A SPEECH MADE IN FANEUIL HALL, ON THE 30TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1842, AT A
PUBLIC RECEPTION GIVEN TO MR. WEBSTER, ON HIS RETURN TO BOSTON, AFTER
THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON.
[On the accession of General Harrison to the Presidency of the United
States, on the 4th of March, 1841, Mr. Webster was called to the office
of Secretary of State, in which, after the President's untimely death,
he continued under Mr. Tyler for about two years. The relations of the
country with Great Britain were at that time in a very critical
position. The most important and difficult subject which engaged the
attention of the government, while he filled the Department of State,
was the negotiation of the treaty with Great Britain, which was signed
at Washington on the 9th of August, 1842. The other members of General
Harrison's Cabinet having resigned their places in the autumn of 1841,
discontent was felt by some of their friends, that Mr. Webster should
have consented to retain his. But as Mr. Tyler continued to place entire
confidence in Mr. Webster's administration of the Department of State,
the great importance of pursuing a steady line of policy in reference to
foreign affairs, and especially the hope of averting a rupture with
England by an honorable settlement of our difficulties with that
country, induced Mr. Webster to remain at his post.
On occasion of a visit made by him to Boston, after the adjournment of
Congress, in August, 1842, a number of his friends were desirous of
manifesting their sense of the services which he had rendered to the
country by pursuing this course. A public meeting of citizens was
accordingly held in Faneuil Hall, on the 30th of September, 1842. At
this meeting the following speech was made.]
I know not how it is, Mr. Mayor, but there is something in the echoes of
these walls, or in this sea of upturned faces which I behold before me,
or in the genius that always hovers over this place, fanning ardent and
patriotic feeling by every motion of its wings,--I know not how it is,
but there is something that excites me strangely, deeply, before I even
begin to speak. It cannot be doubted that this salutation and greeting
from my fellow-citizens of Boston is a tribute dear to my heart. Boston
is indeed my home, my cherished home. It is now more than twenty-five
years since I came to it with my family, to pursue, here in this
enlightened metropolis, those objects of professional life for which my
studies and education were designed to fit me. It is twenty years since
I was invited by the citizens of Boston to take upon myself an office of
public trust in their service.[1] It gives me infinite pleasure to see
here to-day, among those who hold the seats yielded to such as are more
advanced in life, not a few of the gentlemen who were earnestly
instrumental in inducing me to enter upon a course of life wholly
unexpected, and to devote myself to the service of the public.
Whenever the duties of public life have withdrawn me from this home, I
have felt it, nevertheless, to be the attractive spot to which all local
affection tended. And now that the progress of time must shortly bring
about the period, if it should not be hastened by the progress of
events, when the duties of public life shall yield to the influences of
advancing years, I cherish no hope more precious, than to pass here in
these associations and among these friends what may remain to me of
life; and to leave in the midst of you, fellow-citizens, partaking of
your fortunes, whether for good or for evil, those who bear my name, and
inherit my blood.
The Mayor has alluded, very kindly, to the exertions which I have made
since I have held a position in the Cabinet, and especially to the
results of the negotiation in which I have been recently engaged. I
hope, fellow-citizens, that something has been done which may prove
permanently useful to the public. I have endeavored to do something, and
I hope my endeavors have not been in vain. I have had a hard summer's
work, it is true, but I am not wholly unused to hard work. I have had
some anxious days, I have spent some sleepless nights; but if the
results of my efforts shall be approved by the community, I am richly
compensated. My other days will be the happier, and my other nights will
be given to a sweeter repose.
It was an object of the highest national importance, no doubt, to
disperse the clouds which threatened a storm between England and
America. For several years past there has been a class of questions open
between the two countries, which have not always threatened war, but
which have prevented the people from being assured of permanent peace.
His Honor the Mayor has paid a just tribute to that lamented personage,
by whom, in 1841, I was called to the place I now occupy; and although,
Gentlemen, I know it is in very bad taste to speak much of one's self,
yet here, among my friends and neighbors, I wish to say a word or two on
subjects in which I am concerned. With the late President Harrison I had
contracted an acquaintance while we were both members of Congress, and I
had an opportunity of renewing it afterwards in his own house, and
elsewhere. I have made no exhibition or boast of the confidence which it
was his pleasure to repose in me; but circumstances, hardly worthy of
serious notice, have rendered it not improper for me to say on this
occasion, that as soon as President Harrison was elected, without, of
course, one word from me, he wrote to me inviting me to take a place in
his Cabinet, leaving to me the choice of that place, and asking my
advice as to the persons that should fill every other place in it. He
expressed rather a wish that I should take the administration of the
treasury, because, as he was pleased to say, I had devoted myself with
success to the examination of the questions of currency and finance, and
he felt that the wants of the country,--the necessities of the country,
on the great subjects of currency and finance,--were moving causes that
produced the revolution which had placed him in the presidential chair.
It so happened, Gentlemen, that my preference was for another
place,--for that which I have now the honor to fill. I felt all its
responsibilities; but I must say, that, with whatever attention I had
considered the general questions of finance, I felt more competent and
willing to undertake the duties of an office which did not involve the
daily drudgery of the treasury.
I was not disappointed, Gentlemen, in the exigency which then existed in
our foreign relations. I was not unaware of all the difficulties which
hung over us; for although the whole of the danger was not at that
moment developed, the cause of it was known, and it seemed as if an
outbreak was inevitable. I allude now to that occurrence on the frontier
of which the chairman has already spoken, which took place in the winter
of 1841 the case of Alexander McLeod.
