The gild as it appears in Paris in the 13th century, M. Lespinasse in
his Introduction to Étienne Boileau’s _Livre des Métiers_, defines as “a
combination of individuals having the right to carry on an industrial
profession, composed of masters, _valets_, and apprentices, and bound by
oath to observe the prescribed regulations, and to respect the authority
of the Jurés in their supervisory functions.” The gilds in documents of
the time are called somewhat loosely _corporations_, _corps de métier_,
_métier_, _commun du métier_, _ghilde_, and less correctly _charité_ or
_confrérie_.[1] The gild was a fortress to which the workman rallied
and from which he beat off assailants in the form of feudal lords or
foreign trade competitors. Its primary function was to safeguard the
rights of labor, at any period none too stable, and in the complicated
social organization of the later Middle Ages, decidedly precarious.
Privileges had to be fought for and wrested from the overlord of the
community, be he king or noble, and a definite regulation, though still
in its prescriptions onerous, was preferable to a haphazard system of
‘taxation,’ subject only to the sanity or rapacity of count, king or
bishop. Foreign laborers and merchants, too, the narrow economic vision
of the period pointed out as hostile to the well-being of the city-gild,
and so exclusion by legislation is an important article in its “foreign
policy.” Against enemies within their own ranks a sharp guard had to be
maintained; ignorant practitioners or a superfluity of apprentices might
sadly damage the gild’s reputation for work which was “good and loyal.”
The organization of the 13th century gild seems to find its motives in
the desire to establish a definite and firm control over the _métier_,
and to establish, so far as custom and law would sanction it, a monopoly
over the commodities produced.
The question of the political significance of the gild may be set aside
at the start. It has been a difference of opinion which came first,
the gild or the commune, and whether there was a causal relationship
between the two. The fact is that most of the gilds—as organizations—had
no political share in such activities as elections. The gild was not
the cause of the commune; the commune did not originate the gild.
M. Fagniez[2] has said “Le mouvement communal ne fut pour rien dans
cette émancipation de la classe ouvrière; elle était terminée quand il
commença.” It is interesting to note, however, the prominence which,
under the gild régime, certain _bourgeois_ and tradesmen attain. For
example, the provost of the watermen of Paris came to rival in power the
king’s provost of Paris.
It is outside the province of this paper to discuss the somewhat vexed
question of the origin of the gild. Various theories have been vigorously
championed, and a mere mention of them with a few facts as to the early
appearance of the gilds will suffice. One theory maintains a survival
from the Roman _College_, another as an analogue to the Germanic _guild_,
and the third as an organization under the direction of the feudal lord.
It is curious to note how in 1725 M. Félibién in his “Histoire de la
Ville de Paris,” misinterpreted the origin of the _Livre des Métiers_
on the basis of this latter theory, attributing too much of the slow
development of an _organism_ to the shaping hand of Boileau. He says:
“E. B. _rangea_ tous les marchands et les artisans en differens corps
de communautez, sous le titre de confrairies. Ce fut le premier _qui
leur dressa_ des Statuts, qu’il fit ensuite approuver dans une assemblée
des principaux bourgeois de Paris. Les prévosts successeurs de Boileau
adjoustèrent de nouveaux réglemens aux premiers, et il en fut fait en
recueil.”... The prevalent theory of the gilds’ origin is that they were
born spontaneously from the needs of the people, that they were a natural
line of development for youthful industry, in self-protection, to take.
Charters or privileges claimed by the gilds date from the 11th century,
though they are most abundant in the 13th. The most ancient charter
published in the _Recueil des Ordonnances_ is that of the chandlers of
Paris, dated 1061. This document, however, is now supposed to have been
forged in the 15th century. From 1121 dates the first charter of the
_marchands de l’eau de Paris_. In 1160, Louis the VII gave to Thèce,
wife of Yrves Lacohe, and her heirs, the ‘mastery’ of five gilds which
dealt with leathers, the tanners, the curriers, the shoe-makers, the
leather-dressers, and the purse-makers. In 1162 come new privileges
granted in regulation of the bakers. In 1183 Philip Augustus rented _a
cens_ four houses which he had confiscated from the Jews, to the drapers’
gild. A lord in 1219 sold the confrérie of cloth-merchants a house, and
gave them the leases of several adjoining houses.
The book which is the object of this study—the _Livre des Métiers_, owes
its origin to a capable official of Louis IX, Étienne Boileau. He was
appointed prévôt of Paris about 1260.[3] This official had the rank of
the first bailiff of France. His ‘office’ was the Châtelet, where he
judged in person the greater part of the civil and criminal cases in
Paris and the _vicomté_; he was judge of appeal from the feudal nobles
and ecclesiastics who still had fiefs in Paris. He had charge of the
military service, of the policing, the finance and ‘justice’ of Paris
and its suburbs. This official, or the holder of this office, “who
administered with firmness and loyalty,” wished to correct the faults
incident to the jurisdiction over the gilds, by establishing in writing
the ‘constitution’ of each gild. The masters of the gilds accordingly
presented their regulations, and the result is a register of the laws
and customs of 101 craft-gilds of Paris.[4] Some of the privileges or
implied immunities pretend exceeding antiquity. The stone-cutters claim
immunity from the duty of the watch from the time of Charles Martel.
