The bill of 1827, limited, as I have said, to the single object in which

the tariff of 1824 had manifestly failed in its effect, passed the House

of Representatives, but was lost here. We had then the act of 1828. I

need not recur to the history of a measure so recent. Its enemies spiced

it with whatsoever they thought would render it distasteful; its friends

took it, drugged as it was. Vast amounts of property, many millions, had

been invested in manufactures, under the inducements of the act of 1824.

Events called loudly, as I thought, for further regulation to secure the

degree of protection intended by that act. I was disposed to vote for

such regulation, and desired nothing more; but certainly was not to be

bantered out of my purpose by a threatened augmentation of duty on

molasses, put into the bill for the avowed purpose of making it

obnoxious. The vote may have been right or wrong, wise or unwise; but

it is little less than absurd to allege against it an inconsistency with

opposition to the former law.

Sir, as to the general subject of the tariff, I have little now to say.

Another opportunity may be presented. I remarked the other day, that

this policy did not begin with us in New England; and yet, Sir, New

England is charged with vehemence as being favorable, or charged with

equal vehemence as being unfavorable, to the tariff policy, just as best

suits the time, place, and occasion for making some charge against her.

The credulity of the public has been put to its extreme capacity of

false impression relative to her conduct in this particular. Through all

the South, during the late contest, it was New England policy and a New

England administration that were afflicting the country with a tariff

beyond all endurance; while on the other side of the Alleghanies even

the act of 1828 itself, the very sublimated essence of oppression,

according to Southern opinions, was pronounced to be one of those

blessings for which the West was indebted to the "generous South."

With large investments in manufacturing establishments, and many and

various interests connected with and dependent on them, it is not to be

expected that New England, any more than other portions of the country,

will now consent to any measure destructive or highly dangerous. The

duty of the government, at the present moment, would seem to be to

preserve, not to destroy; to maintain the position which it has assumed;

and, for one, I shall feel it an indispensable obligation to hold it

steady, as far as in my power, to that degree of protection which it has

undertaken to bestow. No more of the tariff.

Professing to be provoked by what he chose to consider a charge made by

me against South Carolina, the honorable member, Mr. President, has

taken up a new crusade against New England. Leaving altogether the

subject of the public lands, in which his success, perhaps, had been

neither distinguished nor satisfactory, and letting go, also, of the

topic of the tariff, he sallied forth in a general assault on the

opinions, politics, and parties of New England, as they have been

exhibited in the last thirty years. This is natural. The "narrow policy"

of the public lands had proved a legal settlement in South Carolina, and

was not to be removed. The "accursed policy" of the tariff, also, had

established the fact of its birth and parentage in the same State. No

wonder, therefore, the gentleman wished to carry the war, as he

expressed it, into the enemy's country. Prudently willing to quit these

subjects, he was, doubtless, desirous of fastening on others, which

could not be transferred south of Mason and Dixon's line. The politics

of New England became his theme; and it was in this part of his speech,

I think, that he menaced me with such sore discomfiture. Discomfiture!

Why, Sir, when he attacks any thing which I maintain, and overthrows it,

when he turns the right or left of any position which I take up, when he

drives me from any ground I choose to occupy, he may then talk of

discomfiture, but not till that distant day. What has he done? Has he

maintained his own charges? Has he proved what he alleged? Has he

sustained himself in his attack on the government, and on the history of

the North, in the matter of the public lands? Has he disproved a fact,

refuted a proposition, weakened an argument, maintained by me? Has he

come within beat of drum of any position of mine? O, no; but he has

"carried the war into the enemy's country"! Carried the war into the

enemy's country! Yes, Sir, and what sort of a war has he made of it?

Why, Sir, he has stretched a drag-net over the whole surface of perished

pamphlets, indiscreet sermons, frothy paragraphs, and fuming popular

addresses,--over whatever the pulpit in its moments of alarm, the press

in its heats, and parties in their extravagance, have severally thrown

off in times of general excitement and violence. He has thus swept

together a mass of such things as, but that they are now old and cold,

the public health would have required him rather to leave in their

state of dispersion. For a good long hour or two, we had the unbroken

pleasure of listening to the honorable member, while he recited with his

usual grace and spirit, and with evident high gusto, speeches,

pamphlets, addresses, and all the _et caeteras_ of the political press,

such as warm heads produce in warm times; and such as it would be

"discomfiture" indeed for any one, whose taste did not delight in that

sort of reading, to be obliged to peruse. This is his war. This it is to

carry war into the enemy's country. It is in an invasion of this sort,

that he flatters himself with the expectation of gaining laurels fit to

adorn a Senator's brow!

Mr. President, I shall not, it will not, I trust, be expected that I

should, either now or at any time, separate this farrago into parts, and

answer and examine its components. I shall barely bestow upon it all a

general remark or two. In the run of forty years, Sir, under this

Constitution, we have experienced sundry successive violent party

contests. Party arose, indeed, with the Constitution itself, and, in

some form or other, has attended it through the greater part of its

history. Whether any other constitution than the old Articles of

Confederation was desirable, was itself a question on which parties

divided; if a new constitution were framed, what powers should be given

to it was another question; and when it had been formed, what was, in

fact, the just extent of the powers actually conferred was a third.

Parties, as we know, existed under the first administration, as

distinctly marked as those which have manifested themselves at any

subsequent period. The contest immediately preceding the political

change in 1801, and that, again, which existed at the commencement of

the late war, are other instances of party excitement, of something more

than usual strength and intensity. In all these conflicts there was, no

doubt, much of violence on both and all sides. It would be impossible,

if one had a fancy for such employment, to adjust the relative _quantum_

of violence between these contending parties. There was enough in each,

as must always be expected in popular governments. With a great deal of

popular and decorous discussion, there was mingled a great deal, also,

of declamation, virulence, crimination, and abuse. In regard to any

party, probably, at one of the leading epochs in the history of parties,

enough may be found to make out another inflamed exhibition, not unlike

that with which the honorable member has edified us. For myself, Sir, I

shall not rake among the rubbish of bygone times, to see what I can

find, or whether I cannot find something by which I can fix a blot on

the escutcheon of any State, any party, or any part of the country.

General Washington's administration was steadily and zealously

maintained, as we all know, by New England. It was violently opposed

elsewhere. We know in what quarter he had the most earnest, constant,

and persevering support, in all his great and leading measures. We know

where his private and personal character was held in the highest degree

of attachment and veneration; and we know, too, where his measures were

opposed, his services slighted, and his character vilified. We know, or

we might know, if we turned to the journals, who expressed respect,

gratitude, and regret, when he retired from the chief magistracy, and

who refused to express either respect, gratitude, or regret. I shall not

open those journals. Publications more abusive or scurrilous never saw

the light, than were sent forth against Washington, and all his leading

measures, from presses south of New England. But I shall not look them

up. I employ no scavengers, no one is in attendance on me, furnishing

such means of retaliation; and if there were, with an ass's load of

them, with a bulk as huge as that which the gentleman himself has

produced, I would not touch one of them. I see enough of the violence of

our own times, to be no way anxious to rescue from forgetfulness the

extravagances of times past.

Besides, what is all this to the present purpose? It has nothing to do

with the public lands, in regard to which the attack was begun; and it

has nothing to do with those sentiments and opinions which, I have

thought, tend to disunion and all of which the honorable member seems to

have adopted himself, and undertaken to defend. New England has, at

times, so argues the gentleman, held opinions as dangerous as those

which he now holds. Suppose this were so; why should _he_ therefore

abuse New England? If he finds himself countenanced by acts of hers, how

is it that, while he relies on these acts, he covers, or seeks to cover,

their authors with reproach? But, Sir, if, in the course of forty years,

there have been undue effervescences of party in New England, has the

same thing happened nowhere else? Party animosity and party outrage, not

in New England, but elsewhere, denounced President Washington, not only

as a Federalist, but as a Tory, a British agent, a man who, in his high

office, sanctioned corruption. But does the honorable member suppose, if

I had a tender here who should put such an effusion of wickedness and

folly into my hand, that I would stand up and read it against the South?

Parties ran into great heats again in 1799 and 1800. What was said, Sir,

or rather what was not said, in those years, against John Adams, one of

the committee that drafted the Declaration of Independence, and its

admitted ablest defender on the floor of Congress? If the gentleman

wishes to increase his stores of party abuse and frothy violence, if he

has a determined proclivity to such pursuits, there are treasures of

that sort south of the Potomac, much to his taste, yet untouched. I

shall not touch them.