A year or two before, the Canadian government had seen fit to authorize
a military incursion, for a particular purpose, within the territory of
the United States. That purpose was to destroy a steamboat, charged with
being employed for hostile purposes against its forces and the
peaceable subjects of the crown. The act was avowed by the British
government at home as a public act. Alexander McLeod, a person who
individually could claim no regard or sympathy, happened to be one of
the agents who, in a military character, performed the act of their
sovereign. Coming into the United States some years after, he was
arrested under a charge of homicide committed in this act, and was held
to trial as for a private felony.
According to my apprehensions, a proceeding of this kind was directly
adverse to the well-settled doctrines of the public law. It could not
but be received with lively indignation, not only by the British
government, but among the people of England. It would be so received
among us. If a citizen of the United States should as a military man
receive an order of his government and obey it, (and he must either obey
it or be hanged,) and should afterwards, in the territory of another
power, which by that act he had offended, be tried for a violation of
its law, as for a crime, and threatened with individual punishment,
there is not a man in the United States who would not cry out for
redress and for vengeance. Any elevated government, in a case like this,
where one of its citizens, in the performance of his duty, incurs such
menaces and danger, assumes the responsibility; any elevated government
says, "The act was mine,--I am the man";--"Adsum qui feci, in me
convertite ferrum."
Now, Gentlemen, information of the action of the British government on
this subject was transmitted to us at Washington within a few days after
the installation of General Harrison. I did not think that it was proper
to make public then, nor is it important to say now, all that we knew on
the subject; but I will tell you, in general terms, that if all that was
known at Washington then had been divulged throughout the country, the
value of the shipping interest of this city, and of every other interest
connected with the commerce of the country, would have been depressed
one half in six hours. I thought that the concussion might be averted,
by holding up to view the principles of public law by which this
question ought to be settled, and by demanding an apology for whatever
had been done against those principles of public law by the British
government or its officers. I thought we ought to put ourselves right in
the first place, and then we could insist that they should do right in
the next place. When in England, in the year 1839, I had occasion to
address a large and respectable assemblage; and allusion having been
made to the relations of things between the two countries, I stated
then, what I thought and now think, that in any controversy which should
terminate in war between the United States and England, the only eminent
advantage that _either_ would possess would be found in the rectitude of
its cause. With the right on our side, we are a match for England; and
with the right on her side, she is a match for us, or for anybody.
We live in an age, fellow-citizens, when there has been established
among the nations a more elevated tribunal than ever before existed on
earth; I mean the tribunal of the enlightened public opinion of the
world. Governments cannot go to war now, either with or against the
consent of their own subjects or people, without the reprobation of
other states, unless for grounds and reasons justifying them in the
general judgment of mankind. The judgment of civilization, of commerce,
and of that heavenly light that beams over Christendom, restrains men,
congresses, parliaments, princes, and people from gratifying the
inordinate love of ambition through the bloody scenes of war. It has
been wisely said, and it is true, that every settlement of national
differences between Christian states by fair negotiation, without resort
to arms, is a new illustration and a new proof of the benign influence
of the Christian faith.
With regard to the terms of this treaty, and in relation to the other
subjects connected with it, it is somewhat awkward for me to speak,
because the documents connected with them have not been made public by
authority. But I persuade myself, that, when the whole shall be calmly
considered, it will be seen that there was throughout a fervent
disposition to maintain the interest and honor of the country, united
with a proper regard for the preservation of peace between us and the
greatest commercial nation of the world.
Gentlemen, while I receive these commendations which you have bestowed,
I have an agreeable duty to perform to others. In the first place, I
have great pleasure in bearing testimony to the intelligent interest
manifested by the President of the United States, under whose authority,
of course, I constantly acted throughout the negotiation, and his
sincere and anxious desire that it might result successfully. I take
great pleasure in acknowledging here, as I will acknowledge everywhere,
my obligations to him for the unbroken and steady confidence reposed in
me through the whole progress of an affair not unimportant to the
country, and infinitely important to my own reputation.
A negotiator disparaged, distrusted, treated with jealousy by his own
government, would be indeed a very unequal match for a cool and
sagacious representative of one of the proudest and most powerful
monarchies of Europe, possessing in the fullest extent the confidence of
his government, and authorized to bind it in concerns of the greatest
importance. I shall never forget the frankness and generosity with
which, after a full and free interchange of suggestions upon the
subject, I was told by the President that on my shoulders rested the
responsibility of the negotiation, and on my discretion and judgment
should rest the lead of every measure. I desire also to speak here of
the hearty co-operation rendered every day by the other gentlemen
connected with the administration, from every one of whom I received
important assistance. I speak with satisfaction, also, of the useful
labors of all the Commissioners, although I need hardly say here, what
has been already said officially, that the highest respect is due to the
Commissioners from Maine and Massachusetts for their faithful adherence
to the rights of their own States, mingled with a cordial co-operation
in what was required by the general interests of the United States. And
I hope I shall not be considered as trespassing on this occasion, if I
speak of the happy selection made by England of a person to represent
her government on this occasion,[2]--a thorough Englishman,
understanding and appreciating the great objects and interests of his
own government, of large and liberal views, and of such standing and
weight of character at home, as to impress a feeling of approbation of
his course upon both government and people. He was fully acquainted with
the subject, and always, on all occasions, as far as his allegiance and
duty permitted, felt and manifested good-will towards this country.
