Lord Roberts never showed his self-command and fixed purpose more
clearly than during his six weeks' halt at Bloemfontein. De Wet, the
most enterprising and aggressive of the Boer commanders, was attacking
his eastern posts and menacing his line of communications. A fussy or
nervous general would have harassed his men and worn out his horses by
endeavouring to pursue a number of will-of-the-wisp commandos. Roberts
contented himself by building up his strength at the capital, and
by spreading nearly twenty thousand men along his line of rail from
Bloemfontein to Bethulie. When the time came he would strike, but until
then he rested. His army was not only being rehorsed and reshod, but
in some respects was being reorganised. One powerful weapon which was
forged during those weeks was the collection of the mounted infantry of
the central army into one division, which was placed under the command
of Ian Hamilton, with Hutton and Ridley as brigadiers. Hutton's
brigade contained the Canadians, New South Wales men, West Australians,
Queenslanders, New Zealanders, Victorians, South Australians, and
Tasmanians, with four battalions of Imperial Mounted Infantry, and
several light batteries. Ridley's brigade contained the South African
irregular regiments of cavalry, with some imperial troops. The strength
of the whole division came to over ten thousand rifles, and in its ranks
there rode the hardiest and best from every corner of the earth over
which the old flag is flying.
A word as to the general distribution of the troops at this instant
while Roberts was gathering himself for his spring. Eleven divisions of
infantry were in the field. Of these the 1st (Methuen's) and half
the 10th (Hunter's) were at Kimberley, forming really the
hundred-mile-distant left wing of Lord Roberts's army. On that side also
was a considerable force of Yeomanry, as General Villebois discovered.
In the centre with Roberts was the 6th division (Kelly-Kenny's) at
Bloemfontein, the 7th (Tucker's) at Karee, twenty miles north, the 9th
(Colvile's) and the 11th (Pole-Carew's) near Bloemfontein. French's
cavalry division was also in the centre. As one descended the line
towards the Cape one came on the 3rd division (Chermside's, late
Gatacre's), which had now moved up to Reddersberg, and then, further
south, the 8th (Rundle's), near Rouxville. To the south and east was the
other half of Hunter's division (Hart's brigade), and Brabant's Colonial
division, half of which was shut up in Wepener and the rest at Aliwal.
These were the troops operating in the Free State, with the addition of
the division of mounted infantry in process of formation.
There remained the three divisions in Natal, the 2nd (Clery's), the 4th
(Lyttelton's), and the 5th (Hildyard's, late Warren's), with the cavalry
brigades of Burn-Murdoch, Dundonald, and Brocklehurst. These,
with numerous militia and unbrigaded regiments along the lines of
communication, formed the British army in South Africa. At Mafeking some
900 irregulars stood at bay, with another force about as large under
Plumer a little to the north, endeavouring to relieve them. At Beira, a
Portuguese port through which we have treaty rights by which we may pass
troops, a curious mixed force of Australians, New Zealanders and others
was being disembarked and pushed through to Rhodesia, so as to cut off
any trek which the Boers might make in that direction. Carrington, a
fierce old soldier with a large experience of South African warfare, was
in command of this picturesque force, which moved amid tropical forests
over crocodile-haunted streams, while their comrades were shivering in
the cold southerly winds of a Cape winter. Neither our Government, our
people, nor the world understood at the beginning of this campaign how
grave was the task which we had undertaken, but, having once realised
it, it must be acknowledged that it was carried through in no
half-hearted way. So vast was the scene of operations that the
Canadian might almost find his native climate at one end of it and the
Queenslander at the other.
To follow in close detail the movements of the Boers and the counter
movements of the British in the southeast portion of the Free State
during this period would tax the industry of the historian and the
patience of the reader. Let it be told with as much general truth and
as little geographical detail as possible. The narrative which is
interrupted by an eternal reference to the map is a narrative spoiled.
The main force of the Freestaters had assembled in the north-eastern
corner of their State, and from this they made their sally southwards,
attacking or avoiding at their pleasure the eastern line of British
outposts. Their first engagement, that of Sanna's Post, was a great and
deserved success. Three days later they secured the five companies at
Reddersberg. Warned in time, the other small British bodies closed in
upon their supports, and the railway line, that nourishing artery which
was necessary for the very existence of the army, was held too strongly
for attack. The Bethulie Bridge was a particularly important point; but
though the Boers approached it, and even went the length of announcing
officially that they had destroyed it, it was not actually attacked.
At Wepener, however, on the Basutoland border, they found an isolated
force, and proceeded at once, according to their custom, to hem it in
and to bombard it, until one of their three great allies, want of food,
want of water, or want of cartridges, should compel a surrender.
