THE BILL REGULATING THE DEPOSIT OF THE PUBLIC MONEY IN THE DEPOSIT
BANKS;
THE BILL RESPECTING THE TENURE OF CERTAIN OFFICES, AND THE POWER OF
REMOVAL FROM OFFICE; which has now again been passed to be engrossed, in
the Senate, by a decided majority.
All these important measures, matured and passed in the Senate in the
course of the session, and many others of less importance, were sent to
the House of Representatives, and we never heard any thing more from
them. They there found their graves.
It is worthy of being remarked, also, that the attendance of members of
the Senate was remarkably full, particularly toward the end of the
session. On the last day, every Senator was in his place till very near
the hour of adjournment, as the journal will show. We had no breaking up
for want of a quorum; no delay, no calls of the Senate; nothing which
was made necessary by the negligence or inattention of the members of
this body. On the vote of the three millions of dollars, which was taken
at about eight o'clock in the evening, forty-eight votes were given,
every member of the Senate being in his place and answering to his name.
This is an instance of punctuality, diligence, and labor, continued to
the very end of an arduous session, wholly without example or parallel.
The Senate, then, Sir, must stand, in the judgment of every man, fully
acquitted of all remissness, all negligence, all inattention, amidst the
fatigue and exhaustion of the closing hours of Congress. Nothing passed
unheeded, nothing was overlooked, nothing forgotten, and nothing
slighted.
And now, Sir, I would proceed immediately to give the history of the
fortification bill, if it were not necessary, as introductory to that
history, and as showing the circumstances under which the Senate was
called on to transact the public business, first to refer to another
bill which was before us, and to the proceedings which were had upon it.
It is well known, Sir, that the annual appropriation bills always
originate in the House of Representatives. This is so much a matter of
course, that no one ever looks to see such a bill first brought forward
in the Senate. It is also well known, Sir, that it has been usual,
heretofore, to make the annual appropriations for the Military Academy
at West Point in the general bill which provides for the pay and support
of the army. But last year the army bill did not contain any
appropriation whatever for the support of West Point. I took notice of
this singular omission when the bill was before the Senate, but
presumed, and indeed understood, that the House would send us a separate
bill for the Military Academy. The army bill, therefore, passed; but no
bill for the Academy at West Point appeared. We waited for it from day
to day, and from week to week, but waited in vain. At length, the time
for sending bills from one house to the other, according to the joint
rules of the two houses, expired, and no bill had made its appearance
for the support of the Military Academy. These joint rules, as is well
known, are sometimes suspended on the application of one house to the
other, in favor of particular bills, whose progress has been
unexpectedly delayed, but which the public interest requires to be
passed. But the House of Representatives sent us no request to suspend
the rules in favor of a bill for the support of the Military Academy,
nor made any other proposition to save the institution from immediate
dissolution. Notwithstanding all the talk about a war, and the necessity
of a vote for the three millions, the Military Academy, an institution
cherished so long, and at so much expense, was on the very point of
being entirely broken up.
Now it so happened, Sir, that at this time there was another
appropriation bill which had come from the House of Representatives, and
was before the Committee on Finance here. This bill was entitled "An Act
making appropriations for the civil and diplomatic expenses of the
government for the year 1835."
In this state of things, several members of the House of Representatives
applied to the committee, and besought us to save the Military Academy
by annexing the necessary appropriations for its support to the bill for
civil and diplomatic service. We spoke to them, in reply, of the
unfitness, the irregularity, the incongruity, of this forced union of
such dissimilar subjects; but they told us it was a case of absolute
necessity, and that, without resorting to this mode, the appropriation
could not get through. We acquiesced, Sir, in these suggestions. We went
out of our way. We agreed to do an extraordinary and an irregular thing,
in order to save the public business from miscarriage. By direction of
the committee, I moved the Senate to add an appropriation for the
Military Academy to the bill for defraying civil and diplomatic
expenses. The bill was so amended; and in this form the appropriation
was finally made.
But this was not all. This bill for the civil and diplomatic service,
being thus amended by tacking the Military Academy to it, was sent back
by us to the House of Representatives, where its length of tail was to
be still much further increased. That house had before it several
subjects for provision, and for appropriation, upon which it had not
passed any bill before the time for passing bills to be sent to the
Senate had elapsed. I was anxious that these things should, in some way,
be provided for; and when the diplomatic bill came back, drawing the
Military Academy after it, it was thought prudent to attach to it
several of these other provisions. There were propositions to pave the
streets in the city of Washington, to repair the Capitol, and various
other things, which it was necessary to provide for; and they,
therefore, were put into the same bill, by way of amendment to an
amendment; that is to say, Mr. President, we had been prevailed on to
amend their bill for defraying the salary of our ministers abroad, by
adding an appropriation for the Military Academy, and they proposed to
amend this our amendment by adding matter as germane to it as it was
itself to the original bill. There was also the President's gardener.
His salary was unprovided for; and there was no way of remedying this
important omission, but by giving him place in the diplomatic service
bill, among _chargés d'affaires_, envoys extraordinary, and ministers
plenipotentiary. In and among these ranks, therefore, he was formally
introduced by the amendment of the House, and there he now stands, as
you will readily see by turning to the law.
