ARRIVAL OF JEFFERSON AT THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT--HIS REPUBLICANISM
SHOCKED--MONARCHICAL SENTIMENTS ENTERTAINED BY SOME--HAMILTON
INDUCES JEFFERSON TO SUPPORT HIS FINANCIAL MEASURES--LOCATION OF THE
SEAT OF GOVERNMENT AGREED UPON--JEFFERSON'S SUSPICIONS--HIS DISLIKE
OF HAMILTON--WASHINGTON UNSUSPICIOUS OF DISSENTION IN HIS
CABINET--BIRTH OF THE _FEDERAL_ AND _REPUBLICAN_ PARTIES--SLAVERY
AND THE SLAVE-TRADE DISCUSSED--THE RESULT--DIFFICULTIES WITH THE
INDIAN TRIBES--NEGOTIATIONS AND WAR--RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN
AND SPAIN--SECRET SERVICE--GOUVERNEUR MORRIS AND MAJOR BECKWITH.
After a tedious journey of a fortnight from Richmond, Mr. Jefferson
arrived at the seat of government on the twenty-first of March, when the
debate on the assumption of the state debts was at its bitterest point.
He had returned to America after several years of diplomatic service in
France, with a sincere desire to spend the remainder of his days in
private life. But he was met at the house of his brother-in-law, on his
way from Norfolk (where he landed) to his home at Monticello, by
Washington's letter, already mentioned, inviting him to his cabinet as
secretary of state. The diplomat was disappointed. He had seen, and in a
degree had participated in, the opening act in the drama of the French
revolution. He had, as we have observed, become deeply enamored of the
leaders in the revolt, and the political sentiments they had proclaimed;
and he preferred to remain in France, if he was to be continued in
public employment. But the terms of Washington's invitation were such,
that Jefferson's sense of duty and reverence for the president would not
allow him to refuse, and after due deliberation he accepted the office.
On his arrival at New York, Jefferson found many things to surprise
and startle him. A wonderful change had apparently taken place in
political life during his residence in Europe; and being thoroughly
imbued with republican principles and a deep-seated hatred of monarchy,
his suspicions and jealousies were most painfully alive. He saw dangers
to the state lurking in every recess where the full light of clear
perceptions did not fall. "I found a state of things," he wrote some
years afterward, "which, of all I had contemplated, I least expected. I
had left France in the first year of her revolution, in the fervor of
natural rights and zeal for reformation. My conscientious devotion to
these rights could not be heightened, but it had been aroused and
excited by daily exercise. The president received me cordially, and my
colleagues and circle of principal citizens apparently with welcome. The
courtesies of dinner-parties given me, as a stranger newly arrived among
them, placed me at once in their familiar society. But I can not
describe the wonder and mortification with which the table conversations
filled me. Politics were the chief topic, and a preference of kingly
over republican government was evidently the favorite sentiment. An
apostate I could not be, nor yet a hypocrite; and I found myself, for
the most part, the only advocate on the republican side of the question,
unless among the guests there chanced to be some member of that party
from the legislative houses."
That there were men of character in the United States at that time who
desired a monarchical form of government, evidence is not wanting. Some
of them had been loyalists during the war. Washington spoke of them in
1787, before the assembling of the convention that framed the federal
constitution, as men who either had "not consulted the public mind," or
who lived "in a region more productive of monarchical ideas than was the
case in the southern states." But that any officer of the government, on
Jefferson's arrival, had a desire for kingly rule, there is no positive
evidence. The most earnest advocate for a strong, energetic,
consolidated government, was Alexander Hamilton; yet he never expressed
a _desire_ for a monarchical government in America. In his speech in
the constitutional convention on the eighteenth of June, 1787, he lauded
the British constitution as the best ever devised by man, and said that
he doubted whether anything short of a government like that of Great
Britain (a constitutional monarchy) would do in America. These
sentiments were uttered when everything like order appeared to be on the
verge of destruction, and a strong arm, independent of the popular will,
seemed necessary for the establishment of public strength and individual
security. The crisis was passed, the federal constitution was formed,
and Hamilton gave it his zealous support. Yet, to the close of his life,
he considered the constitution too weak to perform the great duties
assigned it.