Aside from the question of the boundary, there were other important
subjects to be considered, to which I know not whether this is a proper
occasion to allude. When the results of the negotiation shall be fully
before the public, it will be seen that these other questions have not
been neglected, questions of great moment and importance to the country;
and then I shall look with concern, but with faith and trust, for the
judgment of that country upon them. It is but just to take notice of a
very important act, intended to provide for such cases as McLeod's, for
which the country is indebted to the Whig majorities in the two houses
of Congress, acting upon the President's recommendation. Events showed
the absolute necessity of removing into the national tribunals questions
involving the peace and honor of the United States.
There yet remain, Gentlemen, several other subjects still unsettled with
England. First, there is that concerning the trade between the United
States and the possessions of England, on this continent and in the West
Indies. It has been my duty to look into that subject, and to keep the
run of it, as we say, from the arrangement of 1829 and 1830, until the
present time. That arrangement was one unfavorable to the shipping
interests of the United States, and especially so to the New England
States. To adjust these relations is an important subject, either for
diplomatic negotiation, or the consideration of Congress. One or both
houses of Congress, indeed, have already called upon the proper
department for a report upon the operations of that arrangement, and a
committee of the House of Representatives has made a report, showing
that some adjustment of these relations is of vital importance to the
future prosperity of our navigating interests.
There is another question, somewhat more remote; that of the Northwest
Boundary, where the possessions of the two countries touch each other
upon the Pacific. There are evident public reasons why that question
should be settled before the country becomes peopled.
There are also, Gentlemen, many open questions respecting our relations
with other governments. Upon most of the other States of this continent,
citizens of the United States have claims, with regard to which the
delays already incurred have caused great injustice; and it becomes the
government of the United States, by a calm and dignified course, and a
deliberate and vigorous tone of administration of public affairs, to
secure prompt justice to our citizens in these quarters.
I am here to-day as a guest. I was invited by a number of highly valued
personal and political friends to partake with them of a public dinner,
for the purpose of giving them an opportunity to pass the usual greeting
of friends upon my return; of testifying their respect for my public
services heretofore; and of exchanging congratulations upon the results
of the late negotiation. It was at my instance that the proposed dinner
took the form of this meeting, and, instead of meeting them at the
festive board, I agreed to meet them, and those who chose to meet me
with them, here. Still, the general character of the meeting seems not
to be changed. I am here as a guest; here to receive greetings and
salutations for particular services, and not under any intimation or
expectation that I should address the gentlemen who invited me or others
here, upon subjects not suggested by themselves. It would not become me
to use the occasion for any more general purpose. Because, although I
have a design, at some time not far distant, to make known my sentiments
upon political matters generally, and upon the political state of the
country and that of its several parties, yet I know very well that I
should be trespassing beyond the bounds of politeness and propriety,
should I enter upon this whole wide field now. I will not enter upon it,
because the gentlemen who invited me entertain on many of these topics
views different from my own, and they would very properly say, that they
came here to meet Mr. Webster, to congratulate him upon the late
negotiation, and to exchange sentiments upon matters about which they
agreed with him; and that it was not in very correct taste for him to
use the occasion to express opinions upon other subjects on which they
differ. It is on that account that I shall forbear discussing political
subjects at large, and shall endeavor to confine my remarks to what may
be considered as affecting myself, directly or indirectly.
The Mayor was kind enough to say, that having, in his judgment,
performed the duties of my own department to the satisfaction of my
country, it might be left to me to take care of my own honor and
reputation. I suppose that he meant to say, that in the present
distracted state of the Whig party, and among the contrariety of
opinions that prevail (if there be a contrariety of opinion) as to the
course proper for _me_ to pursue, the decision of that question might be
left to myself. I am exactly of his opinion. I am quite of opinion that
on a question touching my own honor and character, as I am to bear the
consequences of the decision, I had a great deal better be trusted to
make it. No man feels more highly the advantage of the advice of friends
than I do; but on a question so delicate and important as that, I like
to choose myself the friends who are to give me advice; and upon this
subject, Gentlemen, I shall leave you as enlightened as I found you.
I give no pledges, I make no intimations, one way or the other; and I
will be as free, when this day closes, to act as duty calls, as I was
when the dawn of this day--(Here Mr. Webster was interrupted by
tremendous applause. When silence was restored he continued:)
There is a delicacy in the case, because there is always delicacy and
regret when one feels obliged to differ from his friends; but there is
no embarrassment. There is no embarrassment, because, if I see the path
of duty before me, I have that within me which will enable me to pursue
it, and throw all embarrassment to the winds. A public man has no
occasion to be embarrassed, if he is honest. Himself and his feelings
should be to him as nobody and as nothing; the interest of his country
must be to him as every thing; he must sink what is personal to himself,
making exertions for his country; and it is his ability and readiness to
do this which are to mark him as a great or as a little man in time to
come.
There were many persons in September, 1841, who found great fault with
my remaining in the President's Cabinet. You know, Gentlemen, that
twenty years of honest, and not altogether undistinguished service in
the Whig cause, did not save me from an outpouring of wrath, which
seldom proceeds from Whig pens and Whig tongues against anybody. I am,
Gentlemen, a little hard to coax, but as to being driven, that is out of
the question. I chose to trust my own judgment, and thinking I was at a
post where I was in the service of the country, and could do it good, I
stayed there. And I leave it to you to-day to say, I leave it to my
country to say, whether the country would have been better off if I had
left also. I have no attachment to office. I have tasted of its sweets,
but I have tasted of its bitterness. I am content with what I have
achieved; I am more ready to rest satisfied with what is gained, than to
run the risk of doubtful efforts for new acquisition.
