the Chung-wang, with a large

army, had taken the field against him, and that Kah-ding was already

invested, Tsing-poo threatened, and the Imperialist troops everywhere

flying like chaff before the stormy wind. Hastily returning to Shanghae,

the authenticity of these reports was at once confirmed by the abject

state of terror in which the Manchoo authorities were plunged. It

appeared that, during General Staveley's laurel-gathering exploits,

nearly the whole available force of Imperialist troops had been

concentrated upon Kah-ding, and, having moved upon the next Ti-ping

city, Tat-seang, had been there totally defeated; the fugitives, a few

hundred out of an army nearly 20,000 strong, having been chased about

thirty miles, and into the village of Woo-sung under the protection of

the Allies' artillery.

In consequence of this, and the inability of the Manchoo authorities to

even garrison the places captured from the patriots by the allied

forces, General Staveley proceeded to the relief of Kah-ding with a

strong force of British troops. Upon reaching the village of Na-zain, a

few miles from the city, they were continually attacked by the Ti-ping

force investing it. In all these attacks, however, the assailants were

driven back by rifle and artillery fire with heavy loss, the English

losing but _one_ Sepoy killed and four wounded. It now appearing that

the Ti-pings were in the field in force, that the communications of

Kah-ding were in their hands, and that the towns of Tsing-poo and

Soon-kong were also invested, General Staveley decided upon evacuating

Kah-ding; and, pending the arrival of reinforcements, discontinuing his

raids upon the Ti-ping strongholds.

We must now for a while turn to other quarters, and record the

performance of another act of the Ti-ping drama. While the allied forces

were violating their pledges, their orders, and the ordinary laws and

usages of civilized or Christian men, the Ti-pings at Ningpo, as

everywhere else, were scrupulously observing all their promises, and

striving to enter into friendly and commercial relations with

foreigners.

It will be remembered that the withdrawal of British missionaries from

Ningpo, upon the capture of that city by the Ti-pings, has already been

noticed; also Mr. Consul Harvey's sinister reason: "This step will tend

to simplify considerably our future relations with the Taepings at

Ningpo." We will now proceed to notice what those "future relations"

were.

Mr. Consul Harvey having been requested by Mr. Bruce to report upon the

character of the Ti-pings, and having been prompted even in the _public_

despatches, forthwith indulged his feelings of hostility against those

people. It is desirable to notice some of the more salient and

characteristic features of the despatch of Mr. Harvey as briefly as

possible.

The despatch containing Mr. Harvey's exposition bears date March 20th,

1862, some three months after the occupation of Ningpo by the Ti-pings,

and _after_ hostilities had been established against them by Admiral

Hope and his friends.

Mr. Harvey states:--

"_Not one single step_[9] in the direction of a 'good

government' has been taken by the Taepings; _not any attempt_

made to organize a political body or commercial institutions;

_not a vestige, not a trace of anything_ approaching to order,

or regularity of action, or consistency of purpose, can be found

in any one of their public acts."

In a despatch dated "Ningpo, December 31, 1861," he had stated as

follows:--

"They _have_ even established a native custom-house, wherein

duties will be levied on the Chinese after ten days' grace....

It has been reported to me that the insurgents propose

establishing a foreign custom-house at this port, such being, it

is said, one of their favourite ideas, and forming part of their

programme in the capture of Ningpo."

And again--

"The Taepings possess a regular embodied force, a draft from

which forms the nucleus of the body of men sent upon any special

service."

Mr. Harvey, with an extraordinary self-complacent assumption of

impartiality, proceeds to declare that he "judged of Taepingdom in sober

sense and dispassionately," yet he concludes the same paragraph by

stating that at Ningpo "the last three months had produced ruin,

desolation, and the annihilation of _every_ vital principle in _all_

that surrounds the presence, or lies under the bane, of the Taepings."

Again, only a few lines further on, he says:--

"It is palpable that a party which, after ten years' full trial,

is found to produce _nothing_, and to destroy _everything_,

cannot pretend to last, or be admitted, even indirectly, into

the comity of nations."

Now, as Mr. Bruce himself reports that "85,000 bales of silk" were

obtained from people who "destroy everything," and as the Ti-pings did

"pretend to last"--so much so, indeed, that British and French

assistance to the Manchoos was necessary to save them from total

destruction, Mr. Harvey's "sober sense," to say the least, seems very

doubtful.

