THE LAWRENCE REGIME
The policy both of France and of England towards the
Acadians was based upon political expediency rather than
upon any definite or well-conceived plan for the development
of the country. The inhabitants, born to serve rather
than to command, had honestly striven according to their
light to maintain respect for constituted authority. But
the state of unrest into which they were so frequently
thrown had deprived them of all sense of security in
their homes and had created among them a spirit of
suspicion. Unable to reason, disinclined to rebel, they
had settled down into a morose intractability, while
their confidence in the generosity or even in the justice
of their rulers gradually disappeared. Those who could
have restored them to a normal condition of healthy
citizenship saw fit to keep them in disquietude, holding
over their heads the tomahawk of the Indian. England and
France were nominally at peace. But each nation was only
waiting for a favourable moment to strike a decisive
blow, not merely for Acadia or any part of it, but for
the mastery of the North American continent. With this
object ever in the background, France, through her agents,
strove to make the Acadians a thorn in Great Britain's
side, while England hesitated to allow them to pass over
to the ranks of her enemies. At the same time she was
anxious that they should, by some visible sign, acknowledge
her sovereignty. But to become a British subject it was
necessary to take the oath of allegiance. Most of the
Acadians had refused to take this oath without reservations.
Great Britain should then have allowed them to depart or
should have deported them. She had done neither. On the
contrary, she had tried to keep them, had made concessions
to them to remain, and had closed her eyes to violations
of the law, until many of them had been, by various means,
acknowledged as British subjects.
A Murray or a Dorchester would have humoured the people
and would probably have kept them in allegiance. But this
was an impossible task for Lawrence. He was unaccustomed
to compromise. He kept before him the letter of the law,
and believed that any deviation from it was fraught with
danger. He entered upon his duties as administrator in
the month of October 1753. Six weeks later he made a
report on the condition of affairs in the province. This
report contains one pregnant sentence. He is referring
to the emigrant Acadians who had left their homes for
French soil and were now wishing to come back, and he
says: 'But Your Lordships may be assured they will never
have my consent to return until they comply [take the
oath] without any reservation whatever.' [Footnote:
Lawrence to Lords of Trade, December 5, 1753.] This was
the keynote of all Lawrence's subsequent action. The
Acadians must take the oath without reserve, or leave
the country. He does not appear to have given any
consideration to the fact that for forty years the Lords
of Trade had, for various motives, nursed the people, or
that only two years before the Council at Halifax had
declared the Acadians to be still entitled to the privileges
accorded to them by the Treaty of Utrecht. To him the
Acadians were as an enemy in the camp, and as such they
were to be treated.
The Lords of Trade partly acquiesced in Lawrence's
reasoning, yet they warned him to be cautious. A year
before they had announced that those who remained in the
country were to be considered as holding good titles;
but they now maintained that the inhabitants had 'in fact
no right, but upon condition of taking the oath of
allegiance absolute and unqualified.' Officials might be
sent among them to inquire into their disputes, but 'the
more we consider the point, the more nice and difficult
it appears to us; for, as on the one hand great caution
ought to be used to avoid giving alarm and creating such
a diffidence in their minds as might induce them to quit
the province, and by their numbers add strength to the
French settlements, so on the other hand we should be
equally cautious of creating an improper and false
confidence in them, that by a perseverance in refusing
to take the oath of allegiance, they may gradually work
out in their own way a right to their lands and to the
benefit and protection of the law, which they are not
entitled to but on that condition.' [Footnote: Lords of
Trade to Lawrence, March 4, 1754.]
After nine months' tenure of office Lawrence had fully
made up his mind as to his policy in dealing with the
Acadians. On August 1, 1754, he addressed a letter to
the Lords of Trade, to acquaint them with the measures
which appeared to him to be 'the most practicable and
effectual for putting a stop to the many inconveniences
we have long laboured under, from their obstinacy,
treachery, partiality to their own countrymen, and their
ingratitude for the favour, indulgence, and protection
they have at all times so undeservedly received from His
Majesty's Government. Your Lordships well know that they
always affected a neutrality, and as it has been generally
imagined here that the mildness of an English Government
would by degrees have fixed them in their own interest,
no violent measures have ever been taken with them. But
I must observe to Your Lordships that this lenity has
not had the least good effect; on the contrary, I believe
they have at present laid aside all thoughts of taking
the oaths voluntarily, and great numbers of them at
present are gone to Beausejour to work for the French,
in order to dyke out the water at the settlement.'