I suppose I ought to pause here. (Cries of "Go on!") I ought, perhaps,
to allude to nothing more, and I will not allude to any thing further
than it may be supposed to concern myself, directly or by implication.
Gentlemen, and Mr. Mayor, a most respectable convention of Whig
delegates met in this place a few days since, and passed very important
resolutions. There is no set of gentlemen in the Commonwealth, so far as
I know them, who have more of my respect and regard. They are Whigs, but
they are no better Whigs than I am. They have served the country in the
Whig ranks; so have I, quite as long as most of them, though perhaps
with less ability and success. Their resolutions on political subjects,
as representing the Whigs of the State, are entitled to respect, so far
as they were authorized to express opinion on those subjects, and no
further. They were sent hither, as I supposed, to agree upon candidates
for the offices of Governor and Lieutenant-Governor for the support of
the Whigs of Massachusetts; and if they had any authority to speak in
the name of the Whigs of Massachusetts to any other purport or intent, I
have not been informed of it. I feel very little disturbed by any of
those proceedings, of whatever nature; but some of them appear to me to
have been inconsiderate and hasty, and their point and bearing can
hardly be mistaken. I notice, among others, a declaration made, in
behalf of all the Whigs of this Commonwealth, of "a full and final
separation from the President of the United States." If those gentlemen
saw fit to express their own sentiments to that extent, there was no
objection. Whigs speak their sentiments everywhere; but whether they may
assume a privilege to speak for others on a point on which those others
have not given them authority, is another question. I am a Whig, I
always have been a Whig, and I always will be one; and if there are any
who would turn me out of the pale of that communion, let them see who
will get out first. I am a Massachusetts Whig, a Faneuil Hall Whig,
having breathed this air for five-and-twenty years, and meaning to
breathe it as long as my life is spared. I am ready to submit to all
decisions of Whig conventions on subjects on which they are authorized
to make decisions; I know that great party good and great public good
can only be so obtained. But it is quite another question whether a set
of gentlemen, however respectable they may be as individuals, shall have
the power to bind me on matters which I have not agreed to submit to
their decision at all.
"A full and final separation" is declared between the Whig party of
Massachusetts and the President. That is the text: it requires a
commentary. What does it mean? The President of the United States has
three years of his term of office yet unexpired. Does this declaration
mean, then, that during those three years all the measures of his
administration are to be opposed by the great body of the Whig party of
Massachusetts, whether they are right or wrong? There are great public
interests which require his attention. If the President of the United
States should attempt, by negotiation, or by earnest and serious
application to Congress, to make some change in the present
arrangements, such as should be of service to those interests of
navigation which are concerned in the colonial trade, are the Whigs of
Massachusetts to give him neither aid nor succor? If the President of
the United States shall direct the proper department to review the whole
commercial policy of the United States, in respect of reciprocity in the
indirect trade, to which so much of our tonnage is now sacrificed, if
the amendment of this policy shall be undertaken by him, is there such a
separation between him and the Whigs of Massachusetts as shall lead them
and their representatives to oppose it. Do you know (there are gentlemen
now here who do know) that a large proportion, I rather think more than
one half, of the carrying trade between the empire of Brazil and the
United States is enjoyed by tonnage from the North of Europe, in
consequence of this ill-considered principle with regard to reciprocity.
You might just as well admit them into the coasting trade. By this
arrangement, we take the bread out of our children's mouths and give it
to strangers. I appeal to you, Sir, (turning to Captain Benjamin Rich,
who sat by him,) is not this true? (Mr. Rich at once replied, True!) Is
every measure of this sort, for the relief of such abuses, to be
rejected? Are we to suffer ourselves to remain inactive under every
grievance of this kind until these three years shall expire, and through
as many more as shall pass until Providence shall bless us with more
power of doing good than we have now?
Again, there are now in this State persons employed under government,
allowed to be pretty good Whigs, still holding their offices;
collectors, district attorneys, postmasters, marshals. What is to become
of them in this separation? Which side are they to fall? Are they to
resign? or is this resolution to be held up to government as an
invitation or a provocation to turn them out? Our distinguished
fellow-citizen, who, with so much credit to himself and to his country,
represents our government in England,[3]--is _he_ expected to come home,
on this separation, and yield his place to his predecessor,[4] or to
somebody else? And in regard to the individual who addresses you,--what
do his brother Whigs mean to do with him? Where do they mean to place
me? Generally, when a divorce takes place, the parties divide their
children. I am anxious to know where, in the case of this divorce, I
shall fall. This declaration announces a full and final separation
between the Whigs of Massachusetts and the President. If I choose to
remain in the President's councils, do these gentlemen mean to say that
I cease to be a Massachusetts Whig? I am quite ready to put that
question to the people of Massachusetts.
I would not treat this matter too lightly, nor yet too seriously. I know
very well that, when public bodies get together, resolutions can never
be considered with any degree of deliberation. They are passed as they
are presented. Who the honorable gentlemen were who drew this resolution
I do not know. I suspect that they had not much meaning in it, and that
they have not very clearly defined what little meaning they had. They
were angry; they were resentful; they had drawn up a string of charges
against the President,--a bill of indictment, as it were,--and, to close
the whole, they introduced this declaration about "a full and final
separation." I could not read this, of course, without perceiving that
it had an intentional or unintentional bearing on my position; and
therefore it was proper for me to allude to it here.
