It was explained at the conclusion of the Eighth Chapter that
THIELEMANN, who had been ordered by BLÜCHER to defend the position of
Wavre in the event of the Enemy advancing in force, or, if otherwise,
to follow the main Army in the direction of Couture, was on the point
of fulfilling the instructions appertaining to the latter contingency,
when VANDAMME's Corps arrived in front of that position, about four
o'clock in the afternoon, and its Artillery immediately opened a
cannonade upon the Prussian troops.
All the Brigades (the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth) of
THIELEMANN's Corps, had, at that time, received the Order to commence
the general movement to the right. A Detachment of only two Battalions
(the Fusilier Battalions of the 30th Regiment and of the 1st Kurmark
Landwehr), under Colonel ZEPELIN, from the Ninth Brigade, which had
not yet crossed the Dyle, was to be left in occupation of Wavre. The
Twelfth Brigade was already in full line of march, and the Eleventh had
been just put in motion.
When General BORCKE, who commanded the Ninth Brigade, fell back upon
Wavre, for the purpose of carrying out his instructions, he found the
Bridge already barricaded, and therefore proceeded with his Brigade
to Bas Wavre: and having crossed the Dyle at this point, left a
Detachment there, consisting of the Sharpshooters of the Fusilier
Battalion of the 8th Regiment, and of those of the 1st Battalion of
the 30th Regiment, under Major DITFURTH; whom he directed to destroy
the Bridge immediately. He then detached the 2nd Battalion of the 30th
Regiment and his two Squadrons of the Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, as a
reinforcement to Colonel ZEPELIN at Wavre; and, with the remainder of
his Brigade, continued his march.
In the mean time, French _Tirailleurs_ were observed extending along
the opposite Heights; and, in their rear, considerable masses of the
Enemy's troops appeared advancing. It soon became manifest that they
contemplated forcing the passage of the river.
THIELEMANN, judging by the want of vigour displayed in the French
pursuit; and by the Enemy not having attempted to secure the passage
of the Dyle at Moustier, Limelette, and Limale, that it was only a
weak Detachment of the Enemy that was advancing upon Wavre, confining
itself to the design of creating some little uneasiness by its movement
along this road to Brussels, had hitherto been of opinion that the
occupation of Wavre by a few Battalions, as directed by BLÜCHER, would
be quite sufficient: but he now plainly saw that the moment had arrived
which required him, in pursuance of his instructions, to maintain the
position at Wavre; and he accordingly ordered the halt of his whole
Corps for this purpose.
The town of Wavre is situated on the left bank of the Dyle: having a
suburb on the opposite side of the river, with which it is connected by
two stone Bridges; the principal one leading towards the middle, and a
small one towards the upper end, of the Town. Higher up the stream, at
the Mill of Bierge, at Limale, and at Limelette; as also below the town
at Bas Wavre, there are wooden Bridges. The river is not deep, but at
the period of the Battle it was swollen by the recent heavy rain. The
low range of Heights on either side of the Valley is covered in many
places with wood. The Heights on the right bank are generally more
elevated, but those on the left have steeper declivities, and offer a
greater command of the river and its passages. The shortest road from
Namur to Brussels passes through the town, besides which there are
numerous cross roads practicable for the movement of all Arms. The
great number of hollow ways forms a prominent feature in the vicinity;
and these, being in a miry state from the rain, were unfavourable to
the progress of troops passing through them.
The position was thus occupied:--the Twelfth Brigade (Colonel
STÜLPNAGEL), with the Horse Battery No. 20, was posted on the Height
in rear of Bierge. The Bridge in front of this Village was barricaded,
and the Mill occupied for the defence of the Bridge. The Tenth Brigade
(Colonel KÄMPFEN) stood upon the Height in rear of Wavre, its Right
resting on a Wood which lay between it and the Twelfth Brigade. The
Eleventh Brigade (Colonel LUCK) was formed across the Brussels road.
The Reserve Cavalry was drawn up, near La Bavette, in Columns of
Squadrons. The Artillery was distributed along the Heights. The Horse
Battery No. 18 remained in reserve.
That part of the town of Wavre which lies on the right bank, or,
more properly, the suburb, was occupied by Light Troops only. The
great Bridge was barricaded as well as time and circumstances would
admit. The houses adjoining the left bank of the river were hastily
loopholed. The smaller Bridge was left perfectly open. A Detachment of
two Companies of Light Infantry, under Major BORNSTÄDT was detached to
reinforce the troops at the Bridge of Bas Wavre.