The despatch under review is one of the most extraordinary series of

contradictory terms ever produced, and really deserves a place in the

British Museum or some old curiosity shop, as the "sober" creation of a

person who takes remarkable care to assure his readers that he is

perfectly "unbiassed." Within half a dozen lines of the last quoted

passage Mr. Harvey audaciously protests:--"I repeat I have no bias one

way or the other...." He then proceeds to state:--

"I have found in official dealings with them" (the Ti-ping

chiefs) "_a rough and blunt sort of honesty quite unexpected and

surprising_, after years of public intercourse with the Imperial

mandarins."

Now, in the very next paragraph he speaks of them as--

"The naturally suspicious Taepings, who, amongst other

peculiarities, _possess a power of concealment and general

secresy quite wonderful_ to meet in China."

Mr. Harvey attempts to prove the plundering propensities of the Ti-ping

soldiery by the following invention:--

"On questioning decently-dressed Taeping soldiers as to how they

liked their profession, the reply has ever been the following:--

"'Why should I not like it? I help myself to everything I choose

to lay hands upon; and if interfered with, I just cut the man's

head off who so interferes.'"

By the side of this we will just place Mr. Hewlett's report to Consul

Harvey of his embassy to the Ti-pings at Yu-yaou, upon their advance to

Ningpo:--

"We saw but few dead bodies about, and of those some were their

own men _who had been caught plundering and burning_."

Endeavouring to vilify the social _regime_ of the Christian patriots,

Mr. Harvey trusts to his inventive genius again, and writes:--

"Your Excellency is doubtless aware that marriage is strictly

forbidden amongst the Taepings, and forms, with opium-smoking, a

capital offence."

Now, Mr. Harvey makes this false assertion in face of the "Proclamation

by Tien-wang, establishing a scale according to which the number of

wives are to be regulated in all ranks," as published in 1862, at page

45, Blue Book upon "The Rebellion in China," and which commences--

"Formerly I made a decree as to the canon of marriages...."

This unbiassed official winds up his sober and dispassionate effusion

with a few equally temperate conclusions. For example--

"I now, therefore, take the liberty of declaring, once for all

(_and for ten years I have firmly adhered to, and been

consistent in, this opinion_), that the Taeping rebellion is the

greatest delusion as a political or popular movement, and the

Taeping doctrines the most gigantic and blasphemous imposition

as a creed, or ethics, that the world ever witnessed.... There

is nothing in past records so dark or so bad; such abominations

committed under the name of religion; such mock-heroic

buffoonery; such horrors accompanied by pantaloonery; and so

much flimsy web worked in the midst of blood and high tragical

events."

If the "ten years" of obstinate adhesion to an opinion formed before

anything was known of the Ti-pings, is Mr. Harvey's idea of "sober

sense" and "no bias" (and he declares it is), we can easily believe that

the "dispassionate" ruminations of so long a period destroyed what

little reason and religion he may at one time have possessed. His

partizanship even lays him open to the charge with which he has so

falsely accused the Ti-pings when stating that their doctrines were "the

most gigantic and blasphemous imposition," &c.; inasmuch as the Ti-ping

doctrines are taken from our Bible, are in all essential particulars

precisely similar to our own, and alone constitute their "creed, or

ethics."

Mr. Harvey terms himself "a sensible and reasoning Englishman," and

proceeds to declare the revolution--

"A sanguinary raid, and an extended brigandage over the country,

burning, destroying, _and killing_ EVERYTHING _that has life in

it_."

In a surprising manner, after a few sentences, he brings the dead to

life:--

"They come, and the helpless inhabitants crouch down and submit.

They (the Taepings) go, and the people breathe again and

rejoice."

"Tel maitre, tel valet," it is said, and Mr. Harvey seems to have

likened into Mr. Bruce amazingly. Mr. Bruce has stated, "every locality

is totally destroyed by the Ti-pings." Mr. Harvey chimes in with the

above, "killing everything," and "not a vestige" diatribes. Mr. Bruce,

in a despatch dated "Pekin, April 10, 1862," inclosing Mr. Harvey's

precious production to Earl Russell, states with regard to the

Ti-pings:--

"NO commerce can co-exist with their presence, and NO specific

relations are possible with a horde of pirates and brigands, who

are allowed to commit every excess, while professing a nominal

allegiance to an ignorant and ferocious fanatic."

Again, in a despatch dated "Pekin, April 18, 1862," Mr. Bruce states

that their presence in any district is "accompanied by the _utter_

destruction of the materials of trade."