[Footnote: Lawrence to Lords of Trade, August 1, 1754.]
Lawrence explained that he had offered the Acadians work
at Halifax, which they had refused to accept; and that
he had then issued a proclamation calling upon them 'to
return forthwith to their lands as they should answer
the contrary at their peril.' Moreover, 'They have not
for a long time brought anything to our markets, but on
the other hand have carried everything to the French and
Indians whom they have always assisted with provisions,
quarters, and intelligence. And indeed while they remain
without taking the oaths to His Majesty (which they never
will do till they are forced) and have incendiary French
priests among them there are no hopes of their amendment.
As they possess the best and largest tracts of land in
this province, it cannot be settled with any effect while
they remain in this situation. And tho' I would be very
far from attempting such a step without Your Lordships'
approbation, yet I cannot help being of opinion that it
would be much better, if they refuse the oaths, that they
were away. The only ill consequences that can attend
their going would be their taking arms and joining with
the Indians to distress our settlements, as they are
numerous and our troops are much divided; tho' indeed I
believe that a very large part of the inhabitants would
submit to any terms rather than take up arms on either
side; but that is only my conjecture, and not to be
depended upon in so critical a circumstance. However, if
Your Lordships should be of opinion that we are not
sufficiently established to take so important a step, we
could prevent any inconvenience by building a fort or a
few blockhouses on Chibenacadie [Shubenacadie] river. It
would hinder in a great measure their communication with
the French.'
In order to prevent the Acadians from trading with the
French, Lawrence issued a proclamation forbidding the
exportation of corn from the province, imposing a penalty
of fifty pounds for each offence, half of such sum to be
paid to the informer. The exact purpose of the proclamation
was explained in a circular. First, it was to prevent
'the supplying of corn to the Indians and their abettors,
who, residing on the north side of the Bay of Fundy, do
commit hostilities upon His Majesty's subjects which they
cannot so conveniently do, that supply being cut off.'
Secondly, it was for the better supply of the Halifax
market, which had been obliged to supply itself from
other colonies. The inhabitants were not asked to sell
their corn to any particular person or at any fixed price;
all that was insisted upon was their supplying the Halifax
market before they should think of sending corn elsewhere.
There was, of course, nothing objectionable in this
proclamation. It was only a protective measure for the
benefit of the whole colony, and did 'not bind the French
inhabitants more or less than the rest of His Majesty's
subjects in the Province.'
Towards the Indians Lawrence adopted the same tone as
towards the Acadians. The tribes at Cape Sable had for
some time talked of peace, and an alliance with them was
particularly to be encouraged. The French were becoming
more of a menace, having strengthened their works at
'Baye Verte and Beausejour, between which places they
lately have made a very fine road and continue to seduce
our French inhabitants to go over to them.' The message,
however, which Lawrence sent to the Indians was hardly
calculated to produce the desired results. 'In short if
the Indians,' the message ran, 'or he [Le Loutre] on their
behalf, have anything to propose of this kind about which
they are really in earnest, they very well know where
and how to apply.'
[Footnote: Nova Scotia Documents, p. 210.]
The answer of the Indians was communicated by Le Loutre.
They agreed to offer no insult to the English who kept
to the highway, but they promised to treat as enemies
all those who departed from it. If a durable peace was
to be made, they demanded the cession to them of an
exclusive territory suitable for hunting and fishing and
for a mission. This territory was to extend from Baie
Verte through Cobequid (Truro) to the Shubenacadie, along
the south coast to the peninsula of Canso, and back to
Baie Verte--an area comprising half the province of Nova
Scotia. Whether the Indians were serious in their
application for this immense domain, we know not; probably
it was an answer to the haughty note of Lawrence.