Gentlemen, there are some topics on which it has been my fortune to
differ from my old friends. They may be right on these topics; very
probably they are; but I am sure _I_ am right in maintaining my
opinions, such as they are, when I have formed them honestly and on
deliberation. There seems to me to be a disposition to postpone all
attempts to do good to the country to some future and uncertain day. Yet
there is a Whig majority in each house of Congress, and I am of opinion
that now is the time to accomplish what yet remains to be accomplished.
Some gentlemen are for suffering the present Congress to expire; another
Congress to be chosen, and to expire also; a third Congress to be
chosen, and then, if there shall be a Whig majority in both branches,
and a Whig President, they propose to take up highly important and
pressing subjects. These are persons, Gentlemen, of more sanguine
temperament than myself. "Confidence," says Lord Chatham, "is a plant of
slow growth in an old bosom." He referred to confidence in men, but the
remark is as true of confidence in predictions of future occurrences.
Many Whigs see before us a prospect of more power, and a better chance
to serve the country, than we now possess. Far along in the horizon,
they discern mild skies and halcyon seas, while fogs and darkness and
mists blind other sons of humanity from beholding all this bright
vision. It was not so that we accomplished our last great victory, by
simply brooding over a glorious Whig future. We succeeded in 1840, but
not without an effort; and I know that nothing but union, cordial,
sympathetic, fraternal union, can prevent the party that achieved that
success from renewed prostration. It is not,--I would say it in the
presence of the world,--it is not by premature and partial, by
proscriptive and denunciatory proceedings, that this great Whig family
can ever be kept together, or that Whig counsels can maintain their
ascendency. This is perfectly plain and obvious. It was a party, from
the first, made up of different opinions and principles, of gentlemen of
every political complexion, uniting to make a change in the
administration. They were men of strong State-rights principles, men of
strong federal principles, men of extreme tariff, and men of extreme
anti-tariff notions. What could be expected of such a party, unless
animated by a spirit of conciliation and harmony, of union and sympathy?
Its true policy was, from the first, and must be, unless it meditates
its own destruction, to heal, and not to widen, the breaches that
existed in its ranks. It consented to become united in order to save the
country from a continuation of a ruinous course of measures. And the
lesson taught by the whole history of the revolution of 1840 is the
momentous value of conciliation, friendship, sympathy, and union.
Gentlemen, if I understand the matter, there were four or five great
objects in that revolution. And, in the first place, one great object
was that of attempting to secure permanent peace between this country
and England. For although, as I have said, we were not actually at war,
we were subjected to perpetual agitations, which disturb the interests
of the country almost as much as war. They break in upon men's pursuits,
and render them incapable of calculating or judging of their chances of
success in any proposed line or course of business. A settled peace was
one of the objects of that revolution. I am glad if you think this is
accomplished.
The next object of that revolution was an increase of revenue. It was
notorious that, for the several last years, the expenditures for the
administration of government had exceeded the receipts; in other words,
government had been running in debt, and in the mean time the operation
of the compromise act was still further and faster diminishing the
revenue itself. A sound revenue was one of those objects; and that it
has been accomplished, our thanks and praise are due to the Congress
that has just adjourned.
A third object was protection, protection incidental to revenue, or
consequent upon revenue. Now as to that, Gentlemen, much has been done,
and I hope it will be found that enough has been done. And for this,
too, all the Whigs who supported that measure in Congress are entitled
to high praise: they receive mine, and I hope they do yours; it is right
that they should. But let us be just. The French rhetoricians have a
maxim, that there is nothing beautiful that is not true; I am afraid
that some of our jubilant oratory would hardly stand the test of this
canon of criticism. It is not true that a majority, composed of Whigs,
could be found, in either house, in favor of the tariff bill. More than
thirty Whigs, many of them gentlemen of lead and influence, voted
against the law, from beginning to end, on all questions, direct and
indirect; and it is not pleasant to consider what would have been the
state of the country, the treasury, and the government itself, at this
moment, if the law actually passed, for revenue and for protection, had
depended on Whig votes alone. After all, it passed the House of
Representatives by a single vote; and there is a good deal of _éclat_
about that single vote. But did not every gentleman who voted for it
take the responsibility and deserve the honor of that single vote?
Several gentlemen in the opposition thus befriended the bill; thus did
our neighbor from the Middlesex District of this State,[5] voting for
the tariff out and out, as steadily as did my honored friend, the member
from this city.[6] We hear nothing of his "coming to the rescue," and
yet he had that _one vote_, and held the tariff in his hand as
absolutely as if he had had a presidential veto! And how was it in the
Senate? It passed by one vote again there, and could not have passed at
all without the assistance of the two Senators from Pennsylvania, of Mr.
Williams of Maine, and of Mr. Wright of New York. Let us then admit the
truth (and a lawyer may do that when it helps his case), that it was
necessary that a large portion of the other party should come to the
assistance of the Whigs to enable them to carry the tariff, and that, if
this assistance had not been rendered, the tariff must have failed.
And this is a very important truth for New England. Her children,
looking to their manufactures and industry for their livelihood, must
rejoice to find the tariff, so necessary to these, no party question.
Can they desire, can they wish, that such a great object as the
protection of industry should become a party object, rising with party,
and with the failure of the party that supported it going to the grave?
This is a public, a national question. The tariff ought to be inwrought
in the sentiments of all parties; and although I hope that the
pre-eminence of Whig principles may be eternal, I wish to take bond and
security, that we may make the protection of domestic industry more
durable even than Whig supremacy.
Let us be true in another respect. This tariff has accomplished much,
and is an honor to the men who passed it. But in regard to protection it
has only restored the country to the state in which it was before the
compromise act, and from which it fell under the operation of that act.
