A SPEECH DELIVERED AT NIBLO'S SALOON, IN NEW YORK, ON THE 15TH OF MARCH,
1837.
Mr. Chairman and Fellow-Citizens:--It would be idle in me to affect to
be indifferent to the circumstances under which I have now the honor of
addressing you.
I find myself in the commercial metropolis of the continent, in the
midst of a vast assembly of intelligent men, drawn from all the classes,
professions, and pursuits of life.
And you have been pleased, Gentlemen, to meet me, in this imposing
manner, and to offer me a warm and cordial welcome to your city. I thank
you. I feel the full force and importance of this manifestation of your
regard. In the highly-flattering resolutions which invited me here, in
the respectability of this vast multitude of my fellow-citizens, and in
the approbation and hearty good-will which you have here manifested, I
feel cause for profound and grateful acknowledgment.
To every individual of this meeting, therefore, I would now most
respectfully make that acknowledgment; and with every one, as with hands
joined in mutual greeting, I reciprocate friendly salutation, respect,
and good wishes.
But, Gentlemen, although I am well assured of your personal regard, I
cannot fail to know, that the times, the political and commercial
condition of things which exists among us, and an intelligent spirit,
awakened to new activity and a new degree of anxiety, have mainly
contributed to fill these avenues and crowd these halls. At a moment of
difficulty, and of much alarm, you come here as Whigs of New York, to
meet one whom you believe to be bound to you by common principles and
common sentiments, and pursuing, with you, a common object. Gentlemen, I
am proud to admit this community of our principles, and this identity of
our objects. You are for the Constitution of the country; so am I. You
are for the Union of the States; so am I. You are for equal laws, for
the equal rights of all men, for constitutional and just restraints on
power, for the substance and not the shadowy image only of popular
institutions, for a government which has liberty for its spirit and
soul, as well as in its forms; and so am I. You feel that if, in warm
party times, the executive power is in hands distinguished for boldness,
for great success, for perseverance, and other qualities which strike
men's minds strongly, there is danger of derangement of the powers of
government, danger of a new division of those powers, in which the
executive is likely to obtain the lion's part; and danger of a state of
things in which the more popular branches of the government, instead of
being guards and sentinels against any encroachments from the executive,
seek, rather, support from its patronage, safety against the complaints
of the people in its ample and all-protecting favor, and refuge in its
power; and so I feel, and so I have felt for eight long and anxious
years.
You believe that a very efficient and powerful cause in the production
of the evils which now fall on the industrious and commercial classes
of the community, is the derangement of the currency, the destruction of
the exchanges, and the unnatural and unnecessary _misplacement_ of the
specie of the country, by unauthorized and illegal treasury orders. So
do I believe. I predicted all this from the beginning, and from before
the beginning. I predicted it all, last spring, when that was attempted
to be done by law which was afterwards done by executive authority; and
from the moment of the exercise of that executive authority to the
present time, I have both foreseen and seen the regular progress of
things under it, from inconvenience and embarrassment, to pressure, loss
of confidence, disorder, and bankruptcies.
Gentlemen, I mean, on this occasion, to speak my sentiments freely on
the great topics of the day. I have nothing to conceal, and shall
therefore conceal nothing. In regard to political sentiments, purposes,
or objects, there is nothing in my heart which I am ashamed of; I shall
throw it all open, therefore, to you, and to all men. [That is right,
said some one in the crowd; let us have it, with no non-committal.] Yes,
my friend, without non-committal or evasion, without barren generalities
or empty phrase, without _if_ or _but_, without a single touch, in all I
say, bearing the oracular character of an Inaugural, I shall, on this
occasion, speak my mind plainly, freely, and independently, to men who
are just as free to concur or not to concur in my sentiments, as I am to
utter them. I think you are entitled to hear my opinions freely and
frankly spoken; but I freely acknowledge that you are still more clearly
entitled to retain, and maintain, your own opinions, however they may
differ or agree with mine.
It is true, Gentlemen, that I have contemplated the relinquishment of my
seat in the Senate for the residue of the term, now two years, for which
I was chosen. This resolution was not taken from disgust or
discouragement, although some things have certainly happened which might
excite both those feelings. But in popular governments, men must not
suffer themselves to be permanently disgusted by occasional exhibitions
of political harlequinism, or deeply discouraged, although their efforts
to awaken the people to what they deem the dangerous tendency of public
measures be not crowned with immediate success. It was altogether from
other causes, and other considerations, that, after an uninterrupted
service of fourteen or fifteen years, I naturally desired a respite. But
those whose opinions I am bound to respect saw objections to a present
withdrawal from Congress; and I have yielded my own strong desire to
their convictions of what the public good requires.