Considering the demand of the Indians insolent, the
Council at Halifax vouchsafed no reply to it; but the
commandant of Fort Lawrence at Chignecto was instructed
to inform the Indians 'that if they have any serious
thoughts of making peace... they may repair to Halifax,'
where any reasonable proposal would be considered.
A case instructive of the new temper of the administration
was that of the Abbe Daudin of Pisiquid. The abbe had
been suspected of stirring up trouble among the Indians,
and Captain Murray of Fort Edward was requested to keep
an eye on him. When the inhabitants refused to bring in
wood for fuel and for the repair of the fort, as they
had been ordered to do, and presented to Murray a statement
signed by eighty-six of their people, declaring that
their oath of fidelity did not require them to furnish
the garrison with wood, Murray attributed their conduct
to the influence of Daudin. Murray therefore received
instructions to repeat his orders, and to summon Daudin
and five others to appear at Halifax under pain of arrest.
When questioned by Murray, Daudin took the ground that
the people, who were free, should have been contracted
with, and not treated as slaves; but he asserted that if
Murray had consulted him instead of reporting to Lawrence,
he could have brought the inhabitants to him in a submissive
manner. When requested to repair to Halifax, Daudin
pleaded illness; and his followers became insolent, and
questioned Murray's authority. Daudin and five others
were immediately arrested and sent under escort to the
capital.
At a special meeting of the Council held on the evening
of October 2, 1754, Claude Brossart, Charles Le Blanc,
Baptiste Galerne, and Joseph Hebert were required to
explain their refusal to obey the orders of Murray, and
the following examination took place:
Q. Why did you not comply with that order to bring in
firewood?
A. Some of them had wood and some had not, therefore
they gave in the remonstrance to Captain Murray.
Q. Why was that not represented in the remonstrance,
which contained an absolute refusal without setting
forth any cause?
A. They did not understand the contents of it.
Q. Was the proclamation ever published at the church
and stuck up against the wall, and by whom?
A. It was, and they believe by John Hebert.
Q. Was it put up with the wrong side uppermost?
A. They heard that it was.
The inhabitants were never known to boast of a reckless
facility in reading, even under normal conditions, and
no doubt the grotesque appearance of the letters in the
inverted document prompted the answer that 'they did not
understand the contents of it.' Neither have we any
evidence to prove that John Hebert contributed to their
enlightenment by reading the document. The prisoners,
however, were severely reprimanded by the Council, and
were ordered under pain of military execution to bring
in the firewood.
The Abbe Daudin, when brought before the Council, was
questioned as to his position in the province. He replied
that he served 'only as a simple missionary to occupy
himself in spiritual affairs; not in temporal.' The abbe
denied that he had made the statements attributed to him,
and was allowed to prepare a paper which he termed his
defence. The next day his defence was presented and read;
but the Council considered that it did not contain anything
'material towards his justification' and ordered his
removal from the province. A few weeks later, however,
the inhabitants addressed a communication to Lawrence,
asking for the reinstatement of the abbe. They expressed
their submission to the government, promising to comply
with the order regarding the supply of wood; and the
Council, considering that the Acadians could not obtain
another priest, relented and permitted the abbe to return
to his duties.
It is noteworthy, however, that Lawrence's regime was
not so rigorous as to prevent some of the Acadians who
had abandoned their lands and emigrated to French territory
from returning to Nova Scotia. In October 1754 six
families, consisting of twenty-eight persons who had
settled in Cape Breton, returned to Halifax in a destitute
condition. They declared that they had been terrified by
the threats of Le Loutre, and by the picture he had drawn
of the fate that would befall them at the hands of the
Indians if they remained under the domination of the
English; that they had retired to Cape Breton, where they
had remained ever since; but that the lands given them
had been unproductive, and that they had been unable to
support their families. They therefore wished to return
to their former habitations. They cheerfully subscribed
to the oath which was tendered them, and in consideration
of their poverty twenty-four of them were allowed provisions
during the winter, and the other four a week's provisions
'to subsist them till they returned to their former
habitations at Pisiquid.' The Council considered that
their return would have a good effect. Thus it came about
that the pangs of hunger accomplished a result which
threats and promises had failed to produce.