Sir, I have not the pleasure to know this useful person; but should I
see him, some morning, overlooking the workmen in the lawns, walks,
copses, and parterres which adorn the grounds around the President's
residence, considering the company into which we have introduced him, I
should expect to see, at least, a small diplomatic button on his working
jacket.
When these amendments came from the House, and were read at our table,
though they caused a smile, they were yet adopted, and the law passed,
almost with the rapidity of a comet, and with something like the same
length of tail.
Now, Sir, not one of these irregularities or incongruities, no part of
this jumbling together of distinct and different subjects, was in the
slightest degree occasioned by any thing done, or omitted to be done, on
the part of the Senate. Their proceedings were all regular; their
decision was prompt, their despatch of the public business correct and
reasonable. There was nothing of disorganization, nothing of
procrastination, nothing evincive of a temper to embarrass or obstruct
the public business. If the history which I have now truly given shows
that one thing was amended by another, which had no sort of connection
with it; that unusual expedients were resorted to; and that the laws,
instead of arrangement and symmetry, exhibit anomaly, confusion, and the
most grotesque associations, it is nevertheless true, that no part of
all this was made necessary by us. We deviated from the accustomed modes
of legislation only when we were supplicated to do so, in order to
supply bald and glaring deficiencies in measures which were before us.
But now, Mr. President, let me come to the fortification bill, the lost
bill, which not only now, but on a graver occasion, has been lamented
like the lost Pleiad.
This bill, Sir, came from the House of Representatives to the Senate in
the usual way, and was referred to the Committee on Finance. Its
appropriations were not large. Indeed, they appeared to the committee to
be quite too small. It struck a majority of the committee at once, that
there were several fortifications on the coast, either not provided for
at all, or not adequately provided for, by this bill. The whole amount
of its appropriations was four hundred or four hundred and thirty
thousand dollars. It contained no grant of three millions, and if the
Senate had passed it the very day it came from the House, not only would
there have been no appropriation of the three millions, but, Sir, none
of these other sums which the Senate did insert in the bill. Others
besides ourselves saw the deficiencies of this bill. We had
communications with and from the departments, and we inserted in the
bill every thing which any department recommended to us. We took care to
be sure that nothing else was coming. And we then reported the bill to
the Senate with our proposed amendments. Among these amendments, there
was a sum of $75,000 for Castle Island in Boston harbor, $100,000 for
defences in Maryland, and so forth. These amendments were agreed to by
the Senate, and one or two others added, on the motion of members; and
the bill, as thus amended, was returned to the House.
And now, Sir, it becomes important to ask, When was this bill, thus
amended, returned to the House of Representatives? Was it unduly
detained here, so that the House was obliged afterwards to act upon it
suddenly? This question is material to be asked, and material to be
answered, too, and the journal does satisfactorily answer it; for it
appears by the journal that the bill was returned to the House of
Representatives on Tuesday, the 24th of February, _one whole week before
the close of the session_. And from Tuesday, the 24th of February, to
Tuesday, the 3d day of March, we heard not one word from this bill.
Tuesday, the 3d day of March, was, of course, the last day of the
session. We assembled here at ten or eleven o'clock in the morning of
that day, and sat until three in the afternoon, and still we were not
informed whether the House had finally passed the bill. As it was an
important matter, and belonged to that part of the public business which
usually receives particular attention from the Committee on Finance, I
bore the subject in my mind, and felt some solicitude about it, seeing
that the session was drawing so near to a close. I took it for granted,
however, as I had not heard any thing to the contrary, that the
amendments of the Senate would not be objected to, and that, when a
convenient time should arrive for taking up the bill in the House, it
would be passed at once into a law, and we should hear no more about it.
Not the slightest intimation was given, either that the executive wished
for any larger appropriation, or that it was intended in the House to
insert such larger appropriation. Not a syllable escaped from anybody,
and came to our knowledge, that any further alteration whatever was
intended in the bill.
At three o'clock in the afternoon of the 3d of March, the Senate took
its recess, as is usual in that period of the session, until five
o'clock. At five o'clock we again assembled, and proceeded with the
business of the Senate until eight o'clock in the evening; and at eight
o'clock in the evening, and not before, the clerk of the House appeared
at our door, and announced that the House of Representatives had
_disagreed_ to one of the Senate's amendments, _agreed_ to others; and
to two of those amendments, namely, the fourth and fifth, it had agreed,
_with an amendment of its own_.
Now, Sir, these fourth and fifth amendments of ours were, one, a vote of
$75,000 for Castle Island in Boston harbor, and the other, a vote of
$100,000 for certain defences in Maryland. And what, Sir, was the
addition which the House of Representatives proposed to make, by way of
"_amendment_" to a vote of $75,000 for repairing the works in Boston
harbor? Here, Sir, it is:--
"_And be it further enacted_, That the sum of three millions of
dollars be, and the same is hereby, appropriated, out of any money
in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended, in
whole or in part, under the direction of the President of the
United States, for the military and naval service, including
fortifications and ordnance, and the increase of the navy:
_Provided_, such expenditures shall be rendered necessary for the
defence of the country prior to the next meeting of Congress."