Gentlemen, in speaking here on the subjects which now so much interest
the community, I wish in the outset to disclaim all personal disrespect
towards individuals. He[1] whose character and fortune have exercised
such a decisive influence on our politics for eight years, has now
retired from public station. I pursue him with no personal reflections,
no reproaches. Between him and myself there has always existed a
respectful personal intercourse. Moments have existed, indeed, critical
and decisive upon the general success of his administration, in which he
has been pleased to regard my aid as not altogether unimportant. I now
speak of him respectfully, as a distinguished soldier, as one who, in
that character, has done the state much service; as a man, too, of
strong and decided character, of unsubdued resolution and perseverance
in whatever he undertakes. In speaking of his civil administration, I
speak without censoriousness, or harsh imputation of motives; I wish him
health and happiness in his retirement; but I must still speak as I
think of his public measures, and of their general bearing and tendency,
not only on the present interests of the country, but also on the
well-being and security of the government itself.
There are, however, some topics of a less urgent present application and
importance, upon which I wish to say a few words, before I advert to
those which are more immediately connected with the present distressed
state of things.
My learned and highly-valued friend (Mr. Ogden) who has addressed me in
your behalf, has been kindly pleased to speak of my political career as
being marked by a freedom from local interests and prejudices, and a
devotion to liberal and comprehensive views of public policy.
I will not say that this compliment is deserved. I will only say, that I
have earnestly endeavored to deserve it. Gentlemen, the general
government, to the extent of its power, is national. It is not
consolidated, it does not embrace all powers of government. On the
contrary, it is delegated, restrained, strictly limited.
But what powers it does possess, it possesses for the general, not for
any partial or local good. It extends over a vast territory, embracing
now six-and-twenty States, with interests various, but not
irreconcilable, infinitely diversified, but capable of being all blended
into political harmony.
He, however, who would produce this harmony must survey the whole field,
as if all parts were as interesting to himself as they are to others,
and with that generous, patriotic feeling, prompter and better than the
mere dictates of cool reason, which leads him to embrace the whole with
affectionate regard, as constituting, altogether, that object which he
is so much bound to respect, to defend, and to love,--his country. We
have around us, and more or less within the influence and protection of
the general government, all the great interests of agriculture,
navigation, commerce, manufactures, the fisheries, and the mechanic
arts. The duties of the government, then, certainly extend over all this
territory, and embrace all these vast interests. We have a maritime
frontier, a sea-coast of many thousand miles; and while no one doubts
that it is the duty of government to defend this coast by suitable
military preparations, there are those who yet suppose that the powers
of government stop at this point; and that as to works of peace and
works of improvement, they are beyond our constitutional limits. I have
ever thought otherwise. Congress has a right, no doubt, to declare war,
and to provide armies and navies; and it has necessarily the right to
build fortifications and batteries, to protect the coast from the
effects of war. But Congress has authority also, and it is its duty, to
regulate commerce, and it has the whole power of collecting duties on
imports and tonnage. It must have ports and harbors, and dock-yards
also, for its navies. Very early in the history of the government, it
was decided by Congress, on the report of a highly respectable
committee, that the transfer by the States to Congress of the power of
collecting tonnage and other duties, and the grant of the authority to
regulate commerce, charged Congress, necessarily, with the duty of
maintaining such piers and wharves and lighthouses, and of making such
improvements, as might have been expected to be done by the States, if
they had retained the usual means, by retaining the power of collecting
duties on imports. The States, it was admitted, had parted with this
power; and the duty of protecting and facilitating commerce by these
means had passed, along with this power, into other hands. I have never
hesitated, therefore, when the state of the treasury would admit, to
vote for reasonable appropriations, for breakwaters, lighthouses, piers,
harbors, and similar public works, on any part of the whole Atlantic
coast or the Gulf of Mexico, from Maine to Louisiana.
But how stands the inland frontier? How is it along the vast lakes and
the mighty rivers of the North and West? Do our constitutional rights
and duties terminate where the water ceases to be salt? or do they
exist, in full vigor, on the shores of these inland seas? I never could
doubt about this; and yet, Gentlemen, I remember even to have
participated in a warm debate, in the Senate, some years ago, upon the
constitutional right of Congress to make an appropriation for a pier in
the harbor of Buffalo. What! make a harbor at Buffalo, where Nature
never made any, and where therefore it was never intended any ever
should be made! Take money from the people to run out piers from the
sandy shores of Lake Erie, or deepen the channels of her shallow rivers!