Singularly enough, General Staveley, although chief leader of the

massacres of Ti-pings, in a despatch to the Secretary of State for War,

dated "Shanghae, July 3, 1862," entirely and absolutely contradicts the

imaginary devastations of Mr. Bruce and his Consul by the following

statement:--

"Europeans continue to visit the rebel country _for purposes of

trade_, and are treated with civility; _large quantities of

silk_ have been brought into Shanghae during the last fortnight,

_and trade seems in a thriving state_."[10]

Mr. Harvey concludes his judgment passed in "sober sense and

dispassionately" by the following words:--

"Your Excellency may rest assured that we shall only arrive at a

correct appreciation of this movement, and do it thorough

justice, when it is treated by us as land piracy on an extensive

scale--piracy odious in the eyes of _all_ men--and, as such, to

be swept off the face of the earth by _every means_ within the

power of the Christian and civilized nations trading with this

vast empire."

Such are the avowed sentiments of the man who protests that he has "no

bias" or prejudice.

Although the occupation of Ningpo by the Ti-pings actually increased the

export trade, and although even Mr. Consul Harvey admitted that it was

captured and held with "wonderful moderation;" still, when hostilities

had become established by Admiral Hope and General Staveley, it was

impossible either their designs could succeed while Ningpo was in

Ti-ping possession, or the anomalous policy of holding Shanghae, and not

Ningpo, be continued. Consequently, both to stop the supplies and

munitions the Ti-pings obtained at the port, and to follow out the

hostile policy settled upon, the British authorities determined upon

driving them out of Ningpo on the first opportunity. As the scrupulous

good conduct and friendliness of the revolutionists afforded no cause of

hostility, it became necessary to invent one. How this was effected the

following account will show.

One day (the 22nd April, 1862), while giving a salute upon the return of

the General Fang from Nankin, several shots appear to have been fired by

some Ti-pings in the direction of the foreign settlement. It was

thereupon _reported_ that these shots had killed a Chinaman or two in

that location. This, however, seems very doubtful. At all events, the

affair was immediately taken up by Captain Cragie, of H.M.S. _Ringdove_,

who wrote to the Chiefs upon the subject, and received a completely

satisfactory answer, stating--

"I beg to assure you that, as soon as I have discovered the

offenders, I will punish them very severely. I hope, then, that

you will think no more about the matter."[11]

Upon the 26th of April Captain R. Dew, with H.M.S. _Encounter_, arrived

at Ningpo from Shanghae, having been ordered there by Admiral Hope.

Judging by the conduct of the Admiral at that time, and by the whole

circumstances of the war upon the Ti-pings, it becomes morally certain

that Captain Dew was dispatched with the reinforcement to Ningpo on

purpose to drive them out. The day after his arrival (27th April, dates

are important), Captain Dew wrote as follows to the Ti-ping generals in

command of the city:--

"_Encounter_, Ningpo, April 27, 1862.

"Sir,--We have received from Commander Cragie your communication

regarding the _accidental_ discharge of bullets whilst firing a

salute ... as well as the communication from General Hwang. Both

these are _so satisfactory_, and tend so much to impress on us

your wish to maintain friendly relations with the English and

French, that we beg to inform you _that we shall not insist on

the demolition of the battery at the point_,[12] but we still do

that you remove the guns....

"We again inform you that it is the earnest wish of our Chiefs

to remain neutral[13] and on good terms with you at Ningpo. Till

the late acts, they had every reason to be satisfied with your

conduct, and you may rest assured that no breach of friendly

relations shall emanate from our side....

"(Signed) R. DEW."

As Colonel Sykes, M.P., has very justly observed in his work, "The

Ti-ping Rebellion in China," incredible as it may appear, the very day

after the above letter was sent, which condoned all previous offences,

and which expressed the most earnest wish to remain on friendly terms,

Captain Dew, in oblivion of his promises, addressed the following letter

to the Generals:--

"_Encounter_, Ningpo, April 28, 1862.

"Sir,--" (After mentioning the firing of musket balls during the

salute, he continues) "I have been sent here _with a

considerable force to demand apology_.... Having consulted with

the officers here in command, I have come to the conclusion that

the foreign settlement is now being seriously menaced by a large

battery in course of construction at a point outside the city

wall ... _so I have to request that you will cause it to be

immediately pulled down_, and that all guns now mounted on the

walls opposite our settlement, be removed as well. I am

requested by my Admiral to inform you that it would grieve him

much[14] to be obliged, by the hostile acts of your people, to

come into collision with them. He will be very sorry to resort

to force (?), as he has not the intention or wish to interfere

with the Imperialists and yourself at Ningpo, and if the former

should attack the city, _we should be entirely neutral, and will

not even allow the foreign settlement to harbour the

Imperialists_." (After threatening to destroy the battery and

capture Ningpo if the guns and fortifications were not removed

in "twenty-four hours," Captain Dew concludes with the following

passage:)

"When these, my _reasonable_ (?) demands, have been carried into

effect, I beg you will report them...."