This proposition, Sir, was thus unexpectedly and suddenly put to us, at
eight o'clock in the evening of the last day of the session. Unusual,
unprecedented, extraordinary, as it obviously is, on the face of it, the
manner of presenting it was still more extraordinary. The President had
asked for no such grant of money; no department had recommended it; no
estimate had suggested it; no reason whatever was given for it. No
emergency had happened, and nothing new had occurred; every thing known
to the administration, at that hour, respecting our foreign relations,
had certainly been known to it for days and weeks.
With what propriety, then, could the Senate be called on to sanction a
proceeding so entirely irregular and anomalous? Sir, I recollect the
occurrences of the moment very well, and I remember the impression which
this vote of the House seemed to make all round the Senate. We had just
come out of executive session; the doors were but just opened; and I
hardly remember that there was a single spectator in the hall or the
galleries. I had been at the clerk's table, and had not reached my seat,
when the message was read. All the Senators were in the chamber. I heard
the message, certainly with great surprise and astonishment; and I
immediately moved the Senate to _disagree_ to this vote of the House. My
relation to the subject, in consequence of my connection with the
Committee on Finance, made it my duty to propose some course, and I had
not a moment's doubt or hesitation what that course ought to be. I took
upon myself, then, Sir, the responsibility of moving that the Senate
should disagree to this vote, and I now acknowledge that responsibility.
It might be presumptuous to say that I took a leading part, but I
certainly took an early part, a decided part, and an earnest part, in
rejecting this broad grant of three millions of dollars, without
limitation of purpose or specification of object, called for by no
recommendation, founded on no estimate, made necessary by no state of
things which was known to us. Certainly, Sir, I took a part in its
rejection; and I stand here, in my place in the Senate, to-day, ready
to defend the part so taken by me; or, rather, Sir, I disclaim all
defence, and all occasion of defence, and I assert it as meritorious to
have been among those who arrested, at the earliest moment, this
extraordinary departure from all settled usage, and, as I think, from
plain constitutional injunction,--this indefinite voting of a vast sum
of money to mere executive discretion, without limit assigned, without
object specified, without reason given, and without the least control.
Sir, I am told, that, in opposing this grant, I spoke with warmth, and I
suppose I may have done so. If I did, it was a warmth springing from as
honest a conviction of duty as ever influenced a public man. It was
spontaneous, unaffected, sincere. There had been among us, Sir, no
consultation, no concert. There could have been none. Between the
reading of the message and my motion to disagree, there was not time
enough for any two members of the Senate to exchange five words on the
subject. The proposition was sudden and perfectly unexpected. I resisted
it, as irregular, as dangerous in itself, and dangerous in its
precedent; as wholly unnecessary, and as violating the plain intention,
if not the express words, of the Constitution. Before the Senate, then,
I avowed, and before the country I now avow, my part in this opposition.
Whatsoever is to fall on those who sanctioned it, of that let me have my
full share.
The Senate, Sir, rejected this grant by a vote of TWENTY-NINE against
nineteen. Those twenty-nine names are on the journal; and whensoever the
EXPUNGING process may commence, or how far soever it may be carried, I
pray it, in mercy, not to erase mine from that record. I beseech it, in
its sparing goodness, to leave me that proof of attachment to duty and
to principle. It may draw around it, over it, or through it, black
lines, or red lines, or any lines; it may mark it in any way which
either the most prostrate and fantastical spirit of _man-worship_, or
the most ingenious and elaborate study of self-degradation, may devise,
if only it will leave it so that those who inherit my blood, or who may
hereafter care for my reputation, shall be able to behold it where it
now stands.
The House, Sir, insisted on this amendment. The Senate adhered to its
disagreement; the House asked a conference, to which request the Senate
immediately acceded. The committee of conference met, and in a very
short time came to an agreement. They agreed to recommend to their
respective houses, as a substitute for the vote proposed by the House,
the following:--
"As an additional appropriation for arming the fortifications of the
United States, three hundred thousand dollars."
"As an additional appropriation for the repairs and equipment of ships
of war of the United States, five hundred thousand dollars."
I immediately reported this agreement of the committee of conference to
the Senate; but, inasmuch as the bill was in the House of
Representatives, the Senate could not act further on the matter until
the House should first have considered the report of the committee,
decided thereon, and sent us the bill. I did not myself take any note of
the particular hour of this part of the transaction. The honorable
member from Virginia[1] says he looked at his watch at the time, and he
knows that I had come from the conference, and was in my seat, at a
quarter past eleven. I have no reason to think that he is under any
mistake on this particular. He says it so happened that he had occasion
to take notice of the hour, and well remembers it. It could not well
have been later than this, as any one will be satisfied who will look at
our journals, public and executive, and see what a mass of business was
despatched after I came from the committee, and before the adjournment
of the Senate. Having made the report, Sir, I had no doubt that both
houses would concur in the result of the conference, and looked every
moment for the officer of the House bringing the bill. He did not come,
however, and I pretty soon learned that there was doubt whether the
committee on the part of the House would report to the House the
agreement of the conferees. At first, I did not at all credit this; but
was confirmed by one communication after another, until I was obliged to
think it true. Seeing that the bill was thus in danger of being lost,
and intending at any rate that no blame should justly attach to the
Senate, I immediately moved the following resolution:--
"_Resolved_, That a message be sent to the honorable the House of
Representatives, respectfully to remind the House of the report of the
committee of conference appointed on the disagreeing votes of the two
houses on the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate to
the bill respecting the fortifications of the United States."