It has repaired the consequences of that measure, and it has done _no
more_. I may speak of the compromise act. My turn has come now. No
measure ever passed Congress during my connection with that body that
caused me so much grief and mortification. It was passed by a few
friends joining the whole host of the enemy. I have heard much of the
motives of that act. The personal motives of those that passed the act
were, I doubt not, pure; and all public men are supposed to act from
pure motives. But if by motives are meant the objects proposed by the
act itself, and expressed in it, then I say, if those be the motives
alluded to, they are worse than the act itself. The principle was bad,
the measure was bad, the consequences were bad. Every circumstance, as
well as every line of the act itself, shows that the design was to
impose upon legislation a restraint that the Constitution had not
imposed; to insert in the Constitution a new prohibitory clause,
providing that, after the year 1842, no revenue should be collected
except according to an absurd horizontal system, and none exceeding
twenty per cent. It was then pressed through under the great emergency
of the public necessities. But I may now recur to what I then said,
namely, that its principle was false and dangerous, and that, when its
time came, it would rack and convulse our system. I said we should not
get rid of it without throes and spasms. Has not this been as predicted?
We have felt the spasms and throes of this convulsion; but we have at
last gone through them, and begin to breathe again. It is something that
that act is at last got rid of; and the present tariff is deserving in
this, that it is specific and discriminating, that it holds to common
sense, and rejects and discards the principles of the compromise act, I
hope for ever.
Another great and principal object of the revolution of 1840 was a
restoration of the currency. Our troubles did not begin with want of
money in the treasury, or under the sapping and mining operation of the
compromise act. They are of earlier date. The trouble and distress of
the country began with the _currency_ in 1833, and broke out with new
severity in 1837. Other causes of difficulty have since arisen, but the
first great shock was a shock on the currency; and from the effect of
this the country is not yet relieved. I hope the late act may yield
competent revenue, and am sure it will do much for protection. But until
you provide a better currency, so that you may have a universal one, of
equal and general value throughout the land, I am hard to be persuaded
that we shall see the day of our former prosperity. Currency, accredited
currency, and easy and cheap internal exchanges,--until these things be
obtained, depend upon it, the country will find no adequate relief.
And now, fellow-citizens, I will say a word or two on the history of the
transactions on this subject. At the special session of Congress, the
Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Ewing, arranged a plan for a national
bank. That plan was founded upon the idea of a large capital, furnished
mainly by private subscriptions, and it included branches for local
discounts. I need not advert, Gentlemen, to the circumstances under
which this scheme was drawn up, and received, as it did, the approbation
of the President and Cabinet, as the best thing that could be done. I
need not remind you, that he whom we had all agreed should hold the
second place in the government had been called to the head of it. I need
not say that he held opinions wholly different from mine on the subjects
which now came before us. But those opinions were fixed, and therefore
it was thought the part of wisdom and prudence not to see how strong a
case might be made against the President, but to get along as well as we
might. With such views, Mr. Ewing presented his plan to Congress. As
most persons will remember, the clause allowing the bank to establish
branches provided that those branches might be placed in any State which
should give its consent. I have no idea that there is any necessity for
such a restriction. I believe Congress has the power to establish the
branches without, as well as with, the consent of the States. But that
clause, at most, was theoretical. I never could find anybody who could
show any practical mischief resulting from it. Its opponents went upon
the theory, which I do not exactly accord with, that an omission to
exercise a power, in any case, amounts to a surrender of that power. At
any rate, it was the best thing that could be done; and its rejection
was the commencement of the disastrous dissensions between the President
and Congress.
Gentlemen, it was exceedingly doubtful at the time when that plan was
prepared whether the capital would be subscribed. But we did what we
could about it. We asked the opinion of the leading merchants of the
principal commercial cities. They were invited to Washington to confer
with us. They expressed doubts whether the bank could be put into
operation, but they expressed hopes also, and they pledged themselves to
do the best they could to advance it. And as the commercial interests
were in its favor, as the administration was new and fresh and popular,
and the people were desirous to have something done, a great earnestness
was felt that that bill should be tried.
It was sent to the Senate at the Senate's request, and by the Senate it
was rejected. Another bill was reported in the Senate, without the
provision requiring the consent of the States to branches, was discussed
for six weeks or two months, and then could not pass even a Whig Senate.
Here was the origin of distrust, disunion, and resentment.
I will not pursue the unhappy narrative of the latter part of the
session of 1841. Men had begun to grow excited and angry and resentful.
I expressed the opinion, at an early period, to all those to whom I was
entitled to speak, that it would be a great deal better to forbear
further action at present. That opinion, as expressed to the two Whig
Senators from Massachusetts, is before the public. I wished Congress to
give time for consultation to take place, for harmony to be restored;
because I looked for no good, except from the united and harmonious
action of all the branches of the Whig government. I suppose that
counsel was not good, certainly it was not followed. I need not add the
comment.
This brings us, as far as concerns the questions of currency, to the
last session of Congress. Early in that session the Secretary of the
Treasury sent in a plan of an exchequer. It met with little favor in
either House, and therefore it is necessary for me, Gentlemen, lest the
whole burden fall on others, to say that it had my hearty, sincere, and
entire approbation. Gentlemen, I hope that I have not manifested through
my public life a very overweening confidence in my own judgment, or a
very unreasonable unwillingness to accept the views of others. But there
are some subjects on which I feel entitled to pay some respect to my own
opinion. The subject of currency, Gentlemen, has been the study of my
life. Thirty years ago, a little before my entrance into the House of
Representatives, the questions connected with a mixed currency,
involving the proper relation of paper to specie, and the proper means
of restricting an excessive issue of paper, came to be discussed by the
most acute and well-disciplined understandings in England in Parliament.