"I have, &c.,

"(Signed) R. DEW."

It is to be remembered that Captain Dew had received and accepted the

"apology" on the 27th, and had replied by stating, "we shall _not_

insist on the demolition of the battery." The renewal of the demands

which had been formally abandoned on the previous day convinced the

Ti-ping generals that Captain Dew was determined to quarrel with them.

That officer knew perfectly well, as Colonel Sykes has forcibly

expressed it, "that no human being with an ounce of militant blood in

his veins would comply with such insulting demands."

The Ti-ping generals, ever forbearing, and always truly earnest in their

efforts to obtain the goodwill and friendship of the "foreign brethren,"

made the following admirable reply to Captain Dew's grossly offensive

despatch, and its readers will find every word truth and sound

reason:--

(Precis.)

"Hwang, General, &c., Pang, General, &c., in official

communication with Captain R. Dew, R.N., H.M.S. _Encounter_:--In

reply to your letter requesting the removal of the battery and

guns, we would remark that ever since the capture of Ningpo,

both parties have been on most friendly and intimate terms. No

suspicions or dislikes; _we have done everything in our power to

protect your trade, and kept good faith in every respect_; have

always inquired into complaints made to us of our soldiers, and

even beheaded some men who broke into a foreign hong; _have

wished to keep a lasting peace with you, and have done all in

our power to that end_.

"The discharge of bullets in firing the salute the other day was

_quite accidental_;--have already taken steps towards punishing

offenders. With regard to the erection of a fort at the point,

_it is a precautionary measure that a proper regard for the

lives of our soldiers renders indispensable, and has nothing

whatever to do with foreigners_, as has been already stated to

Captain Montgomerie. It is now completed, and we cannot assent

to its removal; so also we cannot agree to the removal of the

guns from the walls. We have continually esteemed good faith and

right....

"With good faith and right feeling as the alpha and omega of

one's conduct, each party can afford to put up with one or two

trifling matters. With regard to that part of your letter having

reference to a probable outbreak of hostilities (we would inform

you) that we are not in the least concerned thereat [_lit._, we

are not apprehensive, nor do we take offence thereat]; _we could

not bear to break the oaths of friendship we have sworn_. We

cannot remove the fort or the guns; should you proceed

yourselves to move the same, then it is evident that you have

the intention of quarrelling with us. You can, if you please,

lead on your soldiers against this city; you can, if you please,

attack us; _we shall stand quietly on the defensive_ [_lit._, we

shall await the battle with hand in the cuff, _i.e._, we shall

not strike the first blow].... You still wish to be on friendly

terms with us; let, then, these dislikes and suspicions be

committed to the deep.... In any large army good or bad are to

be found; do not, therefore, let a small matter like this

occasion a breach of such a grand principle as amity. Good

fellowship would request you to give our argument your very best

consideration."

The remainder of the despatch is irrelevant to the subject of the

correspondence. It was received 29th April, 1862. If the Ti-pings had

acted rather as angels than men, their rights would not have been

respected. Captain Dew, neither satisfied by their arguments nor

conciliated by their tone, addressed to them the following cartel:--

"_Encounter_, Ningpo, May 2, 1862.

"SIR,--We have the honour to inform you that your letter of the

29th ult., in reply to my demands for the insults offered to the

French and English flags, and in which you refuse to comply with

those very moderate demands,[15] have been forwarded to our

admirals. In the mean time, pending the decision of our chiefs,

I have moored the foreign ships two miles down the river, and

cut off communication with the city, and am, moreover, ordered

by our chiefs, in the event of the following demands not being

complied with, to prepare to blockade Ching-hae, and prevent all

foreign ships entering the river:--1. _An ample apology._ 2.

Removal of all guns from battery and walls opposite our ships.

3. That an officer shall be specially appointed, and that proper

measures, by means of guards, shall be taken to prevent anybody

whatever coming on the wall opposite the ships or into the

battery.--I have, &c.,

"(Signed) R. DEW."

