CHAPTER XII.

FIRST ACT IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION--LAFAYETTE'S PARTICIPATION IN

IT--AMERICAN SYMPATHY IN THE MOVEMENT--WASHINGTON'S EXPRESSION OF

FEELINGS--OPENING OF THE SECOND SESSION OF CONGRESS--WASHINGTON'S

MESSAGE--PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED--HAMILTON'S REPORT ON THE PUBLIC

DEBT AND PUBLIC CREDIT--HIS FINANCIAL SCHEME--THE PLAN BEFORE

CONGRESS--ASSUMPTION OF STATE DEBTS--FINANCIAL MEASURES ADOPTED BY

CONGRESS--EFFECTS OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT--WASHINGTON'S

OPINIONS--HIS LETTER CONCERNING SECTIONAL JEALOUSIES.

During the summer of 1789 a revolution had broken out in France, and its

influence was soon materially felt in the politics of the United States.

It was severe at the beginning and terrible in its subsequent course.

For a long time the enormous corruptions of state had been apparent, and

an attempted cure by the most violent means appeared inevitable to the

thoughtful and sagacious. The French monarch was a weak man and governed

much by bad advisers; and he often refused to listen to the true friends

of himself and France when they talked of political and social reforms.

Among these was the good, and brave, and generous Lafayette, who loved

the king for his many virtues, but loved France and her true glory,

based upon the welfare and prosperity of her people, far more.

Lafayette's principal associates in the scheme of reform were the Duke

de Rochefoucauld and M. Candorcet. These and one or two others were

regarded as the leaders. They aimed to obtain for France a constitution

similar to that of England, which they regarded as the most perfect

model of human government then known. They desired to retain the throne,

but to diminish very materially the power of the monarch. They desired a

house of peers, with legislative powers similar to that of England, but

restricted in number to one hundred members. They desired a house of

representatives, to be chosen by the great body of the people from among

themselves, and to make the government a constitutional monarchy upon a

republican basis.

With this view Lafayette with his coadjutors had labored for several

months, when, in the assembly of Notables in April, he boldly demanded a

series of reforms, and among others a national assembly. "What!"

exclaimed the Count d'Artois, one of Louis's bad advisers, "do you make

a motion for the states-general?"--"Yes, and even more than that,"

quickly responded Lafayette. That _more_ was a charter from the king, by

which the public and individual liberty should be acknowledged and

guarantied by the future states-general. The measure was carried, and

early in May a session of the states-general was opened at Versailles.

Had the king now listened to the advice of his true friends, and made

concessions, all would have been well. But he ordered the hall of the

national assembly, or states-general, to be closed. He also allowed

German troops from every quarter to gather around Paris, and when

requested by the national assembly to send them away he refused. M.

Necker, the patriotic controller of the treasury, and other ministers

who favored reform were dismissed, and the populace became greatly

excited. For three days there were scenes of violence in the French

capital that presaged the most terrible results. The national assembly

decreed the establishment of an armed militia of forty-eight thousand

men, when no less than two hundred and seventy thousand citizens

enrolled themselves. Arms were seized, and the greatest exasperation

appeared on every side. Again the removal of the troops around Paris was

demanded. "I alone," replied the king, "have the right to judge of the

necessity, and in that respect I can make no change."

Forbearance was no longer a virtue; and the state-prison, called the

Bastile, being regarded as one of the strongholds of despotism, was

attacked and taken by the people on the fourteenth of July. The

conquering thousands then marched in triumph to the city-hall. The chief

supporters of the king fled, and Louis, finding himself abandoned,

hurried to the national assembly to make peace with it. "Heaven knows,"

he exclaimed, "that the nation, and I are one--I confide myself wholly

to you. Help me, in this crisis, to save the state. Relying on the

attachment and security of my subjects, I have ordered the troops to

leave Paris and Versailles. I beseech you to make known my intentions to

the capital!"

