The general remarks on playing by correspondence in this last

passage are evidently made to furnish a pretence for introducing the

notice of the London and Edinburgh match; and they share the fate of

all such forced work. They are absolute nonsense. The probability

that a decidedly superior will overcome an inferior player, is not

at all diminished by the circumstance that the match is played by

correspondence. On the contrary, we should rather be inclined to

say that the chance of an inferior player's escape in a single

game or so is almost extinguished where the match is played by

correspondence; because the time given for deliberation increases

the improbability of his antagonist's erring from carelessness, or

not taking in the whole position of the game, which sometimes occurs

in playing over the board. But there is an inconsequence in the

whole argument which surprises us to find in anything sanctioned

by a person of Mr Staunton's unquestionable powers of mind. The

loss of the match by London is not to be wondered at, it is said,

because it was a match by correspondence; and the immediate cause

of their losing it was the commission of a ridiculous and vexatious

blunder! To make this anything like logic, it would be necessary to

hold that ridiculous and vexatious blunders are more likely to be

committed when the player has time and opportunity to consider his

moves, and to make experiments upon their effect, than where he is

under the necessity of moving at once in presence of an adversary,

and possibly of spectators, apt to get impatient at long delay. It

is plain that the game's being played by correspondence was the

very circumstance calculated to render the London Club's particular

excuse for losing all the more untenable.

It is quite true, however, that at a particular stage of the game

opened by the London Club, (being one of the two games with which

the match commenced,) the London Club might have won the game, by

playing other moves than they did. This may be said of every game;

but it is as unusual as it is unhandsome for the unsuccessful party,

merely because he has missed such an opportunity of winning, to

refuse all credit to his adversary for afterwards defeating him. In

the third game, which was drawn, the Edinburgh Club would have won

if they had played a different 51st move from that which they did.

But this did not lead them to make depreciatory remarks about their

antagonists: all that their report bears on this point is, that the

London Club "conducted a difficult defence with great skill and

dexterity, and finally succeeded in drawing the game."

Further, the remarks above quoted are calculated to produce an

erroneous idea respecting the situation and conduct of the two

clubs in the second game. The sophistry consists in mixing up two

entirely separate and unconnected things. In this same game in which

the London Club failed to observe that they had a winning position,

they applied to have two of their moves recalled after they were

despatched, and the Edinburgh committee refused their request. Now

the obvious tendency of all that the English writers say upon the

subject is to create the impression that if the London Club had been

allowed to recall these two moves, they would have retained their

winning position. This is plainly the only construction that the

passage in the _Quarterly Review_ is capable of bearing. It is the

only construction which would justify his remarks, or make them at

all intelligible. But it is quite incorrect. The only moves which

the London committee wished to recall were the 27th and 28th; but

they have never attempted to show that if they had been allowed to

do so, they could have won the game. It has been demonstrated, over

and over again, that they could not. In fact, the moves they wished

to recall were as good as any others then in their power. They might

have drawn the game if these moves had been played; and they could

have done no more had they been allowed to recall them. This matter

was set at rest while the match was still pending, by a proposal

which emanated from the Edinburgh Club. When the Londoners lost the

game, Mr Lewis insinuated, though he did not expressly state, that

if they had not been held to the 27th and 28th moves, they would

have won the game. A member of the Edinburgh Club then offered to

play a back-game with any one or more of the London Club, in which

the London players were to be allowed a new 27th move instead of

the one they had made, and wished to recall; and also another

back-game in which the Edinburgh player was to take the London side

_at an earlier stage of the game_, with the view of showing that,

by playing differently, the London Club might have won it. This

proposal was under consideration of the London Club _for several

weeks_, during which they satisfied themselves that the recall of

the 27th and 28th moves would be of no use, and, accordingly, it was

declined. It is surely not very uncharitable to surmise that it was

during this period, and on the suggestion of their opponents, that

they discovered that the error was not in the 27th move which they

had proposed to recall, but in the 26th, which they had examined and

adhered to. In his first publication of the games, Mr Lewis gives

no back-game on this 26th move; and it is believed that no member

of the London Club was aware, till the game was finished, that by

playing differently at the 26th move they might have won it. But Mr

Lewis admits that the game could not be won by a mere alteration

of the 27th or 28th move; and any one who says that it could, is

either speaking in ignorance of the subject, or is making a wilful

misrepresentation. The likelihood of the remarks of the English

writers producing an erroneous impression arises from their mixing

up these two separate and distinct things: 1st, that at a previous

stage of the game, the London Club had a winning position which they

did not discover, and failed to avail themselves of; and, 2d, that

the Edinburgh Club would not allow them to retract the 27th and

28th moves. These two facts have no longer any possible connection

with each other when it is known that, at the 27th move, the London

Club had ceased to have a winning position, and that the recall

of that move would have been of no use to them. The failure, at a

previous stage of the game, to maintain the winning position which

they had, is simply one among several illustrations which occurred

in the match, of the truth that the London Club, "in the pride and

plenitude of its strength," did not always play as well as it was

possible to have done. How such things show that superiority on

the part of London, which they are brought forward to establish, we

confess ourselves unable to understand, unless we were to adopt the

principle of the _Chess-Players' Chronicle_, that it is the best

players who are most likely to commit errors in conducting a match

by correspondence!!