Hamilton was always frank and unreserved in the expression of his
political views; and immediately after Jefferson's arrival at the seat
of government, the secretary of the treasury pressed upon his attention
the importance of the assumption of the state debts--a measure which had
been rejected. "He observed," says Jefferson in his account of the
matter, "that the members of the administration ought to act in concert;
that though this question was not of my department, yet a common duty
should make it a common concern; that the president was the centre on
which all administrative questions ultimately rested; that, the question
having been lost by a small majority only, it was probable that an
appeal from me to the judgment and discretion of some of my friends
might effect a change in the vote, and the machinery of government, now
suspended, might be again set in motion."
To this Jefferson replied that he was a stranger to the whole matter;
that if the rejection of the proposition really, as Hamilton alleged,
endangered the Union, it was important to reconsider it; and then
proposed that the secretary of the treasury should meet two or three
friends at table the next day to discuss the subject. The dinner and the
discussion took place; and it was "finally agreed," says Jefferson,
"that whatever importance had been attached to the rejection of this
proposition, the preservation of the Union and of concord among the
states was more important, and that therefore it would be better that
the vote of rejection should be rescinded, to effect which, some
members should change their votes."
At that time the question, Where shall the seat of the federal
government be permanently located? was a subject of violent contest, the
people in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia,
wishing it to be in their respective states. Debates had run high upon
the subject in Congress, and the public press had discussed it
vigorously. It being observed at Jefferson's dinner-party that a
reconsideration of the assumption bill, and its adoption, would be "a
bitter pill" to the southern states, it was proposed that "some
concomitant measure should be adopted to sweeten it a little to them."
The location of the seat of government was chosen as the soother. The
contest had narrowed, geographically, so that it lay between
Philadelphia on the Delaware and Georgetown on the Potomac. It was
proposed to give it to Philadelphia for ten years, and to Georgetown
permanently thereafter, believing that "that might, as an anodyne, calm
in some degree the ferment which might be excited by the other measure
alone." "Two of the Potomac members agreed to change their votes," says
Jefferson, "and Hamilton undertook to carry the other point. In doing
this, the influence he had established over the eastern members, with
the agency of Robert Morris with those of the middle states, effected
his side of the engagement." The assumption bill was carried, and the
location of the seat of government was settled. Congress agreed to make
Philadelphia its residence for ten years, during which time the public
buildings should be erected at some point on the Potomac that the
president might select. Subsequently a territory ten miles square, lying
on both sides of the Potomac in Maryland and Virginia, was ceded by
those states to the United States, and called the district of Columbia.
Thus the matter was settled.
When Jefferson's sensitive republicanism took the alarm to which we have
alluded, he became suspicious of all around him. His feelings toward
Hamilton changed, until he considered him a monarchist in principle, and
regarded all his financial schemes as intended to strengthen the general
government, centralize power, and make the treasury the controlling
lever of public affairs, the chief of which, with almost autocratic
puissance, might direct everything to suit his own political views. With
this impression, retrospection made him angry and resentful. He regarded
the manner in which Hamilton had procured his aid in effecting the
measure of assumption as a snare by which he had been entrapped, and he
characterized the measure itself as a fiscal manoeuvre, to which he
had "ignorantly and innocently been made to hold the candle."
This was the beginning of those dissentions in his cabinet which
afterward gave the president so much trouble. They had grown to
mischievous proportions at a time when he believed there was perfect
harmony among his constitutional advisers. He had never experienced the
sentiment of jealousy himself, and he was the last man to suspect it in
others; and at the time when Jefferson and Hamilton were regarding each
other with a spirit of rivalry, Washington wrote to Lafayette, saying:
"Many of your old acquaintances and friends are concerned with me in the
administration of this government. By having Mr. Jefferson at the head
of the department of state, Mr. Jay of the judiciary, Hamilton of the
treasury, and Knox of war, I feel myself supported by able coadjutors
who harmonize extremely well."