The parties which divided the country at the commencement of the late

war were violent. But then there was violence on both sides, and

violence in every State. Minorities and majorities were equally violent.

There was no more violence against the war in New England, than in other

States; nor any more appearance of violence, except that, owing to a

dense population, greater facility of assembling, and more presses,

there may have been more in quantity spoken and printed there than in

some other places. In the article of sermons, too, New England is

somewhat more abundant than South Carolina; and for that reason the

chance of finding here and there an exceptionable one may be greater. I

hope, too, there are more good ones. Opposition may have been more

formidable in New England, as it embraced a larger portion of the whole

population; but it was no more unrestrained in principle, or violent in

manner. The minorities dealt quite as harshly with their own State

governments as the majorities dealt with the administration here. There

were presses on both sides, popular meetings on both sides, ay, and

pulpits on both sides also. The gentleman's purveyors have only catered

for him among the productions of one side. I certainly shall not supply

the deficiency by furnishing samples of the other. I leave to him, and

to them, the whole concern.

It is enough for me to say, that if, in any part of this their grateful

occupation, if, in all their researches, they find any thing in the

history of Massachusetts, or New England, or in the proceedings of any

legislative or other public body, disloyal to the Union, speaking

slightingly of its value, proposing to break it up, or recommending

non-intercourse with neighboring States, on account of difference of

political opinion, then, Sir, I give them all up to the honorable

gentleman's unrestrained rebuke; expecting, however, that he will extend

his buffetings in like manner _to all similar proceedings, wherever else

found_.

The gentleman, Sir, has spoken at large of former parties, now no longer

in being, by their received appellations, and has undertaken to instruct

us, not only in the knowledge of their principles, but of their

respective pedigrees also. He has ascended to their origin, and run out

their genealogies. With most exemplary modesty, he speaks of the party

to which he professes to have himself belonged, as the true Pure, the

only honest, patriotic party, derived by regular descent, from father to

son, from the time of the virtuous Romans! Spreading before us the

_family tree_ of political parties, he takes especial care to show

himself snugly perched on a popular bough! He is wakeful to the

expediency of adopting such rules of descent as shall bring him in, to

the exclusion of others, as an heir to the inheritance of all public

virtue, and all true political principle. His party and his opinions are

sure to be orthodox; heterodoxy is confined to his opponents. He spoke,

Sir, of the Federalists, and I thought I saw some eyes begin to open and

stare a little, when he ventured on that ground. I expected he would

draw his sketches rather lightly, when he looked on the circle round

him, and especially if he should cast his thoughts to the high places

out of the Senate. Nevertheless, he went back to Rome, _ad annum urbis

conditae_, and found the fathers of the Federalists in the primeval

aristocrats of that renowned city! He traced the flow of Federal blood

down through successive ages and centuries, till he brought it into the

veins of the American Tories, of whom, by the way, there were twenty in

the Carolinas for one in Massachusetts. From the Tories he followed it

to the Federalists; and, as the Federal party was broken up, and there

was no possibility of transmitting it further on this side the Atlantic,

he seems to have discovered that it has gone off collaterally, though

against all the canons of descent, into the Ultras of France, and

finally become extinguished, like exploded gas, among the adherents of

Don Miguel! This, Sir, is an abstract of the gentleman's history of

Federalism. I am not about to controvert it. It is not, at present,

worth the pains of refutation; because, Sir, if at this day any one

feels the sin of Federalism lying heavily on his conscience, he can

easily procure remission. He may even obtain an indulgence, if he be

desirous of repeating the same transgression. It is an affair of no

difficulty to get into this same right line of patriotic descent. A man

now-a-days is at liberty to choose his political parentage. He may elect

his own father. Federalist or not, he may, if he choose, claim to belong

to the favored stock, and his claim will be allowed. He may carry back

his pretensions just as far as the honorable gentleman himself; nay, he

may make himself out the honorable gentleman's cousin, and prove,

satisfactorily, that he is descended from the same political

great-grandfather. All this is allowable. We all know a process, Sir, by

which the whole Essex Junto could, in one hour, be all washed white from

their ancient Federalism, and come out, every one of them, original

Democrats, dyed in the wool! Some of them have actually undergone the

operation, and they say it is quite easy. The only inconvenience it

occasions, as they tell us, is a slight tendency of the blood to the

face, a soft suffusion, which, however, is very transient, since nothing

is said by those whom they join calculated to deepen the red on the

cheek, but a prudent silence is observed in regard to all the past.

Indeed, Sir, some smiles of approbation have been bestowed, and some

crumbs of comfort have fallen, not a thousand miles from the door of the

Hartford Convention itself. And if the author of the Ordinance of 1787

possessed the other requisite qualifications, there is no knowing,

notwithstanding his Federalism, to what heights of favor he might not

yet attain.

Mr. President, in carrying his warfare, such as it is, into New England,

the honorable gentleman all along professes to be acting on the

defensive. He chooses to consider me as having assailed South Carolina,

and insists that he comes forth only as her champion, and in her

defence. Sir, I do not admit that I made any attack whatever on South

Carolina. Nothing like it. The honorable member, in his first speech,

expressed opinions, in regard to revenue and some other topics, which I

heard both with pain and with surprise. I told the gentleman I was aware

that such sentiments were entertained _out_ of the government, but had

not expected to find them advanced in it; that I knew there were persons

in the South who speak of our Union with indifference or doubt, taking

pains to magnify its evils, and to say nothing of its benefits; that

the honorable member himself, I was sure, could never be one of these;

and I regretted the expression of such opinions as he had avowed,

because I thought their obvious tendency was to encourage feelings of

disrespect to the Union, and to impair its strength. This, Sir, is the

sum and substance of all I said on the subject. And this constitutes the

attack which called on the chivalry of the gentleman, in his own

opinion, to harry us with such a foray among the party pamphlets and

party proceedings of Massachusetts! If he means that I spoke with

dissatisfaction or disrespect of the ebullitions of individuals in South

Carolina, it is true. But if he means that I assailed the character of

the State, her honor, or patriotism, that I reflected on her history or

her conduct, he has not the slightest ground for any such assumption. I

did not even refer, I think, in my observations, to any collection of

individuals. I said nothing of the recent conventions. I spoke in the

most guarded and careful manner, and only expressed my regret for the

publication of opinions, which I presumed the honorable member

disapproved as much as myself. In this, it seems, I was mistaken. I do

not remember that the gentleman has disclaimed any sentiment, or any

opinion, of a supposed anti-union tendency, which on all or any of the

recent occasions has been expressed. The whole drift of his speech has

been rather to prove, that, in divers times and manners, sentiments

equally liable to my objection have been avowed in New England. And one

would suppose that his object, in this reference to Massachusetts, was

to find a precedent to justify proceedings in the South, were it not for

the reproach and contumely with which he labors, all along, to load

these his own chosen precedents. By way of defending South Carolina from

what he chooses to think an attack on her, he first quotes the example

of Massachusetts, and then denounces that example in good set terms.

This twofold purpose, not very consistent, one would think, with itself,

was exhibited more than once in the course of his speech. He referred,

for instance, to the Hartford Convention. Did he do this for authority,

or for a topic of reproach? Apparently for both, for he told us that he

should find no fault with the mere fact of holding such a convention,

and considering and discussing such questions as he supposes were then

and there discussed; but what rendered it obnoxious was its being held

at the time, and under the circumstances of the country then existing.

We were in a war, he said, and the country needed all our aid: the hand

of government required to be strengthened, not weakened; and patriotism

should have postponed such proceedings to another day. The thing itself,

then, is a precedent; the time and manner of it only, a subject of

censure.

Now, Sir, I go much further, on this point, than the honorable member.

Supposing, as the gentleman seems to do, that the Hartford Convention

assembled for any such purpose as breaking up the Union, because they

thought unconstitutional laws had been passed, or to consult on that

subject, or _to calculate the value of the Union_; supposing this to be

their purpose, or any part of it, then I say the meeting itself was

disloyal, and was obnoxious to censure, whether held in time of peace or

time of war, or under whatever circumstances. The material question is

the _object_. Is dissolution the _object_? If it be, external

circumstances may make it a more or less aggravated case, but cannot

affect the principle. I do not hold, therefore, Sir, that the Hartford

Convention was pardonable, even to the extent of the gentleman's

admission, if its objects were really such as have been imputed to it.

Sir, there never was a time, under any degree of excitement, in which

the Hartford Convention, or any other convention, could have maintained

itself one moment in New England, if assembled for any such purpose as

the gentleman says would have been an allowable purpose. To hold

conventions to decide constitutional law! To try the binding validity of

statutes by votes in a convention! Sir, the Hartford Convention, I

presume, would not desire that the honorable gentleman should be their

defender or advocate, if he puts their case upon such untenable and

extravagant grounds.