While Lawrence was formulating his policy with regard to
the Acadians, events were at the same time rapidly moving
towards a renewal of war between France and Great Britain
in North America. Indeed, though as yet there had been
no formal declaration, the American phase of the momentous
Seven Years' War had already begun. France had been
dreaming of a colonial empire stretching from Newfoundland
to the Gulf of Mexico. She had asserted her ownership of
the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi; and she had
set before herself the object of confining the English
colonies within limits as narrow as possible. In May 1754
Shirley, the governor of Massachusetts, had advised the
home government that he had received intelligence from
Halifax 'that some of the rebel inhabitants of Chignecto,
together with the Indians of the Peninsula and St John
River, are through the influence of the French garrison
at Beausejour engaged in an enterprise to break up all
the eastern settlements,' and he pointed out that 'if
the advices are true, they will afford ... one instance
of the many mischievous consequences to the colonists of
New England as well as to His Majesty's Province of Nova
Scotia which must proceed from the French of Canada having
possessed themselves of the isthmus of the Peninsula and
St John's river in the Bay of Fundy, and continuing their
encroachments within His Majesty's territories.' [Footnote:
Nova Scotia Documents, p. 382. Shirley to Sir T. Robinson,
May 23, 1754.] To this communication the government had
replied in July 1754 that it was the king's wish that
Shirley should co-operate with Lawrence in attacking the
French forts in Nova Scotia.
The British, therefore, determined upon aggressive action.
In December Shirley acknowledged having received certain
proposals made by Lawrence 'for driving the French of
Canada out of Nova Scotia according to the scheme laid
down in your letters to me and instructions to Colonel
Monckton. I viewed this plan most justly calculated by
Your Honour for His Majesty's Service with great pleasure
and did not hesitate to send you the assistance you
desir'd of me for carrying it into execution, as soon as
I had perused it. ...I came to a determination to co-operate
with you in the most vigorous manner, for effecting the
important service within your own Government, which Your
Honour may depend upon my prosecuting to the utmost of
my power.' [Footnote: Nova Scotia Documents, p. 389.
Shirley says: 'It is now near eleven at night and I have
been writing hard since seven in the morning... and can
scarce hold the pen in my hand.'] In a letter to the
Lords of Trade in January 1755, Lawrence expressed the
opinion that 'no measure I could take for the security
of the Province would have the desired effect until the
fort at Beausejour and every French settlement on the
north side of the Bay of Fundy was absolutely extirpated,
having very good intelligence that the French had determined
as soon as ever they had put the fortifications of
Louisbourg into a tolerable condition to make themselves
masters of the Bay of Fundy by taking our fort at
Chignecto.' [Footnote: Lawrence to Lords of Trade, January
12, 1755.]
In accordance with this Colonel Monckton was instructed
to prepare for an expedition against Beausejour and St
John in the spring of 1755. He was given for the purpose
a letter of unlimited credit on Boston; and every regiment
in Nova Scotia was brought up to the strength of one
thousand men. By May the expedition was ready. Monckton,
with two thousand troops, embarked at Annapolis Royal,
and by June 1 the expedition was at Chignecto. In the
meantime Vergor, the French commandant at Beausejour,
had not been passive. He had strengthened his defences,
had summoned the inhabitants of the surrounding districts
to his help, had mounted cannon in a blockhouse defending
the passage of the river, and had thrown up a strong
breastwork of timber along the shore. On June 3 the
British landed. They had little difficulty in driving
the French from their entrenchments. The inhabitants had
no heart in the work of defence; and the French, unable
to make a stand, threw their cannon into the river and
burned the blockhouse and other buildings. They then
retired to the fort, together with about two hundred and
twenty of the Acadians; the rest of the Acadians threw
away their arms and ammunition, asserting that they did
not wish to be hanged. The British took up a position in
the woods about a mile and a half from the fort; and on
the 13th they succeeded in establishing a battery on a
hill within easy range. The bombardment of the place,
which began the next day, was at first ineffective; and
for a time the British were driven back. But, in the
meantime, news reached the French that no reinforcements
could be expected from Louisbourg; and such disaffection
arose among the Acadians that they were forbidden by a
council of war to deliberate together or to desert the
fort under pain of being shot. When the British renewed
the attack, however, the Acadians requested Vergor to
capitulate; and he feebly acquiesced. The British offered
very favourable terms. So far as the Acadians were
concerned, it was proposed that, since they had taken up
arms under threat of death, they were to be pardoned and
allowed to return to their homes and enjoy the free
exercise of their religion. The soldiers of the garrison
were sent as prisoners to Halifax.