Lafayette and another hurried to the city-hall, in Paris, to inform the

people of the king's declarations. "He has hitherto been deceived," he

said, "but he now sees the merit and justness of the popular cause." The

enthusiasm was general at this announcement. Tears of joy were shed, and

the revolution appeared to be at an end. The king confirmed the

nomination of Lafayette as the commander-in-chief of the national guard,

by which he was put at the head of four millions of armed citizens; and

the nation breathed free with hope. But the wily duke of Orleans, who

desired the destruction of the king for the base purposes of his own

exaltation, excited suspicions among the people, and a demand for the

king's presence at the Tuilleries was made. Louis went voluntarily from

Versailles to Paris, followed by sixty thousand citizens and a hundred

deputies of the assembly, and there formally accepted the Declaration of

the Rights of Man, which was presented to him. This set the minds of the

people at rest, and quiet was restored to the capital and to France.

But Lafayette was filled with apprehension for the future. To Colonel

John Trumbull, who was about to leave France for the United States at

the close of summer, he communicated a special message to Washington

concerning the state of affairs in France. After speaking of the changes

already effected and the hopes for the future, he said: "Unhappily,

there is one powerful and wicked man, who, I fear, will destroy this

beautiful fabric of human happiness--the duke of Orleans." He had

already been accused, and no doubt justly, of sending hired assassins to

Versailles to murder Louis and the royal family, that he might be made

regent of the kingdom. "He does not, indeed," said Lafayette, "possess

talent to carry into execution a great project; but he possesses

immense wealth, and France abounds in marketable talents. Every city

and town has young men eminent for abilities, particularly in the

law--ardent in character, eloquent, ambitious of distinction, but poor."

Such was the material that composed the leaders in the reign of terror

which speedily followed, and deluged Paris in blood.

The revolution in France, under the direction of Lafayette and his

associates, was thorough as far as it went, yet it was conservative. It

elicited the warmest sympathies of the American people, and Washington

was rejoiced at the promise thus made of happiness for the French

nation. "The revolution which has taken place with you," he wrote to

Lafayette in October, "is of such magnitude, and of so momentous a

nature, that we hardly yet dare to form a conjecture about it. We

however trust, and fervently pray, that its consequences may prove happy

to a nation in whose fate we have so much cause to be interested, and

that its influence may be felt with pleasure by future generations." To

the Count de Rochambeau he said: "I am persuaded I express the

sentiments of my fellow-citizens, when I offer our earnest prayer that

it may terminate in the permanent honor and happiness of your government

and people."

The connection of the revolution, the first act of which we have

delineated in outline, with the administration of Washington, will be

developed hereafter. It has been given here because it was appropriate

in the order of time.

Few public events of importance occurred in the United States, after

Washington's return from his eastern tour, until the reassembling of

Congress, early in January, 1790. The day appointed for that assembling

was the fourth, but there was not a quorum of the two houses until the

eighth, when the session was formally opened by Washington in person,

with an address which he read in the senate chamber. According to a

record in his diary, it was done with considerable state, conformably to

arrangements made by General Knox and Colonel Humphreys.[25] In that

address the president recommended adequate provision for the common

defence, having special reference to Indian hostilities; an

appropriation for the support of representatives of the United States at

foreign courts and other agents abroad; the establishment of a federal

rule of naturalization; measures for the encouragement of agriculture,

manufactures, commerce, and literature; and adequate provision for the

interest on the public debt. As at the opening of the first session,

both houses now waited upon the president with formal answers to his

message, and the various recommendations contained in it were referred

to an equal number of committees. The latter practice has ever since

been adhered to.

Three important questions, involving the establishment of precedents,

were discussed and decided early in the session of 1790. The first was a

decision, in accordance with the report of a joint committee of both

houses, that the last session of each Congress should expire on the

third of March. The second was in relation to the unfinished business of

the former session. On the report of a joint committee, a rule was

established that everything might be taken up where it had been left off

at the adjournment, except bills which after having passed one house had

stopped in the other. These were to be considered as lost, and were not

to be revived except in the form of new matter. The third question was

as to the official intercourse of the heads of departments with

Congress. The question grew out of an intimation from Mr. Hamilton, the

secretary of the treasury, that he was ready to make a report on the

national debt and the support of the public credit, according to the

requirements of a resolution passed at the last session. The question

was, Shall the report be made orally or in writing? The decision was

that it should be in writing; and ever since, the heads of departments

have held intercourse with Congress only in writing, the secretary of

the treasury reporting directly to Congress, the other secretaries

through the president.