You recollect this resolution, Sir, having, as I well remember, taken
some part on the occasion.[2]
This resolution was promptly passed; the secretary carried it to the
House, and delivered it. What was done in the House on the receipt of
this message now appears from the printed journal. I have no wish to
comment on the proceedings there recorded; all may read them, and each
be able to form his own opinion. Suffice it to say, that the House of
Representatives, having then possession of the bill, chose to retain
that possession, and never acted on the report of the committee of
conference. The bill, therefore, was lost. It was lost in the House of
Representatives. It died there, and there its remains are to be found.
No opportunity was given to the members of the House to decide whether
they would agree to the report of the committee or not. From a quarter
past eleven, when the report was agreed to, until two or three o'clock
in the morning, the House remained in session. If at any time there was
not a quorum of members present, the attendance of a quorum, we are to
presume, might have been commanded, as there was undoubtedly a great
majority of members still in the city.
But, Sir, there is one other transaction of the evening which I now feel
bound to state, because I think it quite important on several accounts,
that it should be known.
A nomination was pending before the Senate for a judge of the Supreme
Court. In the course of the sitting, that nomination was called up, and,
on motion, was indefinitely postponed. In other words, it was rejected;
for an indefinite postponement is a rejection. The office, of course,
remained vacant, and the nomination of another person to fill it became
necessary. The President of the United States was then in the Capitol,
as is usual on the evening of the last day of the session, in the
chamber assigned to him, and with the heads of departments around him.
When nominations are rejected under these circumstances, it has been
usual for the President immediately to transmit a new nomination to the
Senate; otherwise the office must remain vacant till the next session,
as the vacancy in such case has not happened in the recess of Congress.
The vote of the Senate, indefinitely postponing this nomination, was
carried to the President's room by the secretary of the Senate. The
President told the secretary that it was more than an hour past twelve
o'clock, and that he could receive no further communications from the
Senate, and immediately after, as I have understood, left the Capitol.
The secretary brought back the paper containing the certified copy of
the vote of the Senate, and indorsed thereon the substance of the
President's answer, and also added, that, according to his own watch, it
was quarter past one o'clock.
There are two views, Sir, in which this occurrence may well deserve to
be noticed. One is as to the connection which it may perhaps have had
with the loss of the fortification bill; the other is as to its general
importance, as introducing a new rule, or a new practice, respecting the
intercourse between the President and the two houses of Congress on the
last day of the session.
On the first point, I shall only observe that the fact of the
President's having declined to receive this communication from the
Senate, and of his having left the Capitol, was immediately known in the
House of Representatives. It was quite obvious, that, if he could not
receive a communication from the Senate, neither could he receive a bill
from the House of Representatives for his signature. It was equally
obvious, that, if, under these circumstances, the House of
Representatives should agree to the report of the committee of
conference, so that the bill should pass, it must, nevertheless, fail to
become a law for want of the President's signature; and that, in that
case, the blame of losing the bill, on whomsoever else it might fall,
could not be laid upon the Senate.
On the more general point, I must say, Sir, that this decision of the
President, not to hold communication with the houses of Congress after
twelve o'clock at night, on the 3d of March, is quite new. No such
objection has ever been made before by any President. No one of them has
ever declined communicating with either house at any time during the
continuance of its session on that day. All Presidents heretofore have
left with the houses themselves to fix their hour of adjournment, and to
bring their session for the day to a close, whenever they saw fit.
It is notorious, in point of fact, that nothing is more common than for
both houses to sit later than twelve o'clock, for the purpose of
completing measures which are in the last stages of their progress.
Amendments are proposed and agreed to, bills passed, enrolled bills
signed by the presiding officers, and other important legislative acts
performed, often at two or three o'clock in the morning. All this is
very well known to gentlemen who have been for any considerable time
members of Congress. And all Presidents have signed bills, and have also
made nominations to the Senate, without objection as to time, whenever
bills have been presented for signature, or whenever it became necessary
to make nominations to the Senate, at any time during the session of the
respective houses on that day.
And all this, Sir, I suppose to be perfectly right, correct, and legal.
There is no clause of the Constitution, nor is there any law, which
declares that the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives shall expire at twelve o'clock at night on the 3d of
March. They are to hold for two years, but the precise hour for the
commencement of that term of two years is nowhere fixed by
constitutional or legal provision. It has been established by usage and
by inference, and very properly established, that, since the first
Congress commenced its existence on the first Wednesday in March, 1789,
which happened to be the fourth day of the month, therefore the 4th of
March is the day of the commencement of each successive term; but no
hour is fixed by law or practice. The true rule is, as I think, most
undoubtedly, that the session held on the last day constitutes the last
day for all legislative and legal purposes. While the session begun on
that day continues, the day itself continues, according to the
established practice both of legislative and judicial bodies. This could
not well be otherwise. If the precise moment of actual time were to
settle such a matter, it would be material to ask, Who shall settle the
time? Shall it be done by public authority, or shall every man observe
the tick of his own watch? If absolute time is to furnish a precise
rule, the excess of a minute, it is obvious, would be as fatal as the
excess of an hour. Sir, no bodies, judicial or legislative, have ever
been so hypercritical, so astute to no purpose, so much more nice than
wise, as to govern themselves by any such ideas. The session for the
day, at whatever hour it commences, or at whatever hour it breaks up, is
the legislative day. Every thing has reference to the commencement of
that diurnal session. For instance, this is the 14th day of January; we
assembled here to-day at twelve o'clock; our journal is dated January
14th, and if we should remain here until five o'clock to-morrow morning
(and the Senate has sometimes sat so late), our proceedings would still
bear date of the 14th of January; they would be so stated upon the
journal, and the journal is a record, and is a conclusive record, so far
as respects the proceedings of the body.
