Part One.
_Sic vita erat_: _facile omnes perferre ac pati_:
_Cum quibus erat cunque una_, _his sese dedere_,
_Eorum obsequi studiis_: _advorsus nemini_;
_Nunquam praeponens se aliis_. _Ita facillime_
_Sine invidia invenias laudem_.--
TER., _Andr._, Act i. _se._ 1.
His manner of life was this: to bear with everybody's humours; to
comply with the inclinations and pursuits of those he conversed with;
to contradict nobody; never to assume a superiority over others. This
is the ready way to gain applause without exciting envy.
Man is subject to innumerable pains and sorrows by the very condition of
humanity, and yet, as if Nature had not sown evils enough in life, we are
continually adding grief to grief, and aggravating the common calamity by
our cruel treatment of one another. Every man's natural weight of
affliction is still made more heavy by the envy, malice, treachery, or
injustice of his neighbour. At the same time that the storm beats on the
whole species, we are falling foul upon one another.
Half the misery of human life might be extinguished, would men alleviate
the general curse they lie under, by mutual offices of compassion,
benevolence, and humanity. There is nothing, therefore, which we ought
more to encourage in ourselves and others, than that disposition of mind
which in our language goes under the title of good nature, and which I
shall choose for the subject of this day's speculation.
Good-nature is more agreeable in conversation than wit, and gives a
certain air to the countenance which is more amiable than beauty. It
shows virtue in the fairest light, takes off in some measure from the
deformity of vice, and makes even folly and impertinence supportable.
There is no society or conversation to be kept up in the world without
good nature, or something which must bear its appearance, and supply its
place. For this reason, mankind have been forced to invent a kind of
artificial humanity, which is what we express by the word good-breeding.
For if we examine thoroughly the idea of what we call so, we shall find
it to be nothing else but an imitation and mimicry of good nature, or, in
other terms, affability, complaisance, and easiness of temper, reduced
into an art. These exterior shows and appearances of humanity render a
man wonderfully popular and beloved, when they are founded upon a real
good nature; but, without it, are like hypocrisy in religion, or a bare
form of holiness, which, when it is discovered, makes a man more
detestable than professed impiety.
Good-nature is generally born with us: health, prosperity, and kind
treatment from the world, are great cherishers of it where they find it;
but nothing is capable of forcing it up, where it does not grow of
itself. It is one of the blessings of a happy constitution, which
education may improve, but not produce.
Xenophon, in the life of his imaginary prince whom he describes as a
pattern for real ones, is always celebrating the philanthropy and good
nature of his hero, which he tells us he brought into the world with him;
and gives many remarkable instances of it in his childhood, as well as in
all the several parts of his life. Nay, on his death-bed, he describes
him as being pleased, that while his soul returned to Him who made it,
his body should incorporate with the great mother of all things, and by
that means become beneficial to mankind. For which reason, he gives his
sons a positive order not to enshrine it in gold or silver, but to lay it
in the earth as soon as the life was gone out of it.
An instance of such an overflowing of humanity, such an exuberant love to
mankind, could not have entered into the imagination of a writer who had
not a soul filled with great ideas, and a general benevolence to mankind.
In that celebrated passage of Sallust, where Caesar and Cato are placed
in such beautiful but opposite lights, Caesar's character is chiefly made
up of good nature, as it showed itself in all its forms towards his
friends or his enemies, his servants or dependents, the guilty or the
distressed. As for Cato's character, it is rather awful than amiable.
Justice seems most agreeable to the nature of God, and mercy to that of
man. A Being who has nothing to pardon in Himself, may reward every man
according to his works; but he whose very best actions must be seen with
grains of allowance, cannot be too mild, moderate, and forgiving. For
this reason, among all the monstrous characters in human nature, there is
none so odious, nor indeed so exquisitely ridiculous, as that of a rigid,
severe temper in a worthless man.
This part of good nature however, which consists in the pardoning and
overlooking of faults, is to be exercised only in doing ourselves
justice, and that too in the ordinary commerce and occurrences of life;
for, in the public administrations of justice, mercy to one may be
cruelty to others.
It is grown almost into a maxim, that good-natured men are not always men
of the most wit. This observation, in my opinion, has no foundation in
nature. The greatest wits I have conversed with are men eminent for
their humanity. I take, therefore, this remark to have been occasioned
by two reasons. First, because ill-nature among ordinary observers
passes for wit. A spiteful saying gratifies so many little passions in
those who hear it, that it generally meets with a good reception. The
laugh rises upon it, and the man who utters it is looked upon as a shrewd
satirist. This may be one reason why a great many pleasant companions
appear so surprisingly dull when they have endeavoured to be merry in
print; the public being more just than private clubs or assemblies, in
distinguishing between what is wit and what is ill-nature.
Another reason why the good-natured man may sometimes bring his wit in
question is perhaps because he is apt to be moved with compassion for
those misfortunes or infirmities which another would turn into ridicule,
and by that means gain the reputation of a wit. The ill-natured man,
though but of equal parts, gives himself a larger field to expatiate in;
he exposes those failings in human nature which the other would cast a
veil over, laughs at vices which the other either excuses or conceals,
gives utterance to reflections which the other stifles, falls
indifferently upon friends or enemies, exposes the person who has obliged
him, and, in short, sticks at nothing that may establish his character as
a wit. It is no wonder, therefore, he succeeds in it better than the man
of humanity, as a person who makes use of indirect methods is more likely
to grow rich than the fair trader.
Part Two.
--_Quis enim bonus_, _aut face dignus_
_Arcana_, _qualem Cereris vult esse sacerdos_,
_Ulla aliena sibi credat mala_?--
JUV., _Sat._ xv. 140.
Who can all sense of others' ills escape,
Is but a brute, at best, in human shape.