It would be difficult to discover, in the whole history of the Wars of
modern times, an instance in which so fine, so splendid, an Army as
that of NAPOLEON, one composed almost exclusively of veterans, all men
of one nation, entirely devoted to their Chief, and most enthusiastic
in his cause, became so suddenly panic stricken, so completely
disorganised, and so thoroughly scattered, as was the French Army when
it lost the Battle of Waterloo. A defeated Army usually covers its
retreat by a Rear Guard, but here there was nothing of the kind: and
hence that Army cannot be said to have retreated; but truly to have
fled, from the Field of Battle. No attempt to rally was made on the
Belgian soil, and it was not until some of the scattered fragments
of the immense wreck had been borne across the French frontier that
their partial junction on different points indicated the revival of
at least some portion of that mighty mass of warriors; who, but three
days before, had marched across this same frontier in all the pride of
strength, and in all the assurance of victory.
The rearmost of the fugitives having reached the Sambre, at Charleroi,
Marchienne, and Châtelet, by daybreak of the 19th, indulged themselves
with the hope that they might then enjoy a short rest from the fatigues
which the relentless pursuit by the Prussians had entailed upon them
during the night; but their fancied security was quickly disturbed by
the appearance of a few Prussian Cavalry, judiciously thrown forward
towards the Sambre from the Advanced Guard at Gosselies. They resumed
their flight, taking the direction of Beaumont and Philippeville.
* * * * *
It had been arranged by WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER, on the Field of
Waterloo, that the Prussian Army, not having been so much crippled and
exhausted by the Battle, should undertake the further pursuit, and
proceed by Charleroi towards Avesnes and Laon; whilst the Anglo-Allied
Army, after remaining during the night on the Field, should advance by
Nivelles and Binche towards Peronne.
On the following morning, the pursuing Cavalry belonging to the First,
Fourth, and partly to the Second, Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, reached the
vicinity of Frasne and Mellet.
The Fourth Corps marched at daybreak from Genappe, where it collected
together the Brigades which had been so much broken up by the continued
pursuit. The 8th Prussian Hussars, under Major COLOMB, were detached
from this Corps towards Wavre, to observe Marshal GROUCHY. They
were supported by the 1st Pomeranian Landwehr Cavalry; and, shortly
afterwards, the 2nd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel
SCHILL, also followed in the same direction.
After some hours' rest, the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ marched to Fontaine
l'Evêque, where it bivouacked. It had received Orders to communicate
from this place with Mons. The Advanced Guard, under General SYDOW,
was pushed forward, as far as Lermes, on the road to Thuin; it being
intended that this Corps should proceed by the road to Maubeuge, along
the Sambre.
The First _Corps d'Armée_, which had from the beginning followed the
Fourth as a Reserve, now advanced in pursuit of the Enemy by the direct
road to Charleroi. The Light Cavalry at the head of the Column reached
the passages of the Sambre at Châtelet, Charleroi, and Marchienne,
without meeting any sort of opposition or impediment; nor did it
perceive any thing of the Enemy on the other side of the river. The
Corps halted for the night at Charleroi: having its Advanced Guard
at Marchienne, and its Outposts occupying the line from Montigny by
Louveral as far as Châtelet. Detachments from the Reserve Cavalry
were sent in the direction of Fleurus, to secure the Corps from any
molestation on the part of GROUCHY; of whose proceedings nothing
positive was then known at the Prussian Head Quarters.
* * * * *
It was not until nearly five o'clock in the evening of the 19th, that
General BORCKE, whose Brigade, the Ninth, was still in the vicinity of
St Lambert, discovered the retreat of GROUCHY's troops. He immediately
communicated the fact to General THIELEMANN, who ordered him to cross
the Dyle the next day (the 20th) and march upon Namur. The French Rear
Guard of GÉRARD's _Corps d'Armée_ continued to occupy Limale until
nightfall. THIELEMANN remained posted, during the night of the 19th, at
St Achtenrode; having his Advanced Guard at Ottenburg.
On the evening of the 18th, Pirch received Orders to march from
the Field of Waterloo with his _Corps d'Armée_ (the Second) in the
direction of Namur; for the purpose of turning Marshal GROUCHY's Left
Flank and intercepting his retreat upon the Sambre.
PIRCH made this movement during the night, passing through Maransart,
where he was joined by his Seventh Brigade; and crossing the Genappe
rivulet at Bousseval, as also, subsequently, the Dyle, on his way to
Mellery: which place he reached at eleven o'clock in the forenoon of
the following day. His Corps was much divided on this occasion. He had
with him the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Infantry Brigades, and twenty
four Squadrons of Cavalry: but the Fifth Infantry Brigade, and the
remaining fourteen Squadrons, were with that portion of the Prussian
Army which was pursuing the Enemy along the high road to Charleroi.
The Corps being greatly fatigued by the night march and its exertions
on the previous day, PIRCH ordered the troops to bivouac and to betake
themselves to rest.
During this march, Lieutenant Colonel SOHR had pushed on with his
Cavalry Brigade, as an Advanced Guard; and now he was required to
gain intelligence concerning the Enemy's movements, and to seek a
communication with THIELEMANN. He found the Defile of Mont St Guibert
strongly occupied by the Enemy, but could obtain no information
respecting THIELEMANN's Corps.
When it is considered how very near to Mellery GÉRARD's _Corps
d'Armée_ must have passed, in order to fall into the Namur road at
Sombref; it seems extraordinary that PIRCH, who reached that place
at eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 19th,--the same hour at
which GROUCHY, then beyond Wavre, received the first intimation of
the defeat of NAPOLEON,--should have permitted GÉRARD to continue his
retreat unmolested. His troops required rest, it is true; but had he
maintained a good look out in the direction of Gembloux, he would, in
all probability, after the lapse of a few hours, have been enabled
to fulfil his instructions so far as to have completely intercepted
the retreat of a considerable portion of GROUCHY's Army. That part
of the Enemy's force which Lieutenant Colonel SOHR observed at Mont
St Guibert, was probably the Advanced Guard only of GÉRARD's _Corps
d'Armée_; since its Rear Guard remained at the Bridge of Limale until
nightfall. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, more
especially the express object of the detached movement of the Second
Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, it must be admitted that, on this occasion,
there was a want of due vigilance on the part of General PIRCH.
It was on the 19th, also, that Prince BLÜCHER issued, whilst at
Genappe, a Proclamation to his Army; in which he thanked the troops for
their conduct during the recent struggle.