Then, Sir, the gentleman has no fault to find with these recently

promulgated South Carolina opinions. And certainly he need have none;

for his own sentiments, as now advanced, and advanced on reflection, as

far as I have been able to comprehend them, go the full length of all

these opinions. I propose, Sir, to say something on these, and to

consider how far they are just and constitutional. Before doing that,

however, let me observe that the eulogium pronounced by the honorable

gentleman on the character of the State of South Carolina, for her

Revolutionary and other merits, meets my hearty concurrence. I shall not

acknowledge that the honorable member goes before me in regard for

whatever of distinguished talent, or distinguished character, South

Carolina has produced. I claim part of the honor, I partake in the

pride, of her great names. I claim them for countrymen, one and all, the

Laurenses, the Rutledges, the Pinckneys, the Sumpters, the Marions,

Americans all, whose fame is no more to be hemmed in by State lines,

than their talents and patriotism were capable of being circumscribed

within the same narrow limits. In their day and generation, they served

and honored the country, and the whole country; and their renown is of

the treasures of the whole country. Him whose honored name the gentleman

himself bears,--does he esteem me less capable of gratitude for his

patriotism, or sympathy for his sufferings, than if his eyes had first

opened upon the light of Massachusetts, instead of South Carolina? Sir,

does he suppose it in his power to exhibit a Carolina name so bright as

to produce envy in my bosom? No, Sir, increased gratification and

delight, rather. I thank God, that, if I am gifted with little of the

spirit which is able to raise mortals to the skies, I have yet none, as

I trust, of that other spirit, which would drag angels down. When I

shall be found, Sir, in my place here in the Senate, or elsewhere, to

sneer at public merit, because it happens to spring up beyond the little

limits of my own State or neighborhood; when I refuse, for any such

cause or for any cause, the homage due to American talent, to elevated

patriotism, to sincere devotion to liberty and the country; or, if I see

an uncommon endowment of Heaven, if I see extraordinary capacity and

virtue, in any son of the South, and if, moved by local prejudice or

gangrened by State jealousy, I get up here to abate the tithe of a hair

from his just character and just fame, may my tongue cleave to the roof

of my mouth!

Sir, let me recur to pleasing recollections; let me indulge in

refreshing remembrance of the past; let me remind you that, in early

times, no States cherished greater harmony, both of principle and

feeling, than Massachusetts and South Carolina. Would to God that

harmony might again return. Shoulder to shoulder they went through the

Revolution, hand in hand they stood round the administration of

Washington, and felt his own great arm lean on them for support. Unkind

feeling, if it exist, alienation, and distrust are the growth, unnatural

to such soils, of false principles since sown. They are weeds, the seeds

of which that same great arm never scattered.

Mr. President, I shall enter on no encomium upon Massachusetts; she

needs none. There she is. Behold her, and judge for yourselves. There is

her history; the world knows it by heart. The past, at least, is secure.

There is Boston, and Concord, and Lexington, and Bunker Hill; and there

they will remain for ever. The bones of her sons, falling in the great

struggle for Independence, now lie mingled with the soil of every State

from New England to Georgia; and there they will lie for ever. And, Sir,

where American Liberty raised its first voice, and where its youth was

nurtured and sustained, there it still lives, in the strength of its

manhood and full of its original spirit. If discord and disunion shall

wound it, if party strife and blind ambition shall hawk at and tear it,

if folly and madness, if uneasiness under salutary and necessary

restraint, shall succeed in separating it from that Union, by which

alone its existence is made sure, it will stand, in the end, by the side

of that cradle in which its infancy was rocked; it will stretch forth

its arm with whatever of vigor it may still retain over the friends who

gather round it; and it will fall at last, if fall it must, amidst the

proudest monuments of its own glory, and on the very spot of its origin.

There yet remains to be performed, Mr. President, by far the most grave

and important duty, which I feel to be devolved on me by this occasion.

It is to state, and to defend, what I conceive to be the true principles

of the Constitution under which we are here assembled. I might well have

desired that so weighty a task should have fallen into other and abler

hands. I could have wished that it should have been executed by those

whose character and experience give weight and influence to their

opinions, such as cannot possibly belong to mine. But, Sir, I have met

the occasion, not sought it; and I shall proceed to state my own

sentiments, without challenging for them any particular regard, with

studied plainness, and as much precision as possible.

I understand the honorable gentleman from South Carolina to maintain,

that it is a right of the State legislatures to interfere, whenever, in

their judgment, this government transcends its constitutional limits,

and to arrest the operation of its laws.

I understand him to maintain this right, as a right existing _under_ the

Constitution, not as a right to overthrow it on the ground of extreme

necessity, such as would justify violent revolution.

I understand him to maintain an authority, on the part of the States,

thus to interfere, for the purpose of correcting the exercise of power

by the general government, of checking it, and of compelling it to

conform to their opinion of the extent of its powers.

I understand him to maintain, that the ultimate power of judging of the

constitutional extent of its own authority is not lodged exclusively in

the general government, or any branch of it; but that, on the contrary,

the States may lawfully decide for themselves, and each State for

itself, whether, in a given case, the act of the general government

transcends its power.

I understand him to insist, that, if the exigency of the case, in the

opinion of any State government, require it, such State government may,

by its own sovereign authority, annul an act of the general government

which it deems plainly and palpably unconstitutional.

This is the sum of what I understand from him to be the South Carolina

doctrine, and the doctrine which he maintains. I propose to consider it,

and compare it with the Constitution. Allow me to say, as a preliminary

remark, that I call this the South Carolina doctrine only because the

gentleman himself has so denominated it. I do not feel at liberty to say

that South Carolina, as a State, has ever advanced these sentiments. I

hope she has not, and never may. That a great majority of her people are

opposed to the tariff laws, is doubtless true. That a majority, somewhat

less than that just mentioned, conscientiously believe these laws

unconstitutional, may probably also be true. But that any majority holds

to the right of direct State interference at State discretion, the right

of nullifying acts of Congress by acts of State legislation, is more

than I know, and what I shall be slow to believe.

That there are individuals besides the honorable gentleman who do

maintain these opinions, is quite certain. I recollect the recent

expression of a sentiment, which circumstances attending its utterance

and publication justify us in supposing was not unpremeditated. "The

sovereignty of the State,--never to be controlled, construed, or decided

on, but by her own feelings of honorable justice."

Mr. Hayne here rose and said, that, for the purpose of being

clearly understood he would state that his proposition was in the

words of the Virginia resolution, as follows:--

"That this assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that

it views the powers of the federal government as resulting from the

compact to which the States are parties, as limited by the plain

sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as

no farther valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated

in that compact; and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and

dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact,

the States who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty

bound, to interpose, for arresting the progress of the evil, and

for maintaining within their respective limits the authorities,

rights, and liberties appertaining to them."

Mr. Webster

resumed:--#/

I am quite aware, Mr. President, of the existence of the resolution

which the gentleman read, and has now repeated, and that he relies on it

as his authority. I know the source, too, from which it is understood to

have proceeded. I need not say that I have much respect for the

constitutional opinions of Mr. Madison; they would weigh greatly with me

always. But before the authority of his opinion be vouched for the

gentleman's proposition, it will be proper to consider what is the fair

interpretation of that resolution, to which Mr. Madison is understood to

have given his sanction. As the gentleman construes it, it is an

authority for him. Possibly he may not have adopted the right

construction. That resolution declares, that, _in the case of the

dangerous exercise of powers not granted by the general government, the

States may interpose to arrest the progress of the evil_. But how

interpose, and what does this declaration purport? Does it mean no more

than that there may be extreme cases, in which the people, in any mode

of assembling, may resist usurpation, and relieve themselves from a

tyrannical government? No one will deny this. Such resistance is not

only acknowledged to be just in America, but in England also Blackstone

admits as much, in the theory, and practice, too, of the English

constitution. We, Sir, who oppose the Carolina doctrine, do not deny

that the people may, if they choose, throw off any government when it

becomes oppressive and intolerable, and erect a better in its stead. We

all know that civil institutions are established for the public benefit,

and that when they cease to answer the ends of their existence they may

be changed. But I do not understand the doctrine now contended for to be

that, which, for the sake of distinction, we may call the right of

revolution. I understand the gentleman to maintain, that, without

revolution, without civil commotion, without rebellion, a remedy for

supposed abuse and transgression of the powers of the general government

lies in a direct appeal to the interference of the State governments.