It is so in judicial proceedings. If a man were on trial for his life,
at a late hour on the last day allowed by law for the holding of the
court, and the jury should acquit him, but happened to remain so long in
deliberation that they did not bring in their verdict till after twelve
o'clock, is it all to be held for naught, and the man to be tried over
again? Are all verdicts, judgments, and orders of courts null and void,
if made after midnight on the day which the law prescribes as the last
day? It would be easy to show by authority, if authority could be wanted
for a thing the reason of which is so clear, that the day lasts while
the daily session lasts. When the court or the legislative body adjourns
for that day, the day is over, and not before.
I am told, indeed, Sir, that it is true that, on this same 3d day of
March last, not only were other things transacted, but that the bill for
the repair of the Cumberland Road, an important and much litigated
measure, actually received the signature of our presiding officer after
twelve o'clock, was then sent to the President, and signed by him. I do
not affirm this, because I took no notice of the time, or do not
remember it if I did; but I have heard the matter so stated.
I see no reason, Sir, for the introduction of this new practice; no
principle on which it can be justified, no necessity for it, no
propriety in it. As yet, it has been applied only to the President's
intercourse with the Senate. Certainly it is equally applicable to his
intercourse with both houses in legislative matters; and if it is to
prevail hereafter, it is of much importance that it should be known.
The President of the United States, Sir, has alluded to this loss of the
fortification bill in his message at the opening of the session, and he
has alluded, also, in the same message, to the rejection of the vote of
the three millions. On the first point, that is, the loss of the whole
bill, and the causes of that loss, this is his language: "Much loss and
inconvenience have been experienced in consequence of the failure of the
bill containing the ordinary appropriations for fortifications, which
passed one branch of the national legislature at the last session, but
was lost in the other."
If the President intended to say that the bill, having originated in the
House of Representatives, passed the Senate, and was yet afterwards lost
in the House of Representatives, he was entirely correct. But he has
been wholly misinformed, if he intended to state that the bill, having
passed the House, was lost in the Senate. As I have already stated, the
bill was lost in the House of Representatives. It drew its last breath
there. That House never let go its hold on it after the report of the
committee of conference. But it held it, it retained it, and of course
it died in its possession when the House adjourned. It is to be
regretted that the President should have been misinformed in a matter of
this kind, when the slightest reference to the journals of the two
houses would have exhibited the correct history of the transaction.
I recur again, Mr. President, to the proposed grant of the three
millions, for the purpose of stating somewhat more distinctly the true
grounds of objection to that grant.
These grounds of objection were two; the first was, that no such
appropriation had been recommended by the President, or any of the
departments. And what made this ground the stronger was, that the
proposed grant was defended, so far as it was defended at all, upon an
alleged necessity, growing out of our foreign relations. The foreign
relations of the country are intrusted by the Constitution to the lead
and management of the executive government. The President not only is
supposed to be, but usually is, much better informed on these
interesting subjects than the houses of Congress. If there be danger of
a rupture with a foreign state, he sees it soonest. All our ministers
and agents abroad are but so many eyes, and ears, and organs to
communicate to him whatsoever occurs in foreign places, and to keep him
well advised of all which may concern the interests of the United
States. There is an especial propriety, therefore, that, in this branch
of the public service, Congress should always be able to avail itself of
the distinct opinions and recommendations of the President. The two
houses, and especially the House of Representatives, are the natural
guardians of the people's money. They are to keep it sacred, and to use
it discreetly. They are not at liberty to spend it where it is not
needed, nor to offer it for any purpose till a reasonable occasion for
the expenditure be shown. Now, in this case, I repeat again, the
President had sent us no recommendation for any such appropriation; no
department had recommended it; no estimate had contained it; in the
whole history of the session, from the morning of the first day, down to
eight o'clock in the evening of the last day, not one syllable had been
said to us, not one hint suggested, showing that the President deemed
any such measure either necessary or proper. I state this strongly, Sir,
but I state it truly. I state the matter as it is; and I wish to draw
the attention of the Senate and of the country strongly to this part of
the case. I say again, therefore, that, when this vote for the three
millions was proposed to the Senate, there was nothing before us showing
that the President recommended any such appropriation. You very well
know, Sir, that this objection was stated as soon as the message from
the House was read. We all well remember that this was the very point
put forth by the honorable member from Tennessee,[3] as being, if I may
say so, the but-end of his argument in opposition to the vote. He said,
very significantly, and very forcibly, "It is not asked for by those who
best know what the public service requires; how, then, are we to presume
that it is needed?" This question, Sir, was not answered then; it never
has been answered since, it never can be answered satisfactorily.