This repeated attempt of Captain Dew to make the Ti-pings disarm

themselves, and his attempt to ignore the apology he had already

accepted in his letter to the chief dated 27th April, must afford

convincing proof that a premeditated and organized arrangement to

quarrel with the Ti-pings existed. The generals in command at Ningpo

gave the following reply to Captain Dew. They declared the battery and

guns necessary to defend the city against an attack by a fleet from the

coast, which in fact appeared, commanded by the notorious pirate Apak,

on the 7th May. They promised to remove all ammunition from the guns and

to prevent armed men going on the ramparts, but, as Colonel Sykes says

in his review of the affair, "Had the generals chucked the guns into the

river there would have been some new demand." In their reply the

generals state:--

"In reply to letter of 2nd inst., submitting three demands, we

beg to inform you that we have carefully examined its contents,

and that we will agree to those demands as far as we are able.

In reference to the first, our previous letter _has afforded

full explanations on that head_, how that it was the result of

an accidental discharge of bullets during the salute.... In

reference to the second point, demanding removal of guns, &c.,

_our former despatch has already explained that those guns are

meant as a precaution against an attack from Ting-hae_, that the

multitude of lives in the city that have to be taken care of

urgently demands.... We shall on no account fire the guns,

unless the imps attack us. Under the circumstances stated by

you, we agree to stop up the port-holes of all the guns bearing

on Keang-pih-gan, and to remove all the shot and powder from

thence, _so as to manifest to you our desire for lasting amity_.

Infer from the third point in your letter that you are afraid

that, if people are allowed on the wall, there will be some

lawless persons who will fire the guns by mistake. Far from

allowing anybody whatever to come on the walls, there are most

strict orders against allowing any one to go on the walls, not

only on those opposite to Keang-pih, but also all round the

city.... _We are inordinately desirous of remaining on good

terms with you_, and this is our reason for this distinct

statement." (Dated 3rd May, 1862.)

Affairs remained in this position till the 7th of May, when Captain Dew

wrote to Admiral Hope, stating that on the evening of the 5th, Consul

Harvey received a communication from the late Manchoo Governor of

Ningpo, to the effect that he was about to attack the city with a strong

force, and requesting support from the English and French admirals. The

same evening Captain Dew proceeded down the river, found the Imperialist

fleet (consisting of the pirate Apak's vessels), and visited the

Governor; again, on the following morning, Captain Dew visited that

functionary, and the latter, accompanied by his pirate-admiral Apak,

returned the visit. While closeted with Captain Dew, they made their

arrangements for the forthcoming attack on Ningpo, and the former wrote

to his senior officer:--

"So I told them that in consequence of the rebels refusing

certain demands we had made, I should have no objection to their

passing up, _but that they were not to open fire till well clear

of our men-of-war_."

Now Captain Dew may flatter himself that this statement has hoodwinked

the people of England, but unfortunately for his reputation, people

judge a man by his actions. Instead of these piratical vessels keeping

"well clear" of his ships, they proceeded to execute their part of the

programme of attack by keeping _well foul_ of his men-of-war, according

to previous arrangement.

On May 9th, Consul Harvey reported to Mr. Bruce the movements of the

Imperialist, or rather pirate fleet, under the notorious Apak, as

follows:--

"Their fleet of junks is at the present moment _lying in front

of our settlement_, making preparations for an assault on

Ningpo."

He then adds:--

"The Taoutae[16] Chang, with Commander-in-Chief Chin, came to

see me this morning (9th) at the Consulate, _in a private

manner_, and he informed Captain Dew and myself, that if no

unforeseen event happened, the Imperialist attack on Ningpo

would take place to-morrow morning _at daylight_."

Now Captain Dew (as the representative of Great Britain) having made the

following formal declaration in his despatch to the Ti-ping chiefs,

dated April 28th,

"That he has not the intention or wish to interfere with the

Imperialists and yourself at Ningpo; and if the former should

attack the city, _we should be entirely neutral, and will not

even allow the foreign settlement to harbour the Imperialists_."

And again, in his despatch dated April 27th:--

"You may rest assured that no breach of friendly relations shall

emanate from our side"--

He was bound to fulfil his pledges of neutrality. He was perfectly well

aware that the city could not possibly reply to the fire of the Imperial

fleet without endangering the men-of-war and foreign settlement. It was

therefore his duty, as he himself expressed, "not to allow the foreign

settlement to harbour the Imperialists," or, to have withdrawn the ships

of war from the line of fire, as Admiral Hope had no "wish to

interfere."