Out of the rivalry between Jefferson and Hamilton, and the conflict of
their opinions respecting the national jurisprudence and French
politics, grew the two political parties known respectively, for about
twenty years, as _Federal_ and _Republican_. We shall observe that
growth as we progress in our narrative.
While Congress and the nation were agitated by discussions concerning
the public debt, another topic elicited a still more exciting
discussion: it was African slavery and the slave-trade. Slavery then
existed in all the states of the Union except Massachusetts, in whose
constitution a clause had been inserted for the purpose of tacitly
abolishing the system from the commonwealth. Pennsylvania had adopted
measures with the same view, and had been imitated by Connecticut, Rhode
Island, and New Hampshire. New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland,
had prohibited the further importation of slaves; and in Virginia and
Maryland restrictions upon emancipation had been repealed. A desire to
get rid of the system appeared to prevail throughout the Union. The
Presbyteries of New York and Pennsylvania, composing a united synod, had
constituted themselves as the general assembly of the Presbyterian
church in America; and that representative body issued a pastoral letter
in 1788, in which they strongly recommended the abolition of slavery,
and the instruction of negroes in letters and religion. The Methodist
church, then rising into notice, even refused slaveholders a place in
their communion; and the Quakers had made opposition to slavery a part
of their discipline. In these benevolent movements Washington
sympathized; for he desired to see the system extinguished by some just
method.
It was only a few days after the commencement of the debate on the
public debt, that a petition from the yearly meeting of the Quakers of
Pennsylvania and Delaware, with another from that of New York, was laid
before the house of representatives. A motion for reference to a special
committee caused a warm debate, and some of those who opposed its
reception spoke sneeringly of "the men in the gallery," who were the
Quaker deputation appointed to look after the petition.[28] It was laid
upon the table that day; and at the opening of the session on the
following morning, another petition on the same subject, from the
Pennsylvania society for the abolition of slavery, was presented. It was
signed by Benjamin Franklin (president of the society), then in the last
weeks of his life. The petition was read, and then the Quaker memorial
was called up. The excitement in the house was very great. The movement
was denominated an improper interference with state rights, or at least
an act of imprudence; and Judge Burke, of South Carolina, declared that
if these memorials were entertained by commitment, the act would "sound
an alarm and blow the trumpet of sedition through the southern states."
The question was mainly a constitutional one, but the debates took
great latitude. It was finally agreed to commit the memorials, by a vote
of forty-three to eleven. They were referred to a committee consisting
of one member from each of the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
A month afterward, that committee reported seven resolutions: first,
that the general government was expressly restrained from prohibiting
the carrying on of the slave-trade until the year 1808; second, that by
a fair construction of the constitution, Congress was equally restrained
from interfering with slavery, in the matter of emancipation, in the
several states; third, that Congress had no power to interfere in the
internal regulations of slavery in the several states; fourth, that
Congress had the right, by virtue of the revenue laws, to levy a tax of
ten dollars upon every person imported as property under the special
permission of any of the states; fifth, that Congress had power to
regulate or to interdict the African slave-trade, carried on by citizens
of the United States for the supply of foreign countries; sixth, that
Congress had the right to prohibit foreigners from fitting out vessels
in the United States, to be employed in the supply of foreign countries
with slaves from Africa; seventh, that Congress would exercise their
authority to its full extent, to promote the humane objects set forth in
the memorial of the Quakers.
This report called forth zealous and sometimes angry debates for a whole
week, when it was finally agreed, at the suggestion of Fisher Ames,
seconded by Madison and others, by a vote of twenty-nine to twenty-five,
to enter the report at length upon the journal of the house, where it
might be consulted in the future, and to take no further action. Thus
ended the first agitation of the still pending "slavery question" in
Congress. In a letter to Doctor Stuart, in June, referring to a
complaint of the tardiness of Congress, Washington remarked: "The
introduction of the Quaker memorial respecting slavery was, to be sure,
not only _ill-timed_, but occasioned a great waste of time. The final
decision thereon, however, was as favorable as the proprietors of this
species of property could well have expected, considering the light in
which slavery is viewed by a large part of this Union."