Upholsterers cite privileges granted by Louis the VII, and the bakers
claim from Philip Augustus the right to exclude ‘foreign’ bakers (i.e.
bakers from outside Paris), from the markets except on Saturdays. What we
have then in this invaluable _Livre_ is a cross-section of the commercial
and industrial life of Paris in the third quarter of the 13th century. A
study of this manuscript will show a vivid and complete picture of the
working class, and, by implication, of the upper nobility’s commercial
habits.
The gilds were composed of three grades of individuals: apprentices,
_valets_, and masters. The term _ouvrier_ was applied in general to all
the divisions, even more loosely than our term _workman_.
The apprentice, though considered as a member of the gild, was not of
the corporation until his apprenticeship was over. The term was begun
by a contract between master and aspirant. Usually this contract was
oral, because the writing of a document was too expensive a process.
At any rate, it was always a mutual engagement, sworn to, before the
Jurés, an engagement which imposed on both parties mutual duties which
neither should attempt to evade. A regulation concerning the agreement
runs as follows: “The master who takes an apprentice should summon to
the ceremony of the contract two masters and two _valets_, to hear the
agreement made between master and apprentice, and it is fitting that the
_master who guards the gild_ should be called also.” The Jurés before
authorizing the contract, were supposed to make careful inquiries as to
the ability and the financial position of the master.
About forty of the gilds were allowed to have as many apprentices as
they liked. Among these were the corn-dealers, the gold-beaters, the
ale-brewers, green-grocers, farriers, drawers of iron wire, millers,
shoe-makers and the _barilliers_. Usually, however, the number was
limited to one or two. The mercers, the fullers, weavers of silk-stuffs,
knife-handle and blade makers were allowed to have two, while the
rope-makers, pewterers, precious stone dealers, braid-makers, drapers,
goldsmiths, and shield-makers contented themselves with one. The
motives for such limitation were at least _double_: the altruistic
reason was that the master should not have too many to teach well; the
self-protective reason was that the gild should at no time be swamped in
competition by too many (prospective) masters.
The term of apprenticeship was also most scrupulously fixed. The
conditions are usually a definite term without payment of fee or a term
gradually lessened according to the increase in the size of the fee. The
haberdashers and the pewterers could fix the duration of apprenticeship
at will; other terms vary from 3 to 8, to 10-12 years, with fees varying
from 20 Parisian _sous_ (5 fr.) to 100 Parisian _sous_ (20 fr.), by means
of which the apprentice could buy off part of his time of service.
There seems, however, to have been no attempt to make the time directly
proportionate to the costliness of the raw material and the difficulty
of the process, or the skill required in the craft. The rope-makers
require an apprenticeship of 4 years, the brass-wire drawers 6 years, the
chest-makers 7 years, the makers of iron shields 8 years, the curriers
of shoe-leather 9, the jewellers 10, and the coral and shell bead-makers
12 years. The wool-weavers demand 4 years plus 4 _livres_, 5 years and
3 _livres_, 6 years and one _livre_, or 7 years without fee. Power over
the length of term resided of course in the hands of the masters, and
the rules contain only the minimum requirement. We read, “No one can
or ought to take or have more than two apprentices, and he cannot take
them for less than 7 years of service and twenty _sous_ of Paris, which
apprentices must give to the masters; or at 7 years without money, but
more money and longer service he can require if need be.” How irrational
the terms were may be seen from the fact that while the goldsmith’s term
is 10 years, the brass-wire drawers (a far less “skilled” gild) required
10 years and 20 _sous_, or 12 years and no fee, and that of three
bead-making gilds, one demanded 6 years and 46 _sous_, another 10 years
and 46 _sous_, and the third 12 years without possible shortening of the
term. If the apprentice, however, bought off part of his regular term,
the master was not permitted to take another apprentice till the complete
period was over. An extra apprentice was sometimes allowed if the wife
of a master knew the trade. “No one of the craft aforesaid can have more
than one apprentice, and if he has a wife, can have only one if she does
not know the trade, but if the man and the woman know the trade, they can
have two apprentices, but they can have as many _valets_ as they wish.”
Among the masons, a Juré could have two apprentices, the other masters
could employ only one.
Exceptions to rules of apprenticeship were made for the sons of masters,
or of their wives, and in this beginning of family privileges, we see
foreshadowed the tyranny of the close-corporation control of the gild
in latter centuries. All the sons of the master and his wife, if she
knows the trade, may rise to the ‘mastery’ usually with no fixed term of
apprenticeship. If the children were illegitimate, no privileges were
granted them. In the case of the goldsmith we see still wider family
privileges, for we read “of his lineage and of the lineage of his
wife, whether distant or close, he can have as many (apprentices) as he
wishes.” The wool-weaver was allowed in his house two large looms and one
small one for himself and for each of his married sons, and one loom each
for a brother and a nephew, if they “knew how to work with their hands.”
In the gild of the iron shield-makers and several others, appears the
obligation of teaching the son of a poor master or his orphans free.
The conditions of the contract of apprenticeship shed much light on
the lives of these little workmen, and the statutes recognize the
possibility of their being led astray by “leur folour et leur joliveté.”