On this occasion, however, the Boers had undertaken a task which was
beyond their strength. The troops at Wepener were one thousand seven
hundred in number, and formidable in quality. The place had been
occupied by part of Brabant's Colonial division, consisting of hardy
irregulars, men of the stuff of the defenders of Mafeking. Such men are
too shrewd to be herded into an untenable position and too valiant to
surrender a tenable one. The force was commanded by a dashing soldier,
Colonel Dalgety, of the Cape Mounted Rifles, as tough a fighter as his
famous namesake. There were with him nearly a thousand men of Brabant's
Horse, four hundred of the Cape Mounted Rifles, four hundred Kaffrarian
Horse, with some scouts, and one hundred regulars, including twenty
invaluable Sappers. They were strong in guns--two seven-pounders, two
naval twelve-pounders, two fifteen-pounders and several machine guns.
The position which they had taken up, Jammersberg, three miles north of
Wepener, was a very strong one, and it would have taken a larger force
than De Wet had at his disposal to turn them out of it. The defence had
been arranged by Major Cedric Maxwell, of the Sappers; and though the
huge perimeter, nearly eight miles, made its defence by so small a force
a most difficult matter, the result proved how good his dispositions
were.
At the same time, the Boers came on with every confidence of victory,
for they had a superiority in guns and an immense superiority in men.
But after a day or two of fierce struggle their attack dwindled down
into a mere blockade. On April 9th they attacked furiously, both by day
and by night, and on the 10th the pressure was equally severe. In these
two days occurred the vast majority of the casualties. But the defenders
took cover in a way to which British regulars have not yet attained, and
they outshot their opponents both with their rifles and their cannon.
Captain Lukin's management of the artillery was particularly skilful.
The weather was vile and the hastily dug trenches turned into ditches
half full of water, but neither discomfort nor danger shook the courage
of the gallant colonials. Assault after assault was repulsed, and
the scourging of the cannon was met with stolid endurance. The Boers
excelled all their previous feats in the handling of artillery by
dragging two guns up to the summit of the lofty Jammersberg, whence they
fired down upon the camp. Nearly all the horses were killed and three
hundred of the troopers were hit, a number which is double that of the
official return, for the simple reason that the spirit of the force
was so high that only those who were very severely wounded reported
themselves as wounded at all. None but the serious cases ever reached
the hands of Dr. Faskally, who did admirable work with very slender
resources. How many the enemy lost can never be certainly known, but as
they pushed home several attacks it is impossible to imagine that their
losses were less than those of the victorious defenders. At the end of
seventeen days of mud and blood the brave irregulars saw an empty laager
and abandoned trenches. Their own resistance and the advance of Brabant
to their rescue had caused a hasty retreat of the enemy. Wepener,
Mafeking, Kimberley, the taking of the first guns at Ladysmith,
the deeds of the Imperial Light Horse--it cannot be denied that our
irregular South African forces have a brilliant record for the war. They
are associated with many successes and with few disasters. Their fine
record cannot, I think, be fairly ascribed to any greater hardihood
which one portion of our race has when compared with another, for a
South African must admit that in the best colonial corps at least
half the men were Britons of Britain. In the Imperial Light Horse the
proportion was very much higher. But what may fairly be argued is that
their exploits have proved, what the American war proved long ago, that
the German conception of discipline is an obsolete fetish, and that the
spirit of free men, whose individualism has been encouraged rather
than crushed, is equal to any feat of arms. The clerks and miners and
engineers who went up Elandslaagte Hill without bayonets, shoulder to
shoulder with the Gordons, and who, according to Sir George White, saved
Ladysmith on January 6th, have shown for ever that with men of our race
it is the spirit within, and not the drill or the discipline, that makes
a formidable soldier. An intelligent appreciation of the fact might in
the course of the next few years save us as much money as would go far
to pay for the war.
It may well be asked how for so long a period as seventeen days the
British could tolerate a force to the rear of them when with their great
superiority of numbers they could have readily sent an army to drive
it away. The answer must be that Lord Roberts had despatched his trusty
lieutenant, Kitchener, to Aliwal, whence he had been in heliographic
communication with Wepener, that he was sure that the place could hold
out, and that he was using it, as he did Kimberley, to hold the enemy
while he was making his plans for their destruction. This was the bait
to tempt them to their ruin. Had the trap not been a little slow in
closing, the war in the Free State might have ended then and there.
From the 9th to the 25th the Boers were held in front of Wepener. Let us
trace the movements of the other British detachments during that time.
Brabant's force, with Hart's brigade, which had been diverted on its way
to Kimberley, where it was to form part of Hunter's division, was moving
on the south towards Wepener, advancing through Rouxville, but going
slowly for fear of scaring the Boers away before they were sufficiently
compromised. Chermside's 3rd division approached from the north-west,
moving out from the railway at Bethany, and passing through Reddersberg
towards Dewetsdorp, from which it would directly threaten the Boer
line of retreat. The movement was made with reassuring slowness and
gentleness, as when the curved hand approaches the unconscious fly. And
then suddenly, on April 21st, Lord Roberts let everything go. Had the
action of the agents been as swift and as energetic as the mind of the
planner, De Wet could not have escaped us.