While topics of a domestic nature agitated the public mind and occupied
the attention of the national legislature, the foreign relations of the
government (in which expression may be included the relations with
hostile Indian tribes) were far from satisfactory. We have already
alluded to the hostile attitude of some of the tribes in the northwest
and southwest, among whom it was suspected British emissaries were at
work. Those of the southwest, especially the Creek nation, had been in a
disturbed state for some time, and difficulties with the authorities of
Georgia had caused an open rupture a little earlier than the period in
question. The Creeks were governed by an accomplished chief, Alexander
M'Gillivray, the son of a loyalist Scotchman, of that name, and a Creek
woman of a leading family. He had been well educated, and his father
designed him for commercial pursuits. He loved study more than ledgers;
and his father owning large possessions in Georgia, the young man looked
forward to wealth and social position. But the revolution swept all
away. His father's property was confiscated, and young M'Gillivray took
refuge with the Creeks, his heart filled with hatred of the republicans.
He was brave, fluent in speech, popular with the leading men, and soon
rose to the rank of head chief; and no doubt he stirred up his nation to
assume an attitude hostile to the Americans.
The Creeks, with M'Gillivray at their head, had also established a close
alliance with the Spaniards, who held possession of Florida. The Spanish
governor of that province courted the young half-blood chief, and he was
honored with a colonelcy in the military service of Spain. Through the
Spaniards, the Creeks could readily obtain arms and ammunition in
exchange for their furs; and thus, in point of strength, they were the
most formidable enemies to the United States among the Indian nations.
Good policy caused the United States government to send commissioners to
treat with the Creeks; and in the autumn of 1789, General Lincoln,
Colonel Humphries, and David Griffin--a commission appointed by
Washington--met deputies of that confederacy on the Oconee, to hold a
treaty. M'Gillivray was at the head of the deputation. He received the
American commissioners kindly, and expressed a desire for friendship;
but when he found that they did not propose to restore to the Creeks
their lands about which they had disputed with the Georgians, he
abruptly ended the conference, promising, however, to remain peaceable
until further negotiations could be had.
In March, 1790, Washington despatched Colonel Marinus Willett on a new
mission to the Creeks. He succeeded in persuading M'Gillivray to go to
New York, to carry on negotiations there. Attended by twenty-eight
sachems, chiefs, and warriors, he arrived at the federal capital on the
twenty-third of June, having been received with much attention at the
principal towns on the line of his journey. The members of the Tammany
society of New York, arrayed in Indian costume, escorted M'Gillivray and
his party into the city; and the Creek chief, being the son of a
Scotchman, was made an honorary member of the St. Andrew's society.
These attentions, and the gracious manner in which he was received by
the president, made a deep impression on M'Gillivray's mind. General
Knox, the secretary of war, was appointed to negotiate with him. A
satisfactory treaty, founded upon mutual concessions, was made; and one
of the last acts of Washington during the second session of the first
Congress was the approval of that treaty. It was signed by the
contracting parties on the seventh of August, and was ratified on the
thirteenth, the day after Congress adjourned.
Meanwhile, the aspect of Indian affairs in the country northwest of the
Ohio, into which a stream of emigration was rapidly flowing, claimed the
serious consideration of the government. A territorial government for
that region had been ordained in 1787, and the domain was called the
northwest territory. General Arthur St. Clair was appointed governor. As
we have observed, the Indians in that vicinity had shown much hostility
to the Americans ever since the close of the Revolution. They were
encouraged by Sir John Johnson, then Indian agent on that frontier, and
by Sir Guy Carleton, who was again governor of Canada, to insist upon
re-establishing the Ohio as the Indian boundary. They swarmed upon the
banks of that river, waylaid the boats of emigrants, and even crossed
the stream and made incursions into Kentucky, to attack frontier
stations there. The president was convinced, by long experience with the
Indians, that on the failure of negotiations with them, sound policy and
true economy, not less than humanity, required the immediate employment
of force, which should go as a scourge into the very heart of their
country. Such were now the relations between the northwestern tribes and
the United States; and in the autumn, a military force eleven hundred
strong, under the command of General Harmer, was directed by the
president to march against the Miami village on the Scioto, where
Chilicothe now stands. After some successes and defeats the Americans
withdrew, and the Indians became more insolent and bold.