Mr. Hayne here rose and said: He did not contend for the mere right

of revolution, but for the right of constitutional resistance. What

he maintained was, that in case of a plain, palpable violation of

the Constitution by the general government, a State may interpose;

and that this interposition is constitutional.

Mr. Webster

resumed:--#/

So, Sir, I understood the gentleman, and am happy to find that I did not

misunderstand him. What he contends for is, that it is constitutional to

interrupt the administration of the Constitution itself, in the hands of

those who are chosen and sworn to administer it, by the direct

interference, in form of law, of the States, in virtue of their

sovereign capacity. The inherent right in the people to reform their

government I do not deny; and they have another right, and that is, to

resist unconstitutional laws, without overturning the government. It is

no doctrine of mine that unconstitutional laws bind the people. The

great question is, Whose prerogative is it to decide on the

constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the laws? On that, the main

debate hinges. The proposition, that, in case of a supposed violation of

the Constitution by Congress, the States have a constitutional right to

interfere and annul the law of Congress, is the proposition of the

gentleman. I do not admit it. If the gentleman had intended no more than

to assert the right of revolution for justifiable cause, he would have

said only what all agree to. But I cannot conceive that there can be a

middle course, between submission to the laws, when regularly pronounced

constitutional, on the one hand, and open resistance, which is

revolution or rebellion, on the other. I say, the right of a State to

annul a law of Congress cannot be maintained, but on the ground of the

inalienable right of man to resist oppression; that is to say, upon the

ground of revolution. I admit that there is an ultimate violent remedy,

above the Constitution and in defiance of the Constitution, which may be

resorted to when a revolution is to be justified. But I do not admit,

that, under the Constitution and in conformity with it, there is any

mode in which a State government, as a member of the Union, can

interfere and stop the progress of the general government, by force of

her own laws, under any circumstances whatever.

This leads us to inquire into the origin of this government and the

source of its power. Whose agent is it? Is it the creature of the State

legislatures, or the creature of the people? If the government of the

United States be the agent of the State governments, then they may

control it, provided they can agree in the manner of controlling it; if

it be the agent of the people, then the people alone can control it,

restrain it, modify, or reform it. It is observable enough, that the

doctrine for which the honorable gentleman contends leads him to the

necessity of maintaining, not only that this general government is the

creature of the States, but that it is the creature of each of the

States severally, so that each may assert the power for itself of

determining whether it acts within the limits of its authority. It is

the servant of four-and-twenty masters, of different wills and different

purposes, and yet bound to obey all. This absurdity (for it seems no

less) arises from a misconception as to the origin of this government

and its true character. It is, Sir, the people's Constitution, the

people's government, made for the people, made by the people, and

answerable to the people. The people of the United States have declared

that this Constitution shall be the supreme law. We must either admit

the proposition, or dispute their authority. The States are,

unquestionably, sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected

by this supreme law. But the State legislatures, as political bodies,

however sovereign, are yet not sovereign over the people. So far as the

people have given power to the general government, so far the grant is

unquestionably good, and the government holds of the people, and not of

the State governments. We are all agents of the same supreme power, the

people. The general government and the State governments derive their

authority from the same source. Neither can, in relation to the other,

be called primary, though one is definite and restricted, and the other

general and residuary. The national government possesses those powers

which it can be shown the people have conferred on it, and no more. All

the rest belongs to the State governments, or to the people themselves.

So far as the people have restrained State sovereignty, by the

expression of their will, in the Constitution of the United States, so

far, it must be admitted, State sovereignty is effectually controlled. I

do not contend that it is, or ought to be, controlled farther. The

sentiment to which I have referred propounds that State sovereignty is

only to be controlled by its own "feeling of justice"; that is to say,

it is not to be controlled at all, for one who is to follow his own

feelings is under no legal control. Now, however men may think this

ought to be, the fact is, that the people of the United States have

chosen to impose control on State sovereignties. There are those,

doubtless, who wish they had been left without restraint; but the

Constitution has ordered the matter differently. To make war, for

instance, is an exercise of sovereignty; but the Constitution declares

that no State shall make war. To coin money is another exercise of

sovereign power; but no State is at liberty to coin money. Again, the

Constitution says that no sovereign State shall be so sovereign as to

make a treaty. These prohibitions, it must be confessed, are a control

on the State sovereignty of South Carolina, as well as of the other

States, which does not arise "from her own feelings of honorable

justice." The opinion referred to, therefore, is in defiance of the

plainest provisions of the Constitution.

There are other proceedings of public bodies which have already been

alluded to, and to which I refer again for the purpose of ascertaining

more fully what is the length and breadth of that doctrine, denominated

the Carolina doctrine, which the honorable member has now stood up on

this floor to maintain. In one of them I find it resolved, that "the

tariff of 1828, and every other tariff designed to promote one branch of

industry at the expense of others, is contrary to the meaning and

intention of the federal compact; and such a dangerous, palpable, and

deliberate usurpation of power, by a determined majority, wielding the

general government beyond the limits of its delegated powers, as calls

upon the States which compose the suffering minority, in their sovereign

capacity, to exercise the powers which, as sovereigns, necessarily

devolve upon them, when their compact is violated."

Observe, Sir, that this resolution holds the tariff of 1828, and every

other tariff designed to promote one branch of industry at the expense

of another, to be such a dangerous, palpable, and deliberate usurpation

of power, as calls upon the States, in their sovereign capacity, to

interfere by their own authority. This denunciation, Mr. President, you

will please to observe, includes our old tariff of 1816, as well as all

others; because that was established to promote the interest of the

manufacturers of cotton, to the manifest and admitted injury of the

Calcutta cotton trade. Observe, again, that all the qualifications are

here rehearsed and charged upon the tariff, which are necessary to bring

the case within the gentleman's proposition. The tariff is a usurpation;

it is a dangerous usurpation; it is a palpable usurpation; it is a

deliberate usurpation. It is such a usurpation, therefore, as calls upon

the States to exercise their right of interference. Here is a case,

then, within the gentleman's principles, and all his qualifications of

his principles. It is a case for action. The Constitution is plainly,

dangerously, palpably, and deliberately violated; and the States must

interpose their own authority to arrest the law. Let us suppose the

State of South Carolina to express this same opinion, by the voice of

her legislature. That would be very imposing; but what then? Is the

voice of one State conclusive? It so happens that, at the very moment

when South Carolina resolves that the tariff laws are unconstitutional,

Pennsylvania and Kentucky resolve exactly the reverse. _They_ hold those

laws to be both highly proper and strictly constitutional. And now, Sir,

how does the honorable member propose to deal with this case? How does

he relieve us from this difficulty, upon any principle of his? His

construction gets us into it; how does he propose to get us out?

In Carolina, the tariff is a palpable, deliberate usurpation; Carolina,

therefore, may nullify it, and refuse to pay the duties. In

Pennsylvania, it is both clearly constitutional and highly expedient;

and there the duties are to be paid. And yet we live under a government

of uniform laws, and under a Constitution too, which contains an express

provision, as it happens, that all duties shall be equal in all the

States. Does not this approach absurdity?

If there be no power to settle such questions, independent of either of

the States, is not the whole Union a rope of sand? Are we not thrown

back again, precisely, upon the old Confederation?

It is too plain to be argued. Four-and-twenty interpreters of

constitutional law, each with a power to decide for itself, and none

with authority to bind anybody else, and this constitutional law the

only bond of their union! What is such a state of things but a mere

connection during pleasure, or, to use the phraseology of the times,

_during feeling_? And that feeling, too, not the feeling of the people,

who established the Constitution, but the feeling of the State

governments.

In another of the South Carolina addresses, having premised that the

crisis requires "all the concentrated energy of passion," an attitude of

open resistance to the laws of the Union is advised. Open resistance to

the laws, then, is the constitutional remedy, the conservative power of

the State, which the South Carolina doctrines teach for the redress of

political evils, real or imaginary. And its authors further say, that,

appealing with confidence to the Constitution itself, to justify their

opinions, they cannot consent to try their accuracy by the courts of

justice. In one sense, indeed, Sir, this is assuming an attitude of open

resistance in favor of liberty. But what sort of liberty? The liberty of

establishing their own opinions, in defiance of the opinions of all

others; the liberty of judging and of deciding exclusively themselves,

in a matter in which others have as much right to judge and decide as

they; the liberty of placing their own opinions above the judgment of

all others, above the laws, and above the Constitution. This is their

liberty, and this is the fair result of the proposition contended for by

the honorable gentleman. Or, it may be more properly said, it is

identical with it, rather than a result from it.