* * * * *
At daybreak of the 19th, that portion of the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army
which had fought the Battle of Waterloo, broke up from its bivouac, and
began to move along the high road to Nivelles. Those troops which had
been posted in front of Hal during the 18th, consisting of STEDMAN's
Dutch-Belgian Division, ANTHING's Dutch-Belgian Indian Brigade, and
Colonel ESTORFF's Hanoverian Cavalry Brigade, under Prince FREDERICK
of the Netherlands; as also of JOHNSTONE's British Infantry Brigade,
and LYON's Hanoverian Infantry Brigade, under Lieutenant General Sir
CHARLES COLVILLE, were likewise directed to march upon Nivelles. The
Army occupied Nivelles and the surrounding villages during the night of
the 19th; in the course of which the Duke arrived from Brussels, and
established his Head Quarters in the town.
* * * * *
An hour's rest was all that the harassing pursuit by the Prussians
permitted NAPOLEON to enjoy at Charleroi; and he was compelled to fly
across the Sambre, without the slightest chance of being enabled to
check that pursuit on the Belgian side of the frontier.
The following inscription, which has been cut over the centre of the
archway of the Charleroi gate, is singularly appropriate to the flight
of NAPOLEON on this memorable occasion:
"ABIIT. EXCESSIT. EVASIT. ERVPIT."
The circumstances, however, under which the flight of CATALINE here
described, and that of NAPOLEON, took place, form a strange contrast.
The former, subdued in the Senate by the indignant philippics and
burning eloquence of CICERO, escaped from Rome to the rebel camp of
MANLIUS, to take up arms against his native city for the purpose of
satisfying the cravings of his profligate ambition; and the latter,
defeated in the battle field, fled to the capital, in the vain hope of
obtaining from the Senate of his country further means of waging war
against the legitimate Sovereign.
From Charleroi, NAPOLEON proceeded to Philippeville; whence he hoped
to be able to communicate more readily with GROUCHY. He continued
here four hours; which he employed in expediting Orders to Generals
RAPP, LECOURBE, and LAMARQUE, to advance with their respective _Corps
d'Armée_ by forced marches to Paris: and also to the commandants of
fortresses, to defend themselves to the last extremity. He desired
SOULT to collect together all the troops that might arrive at this
point, and conduct them to Laon; for which place he himself started
with post horses, at two o'clock in the afternoon.
The general disposition of the respective Armies on the evening of the
19th, was as follows:--
The Anglo-Allied Army, which constituted the Right Wing of the
advancing forces, was at Nivelles and its vicinity.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Nivelles.
Of the Prussian Army, which formed the Left Wing, its First _Corps
d'Armée_ was at Charleroi;
Second Corps on the march to Mellery;
Third Corps at St Achtenrode;
Fourth Corps at Fontaine l'Evêque;
Fifth Brigade of the Second Corps at Anderlues, near Fontaine
l'Evêque.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Gosselies.
The disorganized force of the main French Army was in the vicinity of
Beaumont, Philippeville, and Avesnes.
NAPOLEON was posting towards Laon.
The detached portion of the French Army under GROUCHY was on the
march to Namur.
* * * * *
The Duke of WELLINGTON, in whose character the highest military talents
of the Warrior were so intimately blended with the most comprehensive
views of the Statesman, did not allow the dazzling allurements which
beset the path of a Conqueror to divert him for a single moment from
that fixedness of purpose, or to dim that penetrating foresight which
so peculiarly distinguished his proceedings on all great occasions of
a similar nature, involving the peace, the honour, and the security
of not only his own Sovereign and Country, but also of all the Allied
Powers, in whose interests he was so actively engaged. He did not view
the great Battle he had gained in the light of an event to be followed
up by an irruption into the Enemy's country, conducted in such a manner
as to humble to the dust the national pride of the French people; and
to impose upon them the whole weight and burthen of the oppressions,
ravages, and horrors which generally follow in the train of a
victorious and lawless soldiery over the face of an Enemy's country.
His sole aim was directed to the carrying out of the great object of
the War, which comprised not only the annihilation of the power of
NAPOLEON and of the adherents to his cause, but also the Restoration
of the legitimate Sovereign to the Throne of France. With the latter
Sovereign he had been in constant communication, devising means for his
protection during his temporary exile in the Netherlands; and now that
the Armies were on the point of crossing the frontier, counselling him
to hasten forward and show himself in the midst of his people: in order
that by identifying his cause with the common object of the Allied
Powers he might avail himself of all the influence and advantages to be
derived from the recent victory; and become, as it were, a participator
in the brilliant successes which attended their arms on the glorious
18th of June.
In proof of the sincerity of his intentions, and as a first step
towards securing the good will, if not the friendly disposition, of
the French people, more especially of the Legitimists and the well and
peaceably disposed; the Duke issued the following General Order to the
whole of the troops under his command:--
Nivelles, 20th June, 1815.
_General Order._
1. As the Army is about to enter the French territory, the troops
of the Nations, which are at present under the command of Field
Marshal the Duke of WELLINGTON, are desired to recollect that
their respective Sovereigns are the Allies of His Majesty the King
of France; and that France ought, therefore, to be treated as a
friendly country. It is therefore required that nothing should be
taken, either by Officers or soldiers, for which payment be not
made. The Commissaries of the Army will provide for the wants of
the troops in the usual manner; and it is not permitted either to
soldiers or Officers to extort contributions. The Commissaries will
be authorised either by the Field Marshal, or by the Generals who
command the troops of the respective Nations, in cases where their
provisions are not supplied by an English Commissary, to make the
proper requisitions, for which regular receipts will be given; and
it must be strictly understood that they will themselves be held
responsible for whatever they obtain in way of requisition from the
inhabitants of France, in the same manner in which they would be
esteemed accountable for purchases made for their own Government in
the several dominions to which they belong.
2. The Field Marshal takes this opportunity of returning to the Army
his thanks for their conduct in the glorious action fought on the
18th instant, and he will not fail to report his sense of their
conduct in the terms which it deserves to their several Sovereigns.
WELLINGTON.
On the same day, the Duke, in consequence of a report received by him
from Lieutenant General LECOQ, and of a previous communication made
to him by the King of SAXONY, consented to take command of the Saxon
_Corps d'Armée_, amounting to nearly 17,000 men. He directed the above
General to march these troops to Antwerp, and there await further
Orders.