At this time a general European war appeared inevitable. A long-pending
controversy between Spain and Great Britain remained unsettled. It was
believed that France would side with Spain; and it was thought to be a
favorable time for the United States to press upon Great Britain the
necessity of complying with the yet unfulfilled articles of the treaty
of 1783. Accordingly, as early as January, 1790, Gouverneur Morris, then
in Paris, was commissioned by Washington to proceed to London, as
private agent of the United States, to sound the British ministry on the
subject. At that time there was no diplomatic intercourse between the
United States and Great Britain. Mr. Adams had returned home, and the
court of St. James had never sent a minister to the United States.
Morris opened a communication with the English minister for foreign
affairs, but was unable to make much satisfactory progress for some
time. As late as the first of July, Washington made the following record
in his diary:
"Having put into the hands of the vice president of the United
States the communication of Mr. Gouverneur Morris, who had been
empowered to make informal inquiries how well disposed the British
ministry might be to enter into commercial relations with the
United States, and to fulfil the articles of peace respecting our
western posts, and the slaves which had been carried from this
country, he expressed his approbation that this step had been
taken, and added that the disinclination of the British cabinet to
comply with the two latter and to evade the former, as evidently
appears from the correspondence of Mr. Morris with the duke of
Leeds (the British minister for foreign affairs), was of a piece
with their conduct toward him whilst minister at that court, and
just what he expected, and that to have it ascertained was
necessary.
"He thought, as a rupture between England and Spain was almost
inevitable, that it would be our policy and interest to take part
with the latter, as he was very apprehensive that New Orleans was
an object with the former of their possessing, which would be very
injurious to us; but he observed, at the same time, that the
situation of our affairs would not justify the measure, unless the
people [of the United States] themselves should take the lead in
the business."
This was also considered a favorable time for the United States to urge
upon Spain their claims to the free navigation of the Mississippi river.
Mr. Carmichael, the American chargé d'affaires at the court of Madrid,
was instructed not only to press this point with earnestness, but to use
his best endeavors to secure the unmolested use of that river in future,
by obtaining a cession of the island of New Orleans and of the Floridas,
offering as an equivalent the sincere friendship of the United States,
by which the territories of Spain west of the Mississippi might be
secured to that government.
Evidence was not wanting that Great Britain apprehended an alliance of
the United States with Spain in the war that seemed to be impending; and
also that, in the event of war, the arms of Great Britain would be
directed against the Spanish settlements in America, to the disadvantage
of the United States. Sir Guy Carleton (now Lord Dorchester) was
continued in the government of Canada. He had asked leave to pass
through New York on his way to England. It was readily granted. And now,
under the pretext of making a formal acknowledgment for the contest, he
despatched his aid-de-camp, Major Beckwith, to sound the American
government, and ascertain, if possible, its disposition toward the two
disputing nations.
Major Beckwith first approached Hamilton, the secretary of the treasury.
After acknowledging the courtesy of the United States government in
offering to comply with the wishes of Lord Dorchester, he observed that
the prospect of a war between Great Britain and Spain would prevent or
defer his lordship's departure for England.
"He next proceeded to observe," says Hamilton in his written report of
the interview which he laid before the president, "that Lord Dorchester
had been informed of a negotiation commenced on the other side of the
water, through the agency of Mr. Morris; mentioning, as the subscriber
understood principally by way of proof of Lord Dorchester's knowledge of
the transaction, that Mr. Morris had not produced any regular
credentials, but merely a letter from the president directed to himself;
that some delays had intervened, partly on account of Mr. Morris's
absence on a trip to Holland, as was understood, and that it was not
improbable these delays and some other circumstances may have impressed
Mr. Morris with an idea of backwardness on the part of the British
ministry. That his lordship, however, had directed him to say that an
inference of this sort would not, in his opinion, be well founded, as he
had reason to believe that the cabinet of Great Britain entertained a
disposition, not only toward a friendly intercourse, but toward an
alliance with the United States."