In the same publication we find the following: "Previously to our

Revolution, when the arm of oppression was stretched over New England,

where did our Northern brethren meet with a braver sympathy than that

which sprung from the bosoms of Carolinians? We had no extortion, no

oppression, no collision with the king's ministers, no navigation

interests springing up, in envious rivalry of England."

This seems extraordinary language. South Carolina no collision with the

king's ministers in 1775! No extortion! No oppression! But, Sir, it is

also most significant language. Does any man doubt the purpose for which

it was penned? Can anyone fail to see that it was designed to raise in

the reader's mind the question, whether, _at this time_,--that is to

say, in 1828,--South Carolina has any collision with the king's

ministers, any oppression, or extortion, to fear from England? whether,

in short, England is not as naturally the friend of South Carolina as

New England, with her navigation interests springing up in envious

rivalry of England?

Is it not strange, Sir, that an intelligent man in South Carolina, in

1828, should thus labor to prove that, in 1775, there was no hostility,

no cause of war, between South Carolina and England? That she had no

occasion, in reference to her own interest, or from a regard to her own

welfare, to take up arms in the Revolutionary contest? Can any one

account for the expression of such strange sentiments, and their

circulation through the State, otherwise than by supposing the object to

be what I have already intimated, to raise the question, if they had no

"_collision_" (mark the expression) with the ministers of King George

the Third, in 1775, what _collision_ have they, in 1828, with the

ministers of King George the Fourth? What is there now, in the existing

state of things, to separate Carolina from _Old_, more, or rather, than

from _New_ England?

Resolutions, Sir, have been recently passed by the legislature of South

Carolina. I need not refer to them; they go no farther than the

honorable gentleman himself has gone, and I hope not so far. I content

myself, therefore, with debating the matter with him.

And now, Sir, what I have first to say on this subject is, that at no

time, and under no circumstances, has New England, or any State in New

England, or any respectable body of persons in New England, or any

public man of standing in New England, put forth such a doctrine as this

Carolina doctrine.

The gentleman has found no case, he can find none, to support his own

opinions by New England authority. New England has studied the

Constitution in other schools, and under other teachers. She looks upon

it with other regards, and deems more highly and reverently both of its

just authority and its utility and excellence. The history of her

legislative proceedings may be traced. The ephemeral effusions of

temporary bodies, called together by the excitement of the occasion, may

be hunted up; they have been hunted up. The opinions and votes of her

public men, in and out of Congress, may be explored. It will all be in

vain. The Carolina doctrine can derive from her neither countenance nor

support. She rejects it now; she always did reject it; and till she

loses her senses, she always will reject it. The honorable member has

referred to expressions on the subject of the embargo law, made in this

place, by an honorable and venerable gentleman,[6] now favoring us with

his presence. He quotes that distinguished Senator as saying, that, in

his judgment, the embargo law was unconstitutional, and that therefore,

in his opinion, the people were not bound to obey it. That, Sir, is

perfectly constitutional language. An unconstitutional law is not

binding; _but then it does not rest with a resolution or a law of a

State legislature to decide whether an act of Congress be or be not

constitutional_. An unconstitutional act of Congress would not bind the

people of this District, although they have no legislature to interfere

in their behalf; and, on the other hand, a constitutional law of

Congress does bind the citizens of every State, although all their

legislatures should undertake to annul it by act or resolution. The

venerable Connecticut Senator is a constitutional lawyer, of sound

principles and enlarged knowledge; a statesman practised and

experienced, bred in the company of Washington, and holding just views

upon the nature of our governments. He believed the embargo

unconstitutional, and so did others; but what then? Who did he suppose

was to decide that question? The State legislatures? Certainly not. No

such sentiment ever escaped his lips.

Let us follow up, Sir, this New England opposition to the embargo laws;

let us trace it, till we discern the principle which controlled and

governed New England throughout the whole course of that opposition. We

shall then see what similarity there is between the New England school

of constitutional opinions, and this modern Carolina school. The

gentleman, I think, read a petition from some single individual

addressed to the legislature of Massachusetts, asserting the Carolina

doctrine; that is, the right of State interference to arrest the laws of

the Union. The fate of that petition shows the sentiment of the

legislature. It met no favor. The opinions of Massachusetts were very

different. They had been expressed in 1798, in answer to the resolutions

of Virginia, and she did not depart from them, nor bend them to the

times. Misgoverned, wronged, oppressed, as she felt herself to be, she

still held fast her integrity to the Union. The gentleman may find in

her proceedings much evidence of dissatisfaction with the measures of

government, and great and deep dislike to the embargo; all this makes

the case so much the stronger for her; for, notwithstanding all this

dissatisfaction and dislike, she still claimed no right to sever the

bonds of the Union. There was heat, and there was anger in her political

feeling. Be it so; but neither her heat nor her anger betrayed her into

infidelity to the government. The gentleman labors to prove that she

disliked the embargo as much as South Carolina dislikes the tariff, and

expressed her dislike as strongly. Be it so; but did she propose the

Carolina remedy? did she threaten to interfere, by State authority, to

annul the laws of the Union? That is the question for the gentleman's

consideration.

No doubt, Sir, a great majority of the people of New England

conscientiously believed the embargo law of 1807 unconstitutional; as

conscientiously, certainly, as the people of South Carolina hold that

opinion of the tariff. They reasoned thus: Congress has power to

regulate commerce; but here is a law, they said, stopping all commerce,

and stopping it indefinitely. The law is perpetual; that is, it is not

limited in point of time, and must of course continue until it shall be

repealed by some other law. It is as perpetual, therefore, as the law

against treason or murder. Now, is this regulating commerce, or

destroying it? Is it guiding, controlling, giving the rule to commerce,

as a subsisting thing or is it putting an end to it altogether? Nothing

is more certain, than that a majority in New England deemed this law a

violation of the Constitution. The very case required by the gentleman

to justify State interference had then arisen. Massachusetts believed

this law to be "a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a

power not granted by the Constitution." Deliberate it was, for it was

long continued; palpable she thought it, as no words in the Constitution

gave the power, and only a construction, in her opinion most violent,

raised it; dangerous it was, since it threatened utter ruin to her most

important interests. Here, then, was a Carolina case. How did

Massachusetts deal with it? It was, as she thought, a plain, manifest,

palpable violation of the Constitution, and it brought ruin to her

doors. Thousands of families, and hundreds of thousands of individuals,

were beggared by it. While she saw and felt all this, she saw and felt

also, that, as a measure of national policy, it was perfectly futile;

that the country was no way benefited by that which caused so much

individual distress; that it was efficient only for the production of

evil, and all that evil inflicted on ourselves. In such a case, under

such circumstances, how did Massachusetts demean herself? Sir, she

remonstrated, she memorialized, she addressed herself to the general

government, not exactly "with the concentrated energy of passion," but

with her own strong sense, and the energy of sober conviction. But she

did not interpose the arm of her own power to arrest the law, and break

the embargo. Far from it. Her principles bound her to two things; and

she followed her principles, lead where they might. First, to submit to

every constitutional law of Congress, and secondly, if the

constitutional validity of the law be doubted, to refer that question to

the decision of the proper tribunals. The first principle is vain and

ineffectual without the second. A majority of us in New England believed

the embargo law unconstitutional; but the great question was, and always

will be in such cases, Who is to decide this? Who is to judge between

the people and the government? And, Sir, it is quite plain, that the

Constitution of the United States confers on the government itself, to

be exercised by its appropriate department, and under its own

responsibility to the people, this power of deciding ultimately and

conclusively upon the just extent of its own authority. If this had not

been done, we should not have advanced a single step beyond the old

Confederation.