It seems to be a source of melancholy consolation to the English

players, that their Club committed a "ridiculous and vexatious

blunder." We are sorry that, in our strict regard for truth, we must

deprive them even of that comfort. The losing of the disputed game

was not a ridiculous blunder, however vexatious. On the contrary,

the series of moves by which they lost the chance of winning, was

at first a very promising attack, and had the additional temptation

of appearing brilliant and enterprising. If any chess-player will

set up the men at the 27th move of the London Club, or glance at

the diagram given in Mr Staunton's periodical for May 1850, he will

see that nothing but the utmost skill and caution on the part of

Edinburgh could have successfully warded off the attack. The London

Club had not contemplated the defence which they met with; and if,

in these circumstances, they were seduced into an ingenious but

unsound attack, it may be conceded that they manifested want of

circumspection, an important qualification in a chess-player; but

they cannot be accused of committing a ridiculous blunder. They

talk of having "thrown away" a rook. They did no such thing. The

rook was played not by mistake, but for the very purpose of being

taken in the course of their dashing but unsuccessful attack. And in

Mr Lewis's analyses, it will be found that many of his methods of

winning, at previous stages of the game, involve this very sacrifice

of the rook.

The refusal of the Edinburgh Club to allow the recall of the 27th

and 28th moves loses all its importance when it is known that it did

not affect the fate of the game. But we should in any circumstances

be sorry to believe that, in so refusing, they had done what

deserved the censure bestowed on them by the _Quarterly_ reviewer.

In considering the propriety of their conduct, there are only two

lights in which the request may be viewed. They were either asked

to do what the London Club had a right to demand, or they were

asked to grant a favour to the London Club. We do not know that the

former view is supported by any of the English writers. Even the

_Quarterly_ reviewer does not say that the London Club had a _right_

to recall the moves; and on this question of right it appears to

us that there cannot be the least shadow of a doubt. The letter

containing the moves was despatched to the Post-office. It was held

by the Post-office for the party to whom it was addressed, and was

entirely beyond the control of the party sending it. The piece,

in every sense, was therefore "let go" by the player; and the 8th

Article of Sarratt's laws of chess, by which it was agreed that the

games should be played, provides that "as long as a player holds

a piece, he is at liberty to play it where he chooses; but when

he has _let it go_, he cannot recall his move." Accordingly, the

London Club never attempted to contest the question of right. They

stated that they had "no hesitation in acceding to the Edinburgh

Committee's construction," and adhering to the moves. In fact, the

construction put on the point by the Edinburgh Club was not only

assented to by the London players at the time, but several members

of the committee admitted afterwards, that it was unquestionably the

right way of dealing with the case, and no member of the London Club

ever hinted a complaint on the subject, except what was insinuated

by Mr Lewis in the publication referred to.

Were the Edinburgh Club "_to blame_" for not granting the favour

which was asked of them? On this question we think there is quite

as little doubt as the other. We have a strong and decided opinion

as to the necessity of strict play in _all_ games. It is the only

fair and rational system; for once allow indulgence, and it is

impossible to fix the limit at which it should stop. But we think

that the remark applies with peculiar force to the game of chess,

in which rigour is absolutely essential to the acquisition of the

habits fitted for the proper playing of the game. Above all, in an

important match at chess, anything but the strict game is entirely

out of the question. A high-spirited antagonist will scorn to ask

a favour, or even to grumble about the commission of a blunder.