THIELEMANN intended that the Ninth Brigade should be posted in rear of
this general disposition of his troops, so that its services might be
made available according as circumstances might require; but through
some misunderstanding in the transmission of the Order, General BORCKE
was induced, after having moved along the Brussels road until near
La Bavette, thence to turn off to his left, and continue his march,
according to his original instructions, in the direction of Fromont,
Bourgeois, and St Lambert, towards Couture; being under the impression
that the whole Corps had already commenced this march, in pursuance
of the general plan, and that his Brigade was destined to cover the
movement. The departure of the Brigade was not immediately discovered;
and thus, by this misunderstanding, THIELEMANN's force suffered an
unexpected reduction of six Battalions and the Foot Battery No. 18; and
consisted, therefore, of only 15,200 men; with which number he had now
to contend against Marshal GROUCHY's force, amounting altogether to
33,765 men.
THIELEMANN's position was certainly a very favourable one, and the
occupation of it was arranged with great skill. As it was impossible
to foresee in what manner the attack upon it would be conducted;
whether it would be directed against one particular Bridge, or against
all the Bridges, with the design of carrying the whole Line by storm:
THIELEMANN limited the occupation of the town and of the line of the
river to the number of Light Troops which might be sufficient for
sustaining any sudden assault; taking care to have Supports close at
hand for that purpose: but disposing his Reserves, which comprised
his main force, so that they might become available at any point
which might be pressed; or, should the Enemy develop greatly superior
numbers, as was subsequently the case, serve to guard against any flank
attack.
* * * * *
As before explained, it was VANDAMME's Corps which arrived in front
of Wavre between three and four o'clock. Two Batteries, of which
one consisted of twelve pounders, were drawn up on the right of the
road overlooking the valley, and opened the cannonade. These were
subsequently reinforced by a third Battery, posted on the left of the
road. EXCELMANS' Cavalry Corps was posted in right rear of VANDAMME.
GÉRARD, with the Fourth French Corps, was still in the rear on the
march; and PAJOL, with his Light Cavalry, had only just passed through
Tourrines, situated scarcely half way between Gembloux and Wavre.
Marshal GROUCHY sent word to both these Officers to accelerate their
march.
Whilst the French Skirmishers were gradually forcing back the Prussian
Light Troops into the valley, GROUCHY, hearing a powerful cannonade
in the distance to his left, rode off a little way in that direction;
and concluding that NAPOLEON was closely engaged with WELLINGTON,
conceived that as he had now reached the Prussians, he would best
fulfil his instructions by vigorously attacking them, so as to prevent
their detaching reinforcements to the Anglo-Allied Army. He was quite
ignorant as to the strength of the Enemy in his front, and was in doubt
whether the whole Prussian Army was before him, or merely a strong
Detachment. Of the fact that three Prussian Corps were on the march
to co-operate with WELLINGTON's forces, he of course knew nothing.
In this state of uncertainty, and with his troops _aux prises_ with
the Prussians, he was fearful of detaching to his left; since by so
doing, he would expose himself to the risk of his main force becoming
overpowered by superior numbers, and his Detachment cut off.
Independently of other considerations which might have assisted in
dissuading GROUCHY from detaching a portion of his force at this
period, such as the length of time his troops had been upon the
march, along bad and miry roads; he was perfectly justified, under
all the circumstances of his then position, in adopting this course
of proceeding. And even if he had been fully cognisant of the actual
disposition of the Prussian Army, he could at this time have rendered
no essential service to NAPOLEON; the opportunity for doing so had been
suffered to pass by, as was fully explained in Chapter VIII.
His total ignorance, however, of BLÜCHER's proceedings, and of all that
was then taking place between Wavre and the Field of Waterloo, afforded
undeniable proof of his having completely failed in acting up to the
spirit of the instructions he had received, not to lose sight of the
Prussians, and in exercising that degree of enterprise, energy, and
decision, which NAPOLEON had so naturally anticipated from a General
of GROUCHY's note and experience; especially when entrusted with so
important a command, under such highly critical circumstances.
A message having reached GROUCHY from PAJOL, communicating his having
fallen into the Marshal's line of operation, he directed that General
to move upon Limale. His Right Flank, however, continued to be
protected by the 17th Dragoons, detached from General BERTON's Cavalry
Brigade (of EXCELMANS' Corps) _en reconnaissance_, towards the high
road leading from Namur to Louvain.
In the mean time, a vigorous cannonade was maintained between
VANDAMME's and the Prussian Batteries across that part of the valley
in which lay the town of Wavre. Under cover of the French guns, the
Skirmishers pressed down upon that portion of the town situated upon
the right bank of the river, and of which they soon gained possession;
the Prussians having previously decided upon not making any effort
to retain it. On reaching the river, however, they were met by a
most destructive fire of musketry from the opposite houses and the
Bridge. The contest now became desperate, and the defence of the Dyle
was obstinately maintained by the Prussians. The Skirmishers rapidly
extended on either Flank along both banks of the river from Bierge
as far as Bas Wavre. All the Prussian Brigades pushed forward their
Sharpshooters. Those of the 4th Kurmark Landwehr took up the Line
between the Town and Bas Wavre, those of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr took
post in the Town, between the two Bridges; on the right of the latter
stood the Sharpshooters of the Tenth Brigade; and those of the Twelfth
Brigade formed the Right Wing of the whole Line at Bierge.