The apprentice, we are told, should obey all the orders of the master,
and not complain without justice of the master’s oppression to the
_prud’hommes_ of the gild. He had to clean the workshop, run errands
for the family and for the business. That apprentices were not always
docile, nor their circumstances congenial, the many rules dealing with
their flight suggest. An apprentice who had taken flight from his master
could not be received into the workshop of another member of the gild
until the complete period of his apprenticeship contract had elapsed.
The pâter-notriers had to wait a year and a day after the flight of an
apprentice, and the tablet-makers 26 weeks, before taking in another.
After three attempts to escape, all obligation between gild and
apprentice ceased. “And this regulation the _prud’hommes_ of the gild
make to restrain the folly and jollity of the apprentices, for they do
great harm to their masters and themselves, when they run away; for when
the apprentice is enrolled to learn, and runs away in a month or two, he
forgets as much as he has learned, and thus he wastes his time and does
harm to his master.” The wool-weavers and the locksmiths insisted that
the escaping apprentice pay the master what his training had cost.
The statutes recognize the right of the master to sell the apprentice
to another master under certain circumstances. “No cutler can sell his
apprentice unless he (the master) lies on a bed of sickness (_lit de
langueur_), or is going across seas, or is leaving the gild for good or
does it because of poverty.”
The master’s obligations to the apprentice consisted in lodging, feeding
and clothing him and in teaching him the trade. That masters did not
always scrupulously abide by these duties, various law-suits and
_régles_ attest. Only the tablet-makers and the important wool-merchants,
provide, in their statutes, for a defence of the apprentice’s rights.
There we find that if the master fails in his duties, the gild masters,
upon complaint of the apprentice, “must admonish the said master, and if
he does not comply, they must seek out a new master for the apprentice.”
In another place, we learn of a fine imposed on the master who provoked
his apprentice to flight.
A decree from the Châtelet: 3 Sept., 1399, gives a living vignette
of these domestic relations a century after our period.[5] “We have
enjoined and commanded the said master that he treat the said Larin,
his apprentice, as the son of a _prud’homme_ should be treated, and
that he abide by the matters contained in the said contract, without
having him beaten by his wife, but that he should beat him himself if he
misbehaved.” In the same year also a father succeeded in breaking his
son’s contract because the goldsmith, the boy’s master, by hitting him
with a bunch of keys, had “made a hole in his head.”
The possible marriage of an apprentice during the term of his service is
provided for thus: “If any apprentice marries during the time that he has
promised to serve his master, and does not wish to eat dinner and supper
with his master, he ought to have four _deniers_ every working day for
his support.”
It is not very clear from our texts, whether an examination at the end
of his term was usual or infrequent. Only rarely is the demand for a
_chef-d’oeuvre_ mentioned. The saddle-bow makers claim that after an
apprentice has made his _chef-d’oeuvre_ he should become more important
in the workshop “so that his master may not send him out into the city to
fetch his bread and his wine just like a boy.” The goldsmith’s statutes
provide that if he becomes skilful enough to pay his expenses and to
earn 100 _sous_ a year, he may be freed from his contract and allowed
to earn a salary. At the end of the period, however, _any_ apprentice
must declare before the Jurés on his oath that he had fulfilled his term
according to contract.
To our mind, the apprentice system here revealed does not seem devised
for the best interest of the child. Too much power for good or ill lies
with the master. If he so wishes, there seems to be little to prevent
his letting his charge remain in a state of childish and unprofessional
ignorance. The long term of service, the wide power of master upon man
seem devised to add to the master’s profits, not to his charge’s skill.
The _valet_, _sergent_ or _aloué_, i.e. hired man, was an individual
who had finished his term of service as apprenticeship but had not yet
risen to the dignity, as master, of having an establishment of his own.
Women of this grade, in gilds to which they were admitted, were called
_chambrières_ or _meschinettes_. Usually the master could have as many
_valets_ as he wished, but occasionally the number was limited so as
to prevent rich and attractive workshops getting many _valets_, and,
accordingly, something approaching a monopoly of the trade.
A _valet_ who had been trained outside Paris had to present evidence that
he had done the preliminary term elsewhere. Of such a man, too, it was
possible to require a kind of surety or testimonial of a fair dismissal
from a former employer. Evidently the narrow mediaeval view of protection
of home industries led to the discriminations against workmen from
outside, for we read, “It is ordered and decreed that no person of the
said gild should hire any foreign man so long as he can find a workman
who is a member of the gild.” Care was taken too that disgrace and
scandal should not fall upon the gild through _valets_ of bad character.
“_Rêveurs_, scoundrels, murderers, knaves, thieves, men of ill fame” are
stipulated as improper candidates, and a wool-weaver whose relations with
a woman were a by-word “was sent out of the city and forbidden the trade
until he should amend his character.”
