WASHINGTON AT MOUNT VERNON--PUBLIC MATTERS CLAIM HIS
ATTENTION--MONROE AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT--HIS PUBLIC RECEPTION AS
MINISTER--THE DISPLAY DISAPPROVED OF AT HOME--HIS CONCESSIONS TO THE
FRENCH--HIS INDISCREET PROMISE OF PECUNIARY AID--JAY'S
MISSION--MONROE ASKS JAY FOR A COPY OF HIS TREATY FOR THE FRENCH
GOVERNMENT--JAY'S REFUSAL--MONROE OFFENDED--MISAPPREHENSION AND
RESENTMENT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT--MONROE RECALLED--MR. PINCKNEY
HIS SUCCESSOR--MONROE'S DEFENCE--WASHINGTON'S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS
OWN COURSE.
As we have observed, Washington enjoyed the pleasures of retirement and
partial repose at Mount Vernon, for about two months in the summer of
1796. Yet he was not wholly free from the cares and anxieties incident
to his official station. His Farewell Address to his countrymen, as we
have seen, was then carefully prepared for the public consideration; but
subjects of more immediate importance, connected with national affairs,
demanded and received his attention.
Jay's treaty had relieved the country from all apprehension of immediate
war with Great Britain, and, at the same time, it had increased the
unfriendly feeling between the government of the United States and that
of France. The latter had discovered that Washington's original
proclamation of neutrality, and his efforts to preserve that position
for his government, were sincere, and not, as had been hoped, mere
tricks to deceive the British cabinet; and the French Directory, and
their partisans in America, were disappointed and greatly chagrined.
For a long time the administrators of government in France, exercising a
most intolerant and relentless despotism, had been jealous of every act
of friendship, or even of leniency performed toward Great Britain by the
Americans; and Mr. Monroe, an avowed partisan of France, was received,
at first with distrust. But with singular adroitness, discretion, and
good judgment, Monroe managed to place himself, very speedily, high in
the estimation of the government to which he was accredited. We have
already noticed, incidentally, his presentation of the American flag to
the National Convention of France, and the reciprocity of the compliment
by M. Adet, almost a year afterward. The inauguration of these
courtesies by Monroe at Paris, had been immediately followed by a public
display of national amity, in which the representative of the United
States so thoroughly committed his government to a political alliance
with France, as to make Washington's plan of neutrality appear like a
piece of diplomatic finesse. It was ordained that the American minister
should be formally received by the French government, in a public
manner. He was, accordingly, introduced into the National Convention,
where he presented a written address, glowing with the warmest
expressions of friendship for France and the French people, and
admiration of their magnanimity, their fortitude, their valor, and their
wisdom.
To this the president of the convention replied, with even greater
enthusiasm. He alluded to the union of the two governments, as "not
merely a diplomatic alliance," but as "the sweetest, the most frank
fraternity"--"for ever indissoluble--for ever the dread of tyrants, the
safeguard of the liberties of the world, and the preserver of all the
social and philanthropic virtues.
"In bringing to us, citizen," continued the president, "the pledge of
this union, so dear to us, you could not fail to be received with the
liveliest emotions. Five years ago, a usurper of the sovereignty of the
people would have received you with the pride which belongs to vice,
thinking it much to have given to the minister of a free people some
token of an insolent protection. But to-day, the sovereign people
themselves, by the organ of their faithful representatives, receive you;
and you see the tenderness, the effusion of soul, that accompanies the
simple and touching ceremony! I am impatient to give you the fraternal
embrace, which I am ordered to give in the name of the French people.
Come and receive it in the name of the American people, and let this
spectacle complete the annihilation of an impious coalition of tyrants."
At this affectionate appeal Monroe stepped forward, and received the
president's "national embrace," and afterward, the warm congratulations
of the assembly. He was offered the confiscated house of one of the
nobility as a place of residence; and, for a few days, he was the idol
of the French people. Then came the less ethereal operations of the
grave business of his office; and when the pageant was all over--the
apotheosis completed--Mr. Monroe found himself afflicted with many
cares, and assailed by many annoyances. Clamorous American ship-masters
and merchants flocked to his diplomatic residence, and preferred urgent
claims; some for cargoes which they had been compelled to sell to the
French government, and some asking the liquidation of dishonored bills,
drawn by French agents in America, in payment for provision shipped to
France, or the French West Indies. In many forms complaints and claims
were made by Monroe's countrymen upon the French government, and the
minister found a host of unpleasant duties to perform, for he did not
wish to break the charm of that "sweetest, most frank fraternity," to
the preservation of which he had so recently pledged his constituents.