Where was the constitutional authority for this? Where would such
strides of power stop? How long would the States have any power at all
left, if their territory might be ruthlessly invaded for such unhallowed
purposes, or how long would the people have any money in their pockets,
if the government of the United States might tax them, at pleasure, for
such extravagant projects as these? Piers, wharves, harbors, and
breakwaters in the Lakes! These arguments, Gentlemen, however earnestly
put forth heretofore, do not strike us with great power, at the present
day, if we stand on the shores of Lake Erie, and see hundreds of
vessels, with valuable cargoes and thousands of valuable lives, moving
on its waters, with few shelters from the storm, except what is
furnished by the havens created, or made useful, by the aid of
government. These great lakes, stretching away many thousands of miles,
not in a straight line, but with turns and deflections, as if designed
to reach, by water communication, the greatest possible number of
important points through a region of vast extent, cannot but arrest the
attention of any one who looks upon the map. They lie connected, but
variously placed; and interspersed, as if with studied variety of form
and direction, over that part of the country. They were made for man,
and admirably adapted for his use and convenience. Looking, Gentlemen,
over our whole country, comprehending in our survey the Atlantic coast,
with its thick population, its advanced agriculture, its extended
commerce, its manufactures and mechanic arts, its varieties of
communication, its wealth, and its general improvements; and looking,
then, to the interior, to the immense tracts of fresh, fertile, and
cheap lands, bounded by so many lakes, and watered by so many
magnificent rivers, let me ask if such a MAP was ever before presented
to the eye of any statesman, as the theatre for the exercise of his
wisdom and patriotism? And let me ask, too, if any man is fit to act a
part, on such a theatre, who does not comprehend the whole of it within
the scope of his policy, and embrace it all as his country?
Again, Gentlemen, we are one in respect to the glorious Constitution
under which we live. We are all united in the great brotherhood of
American liberty. Descending from the same ancestors, bred in the same
school, taught in infancy to imbibe the same general political
sentiments, Americans all, by birth, education, and principle, what but
a narrow mind, or woful ignorance, or besotted selfishness, or prejudice
ten times blinded, can lead any of us to regard the citizens of any part
of the country as strangers and aliens?
The solemn truth, moreover, is before us, that a common political fate
attends us all.
Under the present Constitution, wisely and conscientiously administered,
all are safe, happy, and renowned. The measure of our country's fame may
fill all our breasts. It is fame enough for us all to partake in _her_
glory, if we will carry her character onward to its true destiny. But if
the system is broken, its fragments must fall alike on all. Not only the
cause of American liberty, but the grand cause of liberty throughout the
whole earth, depends, in a great measure, on upholding the Constitution
and Union of these States. If shattered and destroyed, no matter by what
cause, the peculiar and cherished idea of United American Liberty will
be no more for ever. There may be free states, it is possible, when
there shall be separate states. There may be many loose, and feeble, and
hostile confederacies, where there is now one great and united
confederacy. But the noble idea of United American Liberty, of _our_
liberty, such as our fathers established it, will be extinguished for
ever. Fragments and shattered columns of the edifice may be found
remaining; and melancholy and mournful ruins will they be. The august
temple itself will be prostrate in the dust. Gentlemen, the citizens of
this republic cannot sever their fortunes. A common fate awaits us. In
the honor of upholding, or in the disgrace of undermining the
Constitution, we shall all necessarily partake. Let us then stand by the
Constitution as it is, and by our country as it is, one, united, and
entire; let it be a truth engraven on our hearts, let it be borne on the
flag under which we rally, in every exigency, that we have ONE COUNTRY,
ONE CONSTITUTION, ONE DESTINY.
Gentlemen, of our interior administration, the public lands constitute a
highly important part. This is a subject of great interest, and it ought
to attract much more attention than it has hitherto received, especially
from the people of the Atlantic States. The public lands are public
property. They belong to the people of all the States. A vast portion of
them is composed of territories which were ceded by individual States to
the United States, after the close of the Revolutionary war, and before
the adoption of the present Constitution. The history of these cessions,
and the reasons for making them, are familiar to you. Some of the Old
Thirteen possessed large tracts of unsettled lands within their
chartered limits. The Revolution had established their title to these
lands, and as the Revolution had been brought about by the common
treasure and the common blood of all the Colonies, it was thought not
unreasonable that these unsettled lands should be transferred to the
United States, to pay the debt created by the war, and afterwards to
remain as a fund for the use of all the States. This is the well-known
origin of the title possessed by the United States to lands northwest of
the River Ohio.
By treaties with France and Spain, Louisiana and Florida, containing
many millions of acres of public land, have been since acquired. The
cost of these acquisitions was paid, of course, by the general
government, and was thus a charge upon the whole people. The public
lands, therefore, all and singular, are national property; granted to
the United States, purchased by the United States, paid for by all the
people of the United States.
The idea, that, when a new State is created, the public lands lying
within her territory become the property of such new State in
consequence of her sovereignty, is too preposterous for serious
refutation. Such notions have heretofore been advanced in Congress, but
nobody has sustained them. They were rejected and abandoned, although
one cannot say whether they may not be revived, in consequence of recent
propositions which have been made in the Senate. The new States are
admitted on express conditions, recognizing, to the fullest extent, the
right of the United States to the public lands within their borders; and
it is no more reasonable to contend that some indefinite idea of State
sovereignty overrides all these stipulations, and makes the lands the
property of the States, against the provisions and conditions of their
own constitution, and the Constitution of the United States, than it
would be, that a similar doctrine entitled the State of New York to the
money collected at the custom-house in this city; since it is no more
inconsistent with sovereignty that one government should hold lands, for
the purpose of sale, within the territory of another, than it is that it
should lay and collect taxes and duties within such territory. Whatever
extravagant pretensions may have been set up heretofore, there was not,
I suppose, an enlightened man in the whole West, who insisted on any
such right in the States, when the proposition to cede the lands to the
States was made, in the late session of Congress. The public lands
being, therefore, the common property of all the people of all the
States, I shall never consent to give them away to particular States, or
to dispose of them otherwise than for the general good, and the general
use of the whole country.