The length of the term of hire is not definitely stated in our
regulations, and it varied from a day, a week, a month, to a year. In the
morning all unemployed _valets_ assembled early in a designated street
or square. There they were to stay until the bell from a certain church
sounded. No private individual could hire an artisan. If a bargain was
made, the _valet_ went to the house of his employer at dawn and stayed
under usual conditions till sunset. The hours accordingly varied largely,
from 14 hours in summer to 8 in winter. Very few _valets_ lodged and
ate with their patron. They ‘went out’ in search of their noonday-meal
with the provision that, after it, they should not loiter to wait for
a fellow-workman. If the gild was one which allowed night-work, and
the master desired it of him, the _aloué_ must comply for a raise of
pay. Sometimes the _valets_ rebelled against this compulsion, and were
threatened by the magistrates for this attempt at industrial freedom. In
only one case is vacation mentioned, but as we shall see in discussing
the _chômage_, there was little need of it. The brass-wire drawers
stipulate, however, that the workmen may have a vacation in the month of
August if they wish.
Women were admitted to membership in gilds where their delicate skill and
taste made them useful. In 1292 the group dealing with embroidery was
composed of 81 women and 12 men.
Occasionally conditions of employment are stated with more detail. A
rule of the sword-cutlers runs this: “No[6] master should take a _valet_
to work unless he has five sets of clothes with him in order that the
workmen may look neat in case the nobles, counts, barons, knights, and
other good folk should at any time come into the work-room.” The _valet_
could not be dismissed unreasonably, and rarely the provision is made
that two _valets_ and two masters must agree upon the dismissal before
it could take effect. After a year and a day, the _valet_ could have his
wife come and work with him, if the gild admitted women.
A considerable distinction between masters and _valets_ already existed,
though in the smaller organizations the gulf was less apparent. There
were no large factories in the modern meaning, and in a small workshop
conditions of equality were more likely to obtain. Several facts show,
however, that the _valets_ in some places were beginning to feel
themselves a distinct industrial class. Infrequently they had their
own confrérie and their own jurés. The masters in some cities already
foresaw the possibilities of a kind of class-struggle, and at[7] Beauvais
punished with imprisonment and fine men who attempted combinations in
the hope of raising wages. In 1280 at Ypres, workmen rebelled against an
ordinance adding one hour to their working day, and in their rioting
killed the mayor. Of course they were severely punished. (But how modern
these actions prove our industrial class of the Middle Ages to be.)
The obtaining of the mastership or mastery of a gild, i.e. the right
to set up a workshop, to go into business, depended on certain
qualifications in the aspirants, and certain formal ceremonies,
necessitated by the organization of the gild, and its (frequent) feudal
relationship to the king or his official. The first requirement was
skill, acquired during service as apprentice and _valet_, capital,
upright character and good conduct. Most of the sections have such an
article as “Quiconques veut estre de tel mestier, estre le peut pœrtant
qu’il sache le mestier, et ait de coi,” and an article of the _drapiers_
reads: “Il conviendra qu’il sache faire le mestier de touz poinz, le soy,
sans conseil au ayde d’autruy et qu’il à ce examiné par les gardes du
mestier.” The cook’s regulations require that the son of a master have an
expert in his bake-house until the masters judged the son skilful enough.
This article was evidently designed to counteract the carelessness of
regulation of the apprentice-work of sons. The formal requirement was the
purchase of the right to trade. At the most 25 gilds were required to
purchase this right, the rest were “free.” Among these who purchased were
the bakers, the criers of wine, the retailers of bread and vegetables,
the farriers, the cutlers, locksmiths, weavers of silk cloth, masons,
hose-makers, poulterers, potters, old-clothes dealers, purse-makers,
saddlers, shoe-makers, glovers, and fishermen. The necessity was created
by the fact that about 30 of the gilds were fiefs of the king, and
accordingly could be reserved for himself, or bestowed upon his favorite
officers. In general, however, those the king retained for himself,
notably, the dealers in food-necessities, were free of purchase.
After purchasing the right from the king, the aspirant had usually to
present himself within a week to be admitted to the corporation. At a
solemn meeting the masters or jurés “read loudly” and explained the
regulations. The recipient of the privilege then swore by the saints’
relics that he would keep the laws and carry on his profession carefully
and loyally. Initiation fees were of course variable; the criers paid the
jurés 4 _deniers_ (0 fr. .45), the silk-cloth weavers and hose-makers
10 _sous_ (2 fr. .50); the _épiciers_ paid 5 _sous_[8] _pour boire_ to
their companions. The time for paying this fee also varied. The curriers
of shoe-leather were allowed to pay their fee a year and a day after
establishment, while the bakers were restrained only by a limit of four
years. The widow of a master was generously permitted to carry on the
business in his stead, though usually if she remarried a stranger, i.e. a
man outside the gild, she forfeited this right.
M. Lespinasse makes an interesting distinction in affirming that the
mastership was not a rank, but a privilege; it was not a case of ‘once
a master, always a master.’ Upon the relinquishment of the activity and
privileges implied, a master became an artisan, and, for instance, the
hose-makers assert that 35 masters among them have fallen into poverty.
The master with all his attempts to protect his position and rights, bore
the not-light burden of taxation from which the _valets_ were directly,
at least, exempt.