* * * * *
The Anglo-Allied Army marched this day to Binche and Mons. The British
Cavalry moved into villages between Roeulx and Mons. VIVIAN's Hussar
Brigade took the Outpost duties on the Sambre. The Hanoverian Cavalry
furnished Outposts towards Maubeuge. The Duke fixed his Head Quarters
at Binche.
BLÜCHER, having secured the passage of the Sambre in the neighbourhood
of Charleroi, continued his pursuit of the Enemy, and crossed the
French frontier on the 20th. He directed ZIETEN to march the First
_Corps d'Armée_ from Charleroi to Beaumont, to throw forward his
Advanced Guard as far as Solre le Château, to detach a Party of
Observation to the left towards Florenne, and to watch the road from
Philippeville to Beaumont.
As the First _Corps d'Armée_ advanced, it discovered at every step
fresh proofs of the extreme disorder in which the French Army had
retreated; and found twelve pieces of Artillery which they had hitherto
contrived to save from the great wreck at Waterloo, but had now
abandoned to their pursuers. On arriving at Beaumont, the Corps took up
a bivouac. Its Advanced Guard, under General JAGOW, consisting of the
Third Infantry Brigade, the 1st Silesian Hussars, and a Horse Battery,
reached Solre le Château upon the road to Avesnes.
The Prince, at the same time, ordered BÜLOW to move the Fourth _Corps
d'Armée_ as far as Colleret, where the road to Thuin intersects the
high road from Beaumont to Maubeuge, and to push on the Advanced Guard
to Beaufort. BÜLOW accordingly directed General SYDOW to proceed with
an Advanced Guard, consisting of a Cavalry Brigade, a Horse Battery,
and two Battalions of Infantry, which had the day before reached Lermes
on the road to Thuin, and to ascertain very particularly whether the
French had established themselves on the Sambre, to secure the Bridges
both here and at Lobbes, and further, to restore these passages, should
they have been destroyed by the Enemy. Another Detachment, under
Colonel EICKE, consisting of two Fusilier Battalions, the two Squadrons
attached to the Thirteenth Brigade, and of the 2nd Silesian Hussars,
was sent forward to take possession, in the first instance, of the
passages of the Sambre, and then to join General SYDOW; who, proceeding
by Colleret towards Beaufort, was to form both Detachments into an
Advanced Guard on reaching the latter place. In the mean time, the mass
of the Fourth Corps, headed by the Reserve Cavalry under Prince WILLIAM
of Prussia, followed in one Column.
The progress made by this portion of the Prussian Army on the 20th was
not so rapid as was desirable. Considerable delay arose in consequence
of the degree of caution imparted to the movements by the impression
which BÜLOW entertained that the Enemy would defend the passages, and
endeavour to maintain himself along the opposite side of the river.
Hence the Advanced Guard of the Corps only reached Ferrière la Petite;
part of the main body proceeded as far as Montignies, and the remainder
with the Reserve Artillery, did not get farther than the Bridges
across the Sambre.
The Fifth Brigade (belonging to the Second _Corps d'Armée_) had started
at daybreak from its bivouac at Anderlues, near Fontaine l'Evêque;
and directed its march, by Binche, upon Villers, towards Maubeuge.
The Brigade was reinforced by one hundred Dragoons under Major BUSCH,
and half a Horse Battery; which Detachment arrived at Villers at five
o'clock in the afternoon. This Cavalry was employed in observing the
Fortress of Maubeuge, from the Mons road, as far as the Sambre; and the
Brigade bivouacked at Villers. A Hanoverian Regiment of Hussars also
observed the Fortress on the right of the Prussian Cavalry upon the
Bavay road.
* * * * *
The Left Wing of the Prussian Army, comprising the Third, and part
of the Second, _Corps d'Armée_, came into collision with the Enemy
this day, when pursuing that part of the French Army which was under
GROUCHY. THIELEMANN, having learned that the latter had commenced his
retreat upon Gembloux, marched at five o'clock in the morning from St
Achtenrode to Wavre; where he further ascertained that already on the
afternoon of the 19th, the French had effected their retreat across the
Dyle, leaving only a Rear Guard on the left bank of the river.
GROUCHY, when he decided on retiring upon Namur, ordered General
BONNEMAINS to move on rapidly, by Gembloux, with the 4th and 12th
Dragoons, as an Advanced Guard, and to reach that town as soon as
possible, and secure the passage of the Sambre. They were followed
by the remainder of EXCELMANS' Cavalry, and the Reserve Artillery,
together with the wounded. The Infantry was put in motion in two
Columns: the one, consisting of the Third _Corps d'Armée_, proceeding
by Gembloux; and the other, comprising the Fourth Corps, passing more
to the right, and falling into the Namur road in rear of Sombref.
The Light Cavalry was principally with the Rear Guard. To deceive
THIELEMANN, GROUCHY left his Rear Guard in Wavre and Limale, with
Cavalry Picquets thrown out towards the Prussians, until near evening;
when it followed the main body to Namur.
THIELEMANN, having placed the whole of his Cavalry, with eight pieces
of Horse Artillery, at the head of his Column, now ordered them to
move on at a trot, for the purpose of overtaking the Enemy; but it
was not until they had passed Gembloux that they discovered the Rear
of GROUCHY's force, consisting of a few Regiments of Cavalry. These,
however, now made so rapid a retreat, that it was impossible to bring
them to action.
At length, on arriving near the Village of Fallize, within about three
miles from Namur, the Prussians found VANDAMME's Rear Guard posted on
the brow of the declivity at the foot of which lay the town, in the
valley of the Meuse. It presented about two Battalions of Infantry,
three Regiments of Cavalry, and four guns; and was formed to cover the
retreat of the French troops.
The Prussian Battery immediately opened a fire; during which Colonel
MARWITZ, moving out to the right, with the First Cavalry Brigade, and
Count LOTTUM to the left, with the Second, turned the Enemy in both
Flanks. The latter brought forward a Reserve of Cavalry, when the 8th
Prussian Uhlans, under Colonel Count DOHNA, at the head of the Column
that turned the Enemy's Left, made a most gallant attack upon the
French Dragoons; who met it with a volley from their carbines, but were
overthrown. The 7th Uhlans and a Squadron of the 12th Hussars also
charged on this occasion, and captured three pieces of French Horse
Artillery, which were in the act of moving off, as also fifty Cavalry
horses. The Enemy's Infantry now threw itself into the adjacent Wood,
with which the declivities that here lead down into the valley of the
Meuse are covered, and thus succeeded in preventing the Prussians from
following up their success.
