JAPAN'S ASIATIC POLICY
Colonel Theodore Roosevelt once remarked to one of the authors of this
book, with his accustomed emphasis and gesture: "The United States' proper
sphere is in this hemisphere; Japan's proper sphere is in Asia." With this
text the great statesman was propounding an idea of deep political
significance. What is suggested by the text is, of course, not that either
of the two nations should resume its traditional policy of isolation or
confine its activities within the specified zones, but rather it is to the
effect that each should know its bounds and play the part which destiny
and geography have assigned to it.
In further elucidating the same idea, in his book entitled _Fear God and
Take Your Own Part_, Roosevelt says:
Japan's whole sea front, and her entire home maritime interest, bear
on the Pacific; and of the other great nations of the earth the United
States has the greatest proportion of her sea front on, and the
greatest proportion of her interest in, the Pacific. But there is not
the slightest real or necessary conflict of interests between Japan
and the United States in the Pacific. When compared with each other,
the interest of Japan is overwhelmingly Asiatic, that of the United
States overwhelmingly American. Relatively to each other, one is
dominant in Asia, the other in North America. Neither has any desire,
nor any excuse for desiring, to acquire territory on the other's
continent.
President Roosevelt had a unique opportunity of making himself thoroughly
conversant with the situation in the Far East without even setting foot on
the soil. The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of
1907, the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908, negotiated on behalf of America
by the able Secretary of State, Elihu Root, and the American recognition
of the amalgamation of Korea into the Japanese Empire in 1910, are the
outstanding acts of the Roosevelt administration wherein the foregoing
idea has been translated into deeds. These acts have proceeded from a
thorough appreciation of the history and development of modern Japan. Nor
did Colonel Roosevelt cease on his return to private life to follow
closely the march of events in Asia. He wrote many articles on Far Eastern
affairs which showed his remarkable grasp of the situation. No wonder,
then, that the Japanese people reciprocate this generous appreciation by
paying the highest respect to, and entertaining a genuine admiration for,
the late American statesman.
Korean Situation.
Recently Japan has been made the target of attack from many quarters with
reference to her Asiatic policy. The Shantung settlement, the Korean
administration, and Japan's activities in East Siberia have been severely
assailed by her critics. Patriotism imposes upon a citizen no obligation
to condone any mistakes and wrongs which his country has committed. We
deplore the gross diplomatic blunder which Japan made in 1915 in her
dealings with China, which, although perfectly justifiable in the main
proposals presented,[2] had the appearance of browbeating her to
submission by brandishing the sword. We deplore the atrocities perpetrated
in the attempt to crush the Korean uprisings. Whatever may have been the
advisability of adopting drastic measures to nip the Korean revolt in the
bud, a revolt which, if leniently dealt with, might have resulted in far
greater sufferings of the people, it can never be proffered as a plea for
the committing of inhuman deeds. Fortunately, a change of heart has come
to the Mikado's Government, which, by uprooting the militaristic regime,
is now resolutely introducing liberal measures and reforms in Korea. The
most significant of the measures is the system of local self-government
which has just been inaugurated. It creates in the provinces,
municipalities, and villages of Chosen (Korea) consultative or advisory
Councils whose functions are to deliberate on the finances and other
matters of public importance to the respective local bodies. The members
are partly elective and partly appointive. Besides these deliberative
Councils, there will be established in each municipality, county, and
island a School Council to discuss matters relating to education. This is
the sure road to complete self-government in Chosen. The same process of
evolution, which brought local autonomy and a constitutional regime to
Japan proper, which took thirty years to perfect, is now being applied to
the newly joined integral part of the Mikado's Empire. The step may be
slow, but the goal is sure. Korea's union with Japan was consummated after
the bitter experience of two sanguinary wars and the mature deliberation
of the best minds of the two peoples. Its revocation is out of the
question, unless it is demanded in the future for most cogent reasons. The
privilege of taking a hand in the government of the empire, however,
should be extended as speedily as possible to its subjects in the
peninsula.
Policy of Self-Preservation.
Many as are the pitfalls into which Japan has fallen in pursuance of her
Asiatic policy, it may confidently be asserted that the road she has
trodden has, on the whole, been straight. She can face with a clean
conscience the verdict of history. When Far Eastern history, from the
China-Japan War to the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty, is carefully
examined and rightly understood, it will be conceded that the course which
Japan has adopted, so far as its general principles are concerned, is the
one which any nation of self-respect and right motive would pursue.