But let me here again, Sir, recur to the message of the President.
Speaking of the loss of the bill, he uses these words: "This failure was
the more regretted, not only because it necessarily interrupted and
delayed the progress of a system of national defence projected
immediately after the last war, and since steadily pursued, but also
because it contained a contingent appropriation, inserted in accordance
with the views of the executive, in aid of this important object, and
other branches of the national defence, some portions of which might
have been most usefully applied during the past season."
Taking these words of the message, Sir, and connecting them with the
fact that the President had made no recommendation to Congress of any
such appropriation, it strikes me that they furnish matter for very
grave reflection. The President says that this proposed appropriation
was "in accordance with the views of the executive"; that it was "in aid
of an important object"; and that "some portions of it might have been
most usefully applied during the past season."
And now, Sir, I ask, if this be so, why was not this appropriation
recommended to Congress by the President? I ask this question in the
name of the Constitution of the United States; I stand on its own clear
authority in asking it; and I invite all those who remember its
injunctions, and who mean to respect them, to consider well how the
question is to be answered.
Sir, the Constitution is not yet an entire dead letter. There is yet
some form of observance of its requirements; and even while any degree
of formal respect is paid to it, I must be permitted to continue the
question, Why was not this appropriation recommended? It was in
accordance with the President's views; it was for an important object;
it might have been usefully expended. The President being of opinion,
therefore, that the appropriation was necessary and proper, how is it
that it was not recommended to Congress? For, Sir, we all know the plain
and direct words in which the very first duty of the President is
imposed by the Constitution. Here they are:--
"He shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the
state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient."
After enumerating the _powers_ of the President, this is the first, the
very first _duty_ which the Constitution gravely enjoins upon him. And
now, Sir, in no language of taunt or reproach, in no language of party
attack, in terms of no asperity or exaggeration, but called upon by the
necessity of defending my own vote upon the subject, as a public man, as
a member of Congress here in my place, and as a citizen who feels as
warm an attachment to the Constitution of the country as any other can,
I demand of any who may choose to give it an answer to this question:
WHY WAS NOT THIS MEASURE, WHICH THE PRESIDENT DECLARES THAT HE THOUGHT
NECESSARY AND EXPEDIENT, RECOMMENDED TO CONGRESS? And why am I, and why
are other members of Congress, whose path of duty the Constitution says
shall be enlightened by the President's opinions and communications, to
be charged with want of patriotism and want of fidelity to the country,
because we refused an appropriation which the President, though it was
in accordance with his views, and though he believed it important, would
not, and did not, recommend to us? When these questions are answered to
the satisfaction of intelligent and impartial men, then, and not till
then, let reproach, let censure, let suspicion of any kind, rest on the
twenty-nine names which stand opposed to this appropriation.
How, Sir, were we to know that this appropriation "was in accordance
with the views of the executive"? He had not so told us, formally or
informally. He had not only not recommended it to Congress, or either
house of Congress, but nobody on this floor had undertaken to speak in
his behalf. No man got up to say, "The President desires it; he thinks
it necessary, expedient, and proper." But, Sir, if any gentleman had
risen to say this, it would not have answered the requisition of the
Constitution. Not at all. It is not by a hint, an intimation, the
suggestion of a friend, that the executive duty in this respect is to be
fulfilled. By no means. The President is to make a recommendation,--a
public recommendation, an official recommendation, a responsible
recommendation, not to one house, but to both houses; it is to be a
recommendation to Congress. If, on receiving such recommendation,
Congress fail to pay it proper respect, the fault is theirs. If, deeming
the measure necessary and expedient, the President fails to recommend
it, the fault is his, clearly, distinctly, and exclusively his. This,
Sir, is the Constitution of the United States, or else I do not
understand the Constitution of the United States.
Does not every man see how entirely unconstitutional it is that the
President should communicate his opinions or wishes to Congress, on such
grave and important subjects, otherwise than by a direct and responsible
recommendation, a public and open recommendation, equally addressed and
equally known to all whose duty calls upon them to act on the subject?
What would be the state of things, if he might communicate his wishes or
opinions privately to members of one house, and make no such
communication to the other? Would not the two houses be necessarily put
in immediate collision? Would they stand on equal footing? Would they
have equal information? What could ensue from such a manner of
conducting the public business, but quarrel, confusion, and conflict? A
member rises in the House of Representatives, and moves a very large
appropriation of money for military purposes. If he says he does it upon
executive recommendation, where is his voucher? The President is not
like the British king, whose ministers and secretaries are in the House
of Commons, and who are authorized, in certain cases, to express the
opinions and wishes of their sovereign. We have no king's servants; at
least, we have none known to the Constitution. Congress can know the
opinions of the President only as he officially communicates them. It
would be a curious inquiry in either house, when a large appropriation
is moved, if it were necessary to ask whether the mover represented the
President, spoke his sentiments, or, in other words, whether what he
proposed were "in accordance with the views of the executive." How could
that be judged of? By the party he belongs to? Party is not quite
strongly enough marked for that. By the airs he gives himself? Many
might assume airs, if thereby they could give themselves such importance
as to be esteemed authentic expositors of the executive will. Or is this
will to be circulated in whispers; made known to the meetings of party
men; intimated through the press; or communicated in any other form,
which still leaves the executive completely irresponsible; so that,
while executive purposes or wishes pervade the ranks of party friends,
influence their conduct, and unite their efforts, the open, direct, and
constitutional responsibility is wholly avoided? Sir, this is not the
Constitution of the United States, nor can it be consistent with any
constitution which professes to maintain separate departments in the
government.