At this moment, intelligence was received that General PIRCH was
pursuing the Enemy with the Second _Corps d'Armée_ upon the high road
leading from Sombref to Namur; whereupon the Cavalry of the Third Corps
was moved into this direction. A French Column, consisting of about
twelve Battalions and two Batteries, but without any Cavalry, was
perceived marching along that road. They belonged to GÉRARD's _Corps
d'Armée_, which had effected its retreat by Limale, through Mont St
Guibert. Upon the Height on which the Château of Flavinnes is situated
was posted a Detachment from VANDAMME's Corps, consisting of from four
to five Battalions with a Battery, and a Regiment of Cavalry, for the
purpose of receiving GÉRARD's Column as it fell back, and of protecting
its retreat. As the Enemy continued its retrograde march in Close
Column and in good order; it was not deemed advisable to undertake an
attack with the two Prussian Cavalry Brigades of the Third Corps, which
were much fatigued: but the Horse Battery was drawn up, and discharged
several rounds of shell and grape at the French troops during their
retreat upon the town. The latter, therefore, quitted the high road,
and moved along the adjacent Heights until they reached the Battalions
which had been drawn up in support, and which now opposed the further
advance of PIRCH's _Corps d'Armée_.
At this time, THIELEMANN's Cavalry withdrew, leaving the further
pursuit of the Enemy to the latter Corps--to the movements of which it
is now necessary to recur.
It was not until five o'clock in the morning of the 20th that PIRCH
received intelligence that the Enemy was retiring by Gembloux upon
Namur. Lieutenant Colonel SOHR was immediately detached, in all haste,
to Gembloux with his Cavalry Brigade, a Battery of Horse Artillery,
and the Fusilier Battalions of the 9th, 14th, and 23rd Regiments, as
an Advanced Guard. On approaching that town, Lieutenant Colonel SOHR
ascertained that THIELEMANN's Cavalry was pursuing the Enemy along the
high road from Gembloux to Namur. He therefore decided upon marching by
the narrow road on the right of the _chaussée_ leading from Sombref,
in full trot, covered by the Wood, to overtake the French troops in
retreat. At Temploux, the latter presented a force of two Battalions,
some Cavalry, and four pieces of Artillery in position, prepared to
cover the retreating Column. Lieutenant Colonel SOHR immediately
attacked with both the Regiments of Hussars, supported by the Battery
of Horse Artillery; and defeated this portion of the Enemy's forces. It
was at this moment, too, that a cannonade was opened upon the latter by
the Horse Battery, before mentioned, of THIELEMANN's Corps; whereupon
it fell back upon the favourable position taken up near Flavinnes, and
in which the Enemy appeared determined to make a stand.
PIRCH immediately ordered the attack, and directed that it should be
supported by Major General KRAFFT with the Sixth Brigade, which had
closely followed the Advanced Guard, and had come up with the latter at
four o'clock in the afternoon. Three Columns of Attack were formed. The
First consisted of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Regiment, the Fusilier
Battalion of the 26th Regiment, and the 1st Battalion of the 1st Elbe
Landwehr. It was under the command of Major SCHMIDT, and detached to
the left of the road, to drive back the Enemy's troops posted in the
Wood and upon the Heights. The Second consisted of the 1st and 2nd
Battalions of the 26th Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 9th
Regiment, under Colonel REUSS, and of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of
the Elbe Landwehr, under Colonel BISMARK. This Column, which advanced
partly on the right, and partly on the left, of the road, was supported
by the Battery No 5, and led by Major General KRAFFT in person. The
Third Column comprised the Fusilier Battalions which had constituted
the Infantry of the Advanced Guard; and was detached more to the right,
towards the Sambre, to support the general advance upon Namur.
General KRAFFT, after having kept up a fire, for a short time, upon the
Enemy with his Artillery, ordered the attack with his Infantry. Colonel
REUSS threw out his Skirmishers, who were quickly followed by the
Columns of Attack. The Enemy, after some little resistance, was fairly
driven into Namur by a charge with bayonets, and suffered much loss.
In the mean time, Major SCHMIDT, with his Column of three Battalions,
had turned the Enemy's Right Flank on the Louvain road; and the French
were now limited to the defence of the suburb, which, however, was
maintained with great obstinacy. The Prussian Columns of Attack,
advancing at the _pas de charge_, drove the Enemy out of the suburb,
and endeavoured to gain possession of the Gates of the town. Colonel
ZASTROW, the second in command of the Sixth Brigade, wished to burst
open the Gate which leads to the Louvain road; but was repulsed by a
most murderous fire of musketry and grape, directed upon the assailants
from the walls of the town.
On repeating the attempt, the Prussian Battalions fought with
distinguished bravery, but with a great sacrifice of life. Colonel
ZASTROW was killed at their head; Colonel BISMARK also fell; Colonel
REUSS was wounded; and the Sixth Brigade alone lost forty four
Officers, and 1,274 Under Officers and Privates.
The main body of GROUCHY's Army was at this time in full retreat upon
Dinant, along the Defile of the Meuse. The troops left in Namur, to
keep the Prussians at bay as long as possible, consisted of General
TESTE's Division. They carefully barricaded all the Gates, lined the
walls facing the Prussians, and made a most gallant resistance. The
Officers, finding that their men continued so perfectly steady as not
to require their attention, armed themselves with the muskets of the
wounded, and assisted in maintaining the fire from the walls. The
greatest order prevailed in the Town. The wounded, the provisions, and
ammunition, had already been removed; and were on the line of march.
General PIRCH was well aware that the French defended the town
solely for the purpose of covering their retreat, and had therefore
no intention of undertaking any serious attack; he simply wished to
possess himself of the suburbs, and to hold the Enemy in check by
detaching troops to the Porte de Fer and the St Nicholas Gate. He
thought that a demonstration against the latter Gate would raise
apprehensions in the minds of the French respecting the security of the
Bridge over the Sambre.
With this view, he ordered General BRAUSE to relieve, with the Seventh
Brigade, the troops then engaged; and together with the Advanced Guard
under Lieutenant Colonel Sohr, to blockade the Town. At the same time
he directed the remainder of the Corps to bivouac near Temploux.