He, therefore, made some extraordinary concessions in relation to claims
founded on breaches of the French treaty, in the seizure of enemy's
goods in American vessels. He asked the French government to rescind the
order authorizing such seizures, not because it would be just--be in
accordance with treaty provisions--but because it would be for the
pecuniary and commercial interests of France to do so. He was even so
careful not to wound French pride, as to assure that government that he
had no instructions to complain of that order as a breach of the treaty;
and that, should it be thought productive of real benefit to France, the
American government and people would bear it, not only with patience,
but with pleasure.
When intelligence of Monroe's theatrical performances at his reception
reached his government, it produced much mortification, and the
secretary of state, in an official letter, suggested to him that the
American cabinet expected nothing more than a private reception, and an
oral speech; and reminded him that the government he was sent to
represent was neutral, and that such a display might be offensive to
other governments, especially to those of England and Spain, with both
of whom important negotiations were then in progress. He was also
reminded that circumstances might arise, when it would be necessary "to
explain away or disavow an excess of fervor, so as to reduce it down to
the cool system of neutrality."
The French government, evidently insincere in their "national embraces,"
and believing the other party to be equally so, determined to test the
friendship of their allies. At that time the republic was heavily
pressed with pecuniary embarrassments, and the United States were asked
for a loan to relieve that pressure. Monroe, without the least particle
of authority, unhesitatingly expressed his opinion, that his government
would give to their dear ally any aid in their power to bestow; and he
suggested three sources whence money might be obtained, namely: the
separate states, the general government, and individuals. He went so far
as to enter into a formal agreement concerning the equivalent in
services, which France should give for such pecuniary aid, the most
important of which was an active alliance in seizing the western posts
still held by the British, and the conquest of the Louisiana country,
inhabited by the French and Spanish, west of the Mississippi. France was
also to assist the United States through a war with England and Spain,
if one should occur. This would practically place the American republic
in the position of an entire dependent upon the European one--a position
utterly unnecessary, and incompatible with the interests and dignity of
a free and independent nation.
Mr. Monroe urged his government to loan France five millions of dollars,
in order to secure her good will and active alliance. But his
proposition met with no favor at home, except among the ultra partisans
of the French republic; and he was officially reminded that it had been,
and still was, the invariable policy of the president to have his
country as independent as possible of every nation upon the face of the
earth--a policy which he had pursued from the beginning; "not assumed
now for the first time, but wise at all times, and certain, if steadily
pursued, to protect his country from the effects of commotions in
Europe."
Jay's mission, from the beginning, had produced uneasiness and distrust
in the diplomatic circles of France and Spain, and perplexed Monroe and
his political friends. Giving greater latitude to the spirit of his
instructions than their letter could possibly warrant, Monroe assured
the French government that Jay's authority was strictly limited to a
demand of reparation for injuries; and this assurance produced the
impression that Jay had no authority to conclude a treaty of navigation
and commerce. Not more than a fortnight after Monroe made these
assurances, intelligence came that a treaty of commerce had actually
been negotiated with the British government, and signed by the
contracting parties.
Mr. Monroe's imprudence, and his zeal in the cause of France, now placed
him in an unpleasant dilemma. He received from Mr. Jay the assurance
that he would soon send him, in cipher, the principal heads of the
treaty. But that would not be sufficient to appease the offended French
government, and Mr. Monroe immediately sent a confidential person to Mr.
Jay for a complete copy of the document. "'Tis necessary to observe," he
said, "_that as nothing will satisfy this government but a copy of the
instrument itself_, and which, as our ally, it thinks itself entitled
to, so it will be useless for me to make to it any communication _short
of that_. I mention this that you may know precisely _the state of my
engagements here_, and how I deem it my duty to act under them, in
relation to _this object_."
Mr. Jay, as in duty bound, civilly declined to send a copy of the
treaty; and in his reply to Mr. Monroe's letter, took the occasion to
give that gentleman his views on national independence and the duties of
ministers.