Fundamentally Japan's Asiatic policy is the policy of self-preservation,
the policy of defense, and never of aggression. The Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, which was and still remains the cornerstone of Japan's Asiatic
policy, was formed for purely defensive purposes, in order to maintain
peace in Asia and safeguard mutual interests vested therein of the two
Powers. Only the "inexorable march of events" has brought Japan into
Korea, Manchuria, and East Siberia. None of the statesmen who took part in
the Meiji Restoration could ever have dreamed that their country would in
the course of time be driven through sheer force of circumstances to
plant its flag on the Asiatic mainland. It was solely in self-defense that
Japan took up arms against China and Russia. Once enmeshed in continental
politics, however, it became imperative for her to take such measures as
would ensure and consolidate the position and gains that were won through
enormous sacrifice of blood and treasure. Herein, in short, is the genesis
of Japan's present status in Korea and Manchuria.
Even at the present time, the heavy arming of Japan is a case of
necessity, so long as the Far East remains in such an unstable condition
as exists there to-day, and is not free from the menace of the Bolsheviki,
who, professing pacifism, are not slow to emulate the military machine of
Imperial Russia. Nothing could be more welcome to the Japanese people than
to see the curtailment of their naval and military equipments, for the
maintenance of which they have to bear the burden of crushing taxes, and
to behold the day when they can, without fear of interference by force of
arms, win their spurs in the Far East by engaging in the peaceful
enterprises of farming, trade, and industry.
Precisely as the position of Japan on the Asiatic mainland was the result
of arbitrament by the sword, drawn in response to a challenge made by
others, and is now upheld by the prestige of arms, her Asiatic policy,
although conceived in self-defense, came to assume in the eyes of the
outside world a semblance of military aggrandizement. As a consequence,
Japan is looked upon as a militaristic nation, bent upon conquest.
Suspicion and fear are thereby engendered. This is, to say the least,
extremely unfortunate. No stone should be left unturned to smooth the
sharp edges cut by this historical retrospect and to obliterate the
unpleasant memories of the past. No effort would be too great for Japan to
convince the world of her genuine faith that her future lies "not in
territorial and military conquest, but on the water in the carrying trade
and on land in her commercial and industrial expansion abroad." Her
erstwhile failure to dispel the suspicion of the world about her
intentions and to take it into her confidence is the root of many ills
with which she has been afflicted for the past few years.
Shantung Settlement.
The storm of criticism we have witnessed in America about the Shantung
settlement is a good illustration. Whatever part party politics in the
United States may have played in raising the furor, had Japan secured the
complete confidence of the American people, all the eloquence expended
for the denunciation of the Shantung clause in the Versailles Treaty
would surely have fallen on deaf ears. That our judgment is not wrong is
sustained by the fact that the Portsmouth Treaty evoked not a word of
protest in America. We need not remind our readers that the Treaty
concluded through the good offices of President Roosevelt and the
settlement made at Versailles are not only based upon the same principles
but are exactly identical in many respects, with this most important
exception--namely, that the former Treaty transferred to Japan the lease
of the Kwantung territory, and she still holds it, while in the latter
case she pledges herself to relinquish the leasehold of Kiaochow, thereby
restoring the complete sovereignty of China over Shantung, which had been
infringed upon by Germany. The Shantung settlement is, consequently, of a
far greater advantage to China. What Japan secures in that province is
only the same economic rights and privileges which are enjoyed by other
Powers in other parts of China. There is, therefore, no justifiable ground
for singling out Japan for attack with regard to the international
arrangement now in vogue in China. Were the complete reconstruction of
China, the re-writing of her history, to be attempted, international
justice would demand that the parties interested should all share equal
responsibilities and sacrifices. Discrimination against Japan alone is
unjust, unfair. The would-be builders of the new heaven and the new earth
can ill afford to lay the cornerstone of their edifice on such an unsafe
and unlevel ground. Manifestly, the dawn of the millennium is still far
away. We have to make the best of the world as it is. To ignore this fact
is to make the confusion in the world worse confounded. As a result of
this misapprehension of history, the Shantung question still remains in
abeyance, because of China's refusal to enter into negotiations with Japan
for the restoration of Kiaochow, thus delaying perfect accord between the
two Oriental neighbors whom destiny has called to be on the best of terms.