Yet we find Consul Harvey stating that the pirate lorchas are "lying in

front of our settlement, making preparations for an assault on Ningpo,"

and Captain Dew not only authorized this proceeding but declared it a

_casus belli_ should the Ti-pings venture to return their fire! There

are, in fact, ample grounds for the statements in some of the China

newspapers, and in many private letters, that the whole affair was

arranged between the ex-Governor, the pirate Apak, Captain Dew, and Mr.

Consul Harvey: and the idea seems strengthened by the fact that Mr.

Harvey, in his letter to Mr. Bruce, dated May 9, terms the arrival of

the piratical fleet "an extraordinary but fortunate coincidence, and

that it was far too good an opportunity to be lost."

Immediately _after_ his second interview with the ex-Governor and the

pirate, Captain Dew and the French senior officer sent the following

crafty and equivocal ultimatum to the Ti-ping chiefs, dated May 8th:--

"This is to inform you, on the part of the English and French

senior naval officers, that had you agreed to their demands, and

removed your guns from the walls, they should have felt bound in

honour to have acted up to their promise, and have prevented an

attack on you on the settlement side by Imperial forces, which

in countless numbers and heavily-armed ships advance to attack

you. We now inform you _that we maintain a perfect neutrality_,

BUT IF YOU FIRE THE GUNS OR MUSKETS FROM THE BATTERY OR WALLS

OPPOSITE THE SETTLEMENT ON THE ADVANCING IMPERIALISTS (thereby

endangering the lives of our men and people in the foreign

settlement), WE SHALL THEN FEEL IT OUR DUTY TO RETURN THE FIRE

AND BOMBARD THE CITY."

This was equivalent to saying, "If you defend yourselves against the

Imperialists we shall kill you;" for in firing upon the pirate vessels

as they advanced from the foreign settlement and amongst the British

men-of-war, these latter must inevitably have been endangered.

The following extracts from official despatches and other memoranda will

show how the British squadron joined the fleet of pirates in driving the

Ti-pings out of Ningpo.

On the 10th of May, Captain Dew wrote to Admiral Hope:--

"<sc>Sir</sc>,--I found it necessary to capture the city of Ningpo, and

drive the rebels out, under the following circumstances:--

"You are aware, Sir, that the rebel chiefs had been informed

that if they again fired, either on our ships or in the

_direction_ of the settlement, we should deem it a _casus

belli_. This morning at 10 a.m., the _Kestrel_, and French

vessels _Etoile_ and _Confucius_ were fired on by the Point

battery. I cleared for action in this ship, when a volley of

musketry was fired on us from the bastion abreast. The

undermentioned vessels, viz., _Encounter_, _Ringdove_,

_Kestrel_, and _Hardy_, with the _Etoile_ and _Confucius_,

French gunboats, now opened fire, with shell, on the walls and

batteries, which was replied to with much spirit from guns and

small arms."

The despatch continues to this effect:--At noon the Ti-ping guns were

silenced and practicable breaches effected. At two o'clock the city was

stormed, and at five o'clock, all opposition having ceased, the

ex-governor and his troops landed from their junks. Captain Dew gave

them charge of the city, and re-embarked his men. We must now find out

what had become of the ex-governor, his troops, and Apak's fleet during

this time. Captain Dew carefully avoids stating whether they had made

the attack _at daylight_, according to arrangement, or left him to play

the bravo alone, for he does not mention _one word_ about his allies,

until he hands over the city to them. Consul Harvey, however, in a

despatch to Mr. Bruce, dated May the 16th, throws some light upon the

subject; he states:--

"Shot and shell were poured into this large city with very

little intermission for a period of five hours _by the combined

fleet_, at the end of which time the walls were scaled, and the

Taeping forces were at once completely routed and dispersed."

The only fleet was _eighty_ lorchas of the pirate Apak, the English and

French aiding by six vessels only, a fact suppressed by Captain Dew.

The final expulsion of the Ti-pings from Ningpo was thus effected:--

Early on the morning of the 10th, the piratical fleet commenced the

attack upon Ningpo, advancing from the foreign settlement and then

manoeuvring round and round the British and French gunboats, firing at

the Ti-pings when _between_ their line of fire and the foreign vessels.