General BRAUSE proceeded to post the Fusilier Battalion of the 22nd
Regiment in the direction of the Porte de Fer, and the Fusilier
Battalion of the 2nd Elbe Landwehr towards the Brussels Gate. The main
body of the Seventh Brigade, under Colonel SCHON, was stationed in
rear of the suburb. The first mentioned Battalion stood, under cover,
at four hundred paces distance from the Porte de Fer, having its
_Tirailleurs_ in the Avenue near the Gate. Just as General BRAUSE rode
up to examine its formation, an alarm was spread in front that the
Enemy was making a sortie. The General desired the Commanding Officer,
Major JOCHENS, to lead his Battalion quickly against the defenders, to
overthrow them, and then, if possible, to penetrate into the town along
with the retreating troops. As Major JOCHENS approached the Gate, he
found in its immediate vicinity the _Tirailleurs_ of the Sixth Brigade,
still maintaining the contest in that quarter. The attacking Column and
the _Tirailleurs_ now rushed towards the Gate and the walls; which the
French, probably not deeming themselves strong enough to resist this
pressure, abandoned in the greatest haste.
General TESTE had, in fact, prepared everything for his retreat; and
had so well calculated the time which the Enemy would require in
forcing an entrance by the Porte de Fer, that he succeeded in filing
his Battalions along the parapets of the Bridge, which had been
barricaded, and thus withdrew them to the south bank of the Sambre. The
Prussians found it impossible to force open the Gate. The windows of
the adjoining house of the _Douaniers_ were therefore driven in, and
a small iron door which led from the interior of the house into the
town was opened, and, in this manner, an entrance was effected for the
assailants; who were conducted by Major JOCHENS, of the 22nd, and Major
LUCKOWITZ, of the 9th Regiment, across the Market Place, and as far as
the Bridge over the Sambre: which the French had barricaded, as before
stated, and behind which they had again established themselves. These
troops were closely followed by Major SCHMIDT, with the 9th Regiment,
and lastly by the 2nd Elbe Landwehr, in Close Column, under Majors
MIRBACH and LINDERN.
The Prussians immediately occupied the captured portion of the town;
posted a Column of Reserve on the Market Place, and with loud cheers,
made themselves masters of the Bridge over the Sambre. An attempt had
been made to gain the Enemy's rear, by means of a ford in this river;
but it proved unsuccessful.
The French were driven with so much impetuosity towards the Gate
leading out to Dinant, that there appeared every probability of a
considerable number of them falling into the hands of the Prussians.
The former, however, had heaped up large bundles of wood, intermingled
with straw and pitch, against the Gate, and set them on fire on the
approach of the Prussian troops. The Gate and the street were soon in
flames, and the pursuit was thus obstructed; but even had this not
occurred, the great fatigue of the troops who, during the previous
sixteen hours, had been either marching or fighting, was sufficient to
deprive them of the power of following the retreating Enemy with any
degree of vigour.
After nine o'clock in the evening, the town was in the possession of
the Prussians. Major SCHMIDT took the command at the Dinant Gate and
Major JOCHENS at the Bridge over the Sambre. The remaining troops of
the Seventh, and some Battalions of the Sixth, Brigade were posted by
General BRAUSE upon the Market Place. The Fusilier Battalions of the
Advanced Guard, which had supported the attack, more to the right, had
also advanced into the town, towards the Bridge over the Sambre. They
had been sharply cannonaded by the Enemy from the right bank of the
Sambre.
A small party of Cavalry, under Captain THIELEMANN, of the Pomeranian
Hussars, was sent forward a short distance on the road to Dinant, to
form the Advance of the troops destined to pursue the Enemy at daybreak.
General TESTE's Division retired slowly, and in good order, by the
Dinant road, as far as Profondeville; where it took up a position
during three hours. At midnight it resumed its march, and arrived at
Dinant at four o'clock on the following morning.
This retreat of GROUCHY by Namur upon Dinant was executed in a skilful
and masterly manner; and the gallant defence of the former town by
General TESTE's Division, unaided by Artillery, merits the highest
commendation.
In this action the Prussians suffered a loss, including that already
mentioned as having occurred to the Sixth Brigade, of 1,500 men; and
the French are supposed to have lost about the same number. In the last
attack, the latter abandoned 150 prisoners they had previously taken
from the Prussians.
The Second Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ occupied Namur during the night.
The Cavalry of the Third Corps bivouacked at Temploux; the Infantry
of the latter (which had been rejoined on the march from Wavre by the
Ninth Brigade), near the town of Gembloux.
* * * * *
The circumstances under which the French Army, generally, was placed on
the 19th of June rendered it sufficiently obvious that GROUCHY would be
compelled to effect his retreat by Namur; and further, that whatever
show of resistance he might offer on that point would be solely
intended to gain time for the security of his troops whilst retiring,
in one Column only by the long and narrow Defile of the Meuse which
leads to Dinant. Aware that NAPOLEON's defeated Army was retiring
along the direct line of operation, the Charleroi road; he immediately
saw the imminent risk of his own retreat becoming intercepted, and
the consequent necessity of his effecting the latter in a parallel
direction, with a view to his rejoining the main Army as soon as
practicable. To retire, therefore, by Gembloux upon Namur, and thence
along the line of the Meuse, by Dinant and Givet, naturally presented
itself as the true and proper course to be pursued.
To Generals in command of _Corps d'Armée_, such as THIELEMANN and
PIRCH, a little reflection upon GROUCHY's critical position must have
led to a similar conclusion. The inactivity of the former, during the
afternoon and evening of the 19th, is probably to be explained by his
having satisfied himself that the longer GROUCHY continued in the
vicinity of Wavre, the greater became the chance of his retreat being
cut off by a portion of the Allied Armies; which, in their advance,
would reach the Sambre much sooner than it would be in the power of
the French Marshal to do: and that, therefore, it would be injudicious
on his part to attempt to force the latter from the position, which
appearances induced him to believe he still occupied with his entire
force, on the Dyle. He may also have been strengthened in this
opinion by the circumstance of his not having received any positive
instructions as to his future dispositions, or any reinforcements to
secure for him a preponderance over GROUCHY.