Being fully of opinion that the embargo law was unconstitutional, the

people of New England were yet equally clear in the opinion, (it was a

matter they did doubt upon,) that the question, after all, must be

decided by the judicial tribunals of the United States. Before those

tribunals, therefore, they brought the question. Under the provisions of

the law, they had given bonds to millions in amount, and which were

alleged to be forfeited. They suffered the bonds to be sued, and thus

raised the question. In the old-fashioned way of settling disputes, they

went to law. The case came to hearing and solemn argument; and he who

espoused their cause, and stood up for them against the validity of the

embargo act, was none other than that great man, of whom the gentleman

has made honorable mention, Samuel Dexter. He was then, Sir, in the

fulness of his knowledge, and the maturity of his strength. He had

retired from long and distinguished public service here, to the renewed

pursuit of professional duties, carrying with him all that enlargement

and expansion, all the new strength and force, which an acquaintance

with the more general subjects discussed in the national councils is

capable of adding to professional attainment, in a mind of true

greatness and comprehension. He was a lawyer, and he was also a

statesman. He had studied the Constitution, when he filled public

station, that he might defend it; he had examined its principles that he

might maintain them. More than all men, or at least as much as any man,

he was attached to the general government and to the union of the

States. His feelings and opinions all ran in that direction. A question

of constitutional law, too, was, of all subjects, that one which was

best suited to his talents and learning. Aloof from technicality, and

unfettered by artificial rule, such a question gave opportunity for that

deep and clear analysis, that mighty grasp of principle, which so much

distinguished his higher efforts. His very statement was argument; his

inference seemed demonstration. The earnestness of his own conviction

wrought conviction in others. One was convinced, and believed, and

assented, because it was gratifying, delightful, to think, and feel, and

believe, in unison with an intellect of such evident superiority.

Mr. Dexter, Sir, such as I have described him, argued the New England

cause. He put into his effort his whole heart, as well as all the powers

of his understanding; for he had avowed, in the most public manner, his

entire concurrence with his neighbors on the point in dispute. He argued

the cause; it was lost, and New England submitted. The established

tribunals pronounced the law constitutional, and New England acquiesced.

Now, Sir, is not this the exact opposite of the doctrine of the

gentleman from South Carolina? According to him, instead of referring to

the judicial tribunals, we should have broken up the embargo by laws of

our own; we should have repealed it, _quoad_ New England; for we had a

strong, palpable, and oppressive case. Sir, we believed the embargo

unconstitutional; but still that was matter of opinion, and who was to

decide it? We thought it a clear case; but, nevertheless, we did not

take the law into our own hands, because we did not wish to bring about

a revolution, nor to break up the Union; for I maintain, that between

submission to the decision of the constituted tribunals, and revolution,

or disunion, there is no middle ground; there is no ambiguous condition,

half allegiance and half rebellion. And, Sir, how futile, how very

futile it is, to admit the right of State interference, and then attempt

to save it from the character of unlawful resistance, by adding terms of

qualification to the causes and occasions, leaving all these

qualifications, like the case itself, in the discretion of the State

governments. It must be a clear case, it is said, a deliberate case, a

palpable case, a dangerous case. But then the State is still left at

liberty to decide for herself what is clear, what is deliberate, what is

palpable, what is dangerous. Do adjectives and epithets avail any thing?

Sir, the human mind is so constituted, that the merits of both sides of

a controversy appear very clear, and very palpable, to those who

respectively espouse them; and both sides usually grow clearer as the

controversy advances. South Carolina sees unconstitutionality in the

tariff; she sees oppression there also, and she sees danger.

Pennsylvania, with a vision not less sharp, looks at the same tariff,

and sees no such thing in it; she sees it all constitutional, all

useful, all safe. The faith of South Carolina is strengthened by

opposition, and she now not only sees, but _resolves_, that the tariff

is palpably unconstitutional, oppressive, and dangerous; but

Pennsylvania, not to be behind her neighbors, and equally willing to

strengthen her own faith by a confident asseveration, _resolves_ also,

and gives to every warm affirmative of South Carolina, a plain,

downright, Pennsylvania negative. South Carolina, to show the strength

and unity of her opinion, brings her assembly to a unanimity, within

seven voices; Pennsylvania, not to be outdone in this respect any more

than in others, reduces her dissentient fraction to a single vote. Now,

Sir, again, I ask the gentleman, What is to be done? Are these States

both right? Is he bound to consider them both right? If not, which is in

the wrong? or rather, which has the best right to decide? And if he, and

if I, are not to know what the Constitution means, and what it is, till

those two State legislatures, and the twenty-two others, shall agree in

its construction, what have we sworn to, when we have sworn to maintain

it? I was forcibly struck, Sir, with one reflection, as the gentleman

went on in his speech. He quoted Mr. Madison's resolutions, to prove

that a State may interfere, in a case of deliberate, palpable, and

dangerous exercise of a power not granted. The honorable member supposes

the tariff law to be such an exercise of power; and that consequently a

case has arisen in which the State may, if it see fit, interfere by its

own law. Now it so happens, nevertheless, that Mr. Madison deems this

same tariff law quite constitutional. Instead of a clear and palpable

violation, it is, in his judgment, no violation at all. So that, while

they use his authority for a hypothetical case, they reject it in the

very case before them. All this, Sir, shows the inherent futility, I had

almost used a stronger word, of conceding this power of interference to

the State, and then attempting to secure it from abuse by imposing

qualifications of which the States themselves are to judge. One of two

things is true; either the laws of the Union are beyond the discretion

and beyond the control of the States; or else we have no constitution of

general government, and are thrust back again to the days of the

Confederation.

Let me here say, Sir, that if the gentleman's doctrine had been received

and acted upon in New England, in the times of the embargo and

non-intercourse, we should probably not now have been here. The

government would very likely have gone to pieces, and crumbled into

dust. No stronger case can ever arise than existed under those laws; no

States can ever entertain a clearer conviction than the New England

States then entertained; and if they had been under the influence of

that heresy of opinion, as I must call it, which the honorable member

espouses, this Union would, in all probability, have been scattered to

the four winds. I ask the gentleman, therefore, to apply his principles

to that case; I ask him to come forth and declare, whether, in his

opinion, the New England States would have been justified in interfering

to break up the embargo system under the conscientious opinions which

they held upon it? Had they a right to annul that law? Does he admit or

deny? If what is thought palpably unconstitutional in South Carolina

justifies that State in arresting the progress of the law, tell me

whether that which was thought palpably unconstitutional also in

Massachusetts would have justified her in doing the same thing. Sir, I

deny the whole doctrine. It has not a foot of ground in the Constitution

to stand on. No public man of reputation ever advanced it in

Massachusetts in the warmest times, or could maintain himself upon it

there at any time.

I wish now, Sir, to make a remark upon the Virginia resolutions of 1798.

I cannot undertake to say how these resolutions were understood by those

who passed them. Their language is not a little indefinite. In the case

of the exercise by Congress of a dangerous power not granted to them,

the resolutions assert the right, on the part of the State, to interfere

and arrest the progress of the evil. This is susceptible of more than

one interpretation. It may mean no more than that the States may

interfere by complaint and remonstrance, or by proposing to the people

an alteration of the Federal Constitution. This would all be quite

unobjectionable. Or it may be that no more is meant than to assert the

general right of revolution, as against all governments, in cases of

intolerable oppression. This no one doubts, and this, in my opinion, is

all that he who framed the resolutions could have meant by it; for I

shall not readily believe that he was ever of opinion that a State,

under the Constitution and in conformity with it, could, upon the ground

of her own opinion of its unconstitutionality, however clear and

palpable she might think the case, annul a law of Congress, so far as it

should operate on herself by her own legislative power.

I must now beg to ask, Sir, Whence is this supposed right of the States

derived? Where do they find the power to interfere with the laws of the

Union? Sir, the opinion which the honorable gentleman maintains is a

notion founded in a total misapprehension, in my judgment, of the origin

of this government, and of the foundation on which it stands. I hold it

to be a popular government, erected by the people; those who administer

it, responsible to the people; and itself capable of being amended and

modified, just as the people may choose it should be. It is as popular,

just as truly emanating from the people, as the State governments. It is

created for one purpose; the State governments for another. It has its

own powers; they have theirs. There is no more authority with them to

arrest the operation of a law of Congress, than with Congress to arrest

the operation of their laws. We are here to administer a Constitution

emanating immediately from the people, and trusted by them to our

administration. It is not the creature of the State governments. It is

of no moment to the argument, that certain acts of the State

legislatures are necessary to fill our seats in this body. That is not

one of their original State powers, a part of the sovereignty of the

State. It is a duty which the people, by the Constitution itself, have

imposed on the State legislatures; and which they might have left to be

performed elsewhere, if they had seen fit. So they have left the choice

of President with electors; but all this does not affect the proposition

that this whole government, President, Senate, and House of

Representatives, is a popular government. It leaves it still all its

popular character. The governor of a State (in some of the States) is

chosen, not directly by the people, but by those who are chosen by the

people, for the purpose of performing, among other duties, that of

electing a governor. Is the government of the State, on that account,

not a popular government? This government, Sir, is the independent

offspring of the popular will. It is not the creature of State

legislatures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be told, the people

brought it into existence, established it, and have hitherto supported

it, for the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary

restraints on State sovereignties. The States cannot now make war; they

cannot contract alliances; they cannot make, each for itself, separate

regulations of commerce; they cannot lay imposts; they cannot coin

money. If this Constitution, Sir, be the creature of State legislatures,

it must be admitted that it has obtained a strange control over the

volitions of its creators.