At that time, during the suspension of specie payments by the bank, when
paper was fifteen per cent below par, Mr. Vansittart had presented his
celebrated resolution, declaring that a bank-note was still worth the
value expressed on its face; that the bank note had not depreciated, but
that the price of bullion had risen. Lord Liverpool and Lord Castlereagh
espoused this view, as we know, and it was opposed by the close
reasoning of Huskisson, the powerful logic of Horner, and the practical
sagacity and common sense of Alexander Baring, now Lord Ashburton. The
study of those debates made me a bullionist. They convinced me that
paper could not circulate safely in any country, any longer than it was
immediately redeemable at the place of its issue. Coming into Congress
the very next year, or the next but one after, and finding the finances
of the country in a most deplorable condition, I then and ever after
devoted myself, in preference to all other public topics, to the
consideration of the questions relating to them. I believe I have read
every thing of value that has been published since on those questions,
on either side of the Atlantic. I have studied by close observation the
laws of paper currency, as they have exhibited themselves in this and in
other countries, from 1811 down to the present time. I have expressed my
opinions at various times in Congress, and some of the predictions which
I have made have not been altogether falsified by subsequent events. I
must therefore be permitted, Gentlemen, without yielding to any flippant
newspaper paragraph, or to the hasty ebullitions of debate in a public
assembly, to say, that I believe the plan for an exchequer, as presented
to Congress at its last session, is the _best_ measure, the _only_
measure for the adoption of Congress and the trial of the people. I am
ready to stake my reputation upon it, and that is all that I have to
stake. I am ready to stake my reputation, that, if this Whig Congress
will take that measure and give it a fair trial, within three years it
will be admitted by the whole American people to be the most beneficial
measure of any sort ever adopted in this country, the Constitution only
excepted.
I mean that they should take it as it was when it came from the Cabinet,
not as it looked when the committees of Congress had laid their hands
upon it. For when the committees of Congress had struck out the proviso
respecting exchange, it was not worth a rush; it was not worth the
parchment it would be engrossed upon. The great desire of this country
is a general currency, a facility of exchange; a currency which shall be
the same for you and for the people of Alabama and Louisiana, and a
system of exchange which shall equalize credit between them and you,
with the rapidity and facility with which steam conveys men and
merchandise. That is what the country wants, what you want; and you have
not got it. You have not got it, you cannot get it, but by some adequate
provision of government. Exchange, ready exchange, that will enable a
man to turn his Orleans means into money to-day, (as we have had in
better times millions a year exchanged, at only three quarters of one
per cent,) is what is wanted How are we to obtain this? A Bank of the
United States founded on a private subscription is out of the question.
That is an obsolete idea. The country and the condition of things have
changed. Suppose that a bank were chartered with a capital of fifty
millions, to be raised by private subscription. Would it not be out of
all possibility to find the money? Who would subscribe? What would you
get for shares? And as for the local discount, do you wish it? Do you,
in State Street, wish that the nation should send millions of untaxed
banking capital hither to increase your discounts? What, then, shall we
do? People who are waiting for power to make a Bank of the United States
may as well postpone all attempts to benefit the country to the incoming
of the Jews.
What, then, shall we do? Let us turn to this plan of the exchequer,
brought forward last year. It was assailed from all quarters. One
gentleman did say, I believe, that by some possibility some good might
come out of it, but in general it met with a different opposition from
every different class. Some said it would be a perfectly lifeless
machine,--that it was no system at all,--that it would do nothing, for
good or evil; others thought that it had a great deal too much vitality,
admitting that it would answer the purpose perfectly well for which it
was designed, but fearing that it would increase the executive power:
thus making it at once King Log and King Serpent. One party called it a
ridiculous imbecility; the other, a dangerous giant, that might subvert
the Constitution. These varied arguments, contradicting, if not
refuting, one another, convinced me of one thing at least,--that the
bill would not be adopted, nor even temperately and candidly considered.
And it was not. In a manner quite unusual, it was discussed, assailed,
denounced, before it was allowed to take the course of reference and
examination.
The difficulties we meet in carrying out our system of constitutional
government are indeed extraordinary. The Constitution was intended as
an instrument of great political good; but we sometimes so dispute its
meaning, that we cannot use it at all. One man will not have a bank,
without the power of local discount, against the consent of the States;
for that, he insists, would break the Constitution. Another will not
have a bank with such a power, because he thinks that would break the
Constitution. A third will not have an exchequer, with authority to deal
in exchanges, because that would increase executive influence, and so
might break the Constitution. And between them all, we are like the
boatman who, in the midst of rocks and currents and whirlpools, will not
pull one stroke for safety, lest he break his oar. Are we now looking
for the time when we can charter a United States Bank with a large
private subscription? When will that be? When confidence is restored.
Are we, then, to do nothing to save the vessel from sinking, till the
chances of the winds and waves have landed us on the shore? He is more
sanguine than I am, who thinks that the time will soon come when the
Whigs have more power to work effectually for the good of the country
than they now have. The voice of patriotism calls upon them not to
postpone, but to act at this moment, at the very next session; to make
the best of their means, and to try. You say that the administration is
responsible; why not, then, try the plan it has recommended. If it
fails, let the President bear the responsibility. If you will not try
this plan, why not propose something else?