I felt bound, therefore, on the occasion just alluded to, to resist at
the threshold a proposition to cede the public lands to the States in
which they lie, on certain conditions. I very much regretted the
introduction of such a measure, as its effect must be, I fear, only to
agitate what was well settled, and to disturb that course of proceeding,
in regard to the public lands, which forty years of experience have
shown to be so wise, and so satisfactory in its operation, both to the
people of the old States and to those of the new.
But, Gentlemen, although the public lands are not to be given away, nor
ceded to particular States, a very liberal policy in regard to them
ought certainly to prevail. Such a policy has prevailed, and I have
steadily supported it, and shall continue to support it so long as I may
remain in public life. The main object, in regard to these lands, is
undoubtedly to settle them, so fast as the growth of our population, and
its augmentation by emigration, may enable us to settle them.
The lands, therefore, should be sold, at a low price; and, for one, I
have never doubted the right or expediency of granting portions of the
lands themselves, or of making grants of money for objects of internal
improvement connected with them.
I have always supported liberal appropriations for the purpose of
opening communications to and through these lands, by common roads,
canals, and railroads; and where lands of little value have been long in
market, and, on account of their indifferent quality, are not likely to
command a common price, I know no objection to a reduction of price, as
to such lands, so that they may pass into private ownership. Nor do I
feel any objections to removing those restraints which prevent the
States from taxing the lands for five years after they are sold. But
while, in these and all other respects, I am not only reconciled to a
liberal policy, but espouse it and support it, and have constantly done
so, I still hold the national domain to be the general property of the
country, confined to the care of Congress, and which Congress is
solemnly bound to protect and preserve for the common good.
The benefit derived from the public lands, after all, is, and must be,
in the greatest degree, enjoyed by those who buy them and settle upon
them. The original price paid to government constitutes but a small part
of their actual value. Their immediate rise in value, in the hands of
the settler, gives him competence. He exercises a power of selection
over a vast region of fertile territory, all on sale at the same price,
and that price an exceedingly low one. Selection is no sooner made,
cultivation is no sooner begun, and the first furrow turned, than he
already finds himself a man of property. These are the advantages of
Western emigrants and Western settlers; and they are such, certainly, as
no country on earth ever before afforded to her citizens. This
opportunity of purchase and settlement, this certainty of enhanced
value, these sure means of immediate competence and ultimate
wealth,--all these are the rights and the blessings of the people of the
West, and they have my hearty wishes for their full and perfect
enjoyment.
I desire to see the public lands cultivated and occupied. I desire the
growth and prosperity of the West, and the fullest development of its
vast and extraordinary resources. I wish to bring it near to us, by
every species of useful communication. I see, not without admiration and
amazement, but yet without envy or jealousy, States of recent origin
already containing more people than Massachusetts. These people I know
to be part of ourselves; they have proceeded from the midst of us, and
we may trust that they are not likely to separate themselves, in
interest or in feeling, from their kindred, whom they have left on the
farms and around the hearths of their common fathers.
A liberal policy, a sympathy with its interests, an enlightened and
generous feeling of participation in its prosperity, are due to the
West, and will be met, I doubt not, by a return of sentiments equally
cordial and equally patriotic.
Gentlemen, the general question of revenue is very much connected with
this subject of the public lands, and I will therefore, in a very few
words, express my views on that point.
The revenue involves, not only the supply of the treasury with money,
but the question of protection to manufactures. On these connected
subjects, therefore, Gentlemen, as I have promised to keep nothing back,
I will state my opinions plainly, but very shortly.
I am in favor of such a revenue as shall be equal to all the just and
reasonable wants of the government; and I am decidedly opposed to all
collection or accumulation of revenue beyond this point. An extravagant
government expenditure, and unnecessary accumulation in the treasury,
are both, of all things, to be most studiously avoided.
I am in favor of protecting American industry and labor, not only as
employed in large manufactories, but also, and more especially, as
employed in the various mechanic arts, carried on by persons of small
capitals, and living by the earnings of their own personal industry.
Every city in the Union, and none more than this, would feel severely
the consequences of departing from the ancient and continued policy of
the government respecting this last branch of protection. If duties were
to be abolished on hats, boots, shoes, and other articles of leather,
and on the articles fabricated of brass, tin, and iron, and on
ready-made clothes, carriages, furniture, and many similar articles,
thousands of persons would be immediately thrown out of employment in
this city, and in other parts of the Union. Protection, in this respect,
of our own labor against the cheaper, ill-paid, half-fed, and pauper
labor of Europe, is, in my opinion, a duty which the country owes to its
own citizens. I am, therefore, decidedly for protecting our own industry
and our own labor.