This _tiraillade_ had continued about an hour, when General HULOT's
Division of GÉRARD's _Corps d'Armée_ reached the Field; and received
Orders to take possession of the Mill at Bierge, and to cross the Dyle
at that point. A Battalion of VANDAMME's Corps was at the time vainly
attempting to effect a passage. Upon the Height opposite Bierge were
several guns of the Third Corps, endeavouring to keep down the fire
from the Prussian Batteries on the other side of the valley.
GROUCHY desired GÉRARD to relieve the Battalion attacking the Mill at
Bierge by one of his own Corps; whereupon the latter directed General
HULOT to push forward with a Battalion of the 9th Light Infantry for
that purpose. The Battalion descended into the valley, covered by the
fire from the guns on the Height. Its advance was much impeded by the
swampy nature of the ground at the foot of the declivity, and by the
numerous broad and deep drains by which the valley is intersected: and
its order was still further deranged by the fire from the Artillery
on the opposite Heights, as also by that of the Prussian Skirmishers
posted along the left bank of the river, and strongly occupying the
Mill. The banks of the river at this part, more particularly the left
bank, are mostly lined with trees; which tended still further to
increase the means of resistance on the part of the Prussians to the
advance of the French troops. The latter on reaching the Mill, and
relieving VANDAMME's troops, made an attack; but without success.
GROUCHY was on the point of ordering this attack to be renewed, when he
received, between six and seven o'clock, SOULT's despatch, addressed
to him from the Field of Waterloo at one o'clock in the afternoon: and
desiring him to manoeuvre always in that direction, to maintain a close
communication with the main Army, and to lose not a moment in joining
the latter, and attacking BÜLOW's _Corps d'Armée_; which, it added,
could then be seen upon the Heights of St Lambert.
The circumstances in which GROUCHY found himself at the time this
despatch reached him, held out no prospect of his being able to fulfil,
even partially, the instructions which it contained. VANDAMME's efforts
to force the Bridges of Wavre, and to capture the Town, were completely
frustrated by the most gallant defence maintained on the part of the
Prussians. The issue of the attack upon the Mill of Bierge appeared
very doubtful. Neither the main body of GÉRARD's Corps, nor General
TESTE's Division of the Sixth Corps, nor even PAJOL's Light Cavalry,
had as yet arrived.
GROUCHY, becoming impatient, rode hastily towards La Baraque,
accompanied by GÉRARD, to meet the first mentioned force; and on coming
up with the Columns, directed their march upon Limale, his object now
being to turn the Right of THIELEMANN's position, and to prevent the
retreat of the latter upon Brussels, and at the same time open his
direct road to St Lambert. This he might succeed in effecting; but it
is sufficiently evident from the above view of his position, at so late
an hour of the day, that any important diversion on his part in favour
of NAPOLEON, was quite out of the question.
On returning with GÉRARD to Wavre, GROUCHY found that notwithstanding
the furious assaults that were made in rapid succession upon the
Bridges, supported by the vigorous cannonade from the Heights, and the
incessant fusillade along the banks of the river, no further progress
was effected. As if determined that the passage should be forced,
he dismounted from his horse, and placing himself at the head of a
Battalion, led on another attack upon the Mill of Bierge. But the
bravery of the troops, though so strongly excited by the noble example
of the Marshal, could avail nothing against the indomitable resistance
of the Prussian defenders of this important Post. GÉRARD, who had
accompanied the Marshal in this attack, fell severely wounded by a shot
which struck him in the breast.
GROUCHY now decided upon leaving VANDAMME's Corps and EXCELMANS'
Cavalry in front of Wavre and Bierge; and proceeding himself with
that portion of GÉRARD's troops which was at hand, along the right
bank of the Dyle, towards Limale, and uniting them to the remainder
of the Corps which had been ordered to march in the direction of that
point from La Baraque. This movement occupied considerable time, in
consequence of the difficulties opposed to the march of troops along
the side of the river. At length, having, arrived in front of Limale,
and formed a junction with PAJOL's Cavalry, preparations were made for
an attack.