After the fall of Beausejour, which Monckton renamed Fort
Cumberland, the British met with little further resistance.
Fort Gaspereau on Baie Verte, against which Monckton next
proceeded, was evacuated by the commandant Villeray, who
found himself unable to obtain the assistance of the
Acadians. And the few Acadians at the river St John, when
Captain Rous appeared before the settlement with three
ships, made an immediate submission. Rous destroyed the
cannon, burned the fort, and retired with his troops up
the river. The Indians of the St John, evidently impressed
by the completeness of the British success and awed by
their strong force, invited Rous to come ashore, and
assured him of their friendliness.
Having removed the menace of the French forts, Lawrence
was now able to deal more freely with the question of
the Acadians. The opportunity for action was not long in
presenting itself. In June the Acadians of Minas presented
to Lawrence a petition couched in language not as tactful
as it might have been. In this memorial they requested
the restoration of some of their former privileges. They
first assured the lieutenant-governor of their fidelity,
which they had maintained in face of threats on the part
of the French, and of their determination to remain loyal
when in the enjoyment of former liberties. They asked to
be allowed the use of their canoes, a privilege of which
they were deprived on the pretext that they had been
carrying provisions to the French at Beausejour. Some
refugees might have done so, but they had not. They used
these canoes for fishing to maintain their families. By
an order of June 4 they had been required to hand in
their guns. Some of them had done so, but they needed
them for protection against the wild beasts, which were
more numerous since the Indians had left these parts.
The possession of a gun did not induce them to rebel,
neither did the withdrawal of the weapon render them more
faithful. Loyalty was a matter of conscience. If they
decided to remain faithful, they wished to know what were
the lieutenant-governor's intentions towards them.
On receiving this memorial Lawrence ordered the deputies
of the Acadians to remain in Halifax, on the ground that
the paper was impertinent. Upon this the deputies presented
another memorial, in which they disclaimed any intention
of disrespect, and wished to be allowed a hearing in
order to explain. The Council held a meeting; and the
lieutenant-governor explained 'that Captain Murray had
informed him that for some time before the delivery of
the first of the said memorials the French inhabitants
in general had behaved with greater submission and
obedience to the orders of Government than usual, and
had already delivered to him a considerable number of
their firearms; but that at the delivery of the said
memorial they treated him with great indecency and
insolence, which gave him strong suspicions that they
had obtained some intelligence which we were then ignorant
of, and which the lieutenant-governor conceived might
most probably be a report that had been about that time
spread amongst them of a French fleet being then in the
Bay of Fundy.' [Footnote: Minutes of Council, July 3,
1755.] The deputies were then brought in and told that
if they had not submitted the second memorial they would
have been punished for their presumption. 'They were
severely reprimanded for their audacity in subscribing
and presenting so impertinent a paper, but in compassion
to their weakness and ignorance of the nature of our
constitution,' the Council professed itself still ready
to treat them with leniency, and ordered the memorial to
be read paragraph by paragraph.