The internal administration of the gild was performed by officers called
_jurés_ or _prud’hommes_, and the external relation of the gild in its
dealings with other gilds or the city was supervised by the Crown or the
Crown official who held the gild in fief. The jurés were also called
_gardes_, _syndics_, _éswards_, _élus_. The typical method of choice was
the election of a certain number by the masters of the gild, and their
ratification and investiture by the Provost of Paris or other Crown
official. Sometimes, however, the Provost or Crown officer appointed
the _guards_ with no semblance of suggestion, in theory at least, from
the gild itself. Occasionally the election was wholly in the hands of
the _community_. Sometimes the departing _prud’hommes_ nominated their
successors. Among the haberdashers, failure to serve, if one were
elected, called down upon him a fine of 10 livres (134 fr.). The term
of office was usually a year. The goldsmiths, however, changed their
officers only every three years. The fullers, who had two masters and
two _valets_ as officers, changed them at Christmas and at St. John’s
Day. Before the Provost, the _valets_ named two masters, and the masters
two _valets_, for service, a _nice_ balance in the interest of just
administration. Women were allowed offices for such gilds as they were
important in. The workers in silk-stuffs had three masters and three
mistresses; the weavers of kerchiefs three _maîtresses_.
In being invested with office, the jurés, for instance, of the bakers
swore on the relics of the saints that they would ‘guard the gild’
carefully and loyally, and that in appraising bread, they would spare
neither relatives nor friends, nor condemn anyone wrongly through hatred
or ill-feeling. The chiefs of the gilds scrutinized the quality of
the products, denounced frauds and infractions of the rules, presided
at solemn conclaves of the gild, and represented it before the law.
They presided at the contract of apprenticeship, received the oaths of
artisans and masters, and administered the funds of the corporation. In
case of appeal from the jurisdiction of the jurés, the Provost of Paris
was the first authority, and above him was the _Parlement de Paris_. On
the lands of a feudal lord, the latter usually retained the privilege of
administering petty justice.
The question of remuneration to the jurés for loss of time naturally
arises. Usually a definite fraction of the fines was awarded to them.
Besides, too, the honor which accrued to them, exemptions from the duty
of the watch and from certain of the fines of the trade, are mentioned.
Most gilds had officers of only one rank upon whom all the duties fell.
Occasionally discrimination was made, and two superior officers chosen
from the masters held the power of handing down decisions while their
_valet_-assistants exercised supervision, and reported infractions of
the rules to the masters. Perhaps the most frequent number of _jurés_
in a gild was two or four. The armorers, the iron-shield-makers, the
potters, the rope-makers, bead-makers, gold-beaters, braid-makers,
spinners of silk, etc., had two, the fullers, the tallow-chandlers four.
The brass-shield makers were so few that they did not elect a juré, but
asked the Provost to hear their cases directly. Only one _guard_ is
mentioned in the statutes of the clasp-makers and the flower-hat makers.
The curriers have three, the farriers six, the goldsmiths two or three,
the head-dress makers eight, and later only four. The bakers and the
retailers of fruit and vegetables had twelve officers.
The most feudal feature of the craft-gild organization is, perhaps, the
dependence of the gild on the Crown or its officials or vassals. Most
of the gilds were dependent upon (relevaient à) the Prévôt de Paris.
To him the _prud’hommes_ carried complaints, against other gilds, for
example, and it was he who appointed a _prud’homme_ to execute for him
the functions suggested above. We have seen that Louis the Younger
granted to a woman the ‘mastery’ of five gilds, which remained enfieffed
to the sixteenth century. The grand pantler was the judge of the bakers,
and each year appointed a master to look after the gild. The grand
chamberlain looked after the wool-weavers, haberdashers, tailors and
upholsterers, and others who had to do with clothing and furnishings; the
cup-bearer (_échanson_) had the wine merchants, and the _maréchal_ the
smiths, farriers, helmeters, locksmiths and other iron-workers. The grand
butler tried to keep order among the wine-shop keepers. To his mason,
Guillaume à Saint Patrie, the king confided the masons, stone-breakers,
plasterers, etc.
Exact hours for work were not set down; the time of the world in which
the artisan lived was too entirely dominated by the custom of the Church
to permit of hours being designated as 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. “No one of the
gild,” we read, “ought to work on holy days which the people of the city
keep, nor on Saturdays during _charnage_ (i.e. the time during which it
was permitted to eat meat) after Vespers, nor after Compline on Saturdays
during Lent, nor at night at any time of the year.” During Lent, Vespers
fell at 6 o’clock, and Compline at 9. _Charnage_ was used loosely to mean
not only the period during which meat could be eaten, but also the period
of short days, while _Carême_ meant the period of long days. Night work
was expressly forbidden for goldsmiths, sheath-makers, weavers, braid-,
chest-, buckles-, beads-makers, pewterers, lamp-makers and locksmith’s,
“for the light at night does not suffice for the trade[s] aforesaid.”
Millers and brewers could work day and night, and it was permitted to all
farriers (but not to locksmiths and cutlers), to goldsmiths, lamp-makers,
brass-wire drawers, to cast, if need be, during the night, inasmuch as
the process sometimes lasted a day or a week. The restriction upon night
work was ineffective if the work were for the household of the King, the
Queen, the Princes of the blood, the Bishop of Paris, and other great
Lords.