The foregoing interpretation of the Shantung question could not in
ordinary circumstances have failed to convince the practical American
people of the appropriateness of the Versailles settlement, were they not
tempted to indulge suspicions of Japan and, hence, ready to be easily
misled by false stories, misrepresentations, and slanders concocted by her
enemies.
Rather unfortunate, one is sometimes tempted to think, has been the
heading of the clause in the Versailles Treaty, that has readjusted the
German-China Treaty of 1898 and its sequel, and disposed of the rights and
privileges Germany had secured thereby in the province of Shantung. Like
"the three R's" and other catchwords that have in American history often
proved so powerful in misleading the people, so this curt phrase "Shantung
clause," which was seized on and skillfully utilized by Japan's critics,
has been a cause of mountains of misunderstanding that have crept into the
heads of the American people, who, as a rule, take neither time nor pains
to examine the subject carefully and thoroughly. As a result, they imagine
that the whole province of Shantung was ceded to Japan by the Peace
Treaty. Great, indeed, as is this mistake, it would be extremely difficult
to correct it, as the mischief has already been done, except by the actual
restoration of Kiaochow. Japan cannot, of course, be held responsible for
the misinterpretations of other people, but at the same time it would be
well for her to spare no effort to convince China of the wisdom of
entering into negotiations for the recovery of the leased territory, and,
consequently, of her complete sovereignty over the province of Shantung.
Until this pledge is redeemed, Japan's credit will suffer, and all her
pronouncements on justice and humanity fall flat on the ears of the world.
Cooeperation with China.
While Japan's Asiatic policy was, of course, primarily formulated to
further her own interests, it has also been inspired with the laudable
ambition of rendering a good record of stewardship over the people who
have come within the orbit of its influence. No one who knows the work
undertaken in Korea and South Manchuria will grudge a word of praise for
the record. It has bestowed untold benefits on the inhabitants. Theodore
Roosevelt, in reviewing the enterprise of Japan in Korea, grew
enthusiastic over it. The same story is repeated in South Manchuria, where
the South Manchurian Railroad Company, acting as a civilizing agent, has
wrought marvels. We should like to dwell here with patriotic pride on
these reforms and undertakings in some detail, were they not out of place
in this book.
Commendable as are these civilizing measures adopted by Japan, the fact
remains that she has signally failed in one great essential, namely, in
winning the good will and friendship of her neighbors. This is the weakest
spot in the armor of her Asiatic policy. She is thereby jeopardizing her
future. The sentiment of good will is as much a fact, though imponderable,
as any other fact, and is a force of immense consequence. How vital this
moral asset is to Japan can easily be gauged when we consider that in her
neighboring lands are found the indispensable materials for her industrial
expansion and the best market for her commerce. Japanese leaders are
thoroughly aware of the importance of this moral asset, and have done all
that they could to secure it.
The failure to win it is partly due to the pettiness of Japanese
officialdom, so bitterly complained of by Lafcadio Hearn with his fine
poetical irony--the pettiness which tries to bring everything within its
prescribed order and does not allow free play to the idiosyncrasies and
peculiar characteristics of other peoples. No less responsible are the
shortsightedness of Japanese nationals, their too great eagerness to
accomplish things within a short time, their haughtiness and overbearing
manners, which are decidedly offensive to their neighbors. The fault,
however, is not Japan's alone. There are tremendous difficulties which
confront her in the way of winning the friendship of her neighbors. The
first to reckon with are their weak and unstable qualities, which have so
sadly but too clearly been shown by their incapacity to organize a strong
nation or to put their house in order. To deal with these neighbors is no
easy task. It requires the highest statesmanship. The task is made
difficult a hundredfold by the counteracting influences exerted on Japan's
neighbors, as they are in the vortex of international rivalry. And not all
foreigners are the friends of Japan. There is a considerable number of
those who entertain, for one reason or another, a dislike of the Island
Empire, and ceaselessly labor to defeat its purpose. They paint, either
wittingly or unwittingly, every act of Japan so maliciously that it
instills fear and hatred of her among her neighbors. Undiscriminating and
unfair attacks of Japan's critics play into the hands of the jingoistic
elements in the countries concerned and make the task of the liberals
extremely difficult. Whatever the obstacles, however, they must be
surmounted, for the future road to tread is clear. Japan's salvation,
together with that of her neighbors, lies in their genuine friendship and
cooeperation.