He submits in silence, and plays on in the hope of retrieving his

fault by redoubled care and attention. If, on the other hand, he

were to be expected to grant favours to his blundering antagonist,

it is plain that his very good qualities would be turned to his

disadvantage in the match. The Edinburgh Club played in the belief

that the rules of the game were to apply with equal strictness to

both parties; and though there was more than one instance in which

they would have been glad to recall a move, they never proposed

this, or even spoke of the occasions for it, except in answer to Mr

Lewis's observations on the proposed recall of the 27th move. In

the very game in which this move was made, the Edinburgh committee

had at a _previous_ point in the game made a move which they

discovered to be unsound, or at least doubtful. Their report bears

that "application was made to the Post-office to have the letter

containing it restored, but without effect. Finding this to be the

case, the letter was looked upon as delivered, the Post-office being

regarded as holding it, not on behalf of the Club from which it had

been sent, but on behalf of the Club to which it was addressed;

and therefore no attempt was made to countermand the move, by

transmitting another letter by the same post. The 8th article of

the laws was considered to be too clear and explicit to warrant a

recall." This conduct of the Edinburgh Club appears to us the manly

and proper way of dealing with such a circumstance, and infinitely

better than trying to make it the foundation of a complaint of

rigorous procedure on the part of their opponents.

The same thing happened again to the Edinburgh Club in the fourth

game. In consequence of having put up the game erroneously, they

sent an impossible move--that is to say, they directed a Knight to

be moved to a square already occupied by their King. They discovered

the mistake before the letter had left Edinburgh, but considered

themselves as having incurred the penalty of playing an impossible

move, which was, in the option of their adversary, either to move

the Knight to some other square, or to move their King. Of these

two, the move of the _King_ was infinitely the better play, and

therefore, in order to save time, a note was written on the outside

of the letter explaining the mistake, and stating that the Edinburgh

committee held themselves bound to move the _Knight_, which it was

presumed the London Club would enforce, as the more severe penalty.

The London Club did so; and yet Mr Lewis, in his notes to this

game, rather disingenuously, as it appears to us, represented the

London Club as having yielded an advantage to their antagonists, in

accepting the move of the Knight. This merely accidental blunder, on

the part of the Edinburgh Club, was one cause of their loss of the

fourth game.

Seeing that the Edinburgh Club thus on all occasions subjected

themselves to the most rigorous interpretation of the rules of the

game, we cannot hold the _Quarterly Review_ as justified in saying

that they were "to blame" in not allowing the London Club to retract

a move. But we appeal from the _Quarterly_ reviewer as a partisan of

England, to the _Quarterly_ reviewer, as an impartial enunciator of

general propositions respecting the game of chess. Hear what he says

about the absurdity of giving back moves:--

"Another advantage has arisen from the multiplication of clubs,

and consequent publication of accurate rules--viz., that the

strict game is now played, instead of those courteous surrenders

of advantages offered by a heedless adversary, which used often

to make winners of those who had received back two or three

leading pieces in the course of the game. These were a source

of endless unpleasant discussions, besides being in themselves

an absurdity. We confess we have no notion of rewarding an

opponent for his oversights. We would show him as little mercy

as Mr Smith O'Brien would to Lord Clarendon. Nay, we should be

moved hereto by a consideration of his benefit as well as our

own--for why should we teach him vacillation and heedlessness?"

Again, among a portentous list of narrow-minded delusions, he gives

as "Delusion the Fifth--

"'That it is illiberal to play the strict game.' To this we can

only reply, that other methods are but a miserable imitation.

People talk of the hardship of 'losing a game by an oversight,'

and so on. It is much harder to arrive at nothing but

'conclusions inconclusive,' and to have the game terminate in

an Irish discussion which of the two parties made the greatest

blunders."

We agree in every word of this; and we only wonder that so sound a

reasoner should himself fall under the delusion which he exposes--so

severe a censor should commit the very offence which he condemns.

On the whole, as regards the proposed recall of the 27th and 28th

moves of the second game, we think these three propositions are

conclusively established, 1. That neither according to the rules

of the game, nor upon any other principle which does or ought to

regulate the playing of matches, were the London Club entitled to

have their proposal acceded to. 2. That though it had been acceded

to, and these moves had been allowed to be recalled, the London

Club could not have bettered their situation, as the opportunity of

winning was already irretrievably lost in consequence of the 26th

move, which was not asked to be recalled, but, on the contrary,

was expressly adhered to. 3. That the impression which English

chess-players have so industriously attempted to create, that the

refusal on the part of Edinburgh to allow the 27th and 28th moves

to be recalled was what prevented the London Club from winning the

game, can only exist through a confusion between these moves and the

previous one, which the London Club had adhered to after a renewed

examination, not having even then discovered that it was unsound.