Gentlemen, in speaking of events that have happened, I ought to say, and
will, since I am making a full and free communication, that there is no
one of my age, and I am no longer very young, who has written or spoken
more against the abuse and indiscreet use of the veto power than I have.
And there is no one whose opinions upon this subject are less changed. I
presume it is universally known, that I have advised against the use of
the veto power on every occasion when it has been used since I have been
in the Cabinet. But I am, nevertheless, not willing to join those who
seem more desirous to make out a case against the President, than of
serving their country to the extent of their ability, vetoes
notwithstanding. Indeed, at the close of the extra session, the received
doctrine of many seemed to be, that they would undertake nothing until
they could amend the Constitution so as to do away with this power. This
was mere mockery. If we were now reforming the Constitution, we might
wish for some, I do not say what, guards and restraints upon this power
more than the Constitution at present contains; but no convention would
recommend striking it out altogether. Have not the people of New York
lately amended their constitution, so as to require, in certain
legislative action, votes of two thirds? and is not this same
restriction in daily use in the national House of Representatives
itself, in the case of suspension of the rules? This constitutional
power, therefore, is no greater a restraint than this body imposes on
itself. But it is utterly hopeless to look for such an amendment; who
expects to live to see its day? And to give up all practical efforts,
and to go on with a general idea that the Constitution must be amended
before anything can be done, was, I will not say trifling, but treating
the great necessities of the people as of quite too little importance.
This Congress accomplished, in this regard, nothing for the people. The
exchequer plan which was submitted to it will accomplish some of the
objects of the people, and especially the Whig people. I am confident of
it; I know it. When a mechanic makes a tool, an axe, a saw, or a plane,
and knows that the temper is good and the parts are well proportioned,
he knows that it will answer its purpose. And I know that this plan will
answer its purpose.
There are other objects which ought not to be neglected, among which is
one of such importance that I will not now pass it by; I mean, the
mortifying state of the public credit of this country at this time. I
cannot help thinking, that if the statesmen of a former age were among
us, if Washington were here, if John Adams, and Hamilton, and Madison
were here, they would be deeply concerned and soberly thoughtful about
the present state of the public credit of the country. In the position I
fill, it becomes my duty to read, generally with pleasure, but sometimes
with pain, communications from our public agents abroad. It is
distressing to hear them speak of _their_ distress at what they see and
hear of the scorn and contumely with which the American character and
American credit are treated abroad. Why, at this very time, we have a
loan in the market, which, at the present rate of money and credit,
ought to command in Europe one hundred and twenty-five per cent. Can we
sell a dollar of it? And how is it with the credit of our own
Commonwealth? Does it not find itself affected in its credit by the
general state of the credit of the country? Is there nobody ready to
make a movement in this matter? Is there not a man in our councils large
enough, comprehensive enough in his views, to undertake at least to
_present_ this case before the American people, and thus do something to
restore the public character for morals and honesty?
There are in the country some men who are indiscreet enough to talk of
_repudiation_,--to advise their fellow-citizens to _repudiate_ public
debt. Does repudiation pay a debt? Does it discharge the debtor? Can it
so modify a debt that it shall not be always binding, in law as well as
in morals? No, Gentlemen; repudiation does nothing but add a sort of
disrepute to acknowledged inability. It is our duty, so far as is in our
power, to rouse the public feeling on the subject; to maintain and
assert the universal principles of law and justice, and the importance
of preserving public faith and credit. People say that the intelligent
capitalists of Europe ought to distinguish between the United States
government and the State governments. So they ought; but, Gentlemen,
what does all this amount to? Does not the general government comprise
the same people who make up the State governments? May not these
Europeans ask us how long it may be before the national councils will
repudiate public obligations?
The doctrine of repudiation has inflicted upon us a stain which we ought
to feel worse than a wound; and the time has come when every man ought
to address himself soberly and seriously to the correction of this great
existing evil. I do not undertake to say what the Constitution allows
Congress to do in the premises. I will only say, that if that great fund
of the public domain properly and in equity belongs, as is maintained,
to the States themselves, there are some means, by regular and
constitutional laws, to enable and induce the States to save their own
credit and the credit of the country.
Gentlemen, I have detained you much too long. I have wished to say,
that, in my judgment, there remain certain important objects to engage
our public and private attention, in the national affairs of the
country. These are, the settlement of the remaining questions between
ourselves and England; the great questions relating to the reciprocity
principle; those relating to colonial trade; the most absorbing
questions of the currency, and those relating to the great subject of
the restoration of the national character and the public faith; these
are all objects to which I am willing to devote myself, both in public
and in private life. I do not expect that much of public service remains
to be done by me; but I am ready, for the promotion of these objects, to
act with sober men of any party, and of all parties. I am ready to act
with men who are free from that great danger that surrounds all men of
all parties,--the danger that patriotism itself, warmed and heated in
party contests, will run into partisanship. I believe that, among the
sober men of this country, there is a growing desire for more moderation
of party feeling, more predominance of purely public considerations,
more honest and general union of well-meaning men of all sides to uphold
the institutions of the country and carry them forward.
In the pursuit of these objects, in public life or in a private station,
I am willing to perform the part assigned to me, and to give them, with
hearty good-will and zealous effort, all that may remain to me of
strength and life.
[Footnote 1: The office of Representative in Congress.]
[Footnote 2: Lord Ashburton.]
[Footnote 3: Mr. Edward Everett.]
[Footnote 4: Mr. Andrew Stevenson.]
[Footnote 5: Mr. Parmenter.]
[Footnote 6: Mr. R.C. Winthrop.]