Here, then, Sir, is abundant ground, in my judgment, for the vote of the
Senate, and here I might rest it. But there is also another ground. The
Constitution declares that no money shall be drawn from the treasury but
in consequence of appropriations made by law. What is meant by
"_appropriations_"? Does not this language mean that particular sums
shall be assigned by law to particular objects? How far this pointing
out and fixing the particular objects shall be carried, is a question
that cannot be settled by any precise rule. But "specific
appropriation," that is to say, the designation of every object for
which money is voted, as far as such designation is practicable, has
been thought to be a most important republican principle. In times past,
popular parties have claimed great merit from professing to carry this
doctrine much farther, and to adhere to it much more strictly, than
their adversaries. Mr. Jefferson, especially, was a great advocate for
it, and held it to be indispensable to a safe and economical
administration and disbursement of the public revenues.
But what have the friends and admirers of Mr. Jefferson to say to this
_appropriation_? Where do they find, in this proposed grant of three
millions, a constitutional designation of object, and a particular and
specific application of money? Have they forgotten, all forgotten, and
wholly abandoned even all pretence for specific appropriation? If not,
how could they sanction such a vote as this? Let me recall its terms.
They are, that "the sum of three millions of dollars be, and the same is
hereby, appropriated, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to be expended, in whole or in part, under the direction
of the President of the United States, for the military and naval
service, including fortifications and ordnance, and the increase of the
navy; provided such expenditures shall be rendered necessary for the
defence of the country prior to the next meeting of Congress."
In the first place it is to be observed, that whether the money shall be
used at all, or not, is made to depend on the discretion of the
President. This is sufficiently liberal. It carries confidence far
enough. But if there had been no other objections, if the objects of the
appropriation had been sufficiently described, so that the President, if
he expended the money at all, must expend it for purposes authorized by
the legislature, and nothing had been left to his discretion but the
question whether an emergency had arisen in which the authority ought to
be exercised, I might not have felt bound to reject the vote. There are
some precedents which might favor such a contingent provision, though
the practice is dangerous, and ought not to be followed except in cases
of clear necessity.
But the insurmountable objection to the proposed grant was, that it
specified no objects. It was as general as language could make it. It
embraced every expenditure that could be called either military or
naval. It was to include "fortifications, ordnance, and the increase of
the navy," but it was not confined to these. It embraced the whole
general subject of military service. Under the authority of such a law,
the President might repair ships, build ships, buy ships, enlist seamen,
and do any thing and every thing else touching the naval service,
without restraint or control.
He might repair such fortifications as he saw fit, and neglect the rest;
arm such as he saw fit, and neglect the arming of others; or build new
fortifications wherever he chose. But these unlimited powers over the
fortifications and the navy constitute by no means the most dangerous
part of the proposed authority; because, under that authority, his power
to raise and employ land forces would be equally absolute and
uncontrolled. He might levy troops, embody a new army, call out the
militia in numbers to suit his own discretion, and employ them as he saw
fit.
Now, Sir, does our legislation, under the Constitution, furnish any
precedent for all this?
We make appropriations for the army, and we understand what we are
doing, because it is "the army," that is to say, the army established by
law. We make appropriations for the navy; they, too, are for "the navy,"
as provided for and established by law. We make appropriations for
fortifications, but we say what fortifications, and we assign to each
its intended amount of the whole sum. This is the usual course of
Congress on such subjects; and why should it be departed from? Are we
ready to say that the power of fixing the places for new fortifications,
and the sum allotted to each; the power of ordering new ships to be
built, and fixing the number of such new ships; the power of laying out
money to raise men for the army; in short, every power, great or small,
respecting the military and naval service, shall be vested in the
President, without specification of object or purpose, to the entire
exclusion of the exercise of all judgment on the part of Congress? For
one, I am not prepared. The honorable member from Ohio, near me, has
said, that if the enemy had been on our shores he would not have agreed
to this vote. And I say, if the proposition were now before us, and the
guns of the enemy were pointed against the walls of the Capitol, I would
not agree to it.
The people of this country have an interest, a property, an inheritance,
in this INSTRUMENT, against the value of which forty capitols do not
weigh the twentieth part of one poor scruple. There can never be any
necessity for such proceedings, but a feigned and false necessity; a
mere idle and hollow pretence of necessity; least of all can it be said
that any such necessity actually existed on the 3d of March. There was
no enemy on our shores; there were no guns pointed against the Capitol;
we were in no war, nor was there a reasonable probability that we should
have war, unless we made it ourselves.
But whatever was the state of our foreign relations, is it not
preposterous to say, that it was necessary for Congress to adopt this
measure, and yet not necessary for the President to recommend it? Why
should we thus run in advance of all our own duties, and leave the
President completely shielded from his just responsibility? Why should
there be nothing but trust and confidence on our side, and nothing but
discretion and power on his?