The people, then, Sir, erected this government. They gave it a

Constitution, and in that Constitution they have enumerated the powers

which they bestow on it. They have made it a limited government. They

have defined its authority. They have restrained it to the exercise of

such powers as are granted; and all others, they declare, are reserved

to the States or the people. But, Sir, they have not stopped here. If

they had, they would have accomplished but half their work. No

definition can be so clear, as to avoid possibility of doubt; no

limitation so precise as to exclude all uncertainty. Who, then, shall

construe this grant of the people? Who shall interpret their will, where

it may be supposed they have left it doubtful? With whom do they repose

this ultimate right of deciding on the powers of the government? Sir,

they have settled all this in the fullest manner. They have left it with

the government itself, in its appropriate branches. Sir, the very chief

end, the main design, for which the whole Constitution was framed and

adopted, was to establish a government that should not be obliged to act

through State agency, or depend on State opinion and State discretion.

The people had had quite enough of that kind of government under the

Confederation. Under that system, the legal action, the application of

law to individuals, belonged exclusively to the States. Congress could

only recommend; their acts were not of binding force, till the States

had adopted and sanctioned them. Are we in that condition still? Are we

yet at the mercy of State discretion and State construction? Sir, if we

are, then vain will be our attempt to maintain the Constitution under

which we sit.

But, Sir, the people have wisely provided, in the Constitution itself, a

proper, suitable mode and tribunal for settling questions of

constitutional law. There are in the Constitution grants of powers to

Congress, and restrictions on these powers. There are, also,

prohibitions on the States. Some authority must, therefore, necessarily

exist, having the ultimate jurisdiction to fix and ascertain the

interpretation of these grants, restrictions, and prohibitions. The

Constitution has itself pointed out, ordained, and established that

authority. How has it accomplished this great and essential end? By

declaring, Sir, that "_the Constitution, and the laws of the United

States made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land,

any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary

notwithstanding_."

This, Sir, was the first great step. By this the supremacy of the

Constitution and laws of the United States is declared. The people so

will it. No State law is to be valid which comes in conflict with the

Constitution, or any law of the United States passed in pursuance of it.

But who shall decide this question of interference? To whom lies the

last appeal? This, Sir, the Constitution itself decides also, by

declaring, "_that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising

under the Constitution and laws of the United States_." These two

provisions cover the whole ground. They are, in truth, the keystone of

the arch! With these it is a government; without them it is a

confederation. In pursuance of these clear and express provisions,

Congress established, at its very first session, in the judicial act, a

mode for carrying them into full effect, and for bringing all questions

of constitutional power to the final decision of the Supreme Court. It

then, Sir, became a government. It then had the means of

self-protection; and but for this, it would, in all probability, have

been now among things which are past. Having constituted the government,

and declared its powers, the people have further said, that, since

somebody must decide on the extent of these powers, the government shall

itself decide; subject, always, like other popular governments, to its

responsibility to the people. And now, Sir, I repeat, how is it that a

State legislature acquires any power to interfere? Who, or what, gives

them the right to say to the people, "We, who are your agents and

servants for one purpose, will undertake to decide, that your other

agents and servants, appointed by you for another purpose, have

transcended the authority you gave them!" The reply would be, I think,

not impertinent, "Who made you a judge over another's servants? To their

own masters they stand or fall."

Sir, I deny this power of State legislatures altogether. It cannot stand

the test of examination. Gentlemen may say, that, in an extreme case, a

State government might protect the people from intolerable oppression.

Sir, in such a case, the people might protect themselves, without the

aid of the State governments. Such a case warrants revolution. It must

make, when it comes, a law for itself. A nullifying act of a State

legislature cannot alter the case, nor make resistance any more lawful.

In maintaining these sentiments, Sir, I am but asserting the rights of

the people. I state what they have declared, and insist on their right

to declare it. They have chosen to repose this power in the general

government, and I think it my duty to support it, like other

constitutional powers.

For myself, Sir, I do not admit the competency of South Carolina, or any

other State, to prescribe my constitutional duty; or to settle, between

me and the people, the validity of laws of Congress for which I have

voted. I decline her umpirage. I have not sworn to support the

Constitution according to her construction of its clauses. I have not

stipulated, by my oath of office or otherwise, to come under any

responsibility, except to the people, and those whom they have appointed

to pass upon the question, whether laws, supported by my votes, conform

to the Constitution of the country. And, Sir, if we look to the general

nature of the case, could any thing have been more preposterous, than to

make a government for the whole Union, and yet leave its powers subject,

not to one interpretation, but to thirteen or twenty-four

interpretations? Instead of one tribunal, established by all,

responsible to all, with power to decide for all, shall constitutional

questions be left to four-and-twenty popular bodies, each at liberty to

decide for itself, and none bound to respect the decisions of

others,--and each at liberty, too, to give a new construction on every

new election of its own members? Would any thing, with such a principle

in it, or rather with such a destitution of all principle, be fit to be

called a government? No, Sir. It should not be denominated a

Constitution. It should be called, rather, a collection of topics for

everlasting controversy; heads of debate for a disputatious people. It

would not be a government. It would not be adequate to any practical

good, or fit for any country to live under.

To avoid all possibility of being misunderstood, allow me to repeat

again, in the fullest manner, that I claim no powers for the government

by forced or unfair construction. I admit that it is a government of

strictly limited powers; of enumerated, specified, and particularized

powers; and that whatsoever is not granted, is withheld. But

notwithstanding all this, and however the grant of powers may be

expressed, its limit and extent may yet, in some cases, admit of doubt;

and the general government would be good for nothing, it would be

incapable of long existing, if some mode had not been provided in which

those doubts, as they should arise, might be peaceably, but

authoritatively, solved.

And now, Mr. President, let me run the honorable gentleman's doctrine a

little into its practical application. Let us look at his probable

_modus operandi_. If a thing can be done, an ingenious man can tell

_how_ it is to be done, and I wish to be informed _how_ this State

interference is to be put in practice, without violence, bloodshed, and

rebellion. We will take the existing case of the tariff law. South

Carolina is said to have made up her opinion upon it. If we do not

repeal it, (as we probably shall not,) she will then apply to the case

the remedy of her doctrine. She will, we must suppose, pass a law of her

legislature, declaring the several acts of Congress usually called the

tariff laws null and void, so far as they respect South Carolina, or the

citizens thereof. So far, all is a paper transaction, and easy enough.

But the collector at Charleston is collecting the duties imposed by

these tariff laws. He, therefore, must be stopped. The collector will

seize the goods if the tariff duties are not paid. The State authorities

will undertake their rescue, the marshal, with his posse, will come to

the collector's aid, and here the contest begins. The militia of the

State will be called out to sustain the nullifying act. They will march,

Sir, under a very gallant leader; for I believe the honorable member

himself commands the militia of that part of the State. He will raise

the NULLIFYING ACT on his standard, and spread it out as his banner! It

will have a preamble, setting forth that the tariff laws are palpable,

deliberate, and dangerous violations of the Constitution! He will

proceed, with this banner flying, to the custom-house in Charleston,

"All the while

Sonorous metal blowing martial sounds."

Arrived at the custom-house, he will tell the collector that he must

collect no more duties under any of the tariff laws. This he will be

somewhat puzzled to say, by the way, with a grave countenance,

considering what hand South Carolina herself had in that of 1816. But,

Sir, the collector would not, probably, desist, at his bidding. He would

show him the law of Congress, the treasury instruction, and his own oath

of office. He would say, he should perform his duty, come what come

might.

Here would ensue a pause; for they say that a certain stillness precedes

the tempest. The trumpeter would hold his breath awhile, and before all

this military array should fall on the custom-house, collector, clerks,

and all, it is very probable some of those composing it would request of

their gallant commander-in-chief to be informed a little upon the point

of law; for they have, doubtless, a just respect for his opinions as a

lawyer, as well as for his bravery as a soldier. They know he has read

Blackstone and the Constitution, as well as Turenne and Vauban. They

would ask him, therefore, something concerning their rights in this

matter. They would inquire, whether it was not somewhat dangerous to

resist a law of the United States. What would be the nature of their

offence, they would wish to learn, if they, by military force and array,

resisted the execution in Carolina of a law of the United States, and it

should turn out, after all, that the law _was constitutional_? He would

answer, of course, Treason. No lawyer could give any other answer. John

Fries, he would tell them, had learned that, some years ago. How, then,

they would ask, do you propose to defend us? We are not afraid of

bullets, but treason has a way of taking people off that we do not much

relish. How do you propose to defend us? "Look at my floating banner,"

he would reply; "see there the _nullifying law_!" Is it your opinion,

gallant commander, they would then say, that, if we should be indicted

for treason, that same floating banner of yours would make a good plea

in bar? "South Carolina is a sovereign State," he would reply. That is

true; but would the judge admit our plea? "These tariff laws," he would

repeat, "are unconstitutional, palpably, deliberately, dangerously."