With PIRCH, however, the case was very different. He received distinct
Orders, on the evening of the 18th, to march at once from the Field of
Waterloo, and continue his movement during that night, so as to cut
off GROUCHY's retreat upon the Sambre. It has already been explained,
that on reaching Mellery, at eleven o'clock on the following morning,
he halted to give his troops rest; that he subsequently ascertained,
through Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, who had been despatched, during the
march, with his Cavalry Brigade to reconnoitre on the left, that
the French occupied the Defile of Mont St Guibert in force. This
intelligence might have satisfied him that GROUCHY had not yet reached
Namur; but, if he entertained any doubts on that point, these could
easily have been settled by means of a reconnoitring party, detached
from Mellery, by Gentinne, and St Gery, to Gembloux, a distance of
seven miles. He would then have learned, that no portion whatever of
GROUCHY's force had hitherto crossed this line, in retreat; that he
had, consequently, gained considerably on his rear, and had it in his
power, after allowing a few hours rest to his troops, to march them by
the high road which leads directly from Mellery into the high road near
Sombref, and to anticipate GROUCHY in the possession of Namur.
In this case, GROUCHY, on approaching the latter place, and finding it
occupied by PIRCH, would, in all probability, have hesitated to risk
the loss of so much time as an attempt to force the town and the Pont
de Sambre would necessarily incur, and have preferred endeavouring to
pass his troops across the Sambre by some of the bridges and fords
between Charleroi and Namur, and retire upon either Philippeville or
Dinant; but with a Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ at each of these points,
and another in his rear, this would have been, to say the least of it,
a most hazardous undertaking; and if he attempted to cross the Meuse
below Namur, his chance of regaining NAPOLEON's Army would have been
still more remote.
But setting aside the circumstance of PIRCH's not having, in this
manner, taken due advantage of the position in which he stood
relatively with GROUCHY during the 19th; and passing to the fact,
that he first learned, at five o'clock on the morning of the 20th,
whilst still at Mellery, that the Enemy was retiring along the high
road from Gembloux to Namur, pursued by THIELEMANN's Cavalry: it seems
strange that, inferring, as he must naturally have done, that GROUCHY
would only endeavour to hold out long enough at Namur to effect his
passage by the Pont de Sambre, and to cover his retreat to Dinant, he
did not immediately move off by his right, and push his troops across
the Sambre by some of the bridges and fords higher up the stream;
and then, marching in the direction of Profondeville, under cover of
the Wood of Villers within the angle formed by the confluence of the
Sambre and the Meuse, intercept GROUCHY's retreat through the long
and narrow Defile in which the road to Dinant winds by the side of
the last mentioned river. The situation in which GROUCHY would have
been placed by a movement of this kind--his troops in a long, narrow,
precipitous Defile, obstructed in front by PIRCH, and attacked in rear
by THIELEMANN--would have been perilous in the extreme.
PIRCH probably felt that his _Corps d'Armée_, part of which was then
attached to the Army pressing the Enemy by the Charleroi road, was not
equal to cope with GROUCHY's troops; but in the case here supposed,
by judiciously disposing his force then present so as to command the
Defile at some favourable point in its course, he would have secured
for himself an advantage which, under such circumstances, would have
fully compensated for his deficiency in regard to numbers.
The scattered remnants of the main French Army continued to be hurried
forward in wild confusion across the frontier. Some of the fugitives
hastened towards Avesnes, others to Philippeville: whilst a very great
proportion of them sought no temporary rest of this kind, but, throwing
away their arms, fled into the interior, to return to their homes; the
Cavalry, in many instances, disposing of their horses to the country
people. Several of the superior Officers hastily collected such of the
troops as appeared better disposed, and conducted them in the direction
of Laon. NAPOLEON reached the latter town in the afternoon of the 20th.
After conferring with the _Préfet_, he desired M. DE BUSSY, one of his
Aides de Camp, to superintend the defence of this important place; and
despatched General DEJEAN to Avesnes, and General FLAHAUT to Guise.
In the mean time, a body of troops had been discerned in the distance,
moving towards the town. NAPOLEON sent an Aide de Camp to reconnoitre
it; when it proved to be a Column of about three thousand men, which
SOULT, JEROME, MORAND, COLBERT, PETIT, and PELET had succeeded in
rallying and preserving in order. NAPOLEON now appeared intent upon
remaining at Laon until the remainder of the Army had reassembled: but
he subsequently yielded to the force of the arguments expressed in
opposition to this determination by the Duke of BASSANO and others who
were present, and took his departure for Paris; purposing, at the same
time, to return to Laon on the 25th or 26th of the month.
* * * * *
The following was the general disposition of the respective Armies on
the evening of the 20th:--
The Anglo-Allied Army had its Right at Mons, and its Left at Binche.
The British Cavalry was cantoned in the villages of Strepy, Thieu,
Boussoit sur Haine, Ville sur Haine, and Coegnies; VIVIAN's Brigade
in those of Merbes Ste. Marie, Bienne le Hapart, and Mons: and the
Hanoverian Cavalry in those of Givry and Croix. The Reserve was at
Soignies.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Binche.
The Prussian Army had its First _Corps d'Armée_ at Beaumont; Fourth
Corps at Collerets: Second Corps at Namur, with the exception of
the Fifth Brigade, which was on the march to blockade Maubeuge, and
bivouacked at Villers: Third Corps was at Gembloux, with its Cavalry
bivouacked at Temploux.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Merbes le Château.
The French Army under NAPOLEON was completely dispersed. A few of the
troops took refuge in Avesnes, others in Guise, and the principal
body of them evincing any kind of order, but not exceeding three
thousand men, reached Laon.
The French forces under GROUCHY were at Dinant. NAPOLEON quitted Laon
for Paris.
* * * * *
On the 21st, the Duke of WELLINGTON crossed the French frontier, moving
the principal portion of his Army to Bavay, and the remainder from
Mons upon Valenciennes, which Fortress was immediately blockaded; and
established his Head Quarters at Malplaquet, celebrated as the scene
of the glorious victory gained by the Duke of MARLBOROUGH and Prince
EUGENE over the French under Marshals VILLARS and BOUFFLERS on the 11th
of September 1709.
Both the Allied Commanders had now reached the Triple Line of
Fortresses, which, until the Campaign of 1814 proved the contrary,
had been considered by so many military men as presenting an
insurmountable barrier to the advance of hostile armies into France
by its north-eastern frontier. It was most essential that some of
the principal Fortresses should be secured; and made to constitute a
new basis whence to direct the operations now contemplated against
the interior. The following, which first presented themselves on the
respective lines of advance of the two Commanders, were destined to
be immediately blockaded:--Valenciennes, Lequesnoy, and Cambray, by
the Anglo-Allied Army; and Maubeuge, Landrecy, Avesnes, and Rocroi,
by the Prussians. The general arrangements for the besieging of the
Fortresses, and the planning of the further operations, above alluded
to, were to form the subject of a conference to be held very shortly
between the Chiefs.