The Church’s observance of Sundays and fast-days (holy days) caused among
the gilds much cessation from work—_chômage_. The eve of Sunday and
important holy days, work was stopped at _Nones_ or _Compline_. On Sunday
the baths were not heated, on Sunday the bakers did not make bread, and
kept, besides, twenty-six fast-days and the day of their Patron Saint.
The goldsmiths, the haberdashers, the felt-hat makers, took turns within
the gild in keeping their shops open on Sunday. The _barilliers_ and
the armorers worked without restriction on the ground that their work
was vitally important to noblemen. A saddler could repair a shield or a
harness on Sunday, and rose-chaplets could be made at any time “during
the season of roses.”
Inasmuch as the policy of the gilds proscribed the action of free
competition, it was necessary for them, in order to sustain their
reputation, to provide in some way, that the products should be exactly
what they pretended to be. To this end they legislated carefully as to
the quantity and quality of raw material to be used, and provided for
supervision through the stages of manufacture to the sale of the finished
product. The _cervoise_ (a drink somewhat resembling ale) should have no
constituents save grain and water. The beater of metal-leaves must have
a certain alloy of gold in his silver leaves. The bead-makers must not
string beads which are not perfectly rounded. The haberdashers complain
of the appearance of “several pieces of bad work to the damage of all the
common weal, every day, by reason of the lack of proper restriction.”
At Amiens,[9] the locksmiths were forbidden, for fear of thievery, to
make a key unless the lock was produced, and the butchers to _souffler
la viande_, to mix tallow in the lard, to sell dog, cat or horse flesh.
In Paris, boxes whose locks were made with ‘hinges’ were summarily
burned, and fines were incurred for putting old locks on new furniture
and new locks on old furniture. Trimmings of silver were forbidden on
bone knife-handles for fear the makers should sell them for ivory, and
knife-handles must not be covered with silk, brass- or pewter-wire,
lead or iron, because inside, they were only deal, and might deceive an
ignorant buyer. Hemp and flax must not be used in the same rope.[10] If a
tailor spoilt a valuable piece of cloth by bad cutting, and the _gardes_
ascertained it, he had to make restitution to the client, and pay a fine,
3 _sous_ to the king and 2 _sous_ to the _confrérie_. If an artisan
did the spoiling, he paid the master, and worked for one day, without
pay, for the _confrérie_.[11] Chandlers seem to have been especially
open to temptation. Too heavy a weight of wick is expressly regulated
against in the provision that four pounds of tallow should carry only a
quarter-pound of wick. Wax tapers must not be adulterated with tallow.
Gilds in danger of usurping each other’s business were jealous of
privileges. A tailor must not mend old clothes, nor a rag-man make new
clothes. A curious controversy arose from the fact that clothes restored
by the old-clothes dealers were frequently mistaken for new. It was
finally decided that this latter gild must not press, fold and hang old
garments for fear of this deception.
The visits of the _gardes_ were at unexpected times, and almost all the
gilds require their inspection of saleable articles “poer sauvoir se il i
a nulles mesprantures.” The _gardes_ of the weavers carried an iron rule
on which was marked the length of various kinds of cloth, as it was fixed
by law. Goods which did not comply with the statutes were confiscated,
burned or given to the poor, while the culprit paid a fine. To make
sure that no bad product elude the vigilance of the guards, further
regulations as to the place of manufacture appear. A wool-weaver could
not have two shops on either side of the street, though we have seen how
liberal he might be as to the number of looms. An armorer was not to get
anything necessary for his trade made outside the shop, therefore he was
forbidden to carry armor through the streets unless he were poor and
lived in an out-of-the-way quarter where sales would be difficult. The
tailor must not cut his cloth except at a window of the first floor of
his shop.
Fines ranging from three to ten _sous_ were the natural consequence of
faulty production. The corrupt gold-beater paid 3 _sous_, the jewellers,
who dared use colored glass, 10 _sous_, the dealers in silk-stuffs
paid 8 _sous_, of which 5 went to the King, 2 to the Master, and 1
to the _Confrérie_. In 1312, dealers in spices who purveyed _fausse
merchandise_ were condemned to lose their commodities, and to pay,
besides, 60 _sous_: “40 to us (i.e. the King, or to the lord of the place
where justice is done), and 20 _sous_ to the master of the gild at or
near the place where the offence is committed”—to pay the expenses of the
gild. As a further guard against adulterated products, most of the gilds
had a mark or a seal which carried a guarantee of quality commensurate
with the reputation of the gild.