Hamilton's financial scheme was the most important subject that

occupied the attention of Congress during that session. It was submitted

to the house on the fifteenth of January. It was a most masterly

performance, and commanded the profound attention and respect of the

whole country. It boldly enunciated principles based upon the broad

foundation of common honesty, by which, in the opinion of the secretary,

the United States ought to be governed in relation to the public debt.

The report opened with an able and comprehensive argument in elucidation

and support of these principles the fundamental ground of the whole

argument being the justice and policy of making adequate provision for

the final payment of the federal and state debts.

These debts amounted in the aggregate to a large sum. Hamilton estimated

the foreign debt due to the account of France, to private creditors in

Holland, and a small sum in Spain, at about eleven and three quarter

millions of dollars. This sum included the arrears of interest (more

than a million and a half of dollars) which had accumulated on the

French and Spanish loans since 1786, and installments of the French loan

overdue. The domestic debt, including interest to the end of 1790, and

an allowance for unliquidated claims of two millions of dollars

(principally unredeemed continental money), he estimated at about

forty-two and a half millions, nearly a third part of which was arrears

of interest.

The domestic debt was due originally to officers and soldiers of the war

for independence; farmers who had furnished supplies for the army, or

suffered losses by seizure of their products; and capitalists who had

loaned money to the continental Congress during the war, or spent their

fortunes freely in support of the cause. These were sacred debts; but

the position into which the paper which represented these outstanding

claims had fallen, afforded a specious argument against the propriety of

paying their nominal value to the holders. So long had public justice

delayed in liquidating these claims, that they had sunk to one sixth of

their nominal value, and a greater portion of the paper was held by

speculators. It thus lost the power with which it appealed to the public

sympathy when in the hands of the original holders, and there was a

general sentiment against a full liquidation of these claims. It was

therefore suggested that the principle of a scale of depreciation should

be applied to them, as had been done in the case of the continental

money, in paying them--that is, at the rates at which they had been

purchased by the holders. It was especially urged that this principle

should be applied to the arrears of interest, then accumulated to an

amount almost equal to one half the principal.

In his report, Hamilton took strong grounds against this idea, as being

unjust, dishonest, and impolitic. In the latter point of view, he justly

argued that public credit was essential to the new federal government,

and without it sudden emergencies, to which all governments as well as

individuals are exposed, could not be met promptly and efficiently.

Public credit, he said, could only be established by the faithful

discharge of public debts in strict conformity to the terms of contract.

In the case in question the contract was to pay so much money to the

holders of the certificates, or to their assignees. This was plain, and

nothing but a full and faithful discharge of the nominal value of the

debt could satisfy the contract. Thus he argued concerning the

principal, and he applied the same logic to the accumulated overdue

interest. It ought to have been paid when due, according to contract,

and was as much an honest debt as the principal.

Hamilton went further. He strongly recommended the assumption of the

state debts by the federal government, amounting in the aggregate,

overdue interest included, to about twenty-five millions of dollars.

Both descriptions of debts, he argued, were contracted for the same

objects, and were in the main the same. Indeed, a great part of the

particular debts of the states had arisen from assumptions by them on

account of the Union, and it was most equitable that there should be the

same measure of retribution for all. The secretary considered such

assumption "a measure of sound policy and substantial justice." The

entire debt, federal and state, foreign and domestic, for the payment of

which he recommended measures of provision, was almost eighty millions

of dollars.

The secretary, after giving the whole subject a thorough investigation

and discussion, proposed that a loan should be opened to the full amount

of the debt, federal and state, upon the following terms:--

"_First._ That for every one hundred dollars subscribed payable in

the debt, as well interest as principal, the subscriber should be

entitled to have two thirds founded on a yearly interest of six per

cent. (the capital redeemable at the pleasure of the government by

the payment of the principal), and to receive the other third in

lands of the western territory at their then actual value. Or,

"_Secondly._ To have the whole sum funded at a yearly interest of

four per cent., irredeemable by any payment exceeding five dollars

upon the hundred, per annum, both on account of principal and

interest, and to receive as a compensation for the reduction of

interest fifteen dollars and eighty cents, payable in lands as in

the preceding case. Or,

"_Thirdly._ To have sixty-six and two thirds of a dollar funded at a

yearly interest of six per cent., irredeemable also by any payment

exceeding four dollars and two thirds of a dollar upon the hundred,

per annum, on account both of principal and interest; and to have

at the end of ten years twenty-six dollars and eighty-eight cents,

funded at the like interest and rate of redemption."