In the next place, Gentlemen, I am of opinion, that, with no more than
usual skill in the application of the well-tried principles of
discriminating and specific duties, all the branches of national
industry may be protected, without imposing such duties on imports as
shall overcharge the treasury.
And as to the revenues arising from the sales of the public lands, I am
of opinion that they ought to be set apart for the use of the States.
The States need the money. The government of the United States does not
need it. Many of the States have contracted large debts for objects of
internal improvement, and others of them have important objects which
they would wish to accomplish. The lands were originally granted for the
use of the several States; and now that their proceeds are not necessary
for the purposes of the general government, I am of opinion that they
should go to the States, and to the people of the States, upon an equal
principle. Set apart, then, the proceeds of the public lands for the use
of the States; supply the treasury from duties on imports; apply to
these duties a just and careful discrimination, in favor of articles
produced at home by our own labor, and thus support, to a fair extent,
our own manufactures. These, Gentlemen, appear to me to be the general
outlines of that policy which the present condition of the country
requires us to adopt.
Gentlemen, proposing to express opinions on the principal subjects of
interest at the present moment, it is impossible to overlook the
delicate question which has arisen from events which have happened in
the late Mexican province of Texas. The independence of that province
has now been recognized by the government of the United States. Congress
gave the President the means, to be used when he saw fit, of opening a
diplomatic intercourse with its government, and the late President
immediately made use of those means.
I saw no objection, under the circumstances, to voting an appropriation
to be used when the President should think the proper time had come; and
he deemed, very promptly, it is true, that the time had already arrived.
Certainly, Gentlemen, the history of Texas is not a little wonderful. A
very few people, in a very short time, have established a government for
themselves, against the authority of the parent state; and this
government, it is generally supposed, there is little probability, at
the present moment, of the parent state being able to overturn.
This government is, in form, a copy of our own. It is an American
constitution, substantially after the great American model. We all,
therefore, must wish it success; and there is no one who will more
heartily rejoice than I shall, to see an independent community,
intelligent, industrious, and friendly towards us, springing up, and
rising into happiness, distinction, and power, upon our own principles
of liberty and government.
But it cannot be disguised, Gentlemen, that a desire, or an intention,
is already manifested to annex Texas to the United States. On a subject
of such mighty magnitude as this, and at a moment when the public
attention is drawn to it, I should feel myself wanting in candor, if I
did not express my opinion; since all must suppose that, on such a
question, it is impossible that I should be without some opinion.
I say then, Gentlemen, in all frankness, that I see objections, I think
insurmountable objections, to the annexation of Texas to the United
States. When the Constitution was formed, it is not probable that either
its framers or the people ever looked to the admission of any States
into the Union, except such as then already existed, and such as should
be formed out of territories then already belonging to the United
States. Fifteen years after the adoption of the Constitution, however,
the case of Louisiana arose. Louisiana was obtained by treaty with
France, who had recently obtained it from Spain; but the object of this
acquisition, certainly, was not mere extension of territory. Other great
political interests were connected with it. Spain, while she possessed
Louisiana, had held the mouths of the great rivers which rise in the
Western States, and flow into the Gulf of Mexico. She had disputed our
use of these rivers already, and with a powerful nation in possession of
these outlets to the sea, it is obvious that the commerce of all the
West was in danger of perpetual vexation. The command of these rivers to
the sea was, therefore, the great object aimed at in the acquisition of
Louisiana. But that acquisition necessarily brought territory along with
it, and three States now exist, formed out of that ancient province.
A similar policy, and a similar necessity, though perhaps not entirely
so urgent, led to the acquisition of Florida.
Now, no such necessity, no such policy, requires the annexation of
Texas. The accession of Texas to our territory is not necessary to the
full and complete enjoyment of all which we already possess. Her case,
therefore, stands upon a footing entirely different from that of
Louisiana and Florida. There being no necessity for extending the limits
of the Union in that direction, we ought, I think, for numerous and
powerful reasons, to be content with our present boundaries.
Gentlemen, we all see that, by whomsoever possessed, Texas is likely to
be a slave-holding country; and I frankly avow my entire unwillingness
to do anything that shall extend the slavery of the African race on this
continent, or add other slave-holding States to the Union. When I say
that I regard slavery in itself as a great moral, social, and political
evil, I only use language which has been adopted by distinguished men,
themselves citizens of slave-holding States. I shall do nothing,
therefore, to favor or encourage its further extension. We have slavery
already amongst us. The Constitution found it in the Union; it
recognized it, and gave it solemn guaranties. To the full extent of
these guaranties we are all bound, in honor, in justice, and by the
Constitution. All the stipulations contained in the Constitution in
favor of the slave-holding States which are already in the Union ought
to be fulfilled, and, so far as depends on me, shall be fulfilled, in
the fulness of their spirit and to the exactness of their letter.