Limale was at that time occupied by Lieutenant Colonel STENGEL with the
three Battalions of the 19th Prussian Regiment, two Squadrons of the
6th Uhlans, and one Squadron of the Westphalian Landwehr Cavalry. It
was the Detachment left by ZIETEN for the purpose of covering the Left
Flank of the Third _Corps d'Armée_. It had unaccountably neglected to
adopt any measures for barricading the Bridge; the defence of which,
if conducted with the same energy and resolution by which that of the
Bridges lower down the stream had been distinguished, might have been
the means of preventing the French from crossing the Dyle at all on
that day.
PAJOL, having reconnoitred the place and discovered his neglect,
succeeded in gaining possession of the Bridge by means of a brisk
Cavalry attack. HULOT's Infantry Division of GÉRARD's Corps reached it
shortly afterwards; and it was soon made manifest to Lieutenant Colonel
STENGEL that he was attacked by a force much superior to his own.
Nevertheless he continued to fall gradually back, in good order, until
THIELEMANN pushed forward the Twelfth Brigade to his support. Three
Battalions of the Tenth Brigade moved into the position thus vacated by
the Twelfth: and a general movement was made to the right by all the
troops that could be spared from the defence of Wavre and Bierge. The
4th Kurmark Landwehr, belonging to the Eleventh Brigade, crossed the
Brussels road. The Reserve Cavalry was ordered to move upon Limale, in
support of the Twelfth Brigade.
When Colonel STÜLPNAGEL was ordered to move his Brigade (the Twelfth)
upon Limale, he left three Battalions for the defence of Bierge.
With the remaining six Battalions he came up close to the Enemy,
who was posted on a Height in advance of Limale, his Left thrown
considerably forward and covered by his Cavalry, and his Right resting
upon some houses which he had occupied with Infantry. This Line,
which was perpendicular to the direction of the original position
of the Prussians, had been taken up with great skill by GROUCHY,
notwithstanding the difficulties with which the movement had been
attended. His troops had to ascend the Heights during the obscurity
of the night, in rear of Limale, by a narrow, rugged road, in the
immediate proximity of the Prussians, whose fire reached the head
of the Defile: and he was fully occupied until a very late hour, in
posting the Battalions in their proper places, as they filed out of the
road, on reaching the Height; whilst, in the mean time, PAJOL's Light
Cavalry pushed rapidly round by the left.
Colonel STÜLPNAGEL posted the Fusilier Battalion of the 5th Kurmark
Landwehr, and his Battery, in reserve, in rear of the small Wood on
the right of Bierge, and advanced to the attack, late as it was, with
his five remaining Battalions, having Lieutenant Colonel STENGEL with
his Detachment on the right. The darkness of the night prevented the
Prussians from correctly ascertaining the position and strength of the
French; but nevertheless it was decided that an attempt should be made
to regain Limale, and drive back the Enemy across the Dyle.
The attack was thus formed. Two Battalions in front, closely followed
by the remaining three Battalions. Both the Brigade Squadrons joined
the three Squadrons under Lieutenant Colonel STENGEL; and the whole
of the Reserve Cavalry formed in support. In this movement, however,
the mutual connection of the advancing troops was greatly impeded by
the darkness of the night. The two Battalions in Front Line were on
the point of passing a hollow way when they received a volley from two
French Battalions on the opposite side, by which their further advance
was checked. The three Battalions of the Second Line had inclined too
much to the left, where they became engaged with French _Tirailleurs_.
Lieutenant Colonel STENGEL's Detachment, in attempting to push forward,
was checked by the French Cavalry; and as the latter made a disposition
which menaced his Right Flank, that Officer fell back with his
Detachment as far as the Wood near Point du Jour.
The decided failure of the attack induced Colonel STÜLPNAGEL to
withdraw all his troops to the Wood, leaving only the 1st Battalion of
the 6th Kurmark Landwehr in support of the chain of Advanced Posts. The
Reserve Cavalry bivouacked in rear of the Wood. Thus ended the contest
on this part of the Field. The Prussian and French Picquets were so
close to one another during the night, that the Patrols were constantly
clashing, and the whole Line kept upon the _qui vive_.
* * * * *
Upon the Prussian Left, the conflict for the possession of the town and
Bridges of Wavre continued to be carried on with unabated fury on both
sides until late in the night. VANDAMME devoted the whole of his Corps
to the attack; constantly pushing forward fresh troops to relieve those
who had failed in their attempts to dislodge the Prussians. The latter,
who exhibited on this occasion an extraordinary degree of bravery and
resolution, succeeded in repelling no less than thirteen different
assaults; and even dislodged, in five instances, the French from the
houses they occupied, from the commencement, on the right bank of the
Dyle. At one time the French had already gained possession of the great
Bridge and some houses on the left bank, when they were driven back
again to their own side of the river by the Prussian Reserves--these
having advanced to the relief of their comrades. The struggle was
desperate, and apparently interminable. When the French attacked the
houses nearest the Bridge they succeeded in bursting open the doors,
and by superiority of numbers, in possessing themselves of the ground
floors. But even this did not induce the heroic defenders to relax
their exertions; on the contrary, with increased fury, they defended
the upper storeys of the houses, and held out most gallantly until
relieved by the arrival of their Supports.