Before goods could be sold, those who had the right to weighing and
measuring apparatus in their own houses, must have these sealed by the
measurers and gaugers’ gild. Others must use the scale of the king or his
vassal. Most goods were sold on Friday and Saturday, when the merchants
shut up shop and went to the _Halles_ where markets were held. As a rule,
the gilds were opposed to the hawking of their goods—_col-portage_; they
preferred the more regular custom of the stalls of the market. Here, too,
they succeeded in legalizing their privileges against foreigners. For
example, the bakers succeeded in preventing the sale of all ‘foreign’
bread in the city except on Saturdays. The municipality also watched
after its own interests in the interests of the crafts. Merchants were
forbidden to leave the city before the opening of the Fairs, and sales
must be transacted only in the square of the _Halles_ after a stroke
from the great bell. The craft organizations themselves were much afraid
of possible monopolies. The weavers, dyers and fullers are expressly
forbidden to enter into combinations to fix a price on goods or a
monopoly on materials “so as to prevent the people of the gild from
having work according to their means.” The retailers of produce were
forbidden to arrange for commodities in advance. “Retailers ought not to
buy in advance of any merchant carriage-loads or consignments of eggs and
cheeses, deliverable at his next trip, or after any delay whatsoever”;
such transactions are wrong because they offer too much uncertainty and
too many frauds in the conditions of delivery. The mediaeval man feared
‘corners,’ for he felt “the rich will sell back everything, as dear as it
pleases them to do.”
In the market “good form” must be observed between members of the same
gild. One member must not intrude before a sale is consummated. “If
anyone is in front of the stall or window of a cook to buy or bargain
with the said cook, and if any of the other cooks call him before he has
left the stall or window of his own will,” the fine will be 5 _sous_.
For the privileges implied in the gild structure, the feudal authorities
demanded a return in the form of taxes. The gild-masters bore the
burden not only of the civil taxes which all citizens shared, such as
the _taille_, the _conduits_ and _péages_ (tolls), but also special
commercial taxes such as the _hauban_, the _tonlieu_, and the _coutume_.
The _hauban_, according to _Livre des Métiers_, Section I, Art. 7, “is
the name appropriate to a tax assessed from ancient times, by which it
was established that whoever should be a payer of _hauban_ would have
more freedom and less taxes to pay for his right of trade and commerce.”
It was a sort of agreement offering the advantage of combining in one
payment a large number of daily dues. For this privilege the bakers owed
6 _sous_, the retailers of bread and salt, 3 _sous_, the butchers 6
_sous_, the fishermen, purse-makers and curriers 3 _sous_, the glovers 3
_sous_, 8 _deniers_, and the old-clothes men 6 _sous_ and 8 _deniers_.
The _tonlieu_, also called the tax of buying and selling, was the real
tax on trade. At every sale, the merchant and the customer owed a small
per cent. of the purchase to the city or lord who controlled the market.
About twenty chapters of Part II in the _Livre des Métiers_ are devoted
to an elaborate schedule of this tax which varied according as the
sale was at shop, fair or market. In general, M. Lespinasse estimates,
the _tonlieu_ equalled 4 _deniers_ per wagon-load, 2 per cart-load, 1
_denier_ for beast-of-burden’s load, and 1 obole for a man’s load.
The _coutume_ was very irregularly shared; it usually fell due at several
times through the year. So the bakers owed 6 _deniers_ at Christmas,
22 at Easter, and 5 at St. John’s Day, and a _tonlieu_ of 1½ _deniers_
in bread or money per week. The retailers of produce also owed these
taxes if they dealt in bread. At any earlier period, the _coutume_ was
always paid ‘in nature,’ i.e. in the product itself. Accordingly, the
hay-merchants owed a box of new hay every time the King entered the city.
The wooden-utensils makers furnished seven casks, two feet long, towards
the up-keep of the King’s cellars, and for this service they were excused
from the watch. The farriers owed at first the _fers du Roi_; i.e. they
had to keep the saddle-horses of the court well shod. But later this
function was compounded in terms of money, due to the royal maréchal in
consideration of which he had the horses shod.
Another feudal obligation irksome to some of the gilds was the personal
“duty of the watch”—the _guet_. As the masters of the gilds were alone
responsible for this important service, it was also called the _guet
de métiers_. Each gild had its turn about every three weeks, when the
masters must go at nightfall to the Châtelet and answer the roll. The
watch then lasted from curfew till the next sunrise. Usually the gilds
which served the aristocracy most directly were exempt from this duty.
Among these were the goldsmiths, _barilliers_, armorers, painters,
sculptors, bow-makers, flower- and plumed-hat makers, and haberdashers.
How irksome this duty had become may be inferred from two statutes in the
_Livre des Métiers_. The garment-cutters say:
“The _prud’hommes_ of the said gild beg that they be relieved from (the
duty of) the watch, if it please the King, on account of the fine clothes
which they have to make and keep over night which belong to gentlemen,
and on account of the large number of strange workmen whom they could not
entirely trust to take care of things, and because they have to cut and
sew clothes for gentlemen both day and night in view of the gentlemen and
strangers going away at once, and because they have to return the garment
which they make in the evening, on the morning of the next day.”
The old-clothes dealers have two intimate and vivid articles. Art. 33:
“No one who is 60 years old, nor those whose wives are with child, so
long as they be ill, and no one who has been bled, if he has not been
summoned before he had himself bled, and no one who is going out of the
city, if he has not been summoned before he goes out, need to share the
watch. But they must inform him who has charge of the watch for the King,
by means of their men or their neighbors.”