Slavery, as it exists in the States, is beyond the reach of Congress. It
is a concern of the States themselves; they have never submitted it to
Congress, and Congress has no rightful power over it. I shall concur,
therefore, in no act, no measure, no menace, no indication of purpose,
which shall interfere or threaten to interfere with the exclusive
authority of the several States over the subject of slavery as it exists
within their respective limits. All this appears to me to be matter of
plain and imperative duty.
But when we come to speak of admitting new States, the subject assumes
an entirely different aspect. Our rights and our duties are then both
different.
The free States, and all the States, are then at liberty to accept or to
reject. When it is proposed to bring new members into this political
partnership, the old members have a right to say on what terms such new
partners are to come in, and what they are to bring along with them. In
my opinion, the people of the United States will not consent to bring
into the Union a new, vastly extensive, and slave-holding country, large
enough for half a dozen or a dozen States. In my opinion, they ought not
to consent to it. Indeed, I am altogether at a loss to conceive what
possible benefit any part of this country can expect to derive from such
annexation. Any benefit to any part is at least doubtful and uncertain;
the objections are obvious, plain, and strong. On the general question
of slavery, a great portion of the community is already strongly
excited. The subject has not only attracted attention as a question of
politics, but it has struck a far deeper-toned chord. It has arrested
the religious feeling of the country; it has taken strong hold on the
consciences of men. He is a rash man indeed, and little conversant with
human nature, and especially has he a very erroneous estimate of the
character of the people of this country, who supposes that a feeling of
this kind is to be trifled with or despised. It will assuredly cause
itself to be respected. It may be reasoned with, it may be made willing,
I believe it is entirely willing, to fulfil all existing engagements and
all existing duties, to uphold and defend the Constitution as it is
established, with whatever regrets about some provisions which it does
actually contain. But to coerce it into silence, to endeavor to restrain
its free expression, to seek to compress and confine it, warm as it is,
and more heated as such endeavors would inevitably render it,--should
this be attempted, I know nothing, even in the Constitution or in the
Union itself, which would not be endangered by the explosion which might
follow.
I see, therefore, no political necessity for the annexation of Texas to
the Union; no advantages to be derived from it; and objections to it of
a strong, and, in my judgment, decisive character.
I believe it to be for the interest and happiness of the whole Union to
remain as it is, without diminution and without addition.
Gentlemen, I pass to other subjects. The rapid advancement of the
executive authority is a topic which has already been alluded to.
I believe there is serious cause of alarm from this source. I believe
the power of the executive has increased, is increasing, and ought now
to be brought back within its ancient constitutional limits. I have
nothing to do with the motives which have led to those acts, which I
believe to have transcended the boundaries of the Constitution. Good
motives may always be assumed, as bad motives may always be imputed.
Good intentions will always be pleaded for every assumption of power;
but they cannot justify it, even if we were sure that they existed. It
is hardly too strong to say, that the Constitution was made to guard the
people against the dangers of good intention, real or pretended. When
bad intentions are boldly avowed, the people will promptly take care of
themselves. On the other hand, they will always be asked why they should
resist or question that exercise of power which is so fair in its
object, so plausible and patriotic in appearance, and which has the
public good alone confessedly in view? Human beings, we may be assured,
will generally exercise power when they can get it; and they will
exercise it most undoubtedly, in popular governments, under pretences of
public safety or high public interest. It may be very possible that good
intentions do really sometimes exist when constitutional restraints are
disregarded. There are men, in all ages, who mean to exercise power
usefully; but who mean to exercise it. They mean to govern well; but
they mean to govern. They promise to be kind masters; but they mean to
be masters. They think there need be but little restraint upon
themselves. Their notion of the public interest is apt to be quite
closely connected with their own exercise of authority. They may not,
indeed, always understand their own motives. The love of power may sink
too deep in their own hearts even for their own scrutiny, and may pass
with themselves for mere patriotism and benevolence.
A character has been drawn of a very eminent citizen of Massachusetts,
of the last age, which, though I think it does not entirely belong to
him, yet very well describes a certain class of public men. It was said
of this distinguished son of Massachusetts, that in matters of politics
and government he cherished the most kind and benevolent feelings
towards the whole earth. He earnestly desired to see all nations well
governed; and to bring about this happy result, he wished that the
United States might govern the rest of the world; that Massachusetts
might govern the United States; that Boston might govern Massachusetts;
and as for himself, his own humble ambition would be satisfied by
governing the little town of Boston.