Before leaving the second game, we have this last additional remark

to make about it, that it is one of the erroneous assumptions and

inferences of the English writers, that the winning of that game

would have decided the match in their favour. It was the first won

game; and though it is true that the London Club _subsequently_

won the fourth game, which was the successor of the second, it

is also the fact that the fourth game, which was opened by the

Edinburgh Club, would not have been played if the second had

been won by London, who in that case would have had the opening

of the fourth. We do not mean to say that having to open was a

disadvantage. All we assert is, that, in point of fact, the game,

which the Edinburgh Club lost partly through a mistake in setting

up the men, and through another blunder, not very different in its

character, would not have been played at all if London had won the

second game. Besides, the fourth game would, in other respects, have

been played under very different circumstances. The opening of the

second game by the London Club was one which none of the Edinburgh

players had ever seen before, though, from this match, it now goes

by the name of the Scotch opening. They believed, however, from

their consideration of the second game, that the London Club had

not availed themselves of all the capabilities of the opening, and

they thought it would be a spirited thing to return it upon their

antagonists. This they did in the _third_ game. The event rewarded

their enterprising conduct. They gained a decided advantage; and

during the greater part of the _fourth_ game they believed that it

would never require to be finished, as they thought that by winning

the _third_ game they would gain the match. This accounts for the

carelessness with which they played the fourth game, though we

think nothing can excuse carelessness in playing chess. They were

ultimately disappointed in their expectation of gaining the third

game, as the London Club succeeded in drawing it; and this rendered

a fifth game necessary.

Down to the fifth game it appears plain enough, from the above

examination, that the Edinburgh Club had maintained, at the very

least, an equal position to their antagonists. The first game had

been drawn, with no advantage at any stage of it, in favour of

either party. The second had been won by Edinburgh, but was subject

to the observation that, at one point, London might have won had

they played as well as they _afterwards_ discovered they might

have done. The third game was drawn: but the advantage throughout

had been in favour of Edinburgh, though not sufficiently so for

winning; and, as was the case with London in the previous game,

Edinburgh failed to perceive that by moving differently at a certain

point, they would have been victorious. The fourth game was lost by

Edinburgh, partly through an accidental and what may be called a

mechanical blunder, and partly through another piece of carelessness

of a similar character. After a contest thus maintained down to the

commencement of the fifth game, it is beyond all question that the

palm of superiority, in point of play, must rest with the victor

in that game. And it was a game worthy to determine that question

as well as the match. The Edinburgh Club had again returned upon

their antagonists their own opening. In order to secure scope for

the action of their pieces, they showed considerable intrepidity

in disregarding the ordinary rules against doubled and isolated

pawns; and so admirably had they analysed the game, that for a

great many moves they knew that victory was certain, though all the

while the London Club, according to the confession of some of their

own members, were blind to the fate that was awaiting them; and

believed, on the contrary, that the game was in their own hands.

This fifth game will long be remembered by chess players as one

of the most remarkable in the annals of chess; and appears to us

conclusive, so far as regards the internal evidence derived from the

games themselves, that the superiority, in point of play, lay with

the Edinburgh Club, and that their winning the match was not a mere

accident.

It may be that there are other data for determining the relative

superiority of the two Clubs; but we cannot admit the correctness

of any of those mentioned by the _Quarterly_ reviewer or Mr

Staunton. It is true, as these gentlemen say, that the Edinburgh

Club was comparatively inexperienced. It had only been instituted

in 1822, and the match was begun in 1824. It comprehended, almost

exclusively, professional gentlemen actively engaged in business,

who had not, generally speaking, much leisure or opportunity for

seeking antagonists out of their own little circle of chess-players

at home. On the other hand, it cannot be disputed that there is

to be found in the metropolis of England, in greater abundance

than anywhere else, that combination of leisure with intellectual

power, which gives the promise of good chess-playing. But these

circumstances do not lead our minds to the conclusion to which Mr

Staunton and the _Quarterly_ reviewer have come, that the winning of

the match by the Edinburgh Club was an accident. We should rather

be inclined to hold, considering the character of the contest as

explained by us above, that they are a proof of the greater natural

chess-playing capacity of the members of the Club which won the

match under such disadvantages. Again, Mr Staunton asks where are

the previous exploits to which the Edinburgh players could point,

such as those that the members of the London Club had performed? The

answer is, None. They never had, and never sought the opportunity

of performing any great chess exploit, except beating the London

Club. But in so doing they made their own all the previous victories

of the London Club. The event showed that they might, without

presumption, have expressed the sentiment of Prince Henry--

"Percy is but my factor, good, my lord,

To engross up glorious deeds on my behalf;

And I will call him to so strict account,

That he shall render every glory up.

* * * * *

And all the budding honours on his crest

I'd crop to make a garland for my head."

With which valorous quotation we draw our remarks to a close,

submitting that the members of the Edinburgh Club are bound to

invite us to a special sitting at a board, which shall be garnished

with some other material more soft and digestible than chessmen.

THE INDUSTRY OF THE PEOPLE.

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Volume 68, No. 417, July, 1850 · 第 17 / 20 段