This brilliant defence of Wavre was distinguished, on the part of the
Prussians, not only by the unflinching bravery of the troops, but also
by the judicious disposal of the Reserves; by means of which the Enemy
was foiled in every attempt to gain a permanent footing in the town.
While the Skirmishers and their Supports were posted along the Dyle
and the adjacent houses, the Reserves were concealed in the nearest
streets, that lay in a direction parallel with that of the river:
and at the moment the French Columns of Attack, already crippled by
the fire concentrated from the Skirmishers, endeavoured to force the
Bridge; these Reserves rushed forward from their cover in the side
streets, and presenting themselves in mass before the Enemy, invariably
drove them back with great slaughter.
It was in this manner that the Fusilier Battalion of the 30th Regiment,
under Major SPRENGER, and the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Kurmark
Landwehr, under Major BORNSTÄDT, constantly repulsed, with admirable
bravery, the attacks made with such superior numbers during the earlier
part of the contest. One of these attacks having been attended with a
somewhat favourable result, the 2nd Battalion of the 30th Regiment,
under Major BEAUFORT, was brought forward; and, at a similarly critical
moment, the 1st Battalion of the 4th Kurmark Landwehr, under Major
GROLMAN, came up; when both Battalions succeeded in compelling the
Enemy to retire.
These Battalions then took post in the streets lying parallel with
the river, in the manner before explained; and, with heroic courage,
overcame every renewed attempt on the part of the French to establish
themselves in the town. When, finally, it is considered that from four
o'clock until night, four Prussian Battalions successfully maintained
their ground against a whole _Corps d'Armée_, with which they were
constantly and desperately engaged during the whole of that period; the
merits of Colonel ZEPELIN and his brave troops are beyond all praise,
and present one of the brightest examples of the defence of a town and
of the passage of a river, recorded in military history.
[Illustration]
Both the Bridges of Wavre remained in the possession of the Prussians,
and the smaller one was barricaded during the night.
At a late hour, as the fire on both sides began to slacken, the
combatants bivouacked on their respective sides of the river. Upon
the Prussian extreme Left at Bas Wavre, the French had only shown one
Battalion. This occupied an isolated building, and was supported by
two Squadrons and a piece of artillery. Several unsuccessful attempts
were made to gain the Bridge; which, at nightfall, continued in the
possession of the Prussians.
GROUCHY was occupied late in the night in making his preparations for
renewing the attack on the following morning. General TESTE's Division
of the Sixth Corps having at length arrived, his Left Wing, which was
thus considerably reinforced, bivouacked upon the Height westward of
Bierge; separated by this Village and the Dyle from his Right Wing
which lay in front of Wavre. He had not yet received any intelligence
of NAPOLEON's signal defeat at Waterloo; and was therefore resolved
upon following up, at daybreak, the advantages he had already gained,
by forcing back the Prussian Right Flank.
THIELEMANN, on the contrary, having despatched an Officer of MARWITZ's
Cavalry Brigade _en reconnaissance_ to the right, ascertained through
this means that the Allied Armies had gained a complete victory; and he
therefore fully expected that GROUCHY would be compelled to effect an
immediate retreat.
With the first dawn of the 19th of June, Colonel STENGEL, whose
Detachment was posted on the extreme Right of THIELEMANN's Corps, took
upon himself to march off by St Lambert, to join his _Corps d'Armée_
(the First); the grounds for which proceeding remain to the present
time as unaccountable as his neglect on the previous day to secure the
Bridge of Limale. In consequence of this movement, the Twelfth Brigade
was necessitated to extend its Line too much to the right and to retain
a Reserve of only three weak Battalions upon the road leading through
the Wood to Point du Jour. The Wood to the right was occupied by a
Battalion and two Companies from each of the remaining Regiments of the
Twelfth Brigade. The Left Wing of this Line, which rested upon Bierge,
was formed by six Battalions of the Tenth Brigade.
Colonel LUCK, commanding the Eleventh Brigade, was directed to support
this Division, which was much too weak, with the three Battalions of
the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr; but to leave the two Battalions of the 4th
Kurmark Landwehr, as also the Brigade Squadrons, in rear of Wavre, in a
hollow near the Windmill, where they served to cover the twelve pounder
Battery No. 7.
The Mill of Bierge was occupied by two Battalions of the Twelfth
Brigade: Wavre and Bas Wavre were held by the same troops which
defended those points on the previous day. The barricades and
preparations for defence were rendered more complete.
Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR, whose Detachment, consisting of the 10th
Hussars, a Squadron of Landwehr Cavalry, and two guns from the Horse
Battery No. 12, had formed on the 18th the Advance of the Rear Guard
which THIELEMANN's Corps was considered to constitute, having reached
St Lambert before GROUCHY's attack became so decided, remained there
during the night.
Early on the 19th, GROUCHY sent off three Cavalry Regiments to his
left to watch these troops. They showed no indication of an intention
to attack; and when, later in the day, they retired and disappeared
from LEDEBUR's view, the latter passed the Defile, for the purpose of
proceeding to join his _Corps d'Armée_ (the Fourth), which, however, he
did not reach before the 20th.
This, as well as Colonel STENGEL's Detachment, thus withdrew from the
Field, without any apparent necessity, reducing THIELEMANN's numbers,
already too weak, and taking up a line of march, along which their
services were comparatively useless.
THIELEMANN, concluding from the account that he had received of the
defeat of NAPOLEON, that the French would commence a retreat, renewed
the combat at daybreak by an attack with his Cavalry. Colonel MARWITZ
was sent forward, with the 8th Uhlans and two Squadrons of the 6th
Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, towards the plateau above Limale, occupied
by GROUCHY's Left Wing: whilst General HOBE followed this movement
with the 5th and 7th Uhlans, and formed up on the left of the Advanced
Cavalry. The 5th Uhlans were immediately afterwards advantageously
posted in a hollow in support of Colonel MARWITZ.
The Horse Battery No. 20, subsequently reinforced by the Foot Battery
No. 18, opened a cannonade upon the Enemy's Columns at the plateau;
which displayed a great superiority of numbers, and were supported by a
considerable force of Cavalry. The preponderating number of guns in the
Enemy's Line answered the fire of the Prussians with great vigour; and
as the intervening space was very limited, the numbers of killed and
wounded were very great. The Prussian Artillery lost five guns on this
occasion.
GROUCHY delayed not a moment in making dispositions for an attack
on his part. His force on this side of the Field consisted of the
three Divisions of GÉRARD's Corps, and of TESTE's Division of the
Sixth Corps. The latter and two of the former were posted in Front
Line; the remaining Division, in Reserve. He formed three Columns
of Attack. That on the right consisted of TESTE's Division, and was
directed upon Bierge; the central Column was put in motion against the
Prussian Centre; and that on the left against the Right of the Prussian
formation.
The head of each Column was accompanied by a Battery, and preceded by
a swarm of Skirmishers. At the same time, PAJOL put his Cavalry in
motion, and threatened to turn the Prussian Right.
THIELEMANN resolved upon not only offering to the Enemy a vigorous
opposition; but also upon assuming the offensive himself, and
immediately gave the necessary Orders for that purpose. He also
reinforced his Right with two more Companies, and his Left with an
additional Battalion.
It was soon made manifest, however, that this attack failed to check
the forward movement of the Enemy. The ten Prussian Battalions were
forced to give way to the advance of twenty two French Battalions,
which were followed by six more in support. The French gained
possession of that part of the Wood of Rixansart which was on the right
of the Prussian position, and drove back the Twelfth Brigade. The
Battalions of the latter collected again immediately in rear of the
Wood, under the protection of the three before mentioned Battalions of
the Eleventh Brigade and of a Battery of fifteen guns.
General TESTE's Division had in the mean time attacked Bierge, which
was bravely defended by the two Battalions of the Kurmark Landwehr.
Whilst the engagement continued at this point, THIELEMANN took up a
second position in rear of the first, with four Battalions of the Tenth
Brigade, and occupied the small Wood in rear of Bierge. The Prussian
Cavalry Brigade, under Colonels MARWITZ and Count LOTTUM, comprising
twelve Squadrons, secured the right towards Chambre.
About eight o'clock, just as this position had been taken up,
THIELEMANN received, through General PIRCH, the decisive and authentic
intelligence that a great victory had been gained by the Allies on the
previous day, as also a communication of the fact of the Second _Corps
d'Armée_ having marched to intercept GROUCHY's retreat upon the Sambre.
Advantage was immediately taken of these joyful tidings to raise the
spirits of the troops, and to excite them to a renewed attack. With
loud cheers the Prussian Batteries advanced to the attack; which was
attended with complete success, and even the Wood of Rixansart was
again taken.
The Enemy appeared irresolute, and as if impressed with the idea that
THIELEMANN had received reinforcements; but observing that no further
progress was made, he renewed the attack on his part, and retook the
Wood of Rixansart.