"You must be sensible," he said, "that the United States, as a free and
independent nation, have an unquestionable right to make any pacific
arrangements with other powers which mutual convenience may dictate,
provided those arrangements do not interdict or oppugn their prior
engagements with other states.
"Whether this adjustment was consistent with our treaty with France?
struck me as being the only question which would demand or receive the
consideration of that republic; and I thought it due to the friendship
subsisting between the two countries, that the French government should
have, without delay, the most perfect satisfaction on that head." He
then referred to his former communications, and gave him the following
exact and literal extract from the treaty:--
"Nothing in this treaty contained, shall, however, be construed or
operate contrary to former and existing public treaties with other
sovereigns or states."
After speaking of his former intention to communicate to Mr. Monroe some
of the most interesting particulars of the treaty, "but in the most
perfect confidence," Mr. Jay continued:--
"As that instrument has not yet been ratified, nor received the
ultimate forms necessary to give it validity; as further questions
respecting parts of it may yet arise, and give occasion to further
discussions and negotiations, so that, if finally concluded at all,
it may then be different from what it now is, the impropriety of
making it public at present is palpable and obvious; such a
proceeding would be inconvenient and unprecedented. It does not
belong to ministers who negotiate treaties to publish them, even
when perfected, much less treaties not yet completed, and remaining
open to alteration or rejection. Such acts belong exclusively to
the governments who form them.
"I can not but flatter myself, that the French government is too
enlightened and reasonable to expect that any consideration ought
to induce me to overleap the bounds of my authority, or to be
negligent of the respect which is due to the United States. That
respect, and my obligations to observe it, will not permit me to
give, without the permission of their government, a copy of the
instrument in question to any person, or for _any purpose_; and by
no means for the purpose of being submitted to the consideration
and judgment of the councils of a _foreign nation_, however
friendly."[104]
Soon after this, John Trumbull, Mr. Jay's secretary of legation, was
about to pass through Paris, and he was authorized to make to Mr. Monroe
a confidential communication concerning the provisions of the treaty.
But the incensed minister refused to receive this or any communication
in a form that he could not instantly lay before the French government.
He afterward attempted to obtain a copy of the treaty from Thomas
Pinckney, who passed through Paris on his way to Spain, but that
gentleman would not betray Jay's confidence, and Monroe and the French
government were compelled to wait until the authorized publication of
the treaty the following summer.
Mr. Monroe felt himself aggrieved by what he deemed the want of
confidence in him by the president and his cabinet, who had appointed
him. He felt that the administration had injured him; and that the honor
and credit of the United States were compromised by their refusal to
redeem his promises of aid to the French republic, their "ally and
friend." His first and natural impulse was to resign his post, but
alleged patriotic, as well as personal considerations, induced him to
remain. He held the most intimate private relations with the members of
the Committee of Public Safety and other officers of the French
government, and appears to have enjoyed their confidence while he
remained there. But, whether from his undue attachment to the French
republic, his opposition to Jay's treaty, or his mistaken notions of
American interests, Mr. Monroe appears to have done little, after his
correspondence with Mr. Jay, to allay ill feeling toward his country on
the part of the French government. He had been specially instructed,
when sent envoy to France, to explain the views and conduct of the
government of the United States in forming the treaty with England; and
for this purpose ample documents were furnished him. But it appears from
his own letters (published in his defence after his return, in
1796),[105] that he omitted to use them. Uninstructed in the truths
which should have been given them, the French government utterly
misinterpreted the actions and misconceived the views of the United
States; and when informed that the house of representatives would
execute the treaty made by Jay, they became very bitter in their
resentment, and exhibited their animosity by allowing a French privateer
to capture an American merchant-vessel.
Washington and his cabinet were satisfied that the amity between the two
nations would be wholly destroyed, if Mr. Monroe should remain longer in
France, as the accredited representative of his government, and his
recall was resolved upon.[106] To choose a proper person required great
caution, sagacity, and discretion. It was the duty of the president to
make the choice, and to take the responsibility of his appointment, the
Congress not being in session. With great care, after consultation, he
contemplated the character of his contemporaries in public life, and
fixed upon two--John Marshall and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney--either of
whom he considered well fitted for the responsible and delicate station.