In addition to these propositions, the creditors were to have an option

of vesting their money in annuities on different plans; and it was also

recommended to open a loan at five per cent. for ten millions of

dollars, payable one half in specie and the other half in the debt,

irredeemable by any payment exceeding six dollars upon the hundred, per

annum, both of principal and interest.

The secretary also proposed an augmentation of the duties on imported

wines, spirits, tea, and coffee, to enable the treasury to meet the

increased demand that would be made upon it; and a duty on domestic

spirits was also recommended. Serious trouble grew out of the latter

measure when adopted and put in force.

Hamilton's report, sent to Congress on the fourteenth of January, was

taken up for consideration in the house of representatives on the

twenty-eighth; but action was postponed until the eighth of February.

Its propositions, especially the one relating to the assumption of the

state debts, were vehemently opposed, chiefly because of their tendency

to a centralization of power, as giving an undue influence to the

general government, and as being of doubtful constitutionality. Many in

different parts of the Union thought they saw great political evil in

this financial union of the states; and Virginia, above all others, most

earnestly opposed the scheme. It was believed that the funding of the

state debts would materially benefit the northern states, in which was

almost the entire capital of the country, while the southern states

could see no benefit for themselves.

Finally, on the ninth of March, a bill predicated upon the secretary's

report passed in committee of the whole by a small majority, and went to

the house for discussion. This continued from time to time until August,

when, on the fourth, an act was passed embodying essentially the several

propositions in Hamilton's report. It authorized the president to borrow

twelve millions of dollars, if so much were found necessary, for

discharging the arrears of interest and the overdue installments of the

foreign debt, and for the paying off the whole of that debt, could it be

effected on advantageous terms, the money thus borrowed to be reimbursed

within fifteen years. It also authorized the opening of a new loan,

payable in certificates of the domestic debt at par value, and in

continental bills of credit at the rate of one hundred for one.

Certificates were to be issued for subscriptions in the interest of the

domestic debt to the full amount, redeemable at the pleasure of the

government, and bearing interest at the rate of three per cent., the

interest to be paid quarterly, and to commence with the first day of

January, 1791; all interest becoming due on continental certificates, up

to that time, to be funded as above. Subscriptions in the principal of

the domestic debt were to bear interest at six per cent.; but upon one

third of the amount, entitled "deferred stock," the interest was not to

commence till the year 1800. This interest was not to be redeemable at a

faster rate than eight dollars upon the hundred, annually, including the

yearly interest, and it was left to the option of the public creditors

to subscribe, or not, to this new loan.

The amount of state debts assumed by the general government, by the act,

was twenty-one millions, five hundred thousand dollars. For this the act

authorized an additional loan, payable in certificates of the state

debts, which were distributed among the states in specific

proportions;[26] but no certificates were to be received except such as

had been issued for services or supplies during the war.

"The effect of this measure," says Marshall, "was great and rapid. The

public paper suddenly rose, and was for a short time above par. The

immense wealth which individuals acquired by this unexpected

appreciation could not be viewed with indifference. Those who

participated in its advantages regarded the author of a system to which

they were so greatly indebted, with an enthusiasm of attachment to which

scarcely any limits were assigned. To many others, this adventitious

collection of wealth in particular hands was a subject rather of chagrin

than of pleasure; and the reputation which the success of his plans gave

to the secretary of the treasury was not contemplated with unconcern."

The discussions which Hamilton's report produced in and out of

Congress, in the public press and in private circles, fearfully agitated

the country, and called forth the first regular and systematic

opposition to the principles on which the affairs of the Union were

administered. In this discussion Washington was greatly interested, yet

he avoided all semblance of participation in it. He heartily approved of

Hamilton's plan for restoring the public credit and laying the

foundation of national policy, as the most perfect that human wisdom had

yet devised; but he concealed his opinions in his own breast, except

when in private conversation with intimate friends. He looked with

ineffable disgust upon the sectional jealousies which the discussion

revealed; and in an able letter to Dr. Stuart, written toward the close

of March, in reply to remarks of that gentleman concerning a spirit of

jealousy in Virginia toward the eastern states, he spoke out warmly. The

latter section of the Union had united in favor of Hamilton's scheme,

while Virginia, for reasons already alluded to, opposed it. Stuart

wrote: "It is represented that the northern phalanx is so firmly united

as to bear down all opposition, while Virginia is unsupported even by

those whose interests are similar to hers.[27] Colonel Lee tells me that

many who were warm supporters of the government are changing their

sentiments, from a conviction of the impracticability of union with

states, whose interests are so dissimilar to those of Virginia."