Understanding with America.
A brief review of Japan's Asiatic policy was deemed advisable in
connection with the discussion of the Japanese-California problem in order
to see how Japan proposes to solve the question of human congestion at
home and to meet her other urgent needs. The succeeding chapters will show
what an unparalleled predicament Japan is facing. Circumscribed within a
narrowly limited area, only 16 per cent. of which is fit for cultivation,
and crowded with two thirds as many people as the entire population of the
United States, with an annual increase at the rate of seven hundred
thousand, Japan must perforce find a way whereby her people may live
contentedly and develop robustly. Emigration and industrial expansion are
manifestly the exits from the dilemma of slow strangulation. Emigration,
however, is found a difficult exit, for the Japanese find themselves
barred from the most favorably placed lands of the earth. Australia,
Canada, and the United States, with their vast lands yet sparsely peopled,
and their immense resources left unexploited, while welcoming every race
and creed of Europe, shut their doors against the Japanese.
Japan has acquiesced without much ado in the restrictive immigration
measures adopted by America and by British colonies from the higher
consideration of international comity. She saw that there lies at the
bottom of these measures the delicate question of race difference, which
requires a long period for its proper adjustment. To ignore this fact and
force the race issue, however just in principle, would be to court
disaster. It might result in the loss of friendship of her best associates
in international affairs and of the vital interests involved in that
friendship. At the same time, the "Gentlemen's Agreement" which Japan has
entered into is evidence of her sincere solicitude to avoid embarrassment
of her friends by the influx of an alien race. It is then but just that
they reciprocate the courtesy by a sympathetic understanding of Japan's
difficulties.
Barred in the east and south, it is natural for Japan to strive to find
room and employment for the surplus of her population in her neighboring
lands--the sparsely peopled Manchuria, Mongolia, and East Siberia.
Climate, cheap and efficient native labor, and the unfavorable economic
conditions, however, preclude the immigration in large numbers of Japanese
laborers into these regions. Only by building up large plants and
inaugurating big agricultural enterprises, in cooeperation with the
natives, could Japan hope to transplant in these lands some portion of her
skilled laborers and traders. During the stay of a decade and a half in
South Manchuria, limited as it was until the conclusion of the China-Japan
Treaties of 1915 to the Kwantung territory and the railway zones, Japan
can count therein as colonists only a little over 150,000 of her sons and
daughters.[3]
The only alternative which remains and which is the most feasible
proposition to absorb the energies of her crowded population is found in
her commercial and industrial expansion. Here again, however, she is
terribly handicapped, as we shall see in the next chapter, by the
conspicuous absence and scarcity of raw materials indispensable for
industrial development. Fortunately, in the territories of her
neighbors--China and East Siberia--there are vast stores of these
materials untouched and unused, the unfolding of which will not only meet
her wants, but will equally benefit her neighbors. The supreme importance
of winning their good will thereby becomes accentuated a thousandfold, for
without their willing cooeperation nothing can be accomplished. In the
participation of the benefits accruing from the development of her
neighbors' natural resources Japan need not ask for special privileges.
The faithful and effective execution of the "open door" policy is all she
requires. Here she stands on common ground with Occidental Powers. She
entertains no fear of the outcome of the "open door" policy, for she is in
a position to secure every advantage accruing from its operation.
Japan's Proper Sphere of Activity.
As Colonel Roosevelt pointed out, "Japan's proper sphere is in Asia," and
it is but proper that her activities therein develop in intensity and
vigor. She is entitled to use every peaceful and legitimate means that is
open to her for the extension of her influence in the Far East, for it is
there that she can assure herself of her right to live. America and Great
Britain, while reserving to themselves the right of opening or closing
their own doors to the Japanese, will not be playing a fair and even game
if they grudge to recognize this fact. In the strict adherence on the part
of Japan to the spirit which gave birth to the "Gentlemen's Agreement,"
and in the just appreciation on the part of America of Japan's
difficulties at home and abroad, lies one of the fundamentals of an
equitable solution of the Japanese-California problem.