Captain Dew never attempted to enforce his pretended order for them to

keep "well clear" of his vessels. For some time the Ti-pings bore this

attack silently and without reply, doubtless trusting that Captain Dew

would either move his vessels or make the pirates give them a clear

berth. This, however, was not done, the intention being to compel the

Ti-pings to open fire on the attacking fleet, when, as the latter were

placed directly between the British and French men-of-war and the guns

of the town, any shot must necessarily pass in the "direction" of those

vessels, and thereby constitute the false _casus belli_ required, and

eagerly watched for by Captain Dew with his vessels quite prepared and

his guns loaded and ready.

At last human nature could bear no more, and the Ti-pings opened a

musketry fire upon the pirate lorchas, yet still with extraordinary

forbearance, and such a desire to avoid endangering the foreign ships or

settlement, that they did not make use of their artillery. It is

perfectly certain that the Manchoo piratical fleet dared not have

ventured to make their attack unless fully assured of foreign

co-operation. That such assistance _was_ guaranteed and arranged has

scarcely ever been doubted.

Many of the Ti-ping soldiers had been killed by the fire of the pirate

fleet before they replied with musketry. The very instant they did so,

the British and French vessels came to the aid of their allies, and

commenced bombarding the town. It is said that a couple of bullets from

the volley fired upon a lorcha, which having just delivered her

broadside was tacking under the stern of the _Kestrel_, struck the

quarter of the latter vessel. This may have accidentally occurred; but

it is, however, perfectly certain that the Ti-pings did not fire upon

the foreign men-of-war, as stated by Captain Dew.

The Ti-pings fought their battery against the overwhelming fire from the

heavy pivot guns of the smaller vessels and the broadsides from the

_Encounter_ until every gun was dismounted and the work knocked to

pieces. When the British and French storming parties carried the walls

of Ningpo, the defenders offered a determined resistance; but shell and

Enfield rifles at last overcame it; though not until both the generals

Hwang and Fang were severely wounded did they evacuate the city, leaving

about 100 dead within and around the walls. The British loss was only 3

killed and 23 wounded.

Even Consul Harvey termed the conduct of the Ti-pings when they captured

Ningpo "wonderfully moderate." What will the British public think of the

following account of the behaviour of Captain Dew's allies when

re-established in the city? Contrasting the events which followed the

Ti-ping seizure of the city with those which occurred on its subsequent

capture by the British and French, can any question arise as to which

was the most civilized and merciful? The correspondent of the _China

Mail_, under date the 22nd May, 1862, states:--

"The rebels retreated through the west gate--the pirates then

entered the city and began the work of destruction, and in a few

hours did more damage than the rebels did in the whole of the

five months that they had possession.... On _Sunday_ the

reinstated Taoutae was busy chopping off the heads of the

unlucky rebels that he caught, and otherwise torturing them. I

saw some fearful sights; such as a boy with his entrails cut

right out, from a great gash across the stomach, carried round

the back--a man with all the flesh torn off his ribs, leaving

them quite bare--a man whose heart had been torn out and his

head cut off; together with others equally revolting.... On

Monday the same scenes were enacting.... One of the principal

murderers and torturers of the poor fellows found in the city

was one A-fook, the _British Consul's_ boy or personal

attendant, who was dressed up in silks, and who, stuck upon a

pony, paraded the city with attendants, ordering them to execute

unfortunates, and issuing orders (which were actually obeyed) to

the English soldiers."

Now it can safely be declared that the Ti-pings have _never_ committed

similar atrocities to the above. They have, it is true, often killed

large numbers at the capture of obstinately defended towns, but their

prisoners were never tortured to death as their comrades, captured by

British troops and then delivered up to the cruel Tartar mandarins, have

been under the shadow of the Union Jack.

The _China Overland Trade Report_ of October 14, 1862, states:--

"So much mystery and double-dealing has been practised by the

allies to wrest this port from the Taipings, and so little

regard for veracity pervades the official despatches regarding

their doings, that the truth is most difficult to arrive at, and

has certainly never yet been published.... The possession of

Ningpo by the Taipings was peculiarly adapted to thwart those

schemes for aiding and abetting the Imperial cause, which have

so peculiarly characterized the British minister. The Taipings

held the province, and it is evident that the possession of a

seaport would have enabled them not only to have deprived

Shanghae of the greater proportion of the customs duties,[17]

but to have diverted the same into their own exchequer. Now Mr.