Marshall was the first choice, but private considerations compelled him
to decline, when the president addressed the following letter to Mr.
Pinckney:--
"The situation of affairs, and the interests of this country, as
they relate to France, render it indispensably necessary that a
faithful organ near that government, able and willing to explain
its views, and to ascertain those of France, should immediately
fill the place of our present minister plenipotentiary in Paris.
Policy requires that this character, to be essentially serviceable,
should be well attached to the government of his own country, and
not obnoxious to the one to which he is sent. Where, then, can a
man be found that would answer this description better than
yourself?
"It is a fact too notorious to be denied, that the greatest
embarrassments under which the administration of this government
labors, proceed from the counteraction of people among ourselves,
who are more disposed to promote the views of another nation, than
to establish a national character of their own; and that, unless
the virtuous and independent men of this country will come forward,
it is not difficult to predict the consequences. Such is my decided
opinion....
"Had not the case been important and urgent, I might have hesitated
longer; but, in finding a character of the description I have
mentioned, you will be at no loss to perceive the difficulty which
occurs. He must be a man whose abilities and celebrity of character
are well known to the people of this country, whose honor and
integrity are unimpeached, and who ought, as far as the nature of
the case will admit, to be acceptable to all parties. Doubtless
many such there are; but those who have been either in the
legislative or executive departments of the general government, and
are best known to me, have been so decisive in their politics, and,
possibly, so frank and public in their declarations, as to render
it very difficult to choose from among them one in whom the
confidence of this country could be placed, and the prejudices of
the others not excited."
Mr. Pinckney accepted the appointment, and made immediate preparations
for his departure for France. "Though my affairs have not, hitherto,
been arranged as I could wish them," he said in his letter of
acceptance, "the manner in which you state our political situation, and
the interests of this country as they relate to France, oblige me to
accept your appointment without hesitation. I am only apprehensive that
your friendship has been too partial to the little merit I may possess,
and that matters intrusted to me may fail through my want of ability."
Monroe had the misfortune to lose the confidence of his own government
and that of the French republic at about the same time. Hoping that the
house of representatives would refuse to execute the British treaty, and
thus appease the French Directory, he had been quiet for some time,
when, in February, 1796, he received a communication from De La Croix,
the French minister for foreign affairs, informing him, that since the
ratification of Jay's treaty, the Directory considered the alliance
between France and the United States at an end; that Adet was to be
recalled, and a special minister was to be sent out to make the
announcement, and act as agent for his government. It was intimated,
too, that Monroe could not fulfil the promises he had made, and that all
the assurances of his inaugural as minister were fallacious. Monroe
remonstrated, and in a special interview with the Directory, professed
his willingness to answer all objections that might be made against the
treaty. He was soon afterward furnished with a report on the subject of
American relations, signed by De La Croix, in which the government was
charged with the non-execution of treaty obligations, in several
particulars. To these charges Monroe made a reply, which Washington
considered very satisfactory: but it did not change the course of the
Directory; and in the autumn they issued an "_arret_," ordering the
seizure of British property found on board American vessels, and of
provisions bound for England. This was a direct violation of the
provisions of the treaty between the United States and France, and
exhibited a disposition decidedly hostile.
This correspondence reached the president soon after his appointment of
Pinckney as Monroe's successor; and a little later he received a letter
from Mr. Monroe, written in cipher, on the twenty-fourth of March, which
had been unaccountably delayed in its transmission. In that
communication Monroe took occasion to say, that a long, private letter,
written by Washington to Gouverneur Morris toward the close of December,
1795, had got into the hands of the French Directory, and produced an
ill effect. Washington replied to this letter on the twenty-fifth of
August. He acknowledged the genuineness of the letter; "but," he said,
"I deny that there is anything contained in it that the French
government could take exception to, unless the expression of an ardent
wish that the United States might remain in peace with all the world,
taking no part in the disputes of any part of it, should have produced
this effect. I also gave it as my further opinion, that the sentiments
of the mass of citizens in this country were in unison with mine.
"Confidential as this letter was expected to be, I have no objection to
its being seen by anybody; and there is some mistake in saying I had no
copy thereof, when there is a press one now before me, in which I
discover no expression that in the eye of liberality and candor would be
deemed objectionable."