That may all be so; but if the tribunal should not happen to be of that

opinion, shall we swing for it? We are ready to die for our country, but

it is rather an awkward business, this dying without touching the

ground! After all, that is a sort of hemp tax worse than any part of the

tariff.

Mr. President, the honorable gentleman would be in a dilemma, like that

of another great general. He would have a knot before him which he could

not untie. He must cut it with his sword. He must say to his followers,

"Defend yourselves with your bayonets"; and this is war,--civil war.

Direct collision, therefore, between force and force, is the unavoidable

result of that remedy for the revision of unconstitutional laws which

the gentleman contends for. It must happen in the very first case to

which it is applied. Is not this the plain result? To resist by force

the execution of a law, generally, is treason. Can the courts of the

United States take notice of the indulgence of a State to commit

treason? The common saying, that a State cannot commit treason herself,

is nothing to the purpose. Can she authorize others to do it? If John

Fries had produced an act of Pennsylvania, annulling the law of

Congress, would it have helped his case? Talk about it as we will, these

doctrines go the length of revolution. They are incompatible with any

peaceable administration of the government. They lead directly to

disunion and civil commotion; and therefore it is, that at their

commencement, when they are first found to be maintained by respectable

men, and in a tangible form, I enter my public protest against them all.

The honorable gentleman argues, that, if this government be the sole

judge of the extent of its own powers, whether that right of judging be

in Congress or the Supreme Court, it equally subverts State

sovereignty. This the gentleman sees, or thinks he sees, although he

cannot perceive how the right of judging, in this matter, if left to the

exercise of State legislatures, has any tendency to subvert the

government of the Union. The gentleman's opinion may be, that the right

_ought not_ to have been lodged with the general government; he may like

better such a constitution as we should have under the right of State

interference; but I ask him to meet me on the plain matter of fact. I

ask him to meet me on the Constitution itself. I ask him if the power is

not found there, clearly and visibly found there?

But, Sir, what is this danger, and what are the grounds of it? Let it be

remembered, that the Constitution of the United States is not

unalterable. It is to continue in its present form no longer than the

people who established it shall choose to continue it. If they shall

become convinced that they have made an injudicious or inexpedient

partition and distribution of power between the State governments and

the general government, they can alter that distribution at will.

If any thing be found in the national Constitution, either by original

provision or subsequent interpretation, which ought not to be in it, the

people know how to get rid of it. If any construction, unacceptable to

them, be established, so as to become practically a part of the

Constitution, they will amend it, at their own sovereign pleasure. But

while the people choose to maintain it as it is, while they are

satisfied with it, and refuse to change it, who has given, or who can

give, to the State legislatures a right to alter it, either by

interference, construction, or otherwise? Gentlemen do not seem to

recollect that the people have any power to do any thing for themselves.

They imagine there is no safety for them, any longer than they are under

the close guardianship of the State legislatures. Sir, the people have

not trusted their safety, in regard to the general Constitution, to

these hands. They have required other security, and taken other bonds.

They have chosen to trust themselves, first, to the plain words of the

instrument, and to such construction as the government themselves, in

doubtful cases, should put on their own powers, under their oaths of

office, and subject to their responsibility to them; just as the people

of a State trust their own State governments with a similar power.

Secondly, they have reposed their trust in the efficacy of frequent

elections, and in their own power to remove their own servants and

agents whenever they see cause. Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the

judicial power, which, in order that it might be trustworthy, they have

made as respectable, as disinterested, and as independent as was

practicable. Fourthly, they have seen fit to rely, in case of necessity,

or high expediency, on their known and admitted power to alter or amend

the Constitution, peaceably and quietly, whenever experience shall point

out defects or imperfections. And, finally, the people of the United

States have at no time, in no way, directly or indirectly, authorized

any State legislature to construe or interpret _their_ high instrument

of government; much less, to interfere, by their own power, to arrest

its course and operation.

If, Sir, the people in these respects had done otherwise than they have

done, their Constitution could neither have been preserved, nor would it

have been worth preserving. And if its plain provisions shall now be

disregarded, and these new doctrines interpolated in it, it will become

as feeble and helpless a being as its enemies, whether early or more

recent, could possibly desire. It will exist in every State but as a

poor dependent on State permission. It must borrow leave to be; and will

be, no longer than State pleasure, or State discretion, sees fit to

grant the indulgence, and to prolong its poor existence.

But, Sir, although there are fears, there are hopes also. The people

have preserved this, their own chosen Constitution, for forty years, and

have seen their happiness, prosperity, and renown grow with its growth,

and strengthen with its strength. They are now, generally, strongly

attached to it. Overthrown by direct assault, it cannot be; evaded,

undermined, NULLIFIED, it will not be, if we and those who shall succeed

us here, as agents and representatives of the people, shall

conscientiously and vigilantly discharge the two great branches of our

public trust, faithfully to preserve, and wisely to administer it.

Mr. President, I have thus stated the reasons of my dissent to the

doctrines which have been advanced and maintained. I am conscious of

having detained you and the Senate much too long. I was drawn into the

debate with no previous deliberation, such as is suited to the

discussion of so grave and important a subject. But it is a subject of

which my heart is full, and I have not been willing to suppress the

utterance of its spontaneous sentiments. I cannot, even now, persuade

myself to relinquish it, without expressing once more my deep

conviction, that, since it respects nothing less than the Union of the

States, it is of most vital and essential importance to the public

happiness. I profess, Sir, in my career hitherto, to have kept steadily

in view the prosperity and honor of the whole country, and the

preservation of our Federal Union. It is to that Union we owe our safety

at home, and our consideration and dignity abroad. It is to that Union

that we are chiefly indebted for whatever makes us most proud of our

country. That Union we reached only by the discipline of our virtues in

the severe school of adversity. It had its origin in the necessities of

disordered finance, prostrate commerce, and ruined credit. Under its

benign influences, these great interests immediately awoke, as from the

dead, and sprang forth with newness of life. Every year of its duration

has teemed with fresh proofs of its utility and its blessings; and

although our territory has stretched out wider and wider, and our

population spread farther and farther, they have not outrun its

protection or its benefits. It has been to us all a copious fountain of

national, social, and personal happiness.

I have not allowed myself, Sir, to look beyond the Union, to see what

might lie hidden in the dark recess behind. I have not coolly weighed

the chances of preserving liberty when the bonds that unite us together

shall be broken asunder. I have not accustomed myself to hang over the

precipice of disunion, to see whether, with my short sight, I can fathom

the depth of the abyss below; nor could I regard him as a safe

counsellor in the affairs of this government, whose thoughts should be

mainly bent on considering, not how the Union may be best preserved, but

how tolerable might be the condition of the people when it should be

broken up and destroyed. While the Union lasts, we have high, exciting,

gratifying prospects spread out before us, for us and our children.

Beyond that I seek not to penetrate the veil. God grant that, in my day,

at least, that curtain may not rise! God grant that on my vision never

may be opened what lies behind! When my eyes shall be turned to behold

for the last time the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the

broken and dishonored fragments of a once glorious Union; on States

dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil feuds, or

drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood! Let their last feeble and

lingering glance rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the republic, now

known and honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its

arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a stripe

erased or polluted, nor a single star obscured, bearing for its motto,

no such miserable interrogatory as "What is all this worth?" nor those

other words of delusion and folly, "Liberty first and Union afterwards";

but everywhere, spread all over in characters of living light, blazing

on all its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over the land,

and in every wind under the whole heavens, that other sentiment, dear to

every true American heart,--Liberty _and_ Union, now and for ever, one

and inseparable!

Mr. Hayne having rejoined to Mr. Webster, especially on the

constitutional question, Mr. Webster rose, and, in conclusion,

said:--#/

A few words, Mr. President, on this constitutional argument, which the

honorable gentleman has labored to reconstruct.

His argument consists of two propositions and an inference. His

propositions are,--