"Major Beckwith then proceeded to speak of the particular cause of the
expected rupture between Spain and Great Britain, observing it was one
in which all commercial nations must be supposed to favor the views of
Great Britain. That it was therefore presumed, should a war take place,
that the United States would find it to their interest to take part with
Great Britain rather than with Spain."
Major Beckwith then, in the name of Lord Dorchester, disclaimed any
influence, under the sanction of British authorities, over the western
tribes, unfavorable to the interests of the citizens of the United
States; and concluded by producing a letter signed by Dorchester, which
contained sentiments similar to those expressed by the bearer, with an
assurance that "his lordship knew too well the consequences of such a
step, to have taken it without a previous knowledge of the intentions of
the cabinet."
Washington's impression of this semi-official overture from Great
Britain is expressed in the following record in his diary on the eighth
of July: "The aspect of this business, in the moment of its
communication to me, appeared simply and no other than this: 'We did not
incline to give any satisfactory answer to Mr. Morris, who was
_officially_ commissioned to ascertain our intentions with respect to
the evacuation of the western posts within the territory of the United
States, and other matters, until by this unauthenticated mode we can
discover whether you will enter into an alliance with us, and make
common cause against Spain. In that case we will enter into a commercial
treaty with you, and _promise perhaps_ to fulfil what we already stand
engaged to perform.'"
The president referred the matter to his cabinet, with a request that
they would give it their serious consideration. They did so; and on the
fourteenth it was agreed to treat Beckwith's communications very
civilly--to intimate, delicately, that they carried no marks official or
authentic; nor, in speaking of alliance, did they convey any definite
meaning by which the precise object of the British cabinet could be
discovered. "In a word," says Washington in his diary, "that the
secretary of the treasury was to extract as much as he could from Major
Beckwith, and to report to me, without committing, by any assurances
whatever, the government of the United States, leaving it entirely free
to pursue, unreproached, such a line of conduct in the dispute as her
interest and honor shall dictate."
It was evident that the British government were willing that their
relations with the United States should remain unchanged, until they
should perceive what course European affairs were likely to take. For
about nine months Morris remained in London, endeavoring to accomplish
the objects of his mission; but, at the end of that time, the views of
the British government, on all the main topics of discussion, were as
much hidden in a cloud of uncertainty as when he first presented
Washington's letter to the duke of Leeds, as his credentials. The powers
given to Mr. Morris were withdrawn; because, to further press the
subject of a commercial treaty, or the exchange of ministers, or the
evacuation of the western posts, on the part of the United States, would
be useless and dishonorable; and it was resolved to pause in action
until the government had become strong enough to speak in decisive
tones, and prepare to maintain words with works.
Finding the French government, then embarrassed by its own internal
difficulties, disinclined to take part in the quarrel with Great
Britain, Spain, unable alone to cope with her foe, yielded every point
in the controversy, and the dispute was settled.
FOOTNOTES:
[28] In his diary under date of March the sixteenth, 1790, Washington
recorded: "Exercised on horseback, between ten and twelve o'clock;
previous to this, I was visited (having given permission) by Mr. Warner
Mifflin, one of the people called Quakers, active in pursuit of the
measures laid before Congress for emancipating the slaves. After much
general conversation, and an endeavor to remove the prejudices which, he
said, had been entertained of the motives by which the attending
deputations from their society were actuated, he used arguments to show
the immorality, injustice, and impolicy of keeping these people in a
state of slavery; with declarations, however, that he did not wish for
more than a gradual abolition, or to see any infraction of the
constitution to effect it. To these I replied, that as it was a matter
which might come before me for official decision, I was not inclined to
express any sentiments on the merits of the question before this should
happen."