Lay was acting Chinese ambassador in London, and the absorption

of these duties would have entirely frustrated the object of his

errand[18] and indeed have destroyed the main stay of the

Imperial cause. Besides, the possession of Ningpo would have

enabled the Taipings to have obtained all the munitions of war

which they stood so much in need of. It would have dispelled the

_illusion_ of their being inimical to foreign trade.... Admiral

Hope ... from some such cogent reasons as are above named, fell

into the British minister's views, and clearly resolved on the

recapture of the place by fair means or foul. The mode of

accomplishing this design reflects _indelible disgrace_ on

British prestige....

"Admiral Hope detached a portion of his fleet to Ningpo under

command of Captain Dew, of H.M.S. _Encounter_, clearly to act in

concert with this piratical squadron, with which daily

communications were established. The day before the Taoutae

arrived at Ningpo, the British ships had taken up their

stations, and had cleared for action. Captain Dew had opened a

correspondence with the Taiping chiefs, the drift of which was a

demand that they should remove a certain battery on some absurd

pretext, which they refused to do. The night prior to the

attack, a council of war was held on board the _Encounter_, and

a private note was seen by several Europeans at Ningpo, written

by a certain British official, which stated that the city would

be attacked the following morning. The pirate fleet arrived

accordingly, and proceeding in driblets _between_ the British

men-of-war and the city, opened fire. This could not possibly be

returned without directing the guns towards the men-of-war. The

result is known and need not be repeated."

The _Hong-kong Daily Press_, in a long article upon the capture of

Ningpo by the Anglo-Franco-Manchoo-piratical fleet, makes precisely

similar statements to those quoted from the _Overland Trade Report_, and

commences with the following paragraph:--

"There never was a falser, more unprovoked, or more

unjustifiable act than the taking of Ningpo by the allies from

the Taipings. It should, in fairness, be recorded _to the

eternal disgrace of Captain_ RODERIC DEW, _of H.M.S.

Encounter_."

FOOTNOTES:

[4] Lord Palmerston's Government had one great quality--it manfully

supported its subordinate officials whether right or wrong; it is at

least doubtful whether his successors will have courage to pursue the

same policy.

[5]

The forces consisted of:--

French, under Rear-Admiral Protet:--

Small-arm men and Marines; field-piece party and

4 guns 410

English, under Brigadier General Staveley:--

Royal Artillery, 6 guns 78

5th Bombay N. I. 440

H.M. 99th Regiment 56

22nd Punjaub N. I. 519

Under Captain Borlase, R.N.:--

Field-piece party, 3 guns 45

H.M.S. _Pearl_ small-arm company 60

Axe party 16

Under Captain Willes, R.N.:--

H.M.S. _Imperieuse_ small-arm company 189

Marines of Squadron 94

-----1,497

Disciplined Chinese of General Ward's legion 300

-----

Total 2,207

[6]

The force consisted of:--

British Naval Division, with 3 howitzers 350

Royal Artillery, with 4 howitzers 90

H.M. 99th Regiment 80

22nd Punjaub N. I. 400

5th Bombay N. I. 400

French Contingent, with 5 rifled guns and 2 field-pieces 700

Disciplined Chinese of Ward's legion 400

-----

Total 2,420

[7]

The allied force consisted of:--

British troops, under General Staveley:--

Royal Engineers 22

Royal Artillery, with 7 guns and 6 mortars 100

H.M. 31st Regiment 552

H.M. 99th and 67th Regiments 280

5th Bombay N.I 350

22nd Punjaub N.I 350

French force, under Admiral Protet:--

Algerian Infantry, Chasseurs, Marines, and Seamen, with

8 guns 900

British Naval Division, under Captain Borlase, R.N.:--

Seamen and Marines, with 9 guns 330

Ward's disciplined Chinese 1,000

-----

Total 3,884

Assisted by Imperialist troops under Manchoo General Le 5,000

[8] _See_ Note, p. 509.

[9] Italics are by the Author.

[10] _Vide_ "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," 1863,

p. 43; Inclosure in No. 27; Brigadier-General Staveley to Sir C. Lewis.

[11] This and all following extracts are taken from the Official

Correspondence presented to both Houses of Parliament in Blue Book form.

[12] Compare this with the next despatch of Captain Dew's.

[13] These Chiefs were at the time conducting the murderous raids from

Shanghae, already described.

[14] Did it grieve the philanthropic Admiral "much," I wonder, to

massacre them in his raids from Shanghae?

[15] We may safely presume that Captain Dew was gibing the chiefs.

[16] Governor of a city.

[17] From these duties the indemnity for the war was being extracted.

[18] The errand was to obtain the notorious Anglo-Chinese flotilla.