Prince BLÜCHER having, on this day, received reports from PIRCH and
THIELEMANN, detailing their proceedings during the two previous days,
and showing that GROUCHY had succeeded in effecting his escape by
Dinant, immediately ordered that the Second _Corps d'Armée_ should
move upon Thuin, and place itself under the Orders of Prince AUGUSTUS
of Prussia; who was to undertake the besieging of the Fortresses to
be left in rear of the Prussian Army; and that the Third Corps should
march by Charleroi, and follow the First and Fourth Corps as a Reserve.
It will be recollected that Captain THIELEMANN was sent forward from
Namur, with a party of the Pomeranian Hussars, on the night of the
20th, a short distance along the road to Dinant. He was joined at
daybreak of the 21st by Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, with the Fusilier
Battalions of the 14th and 23rd Regiments, the Brandenburg and
Pomeranian Hussars, and five pieces of Horse Artillery; when the whole
force followed the Enemy towards Dinant. The latter had, during his
retreat, seized every favourable opportunity in narrow and rocky parts
of the Defile, to barricade the road, and offer every obstruction to
the pursuit: by means of which precaution, and the previous night
march, the French contrived to gain so considerably in advance, that
Lieutenant Colonel SOHR deemed it prudent, when near Dinant, to forego
all further pursuit; and to endeavour to effect a junction with the
main body of the Prussian Army, by moving upon Florennes and Walcour.
At the former place he halted his Detachment during the night of the
21st; and, in this manner, covered the Left Flank of the main Army.
Anxious to gain intelligence concerning the assembling and marching
of the French troops on the left of the Allied Armies, Prince BLÜCHER
despatched Major FALKENHAUSEN, with the 3rd Regiment of Silesian
Landwehr Cavalry, to scour the country in the vicinity of the road by
Rettel to Laon. A Detachment of fifty Dragoons was posted at Bossule le
Valcourt, in observation of Philippeville.
The Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ was ordered by the Prince to advance, this
day, as far as Maroilles, upon the road from Maubeuge to Landrecies.
Its Advanced Guard, under General SYDOW, was directed to proceed still
further, and to blockade the latter Fortress.
* * * * *
ZIETEN, in pursuance of Orders which he had received the night before,
marched with the First _Corps d'Armée_ upon Avesnes; which Fortress,
the Advanced Guard, under General JAGOW, was directed to blockade
on both sides of the Helpe. The march of the Corps was made in two
Columns: the Right, consisting of the First and Second Brigades,
proceeded by Semonsies, and halted at the junction of the road from
Maubeuge with that from Beaumont to Avesnes; the Left, comprising the
Fourth Brigade, the Reserve Cavalry, and Reserve Artillery, marched
by Solre le Château, towards Avesnes, and bivouacked near the First
and Second Brigades. Two Companies of the Fourth Brigade, with twenty
Dragoons, were left to garrison Beaumont; but after the capture of
Avesnes, they were ordered to move on to the latter place.
It was between three and four o'clock when the Advanced Guard of
the Third Brigade, consisting of the 1st Silesian Hussars, two
Rifle Companies, and a Fusilier Battalion, arrived in front of the
Fortress of Avesnes. The Commandant having rejected ZIETEN's summons
to surrender, the latter ordered the bombardment to be commenced
forthwith. Ten Howitzers, of which six were ten pounders and four seven
pounders, drew up on the Flank of the Cavalry, and fired upon the Town.
The houses of the latter being all strongly built, the shells failed
in setting any part on fire; and a twelve pounder Battery produced
no great effect upon the firm masonry of the works. At nightfall the
bombardment was suspended; with the intention, however, of resuming
it at midnight. When it ceased, a sortie was made by the French
_Tirailleurs_; but these were immediately encountered and gallantly
driven in by the Silesian Rifles, who lost ten men on this occasion.
Immediately after midnight, the Prussian Batteries recommenced their
fire. At the fourteenth round, a ten pounder shell struck the principal
Powder Magazine, when a tremendous explosion ensued, by which forty
houses were involved in one common ruin; but it occasioned no damage
whatever to the fortifications. The panic, however, which it created
amidst the garrison was such as to induce the latter to express its
desire to capitulate. Such a desire could only have proceeded from
the want of sufficient energy on the part of the Commandant, or from
a bad disposition evinced by the garrison; for when the Prussians
subsequently entered the place, they found in it 15,000 cartridges for
cannon, and a million musket ball cartridges. There were also in the
Fortress forty seven pieces of artillery, mostly of heavy calibre;
which were now made available in the besieging of the remaining
Fortresses. The garrison, comprising three Battalions of National
Guards, and two hundred Veterans, were made prisoners of war. The
National Guards were disarmed, and sent off to their respective homes;
but the Veterans were conducted to Cologne.
The possession of Avesnes, gained too with so little sacrifice of life,
and with none of time, was of essential importance to the Prussians;
offering as it did a secure depôt for their material and supplies upon
their new line of operation. It also served for the reception of their
sick, and all who had been rendered incapable of keeping up with the
Army.
* * * * *
On the 21st, the French Army continued collecting its scattered
remnants between Avesnes and Laon.
* * * * *
The following was the general disposition of the respective Armies on
the evening of the 21st:
The Anglo-Allied Army had its principal force at Bavay; and its Right
at Valenciennes, which it blockaded.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Malplaquet.
The Prussian Army had its First _Corps d'Armée_ near Avesnes.
The Fourth Corps at Maroilles; its Reserve Cavalry blockading
Landrecy.
The Second Corps at Thuin, except the Fifth Brigade which blockaded
Maubeuge.
The Third Corps at Charleroi.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Noyelles sur Sambre.
The defeated portion of the French Army lay between Avesnes and Laon.
GROUCHY's force was at Philippeville.
The Duke of WELLINGTON, steadfastly pursuing that line of policy
which led him to constitute as an important feature of his plan, the
practical assurance to the French people, that, although entering
their country as a Conqueror, he did so in hostility to none, save
the Usurper and his adherents, issued the following Proclamation,
previously to his quitting Malplaquet:--
PROCLAMATION. PROCLAMATION.