Art. 34: “And the _prud’hommes_ of the gild say that they are grieved
that, for 10 years back, those who have charge of the guard for the King,
have not been willing to receive the excuse from the above-mentioned
service from their neighbors and their workmen, but make come their wives
themselves, either fair or ugly, either young or old, or feeble or fat,
to convey the excuse to the lord, a thing which is most ugly and most
grievous—that a woman should stay and sit at the Châtelet from curfew so
long as the watch is out, and then go away with her son or her daughter,
or without either of them, through strange streets to her home, and
through this message-bearing wrong, sin, yea, villainy has been done.”
_Confrérie_ is a word not very widely used in the _Livre_. Seventeen of
the gilds display this organism. It served to systematize the religious
impulses of the gild-men’s lives and also to control the benevolent
activities of the older structure. The tablet-makers require all salaried
workers to join the _Confrérie_, and at a death in the gild, a man or
woman from each workshop must follow the corpse or pay a fine of ½ pound
of wax. The _confrérie_ usually centered its activity in a church or
chapel in the district where most of the members lived. The _confrérie_
of the furriers and the upholsterers shared _l’Église des Innocents_;
the masons attended the _Chapelle de St. Bleive_; the bakers _St. Pierre
aux Liens_, and the wine-merchants and brass-shield makers St. Léonard’s
chapel of church _St. Merri_. The confraternity usually put itself under
the protection of a particular saint. The goldsmiths chose _St. Éloi_,
and the confraternity had a seal inscribed “Sigillum confratrie sancti
Elegii auri fabrorum.”
The _confrérie’s_ resources were usually derived from initiation fees,
subscriptions and legacies from members, and a share of the fines
collected in the gild. The organization also derived benefits from
holding real estate. It could transact business and fall in debt. The
_confrérie_ of the wool-weavers owing 600 pounds, put a tax of 12
_sous_ on every piece of cloth manufactured in Paris. A statute of the
plasterers reads: “If he finds that the proportion is not good, the
plasterer shall pay five _sous_ as a fine: to the Chappelle Bleive
aforesaid, two _sous_, to the master who guards the gild, two _sous_, and
to the one who has measured the plaster 12 _deniers_.” When a plasterer
took an apprentice for less than six years, he paid 20 _sous_ to the
Chapelle.
Part of the funds acquired by the _confrérie_ were used for common
expenses, and part for benevolent work. For every piece of cloth sold
the wool-merchants were supposed to give a _denier_ to buy grain for
the poor. The rich confraternity of the goldsmiths gave every Easter
a dinner to the poor of the Hôtel Dieu, while the cooks set aside a
third of their fines to maintain “les pouvres vieilles gens du mestier
qui seront decheuz par fait de marchandise ou de vieillece.” In 1319
the vair-furriers formed an association[12] with an initiation fee of
10 _sous_ (8 fr. .40) and 6 _deniers_ for the secretary, and a weekly
subscription of one _denier_, the funds of which were to aid members in
case of sickness or infirmity at the rate of 3 _sous_ per week during
illness, and 6 _sous_ in convalescence. The curriers mention the use of
funds from “la boîte” to support the orphans of the gild or children of
poverty-stricken masters.
At the first appearance of the _confrérie_, the Church opposed it,
suspecting in its secrecy, antagonism or some outcroppings of pagan
ritualism.[13] Later, however, both Church and _confrérie_ profited by a
close relationship. The monastery of St. Trond, in return for the right
to fall heir to the properties of members of the shearmen and fuller’s
_confrérie_ who died without wife or child, maintained a hospital for
the care of its sick, and conducted funerals, while the sacristan and a
priest arbitrated on the occasion of disputes within the gild.
* * * * *
Conclusion. The trade-gild régime was a defensive one against the
confused powers of feudalism and the conflicting activities of
competition. It protected the apprentice against his own folly and his
master; it protected the artisan against diminution in the pay-rate,
illegal dismissal, and the usurpation of other trades on his field.
It guarded the master from insubordination, idleness, bad measure and
adulteration, and by the limitation of the number of workmen assured the
sale of his goods.
Some of the principles implied in the organization we may agree with M.
Lespinasse[14] are “relatively true,” such as the protection of infant
industry, guarantee of work and property, examinations and probations
to make certain the skill of the candidates; prohibition of combination
of several professions to prevent the abusive use of them; supervision
of manufacture to assure the soundness of the product; an industrial
jurisdiction from apprenticeship to mastery, lack of division in a craft
such as to train in time a fully equipped workman and a future master;
suppression of any parasitic intermediary between producer and consumer;
work in common and in the public eyes, and solidarity of the industrial
family.
On the other hand, there are shadows in the picture, and among them we
may distinguish—the immoderate extension of term of apprenticeship,
difficulties set in the way of becoming a master; arbitrary fiscal
measures and dues; meticulous regulation and too frequent cessation from
work; a routine transmission of methods of manufacture; maintenance of
a fixed price, and prohibitions of combinations such as would encourage
inventions and stimulate a wider economic unit.
We have studied a particularly agreeable phase of gild growth. Far off
still is the bad opposition between employee and employed, though the
pessimist may see the seeds of the present in this past. Though one
hesitates to call with M. Fagniez the spirit of the gilds “fundamentally
Christian,” he is glad to recognize such alertness of intelligence, such
elaborate industrial devices and purposes, such thoughtful humanitarian
interests, so complex a system of checks and balances in our supposedly
naïve mediaeval precursors.