I do not intend, Gentlemen, to commit so unreasonable a trespass on your
patience as to discuss all those cases in which I think executive power
has been unreasonably extended. I shall only allude to some of them,
and, as being earliest in the order of time, and hardly second to any
other in importance, I mention the practice of removal from all offices,
high and low, for opinion's sake, and on the avowed ground of giving
patronage to the President; that is to say, of giving him the power of
influencing men's political opinions and political conduct, by hopes and
by fears addressed directly to their pecuniary interests. The great
battle on this point was fought, and was lost, in the Senate of the
United States, in the last session of Congress under Mr. Adams's
administration. After General Jackson was known to be elected, and
before his term of office began, many important offices became vacant by
the usual causes of death and resignation. Mr. Adams, of course,
nominated persons to fill these vacant offices. But a majority of the
Senate was composed of the friends of General Jackson; and, instead of
acting on these nominations, and filling the vacant offices with
ordinary promptitude, the nominations were postponed to a day beyond the
4th of March, for the purpose, openly avowed, of giving the patronage of
the appointments to the President who was then coming into office. When
the new President entered on his office, he withdrew these nominations,
and sent in nominations of his own friends in their places. I was of
opinion then, and am of opinion now, that that decision of the Senate
went far to unfix the proper balance of the government. It conferred on
the President the power of rewards for party purposes, or personal
purposes, without limit or control. It sanctioned, manifestly and
plainly, that exercise of power which Mr. Madison had said would deserve
impeachment; and it completely defeated one great object, which we are
told the framers of the Constitution contemplated, in the manner of
forming the Senate; that is, that the Senate might be a body not
changing with the election of a President, and therefore likely to be
able to hold over him some check or restraint in regard to bringing his
own friends and partisans into power with him, and thus rewarding their
services to him at the public expense.
The debates in the Senate, on these questions, were long continued and
earnest. They were of course in secret session, but the opinions of
those members who opposed this course have all been proved true by the
result. The contest was severe and ardent, as much so as any that I have
ever partaken in; and I have seen some service in that sort of warfare.
Gentlemen, when I look back to that eventful moment, when I remember who
those were who upheld this claim for executive power, with so much zeal
and devotion, as well as with such great and splendid abilities, and
when I look round now, and inquire what has become of these gentlemen,
where they have found themselves at last, under the power which they
thus helped to establish, what has become now of all their respect,
trust, confidence, and attachment,--how many of them, indeed, have not
escaped from being broken and crushed under the weight of the wheels of
that engine which they themselves set in motion,--I feel that an
edifying lesson may be read by those who, in the freshness and fulness
of party zeal, are ready to confer the most dangerous power, in the hope
that they and their friends may bask in its sunshine, while enemies only
shall be withered by its frown.
I will not go into the mention of names. I will give no enumeration of
persons; but I ask you to turn your minds back, and recollect who the
distinguished men were who supported, in the Senate, General Jackson's
administration for the first two years; and I will ask you what you
suppose they think now of that power and that discretion which they so
freely confided to executive hands. What do they think of the whole
career of that administration, the commencement of which, and indeed the
existence of which, owed so much to their own great exertions?
In addition to the establishment of this power of unlimited and
causeless removal, another doctrine has been put forth, more vague, it
is true, but altogether unconstitutional, and tending to like dangerous
results. In some loose, indefinite, and unknown sense, the President has
been called the _representative of the whole American people_. He has
called himself so repeatedly, and been so denominated by his friends a
thousand times. Acts, for which no specific authority has been found
either in the Constitution or the laws, have been justified on the
ground that the President is the representative of the whole American
people. Certainly, this is not constitutional language. Certainly, the
Constitution nowhere calls the President the universal representative of
the people. The constitutional representatives of the people are in the
House of Representatives, exercising powers of legislation. The
President is an executive officer, appointed in a particular manner, and
clothed with prescribed and limited powers. It may be thought to be of
no great consequence, that the President should call himself, or that
others should call him, the sole representative of all the people,
although he has no such appellation or character in the Constitution.
But, in these matters, words are things. If he is the people's
representative, and as such may exercise power, without any other grant,
what is the limit to that power? And what may not an unlimited
representative of the people do? When the Constitution expressly creates
representatives, as members of Congress, it regulates, defines, and
limits their authority. But if the executive chief magistrate, merely
because he is the executive chief magistrate, may assume to himself
another character, and call himself the representative of the whole
people, what is to limit or restrain this representative power in his
hands?
I fear, Gentlemen, that if these pretensions should be continued and
justified, we might have many instances of summary political logic, such
as I once heard in the House of Representatives. A gentleman, not now
living, wished very much to vote for the establishment of a Bank of the
United States, but he had always stoutly denied the constitutional power
of Congress to create such a bank. The country, however, was in a state
of great financial distress, from which such an institution, it was
hoped, might help to extricate it; and this consideration led the worthy
member to review his opinions with care and deliberation. Happily, on
such careful and deliberate review, he altered his former judgment. He
came, satisfactorily, to the conclusion that Congress might incorporate
a bank. The argument which brought his mind to this result was short,
and so plain and obvious, that he wondered how he should so long have
overlooked it. The power, he said, to create a bank, was either given to
Congress, or it was not given. Very well. If it was given, Congress of
course could exercise it; if it was not given, the people still retained
it, and in that case, Congress, as the representatives of the people,
might, upon an emergency, make free to use it.
Arguments and conclusions in substance like these, Gentlemen, will not
be wanting, if men of great popularity, commanding characters, sustained
by powerful parties, _and full of good intentions towards the public_,
may be permitted to call themselves the universal representatives of the
people.