After summing up the substance of his letter, Washington said, in
conclusion: "My conduct in public and private life, as it relates to the
important struggle in which the latter nation is engaged, has been
uniform from the commencement of it, and may be summed up in a few
words: that I have always wished well to the French Revolution; that I
have always given it as my decided opinion, that no nation had a right
to intermeddle in the internal concerns of another; that every one had a
right to form and adopt whatever government they like best to live under
themselves; and that, if this country could, consistently with its
engagements, maintain a strict neutrality, and thereby preserve peace,
it was bound to do so by motives of policy, interest, and every other
consideration that ought to actuate a people situated as we are, already
deeply in debt, and in a convalescent state from the struggle we have
been engaged in ourselves.
"On these principles I have steadily and uniformly proceeded, bidding
defiance to calumnies calculated to sow seeds of distrust in the French
nation, and to excite their belief of an influence possessed by Great
Britain in the councils of this country, than which nothing is more
unfounded and injurious."
FOOTNOTES:
[104] Letter of Jay to Monroe, dated February 5, 1795.--Life and
Writings of John Jay, vol. i., page 336.
[105] Entitled "A View of the Conduct of the Executive of the United
States, connected with the Mission to the French Republic, during the
Years 1794, '5, & '6."
[106] Washington asked the opinion of his cabinet on the subject of a
change of ministers, and at a meeting on the second of July, the three
secretaries, Pickering, Wolcott, and M'Henry, addressed a letter to him,
in which they said:--
"On the expediency of this change we are agreed. We think the great
interests of the United States require, that they have near the
French government some faithful organ to explain their real views,
and to ascertain those of the French. Our duty obliges us to be
explicit. Although the present minister plenipotentiary of the
United States at Paris has been amply furnished with documents, to
explain the views and conduct of the United States, yet his own
letters authorize us to say, that he has omitted to use them, and
thereby exposed the United States to all the mischiefs which could
flow from jealous and erroneous conceptions of their views and
conduct. Whether this dangerous omission arose from such an
attachment to the cause of France as rendered him too little
mindful of the interests of his own country, or from mistaken views
of the latter, or from any other cause, the evil is the same. We,
therefore, conceive it to be indispensably necessary, that the
present minister plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris
should be recalled, and another American citizen appointed in his
stead.... In confirmation of our opinion of the expediency of
recalling Mr. Monroe, we think the occasion requires that we
communicate a private letter from him, which came to our hands
since you left Philadelphia. This letter corresponds with other
intelligence of his political opinions and conduct. A minister who
has thus made the notorious enemies of the whole system of
government his confidential correspondents in matters which affect
that government, can not be relied on to do his duty to the latter.
This private letter we received in confidence. Among other
circumstances that will occur to your recollection, the anonymous
letters from France to Thomas Blount and others are very
noticeable. We know that Montflorence was the writer, and that he
was the chancellor of the consul Skipwith; and, from the connection
of Mr. Monroe with those persons, we can entertain no doubt the
anonymous letters were written with his privity.
"These anonymous communications from officers of the United States
in a foreign country, on matters of a public nature, and which
deeply concern the interests of the United States in relation to
that foreign country, are proofs of sinister designs, and show that
the public interests are no longer safe in the hands of such men."
The attorney-general, in his letter to the president, said: "I have
formed an opinion that our minister plenipotentiary at Paris ought not
to be permitted to continue there any longer, than until the arrival of
his successor; and that it is not only expedient, but absolutely
necessary, that he should be immediately recalled, and another minister
appointed. Upon this subject I concur in sentiment with the heads of
departments, as expressed in their letter of the second instant."
The attorney-general then gave, as reasons for his opinion--First, that
"from his letters in the office of the department of state, it appears
he has neglected or failed to justify, or truly represent, to the
republic of France the conduct and motives of his own country, relative
to the treaty with Great Britain." Secondly, that "his correspondence
with the executive of the United States has been, and is, infrequent,
unsatisfactory, reserved, and without cordiality or confidence on his
part."
"I might add other reasons, if they were necessary," continued the
attorney-general; "for instance, that he corresponds less confidentially
with the executive of the United States, than with the opposers and
libellers of his administration; and that there is too much reason to
believe he is furthering the views of a faction in America, more than
the peace and happiness of the United States."