"I am sorry such jealousies as you speak of should be gaining ground, or

are poisoning the minds of the southern people," Washington wrote in

reply. "But admit the fact, which is alleged as the cause of them, and

give it full scope--does it amount to more than was known to every man

of information before, at, and since the adoption of the constitution?

Was it not always believed that there are some points which peculiarly

interest the eastern states? And did any one who reads human nature, and

more especially the character of the eastern people, conceive that they

would not pursue them steadily by a combination of their force? Are

there not other points which equally concern the southern states? If

these states are less tenacious of their interest, or if, whilst the

eastern move in a solid phalanx to effect their views, the southern are

always divided, which of the two is most to be blamed? That there is a

diversity of interests in the Union none have denied; that this is the

case also in every state is equally certain; and that it even extends to

the counties of individual states can be as readily proved. Instance the

southern and northern parts of Virginia, the upper and lower parts of

South Carolina. Have not the interests of these always been at variance?

Witness the county of Fairfax. Have not the interests of the people of

that county varied, or the inhabitants been taught to believe so? These

are well-known truths; and yet, it did not follow that separation was to

result from the disagreement.

"To constitute a dispute there must be two parties. To understand it

well, both parties and all the circumstances must be fully heard; and,

to accommodate differences, temper and mutual forbearance are requisite.

Common danger brought the states into confederacy, and on their union

our safety and importance depend. A spirit of accommodation was the

basis of the present constitution. Can it be expected, then, that the

southern or eastern parts of the empire will succeed in all their

measures? Certainly not. But I will readily grant that more points will

be carried by the latter than the former, and for the reason which has

been mentioned, namely, that in all great national questions they move

in unison, whilst the others are divided. But I ask, again, which is

most blameworthy--those who see, and will steadily pursue their

interest, or those who can not see, or seeing will not act wisely? And I

will ask another question, of the highest magnitude in my mind, to wit:

if the eastern and northern states are dangerous in union, will they be

less so in separation? If self-interest is their governing principle,

will it forsake them, or be restrained by such an event? I hardly think

it would. Then, independently of other considerations, what would

Virginia, and such other states as might be inclined to join her, gain

by a separation? Would they not, most unquestionably, be the weaker

party?"

FOOTNOTES:

[25] The following is the record:--

"According to appointment, at eleven o'clock I set out for the

city-hall in my coach, preceded by Colonel Humphreys and Major

Jackson in uniform (on my two white horses), and followed by

Messrs. Lear and Nelson in my chariot, and Mr. Lewis, on horseback,

following them. In their rear were the chief justice of the United

States, and secretary of the treasury and war departments, in their

respective carriages, and in the order they are named. At the outer

door of the hall I was met by the doorkeepers of the senate and

house, and conducted to the door of the senate chamber; and passing

from thence to the chair through the senate on the right, and house

of representatives on the left, I took my seat. The gentlemen who

attended me followed and took their stand behind the senators, the

whole rising as I entered. After being seated, at which time the

members of both houses also sat I arose (as they also did) and made

my speech, delivering one copy to the president of the senate, and

another to the speaker of the house of representatives; after

which, and being a few moments seated, I retired, bowing on each

side to the assembly (who stood) as I passed, and descending to the

lower hall, attended as before, I returned with them to my house."

[26] The following were the amounts: New Hampshire, $300,000;

Massachusetts, $4,000,000; Rhode Island, $200,000; Connecticut,

$1,600,000; New York, $1,200,000; New Jersey, $800,000; Pennsylvania,

$2,200,000; Delaware, $200,000; Maryland, $800,000; Virginia,

$3,000,000; North Carolina, $2,400,000; South Carolina, $4,000,000;

Georgia, $300,000.

[27] South Carolina joined New England in favor of Hamilton's scheme.

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