When the question of the oath came up for discussion,
the deputies said they were ready to take it as they had
done before. To this the Council replied that 'His Majesty
had disapproved of the manner of their taking the oath
before' and 'that it was not consistent with his honour
to make any conditions.' The deputies were then allowed
until the following morning to come to a resolution. On
the next day they declared that they could not consent
to take the oath in the form required without consulting
others. They were then informed that as the taking of
the oath was a personal act and as they had for themselves
refused to take it as directed by law, and had therefore
sufficiently evinced the sincerity of their unfriendliness
towards the government, the Council could look upon them
no longer as subjects of His Majesty, but must treat them
hereafter as subjects of the king of France. They were
ordered to withdraw. The Council then decided that with
regard to the oath none of them should for the future be
admitted to take it after having once refused to do so,
but that effectual measures ought to be taken to remove
all such recusants out of the province. The deputies,
again being called in and informed of this resolution,
offered to take the oath, but were informed that there
was no reason to hope that 'their proposed compliance
proceeds from an honest mind and can be esteemed only
the effect of compulsion and force, and is contrary to
a clause in 1 Geo. II, c. 13, whereby persons who have
once refused to take oaths cannot be afterwards permitted
to take them, but are considered as Popish recusants.'
Therefore they could not be indulged with such permission.
Later they were ordered into confinement.
On the 25th of July a memorial signed by over two hundred
of the inhabitants of Annapolis Royal was laid before
the Council. The memorialists said they had unanimously
consented to deliver up their firearms, although they
had never had any desire to use them against His Majesty's
government. They declared that they had nothing to reproach
themselves with, for they had always been loyal, and that
several of them had risked their lives in order to give
information regarding the enemy. They would abide by the
old oath, but they could not take a new one. The deputies
who had brought this memorial from Annapolis, on being
called before the Council and asked what they had to say
regarding the new oath, declared 'that they could not
take any other oath than what they had formerly taken.'
If it was the king's intention, they added, to force them
out of the country, they hoped 'that they should be
allowed a convenient time for their departure.' The
Council warned them of the consequences of their refusal;
and they were allowed until the following Monday to
decide. Their final answer was polite, but obdurate:
Inasmuch as a report is in circulation among us, the
French inhabitants of this province, that His Excellency
the Governor demands of us an oath of obedience
conformable, in some manner, to that of natural subjects
of His Majesty King George the Second, and as, in
consequence, we are morally certain that several of
our inhabitants are detained and put to inconvenience
at Halifax for that object; if the above are his
intentions with respect to us, we all take the liberty
of representing to His Excellency, and to all the
inhabitants, that we and our fathers, having taken an
oath of fidelity, which has been approved of several
times in the name of the King, and under the privileges
of which we have lived faithful and obedient, and
protected by His Majesty the King of Great Britain,
according to the letters and proclamation of His
Excellency Governor Shirley, dated 16th of September
1746, and 21st of October 1747, we will never prove
so fickle as to take an oath which changes, ever so
little, the conditions and the privileges obtained
for us by our sovereign and our fathers in the past.
And as we are well aware that the King, our master,
loves and protects only constant, faithful, and free
subjects, and as it is only by virtue of his kindness,
and of the fidelity which we have always preserved
towards His Majesty, that he has granted to us, and
that he still continues to grant to us, the entire
possession of our property and the free and public
exercise of the Roman Catholic Religion, we desire to
continue, to the utmost of our power, to be faithful
and dutiful in the same manner that we were allowed
to be by His Excellency Mr Richard Philipps.
Charity for our detained inhabitants, and their
innocence, obliged us to beg Your Excellency, to allow
yourself to be touched by their miseries, and to
restore to them that liberty which we ask for them,
with all possible submission and the most profound
respect.
The inhabitants of Pisiquid presented a similar petition.
They hoped that they would be listened to, and that the
imprisoned deputies would be released. Another memorial
was presented by the inhabitants of Minas. They refused
to take a new oath; and thereupon their deputies were
ordered to be imprisoned.
There was now, the Council considered, only one course
left open for it to pursue. Nothing remained but to
consider the means which should be taken to send the
inhabitants out of the province, and distribute them
among the several colonies on the continent.
'I am determined,' Lawrence had written, 'to bring the
inhabitants to a compliance, or rid the province of such
perfidious subjects.' [Footnote: Lawrence to Lords of
Trade, July 18, 1755.] He was now about to fulfil his
promise.