Sir, if there be any philosophy in history, if human blood still runs in
human veins, if man still conforms to the identity of his nature, the
institutions which secure constitutional liberty can never stand long
against this excessive personal confidence, against this devotion to
men, in utter disregard both of principle and experience, which seem to
me to be strongly characteristic of our times. This vote came to us,
Sir, from the popular branch of the legislature; and that such a vote
should come from such a branch of the legislature was amongst the
circumstances which excited in me the greatest surprise and the deepest
concern. Certainly, Sir, certainly I was not, on that account, the more
inclined to concur. It was no argument with me, that others seemed to be
rushing, with such heedless, headlong trust, such impetuosity of
confidence, into the arms of executive power. I held back the more
strongly, and would hold back the longer. I see, or I think I see,--it
is either a true vision of the future, revealed by the history of the
past, or, if it be an illusion, it is an illusion which appears to me in
all the brightness and sunlight of broad noon,--that it is in this
career of personal confidence, along this beaten track of _man-worship_,
marked at every stage by the fragments of other free governments, that
our own system is making progress to its close. A personal popularity,
honorably earned at first by military achievements, and sustained now by
party, by patronage, and by enthusiasm which looks for no ill, because
it means no ill itself, seems to render men willing to gratify power,
even before its demands are made, and to surfeit executive discretion,
even in anticipation of its own appetite.
If, Sir, on the 3d of March last, it had been the purpose of both houses
of Congress to create a military dictator, what formula had been better
suited to their purpose than this vote of the House? It is true, we
might have given more money, if we had had it to give. We might have
emptied the treasury; but as to the _form_ of the gift, we could not
have bettered it. Rome had no better models. When we give our money _for
any military purpose whatever_, what remains to be done? If we leave it
with one man to decide, not only whether the military means of the
country shall be used at all, but how they shall be used, and to what
extent they shall be employed, what remains either for Congress or the
people but to sit still and see how this dictatorial power will be
exercised? On the 3d of March, Sir, I had not forgotten, it was
impossible that I should have forgotten, the recommendation in the
message at the opening of that session, that power should be vested in
the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal against France, at
his discretion, in the recess of Congress. Happily, this power was not
granted; but suppose it had been, what would then have been the true
condition of this government? Why, Sir, this condition is very shortly
described. The whole war power would have been in the hands of the
President; for no man can doubt a moment that reprisals would bring on
immediate war; and the treasury, to the amount of this vote, in addition
to all ordinary appropriations, would have been at his absolute disposal
also. And all this in a time of peace. I beseech all true lovers of
constitutional liberty to contemplate this state of things, and tell me
whether such be a truly republican administration of this government.
Whether particular consequences had ensued or not, is such an
accumulation of power in the hands of the executive according to the
spirit of our system? Is it either wise or safe? Has it any warrant in
the practice of former times? Or are gentlemen ready to establish the
practice, as an example for the benefit of those who are to come after
us?
But, Sir, if the power to make reprisals, and this money from the
treasury, had both been granted, is there not great reason to believe
that we should have been now actually at war? I think there is great
reason to believe this. It will be said, I know, that if we had armed
the President with this power of war, and supplied him with this grant
of money, France would have taken it for such a proof of spirit on our
part, that she would have paid the indemnity without further delay. This
is the old story, and the old plea. It is the excuse of every one who
desires more power than the Constitution or the laws give him, that if
he had more power he could do more good. Power is always claimed for the
good of the people; and dictators are always made, when made at all, for
the good of the people. For my part, Sir, I was content, and am content,
to show France that we are prepared to maintain our just rights against
her by the exertion of our power, when need be, according to the forms
of our own Constitution; that, if we make war, we will make it
constitutionally; and that we will trust all our interests, both in
peace and war, to what the intelligence and the strength of the country
may do for them, without breaking down or endangering the fabric of our
free institutions.
Mr. President, it is the misfortune of the Senate to have differed with
the executive on many great questions during the last four or five
years. I have regretted this state of things deeply, both on personal
and on public accounts; but it has been unavoidable. It is no pleasant
employment, it is no holiday business, to maintain opposition against
power and against majorities, and to contend for stern and sturdy
principle, against personal popularity, against a rushing and
overwhelming confidence, that, by wave upon wave and cataract after
cataract, seems to be bearing away and destroying whatsoever would
withstand it. How much longer we may be able to support this opposition
in any degree, or whether we can possibly hold out till the public
intelligence and the public patriotism shall be awakened to a due sense
of the public danger, it is not for me to foretell. I shall not despair
to the last, if, in the mean time, we are true to our own principles. If
there be a steadfast adherence to these principles, both here and
elsewhere, if, one and all, they continue the rule of our conduct in the
Senate, and the rallying-point of those who think with us and support us
out of the Senate, I am content to hope on and to struggle on. While it
remains a contest for the preservation of the Constitution, for the
security of public liberty, for the ascendency of principles over men, I
am willing to bear my part of it. If we can maintain the Constitution,
if we can preserve this security for liberty, if we can thus give to
true principle its just superiority over party, over persons, over
names, our labors will be richly rewarded. If we fail in all this, they
are already among the living who will write the history of this
government, from its commencement to its close.
[Footnote 1: Mr. Leigh.]
[Footnote 2: Mr. King, of Alabama, was in the chair.]
[Footnote 3: Mr. White.]