It was not until about this time--towards nine o'clock--that TESTE's
Division gained possession of the Village of Bierge; on which
occasion General PENNE, an Officer of considerable distinction in
the French Army, was killed. The French were prevented for some time
from debouching from the place, by the determined opposition of the
_Tirailleurs_ of the 31st Prussian Regiment, under Major NATZMER.
THIELEMANN had now done all which could possibly have been expected
from any General under similar circumstances--with a force not equal
to one half of that of the Enemy, he had endeavoured, whenever an
opportunity offered, and in defiance of superior numbers, to force
back the French Left Wing upon the Dyle; but now that he had failed in
effecting this object, and that Bierge, the key of his position, had
been taken from him, whilst the French Left was pressing forward with
increased numbers to gain the Brussels road, he saw very plainly that
to attempt to maintain his ground any longer would be to expose himself
to the imminent risk of total overthrow, and that no other course was
left to him but to order a general retreat.
* * * * *
It was about ten o'clock in the morning when the Prussian troops began
to retire from the Field. The Town of Wavre had not been attacked on
the 19th, and Colonel ZEPELIN abandoned it without being much pressed
upon his line of retreat. Colonel MARWITZ was ordered to form the Rear
Guard, which was furnished from the 7th and 8th Uhlans, and the 3rd and
6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry. It was accompanied by three Batteries of
Horse, and one of Foot, Artillery. With these troops Colonel MARWITZ
took Post, at first, in front of the Brussels road; placing three
Batteries on his Left, and the remaining one in Reserve. THIELEMANN
gave the Rear Guard an express Order not to march off until Wavre had
been completely evacuated.
In the mean time, GÉRARD's _Corps d'Armée_ had crossed the Dyle
both at Bierge and at Wavre. The two Battalions of the 4th Kurmark
Landwehr, which had been posted in the hollow in rear of the Town, for
the protection of the twelve pounder Battery, became closely pressed
in consequence of this movement. One of the Battalions under Major
SCHMADE had advanced against an Enemy's Column near the Brussels road;
when it unexpectedly received the fire of three French Battalions,
which were pushing forward under cover of an eminence, and followed
by some Cavalry. The Battalion succeeded in reaching the small Wood
near La Bavette; and as the Enemy attempted to turn the latter, it
suddenly attacked and drove him back, after which it came up with the
Rear Guard. The other Battalion, commanded by Major SCHWERIN, attacked
a French Battalion which was advancing against it, threw it back in
confusion, and then continued its retreat. The gallantry and steadiness
displayed in this affair by the Kurmark Landwehr acquired for the
latter great and well merited renown.
The French Cavalry debouched from the Wood of Rixansart and drew up,
with its Left resting upon Chambre. VANDAMME now advanced the Columns
of his Corps towards the Heights of La Bavette, and pushed forward some
Cavalry along the high road. The latter, however, was driven back by
Colonel MARWITZ.
It has been explained that General BORCKE, instead of posting his
remaining six Battalions in rear of the position at Wavre, as intended
by THIELEMANN, proceeded on his march to Couture, by St Lambert.
This place he reached about nightfall, when he despatched an Officer
to BLÜCHER to report his arrival. The latter, in reply, desired him
to bivouac on the spot where he was, and to await further Orders on
the following morning. The Brigade was still in its bivouac at seven
o'clock the next morning, when Colonel STENGEL passed through St
Lambert with his Detachment. The latter informed General BORCKE that he
had defended the Bridge of Limale, and had been followed by the Enemy's
troops.
BORCKE, on hearing this, immediately broke up his bivouac, and decided
upon securing the Wood which extends from St Rober as far as Rixansart.
He deployed two Battalions of the 8th Regiment along the edge of the
Wood, and held the remaining four Battalions of his Brigade, then
with him, in reserve. Perceiving French Cavalry, at the time of their
first attack, marching into the Wood of Rixansart for the purpose of
advancing through it upon Chambre; he opened a fire upon them from his
Battery, with the hope of checking their movement. The only effect
it produced was that of their detaching three Regiments of Cavalry
towards his Brigade. These, however, contented themselves with watching
his movements. It is curious that the Ninth Brigade, as if bent upon
continuing the blunder committed the previous day of detaching itself
from its Corps, should not have attempted, with its six Battalions,
to effect a more important diversion upon the Enemy's extreme Left,
from which it was not more than three thousand paces distant. It was
then eight o'clock, and the Battle was maintained until about eleven;
and yet General BORCKE allowed the three Cavalry Regiments to move off
and join the remainder of the French Cavalry, towards ten o'clock, at
Chambre, without even attempting to molest their movement.
THIELEMANN effected his retreat, in several Columns, by Ottenburg and
St Achtenrode; at which latter place (about half way to Louvain) he
took up a position. The French Cavalry followed as far as the Brussels
road, and the Infantry occupied the Heights of La Bavette.