"Je fais savoir aux Français que "I make known to the French
j'entre dans leur pays à la tête that I enter their country at the
d'une Armée déjà victorieuse, non en head of an Army already victorious,
Ennemi (excepté de l'Usurpateur, not as an Enemy (except of the
prononcé l'Ennemi du Genre Usurper, declared to be the Enemy
Humain, avec lequel on ne peut of Mankind; with whom may be
avoir ni paix ni trêve), mais pour had neither Peace nor Truce), but
les aider à secouer le joug de fer to help them to shake off the Yoke
par lequel ils sont opprimés. of Iron with which they are
oppressed.
"En consequence j'ai donné les "In consequence I have given the
Ordres ci joints à mon Armée, et je annexed Orders to my Army, and
demande qu'on me fasse connaître I request that I may be informed
tout infracteur. of all infringers of them.
"Les Français savent cependant "The French know, however,
que j'ai le droit d'exiger qu'ils se that I have the right to require
conduisent de manière que je that they will conduct themselves
puisse les protéger contre ceux in such a manner that I may be able
qui voudraient leur faire du mal. to protect them against those who
would do them harm.
"Il faut donc qu'ils fournissent "It is necessary, then, that they
aux réquisitions qui leur seront supply the requisitions which will
faites de la part des personnes be made upon them by persons
autorisées à les faire, en échange authorized to make the same, in
pour des reçus en forme et ordre; exchange for the receipts in order
et qu'ils se tiennent chez eux and form; and that they will stay
paisiblement, et qu'ils n'aient at home peaceably; and that they
aucune correspondence ou communication will not have any correspondence
avec l'Usurpateur Ennemi, nor communication with the Enemy
ni avec ses adhérens. Usurper nor with his adherents.
"Tous ceux qui s'absenteront de "All those who will absent
leur domicile après l'entrée en themselves from their homes after
France, et tous ceux qui se the entry in France and all those
trouveront absens au service de who will be absent in the service
l'Usurpateur, seront considérés of the Usurper, will be considered
comme ses adhérens et comme as his adherents and as Enemies;
Ennemis; et leurs propriétés and their properties will be
seront affectées à la subsistance de appropriated to the subsistence of
l'Armée. the Army.
"Donné au Quartier Général à "Given at the Head Quarters
Malplaquet, ce 22 de juin, 1815. at Malplaquet, this 22nd of June
1815.
"WELLINGTON." "WELLINGTON."
No Proclamation of a similar nature was issued by Prince BLÜCHER, nor
were any direct Orders given by the latter to remind his troops that
France was "to be treated as a friendly country," or to forbid them
taking anything "for which payment be not made."
Hence, in the advance to Paris, a marked contrast was observed between
the conduct of the Prussian, and that of the Anglo-Allied, Army: the
troops of the former committing great excesses and imposing severe
exactions along their whole line of march; whilst the British and
German troops under the Duke of WELLINGTON acquired from the outset
the good will and kindly disposition of the inhabitants of the country
through which they passed. The Anglo-Allied troops inspired the people
with confidence: the Prussians awed them into subjection.
Much of the cause of all this may be traced to the different views
entertained by the two great Commanders. BLÜCHER's extreme hatred of
the French would not allow him to modify, still less to abandon, the
opinion which he had imbibed from the first moment he heard of the
escape of NAPOLEON from Elba; that they ought not only to be thoroughly
humbled, but also severely punished. Neither he nor his soldiers could
ever forget the monstrous cruelties and grinding extortions which
their own country had been compelled to endure when overrun by the
French: and now that they were once more brought into the land of their
bitterest Enemies, and another period of retribution had arrived; but
one sentiment pervaded the whole Prussian Army--that those who had not
scrupled to inflict the scourge of War throughout the whole Continent,
should, in their turn, be made duly sensible of its evils. A contrary
train of ideas, or a different course of proceeding, on the part of the
Prussians was scarcely to be expected. Hence the value of the excellent
and orderly conduct of the British troops operating as a salutary
counterpoise to the domineering and revengeful spirit which actuated
the Prussians.
BLÜCHER felt equally with WELLINGTON that the advance upon Paris before
the approach of the Allied Armies, which were then only crossing the
Rhine, was a departure from strictly military principles; and that
this could only be justified by the extraordinary moral effect which
would be produced by the signal defeat of NAPOLEON. But his views
were limited to the military part of the plan, which was to make a
dash at the capital; and, if possible, to intercept GROUCHY whilst
endeavouring to rejoin the routed force under SOULT. WELLINGTON's
admirable policy embraced a wider field. He invariably kept in view the
great object for which the War had been undertaken. The information
which he contrived to obtain relative to the effect which NAPOLEON's
disaster produced upon the minds of the leading men of the great
political Parties by which France was then agitated, and upon the
Members of the two Chambers of Parliament generally, combined with the
knowledge he had already acquired of the disposition of the inhabitants
of the Department of the North, which, in fact, had not evinced that
enthusiasm attendant upon the return of NAPOLEON from Elba that was
manifested throughout the greater part of the nation, convinced him
that by adopting measures calculated to impress upon the French people
that the Allies were friendly towards them, though inveterately
hostile to NAPOLEON, and by seizing every advantage afforded by the
presence and the influence of their legitimate Monarch, he was, by
such means, insuring the security of the operations upon Paris more
effectually than could have been accomplished by additional military
force applied under different circumstances.
The aid which such a line of conduct, on the part of the Duke, gave
to the cause of LOUIS XVIII. was immense. The people of the Northern
Departments, who, in general, were wearied by the continuance of wars
undertaken for the sole purpose of aggrandizing and upholding the power
of NAPOLEON; and who now longed to enjoy the blessings of peace, saw
in the friendly disposition of the Allies, and the support which these
yielded to the King's authority, a pledge of their determination to
crush the War Party, and at the same time, to cement their alliance
with the legitimate Sovereign. The White Flag was soon seen to wave
from countless steeples. The tide of Royalty, favoured in no small
degree by the versatile nature of the French character, was already
setting in fast: and as it rolled steadily on towards the capital, the
Duke's customary foresight and good tact gave it an impulse which not
only bore him along with it in easy triumph; but, when it subsequently
reached the goal, swept away every vestige of the Government usurped by
NAPOLEON and his adherents.