But, Gentlemen, it is the _currency_, the currency of the country,--it
is this great subject, so interesting, so vital, to all classes of the
community, which has been destined to feel the most violent assaults of
executive power. The consequences are around us and upon us. Not
unforeseen, not unforetold, here they come, bringing distress for the
present, and fear and alarm for the future. If it be denied that the
present condition of things has arisen from the President's interference
with the revenue, the first answer is, that, when he did interfere, just
such consequences were predicted. It was then said, and repeated, and
pressed upon the public attention, that that interference must
necessarily produce derangement, embarrassment, loss of confidence, and
commercial distress. I pray you, Gentlemen, to recur to the debates of
1832, 1833, and 1834, and then to decide whose opinions have proved to
be correct. When the treasury experiment was first announced, who
supported, and who opposed it? Who warned the country against it? Who
were they who endeavored to stay the violence of party, to arrest the
hand of executive authority, and to convince the people that this
experiment was delusive; that its object was merely to increase
executive power, and that its effect, sooner or later, must be injurious
and ruinous? Gentlemen, it is fair to bring the opinions of political
men to the test of experience. It is just to judge of them by their
measures, and their opposition to measures; and for myself, and those
political friends with whom I have acted, on this subject of the
currency, I am ready to abide the test.
But before the subject of the currency, and its present most
embarrassing state, is discussed, I invite your attention, Gentlemen, to
the history of executive proceedings connected with it. I propose to
state to you a series of facts; not to argue upon them, not to _mystify_
them, nor to draw any unjust inference from them; but merely to state
the case, in the plainest manner, as I understand it. And I wish,
Gentlemen, that, in order to be able to do this in the best and most
convincing manner, I had the ability of my learned friend, (Mr. Ogden,)
whom you have all so often heard, and who usually states his case in
such a manner that, when stated, it is already very well argued.
Let us see, Gentlemen, what the train of occurrences has been in regard
to our revenue and finances; and when these occurrences are stated, I
leave to every man the right to decide for himself whether our present
difficulties have or have not arisen from attempts to extend the
executive authority. In giving this detail, I shall be compelled to
speak of the late Bank of the United States; but I shall speak of it
historically only. My opinion of its utility, and of the extraordinary
ability and success with which its affairs were conducted for many years
before the termination of its charter, is well known. I have often
expressed it, and I have not altered it. But at present I speak of the
bank only as it makes a necessary part in the history of events which I
wish now to recapitulate.
Mr. Adams commenced his administration in March, 1825. He had been
elected by the House of Representatives, and began his career as
President under a powerful opposition. From the very first day, he was
warmly, even violently, opposed in all his measures; and this
opposition, as we all know, continued without abatement, either in force
or asperity, through his whole term of four years. Gentlemen, I am not
about to say whether this opposition was well or ill founded, just or
unjust. I only state the fact as connected with other facts. The Bank of
the United States, during these four years of Mr. Adams's
administration, was in full operation. It was performing the fiscal
duties enjoined on it by its charter; it had established numerous
offices, was maintaining a large circulation, and transacting a vast
business in exchange. Its character, conduct, and manner of
administration were all well known to the whole country.
Now there are two or three things worthy of especial notice. One is,
that during the whole of this heated political controversy, from 1825 to
1829, the party which was endeavoring to produce a change of
administration in the general government brought no charge of political
interference against the Bank of the United States. If any thing, it was
rather a favorite with that party generally. Certainly, the party, as a
party, did not ascribe to it undue attachment to other parties, or to
the then existing administration. Another important fact is, that,
during the whole of the same period, those who had espoused the cause of
General Jackson, and who sought to bring about a revolution under his
name, did not propose the destruction of the bank, or its
discontinuance, as one of the objects which were to be accomplished by
the intended revolution. They did not tell the country that the bank was
unconstitutional; they did not declare it unnecessary; they did not
propose to get along without it, when they should come into power
themselves. If individuals entertained any such purposes, they kept them
much to themselves. The party, as a party, avowed none such. A third
fact, worthy of all notice, is, that during this period there was no
complaint about the state of the currency, either by the country
generally or by the party then in opposition.
In March, 1829, General Jackson was inaugurated as President. He came
into power on professions of reform. He announced reform of all abuses
to be the great and leading object of his future administration; and in
his inaugural address he pointed out the main subjects of this reform.
But the bank was not one of them. It was not said by him that the bank
was unconstitutional. It was not said that it was unnecessary or
useless. It was not said that it had failed to do all that had been
hoped or expected from it in regard to the currency.
In March, 1829, then, the bank stood well, very well, with the new
administration. It was regarded, so far as appears, as entirely
constitutional, free from political or party taint, and highly useful.
It had as yet found no place in the catalogue of abuses to be reformed.
But, Gentlemen, nine months wrought a wonderful change. New lights broke
forth before these months had rolled away; and the President, in his
message to Congress in December, 1829, held a very unaccustomed language
and manifested very unexpected purposes.
Although the bank had then five or six years of its charter unexpired,
he yet called the attention of Congress very pointedly to the subject,
and declared,--