Between Wavre and Louvain the country assumes a new character,
being covered with hedges, hollow ways, ditches, and gardens, and is
altogether much intersected. From Ottenburg as far as St Achtenrode,
there is almost one continued defile. In this, Cavalry cannot act with
advantage; and it was therefore fortunate for the Prussian Cavalry that
it was followed but slowly by the French.
The loss experienced by THIELEMANN's _Corps d'Armée_ in this Battle of
the 18th and 19th of June, amounted to 2,476 men. No returns whatever
of the losses sustained by GROUCHY's Army are forthcoming, but they
could not have been less than those of the Prussians.
* * * * *
Such was the Battle of Wavre; a Battle the result of which was of no
advantage to NAPOLEON on the 18th, and of positive disadvantage to him
on the 19th. On the former day it did not prevent the march of the
great mass of the Prussian Army towards the Field of Waterloo; and,
on the 19th, the continuance of the contest, while NAPOLEON was in
full flight, exposed this, the only remaining intact, portion of the
French Army, to the imminent risk of being completely cut off from all
retreat. Nor can this defeat of THIELEMANN be looked upon as having
shed additional lustre upon the French arms, when it is considered how
long and successfully the Prussians battled against them with less than
half their strength.
The errors which led to the circumstance of the force under
GROUCHY--constituting, as NAPOLEON himself has been pleased to term
it, the Right Wing of the French Army--becoming exclusively occupied
in attacking a single Corps of the Prussian Army; whilst the remaining
three Corps of the latter were wending their way unmolested towards the
decisive Field of Battle, have already been sufficiently discussed:
and now that their result has been fully exhibited, it is scarcely
necessary to draw attention to the proof which the latter affords of
the entire ignorance of each other's proceedings which characterised
the conduct of NAPOLEON and GROUCHY, great Generals as they were, in
this memorable Campaign. The former received intelligence, before he
began the Battle with WELLINGTON, that the Right Wing was to follow
the Prussians to Wavre, and to act in such a manner as to prevent
these from detaching towards the Anglo-Allied Army; and therefore
felt satisfied that his general plan of operations was in successful
progress. But in less than two hours from the commencement of the
Battle, the fatal consequence of both Generals having unaccountably
neglected to maintain a vigilant reconnaissance and an uninterrupted
communication, was made manifest; and the first intimation NAPOLEON
received of the advance of the Prussians towards La Belle Alliance was
the distant view which he himself had, from his own Field, of BÜLOW's
Corps descending the Heights of St Lambert, at about one o'clock.
The leading principle of the French Emperor's plan was to endeavour,
by all means in his power, to beat the Armies opposed to him _in
detail_. It was therefore incumbent on him, in order to insure the
success of that plan, to adopt such precautionary measures as should
procure for him the earliest and the clearest information concerning
the movements of his Enemies. If he found it necessary temporarily
to divide his force, and act upon two lines; those measures became
still more indispensable, and at the same time admitted the greater
facility of execution. Several reconnoitring parties, both upon the
Flanks of the Army and in front of the interval between the two lines
of operation, under the guidance of experienced, active and intelligent
Officers, would have obtained for both Generals that insight into the
movements and designs of their opponents which was so essential for
the attainment of their common object: whilst parties detached from
each Wing, for the sole purpose of maintaining a close and direct
communication between them, would have afforded the ready means of
regulating each other's proceedings according to the circumstances
under which they might have found themselves respectively placed.
That there should have been so total a disregard of any measure of the
kind appears almost incredible; yet such was the fact; and hence it
came to pass that the despatch sent to GROUCHY, at one o'clock, from
the Heights in rear of La Belle Alliance did not reach him until seven
in the evening; at which time, as before explained, it was too late
to admit of the instructions it conveyed being fulfilled: and hence,
also, GROUCHY was left battling with his entire force--not less than a
third of the whole French Army--against a single incomplete Prussian
Corps, under THIELEMANN, from daybreak until about eleven o'clock in
the forenoon of the 19th, when he was first made acquainted with the
fact that during the whole of that time the Army under NAPOLEON, having
been most signally defeated and completely scattered on the preceding
evening, was flying across the frontier in the wildest confusion.
On receiving this latter intelligence, GROUCHY's first idea was to
march against the rear of the main body of the Prussian Army: but,
calculating that his force was not adequate for such an enterprise,
that the victorious Allies might detach to intercept his retreat, and
that he should be closely followed by that portion of the Prussians
which he had just defeated; he decided on retiring upon Namur, where he
would regulate his further operations according to the intelligence he
might gain in that quarter concerning the real state of affairs.
[Illustration]