What held Lord Roberts's hand for some few days after he was ready to
strike was the abominable weather. Rain was falling in sheets, and
those who know South African roads, South African mud, and South African
drifts will understand how impossible swift military movements are under
those circumstances. But with the first clearing of the clouds the
hills to the south and east of Bloemfontein were dotted with our scouts.
Rundle with his 8th division was brought swiftly up from the south,
united with Chermside to the east of Reddersberg, and the whole force,
numbering 13,000 rifles with thirty guns, advanced upon Dewetsdorp,
Rundle, as senior officer, being in command. As they marched the blue
hills of Wepener lined the sky some twenty miles to the south, eloquent
to every man of the aim and object of their march.
On April 20th, Rundle as he advanced found a force with artillery across
his path to Dewetsdorp. It is always difficult to calculate the number
of hidden men and lurking guns which go to make up a Boer army, but with
some knowledge of their total at Wepener it was certain that the force
opposed to him must be very inferior to his own. At Constantia Farm,
where he found them in position, it is difficult to imagine that there
were more than three thousand men. Their left flank was their weak
point, as a movement on that side would cut them off from Wepener
and drive them up towards our main force in the north. One would have
thought that a containing force of three thousand men, and a flanking
movement from eight thousand, would have turned them out, as it has
turned them out so often before and since. Yet a long-range action began
on Friday, April 20th, and lasted the whole of the 21st, the 22nd, and
the 23rd, in which we sustained few losses, but made no impression upon
the enemy. Thirty of the 1st Worcesters wandered at night into the wrong
line, and were made prisoners, but with this exception the four days
of noisy fighting does not appear to have cost either side fifty
casualties. It is probable that the deliberation with which the
operations were conducted was due to Rundle's instructions to wait until
the other forces were in position. His subsequent movements showed that
he was not a General who feared to strike.
On Sunday night (April 22nd) Pole-Carew sallied out from Bloemfontein on
a line which would take him round the right flank of the Boers who were
facing Rundle. The Boers had, however, occupied a strong position at
Leeuw Kop, which barred his path, so that the Dewetsdorp Boers were
covering the Wepener Boers, and being in turn covered by the Boers of
Leeuw Kop. Before anything could be done, they must be swept out of the
way. Pole-Carew is one of those finds which help to compensate us for
the war. Handsome, dashing, debonnaire, he approaches a field of battle
as a light-hearted schoolboy approaches a football field. On this
occasion he acted with energy and discretion. His cavalry threatened the
flanks of the enemy, and Stephenson's brigade carried the position in
front at a small cost. On the same evening General French arrived and
took over the force, which consisted now of Stephenson's and the Guards
brigades (making up the 11th division), with two brigades of cavalry and
one corps of mounted infantry. The next day, the 23rd, the advance was
resumed, the cavalry bearing the brunt of the fighting. That gallant
corps, Roberts's Horse, whose behaviour at Sanna's Post had been
admirable, again distinguished itself, losing among others its Colonel,
Brazier Creagh. On the 24th again it was to the horsemen that the honour
and the casualties fell. The 9th Lancers, the regular cavalry regiment
which bears away the honours of the war, lost several men and officers,
and the 8th Hussars also suffered, but the Boers were driven from their
position, and lost more heavily in this skirmish than in some of the
larger battles of the campaign. The 'pom-poms,' which had been supplied
to us by the belated energy of the Ordnance Department, were used with
some effect in this engagement, and the Boers learned for the first
time how unnerving are those noisy but not particularly deadly fireworks
which they had so often crackled round the ears of our gunners.
On the Wednesday morning Rundle, with the addition of Pole-Carew's
division, was strong enough for any attack, while French was in a
position upon the flank. Every requisite for a great victory was there
except the presence of an enemy. The Wepener siege had been raised and
the force in front of Rundle had disappeared as only Boer armies can
disappear. The combined movement was an admirable piece of work on
the part of the enemy. Finding no force in front of them, the combined
troops of French, Rundle, and Chermside occupied Dewetsdorp, where the
latter remained, while the others pushed on to Thabanchu, the storm
centre from which all our troubles had begun nearly a month before. All
the way they knew that De Wet's retreating army was just in front
of them, and they knew also that a force had been sent out from
Bloemfontein to Thabanchu to head off the Boers. Lord Roberts might
naturally suppose, when he had formed two cordons through which De Wet
must pass, that one or other must hold him. But with extraordinary
skill and mobility De Wet, aided by the fact that every inhabitant was
a member of his intelligence department, slipped through the double net
which had been laid for him. The first net was not in its place in time,
and the second was too small to hold him.
While Rundle and French had advanced on Dewetsdorp as described, the
other force which was intended to head off De Wet had gone direct to
Thabanchu. The advance began by a movement of Ian Hamilton on April 22nd
with eight hundred mounted infantry upon the waterworks. The enemy, who
held the hills beyond, allowed Hamilton's force to come right down to
the Modder before they opened fire from three guns. The mounted infantry
fell back, and encamped for the night out of range. [Footnote: This was
a remarkable exhibition of the harmlessness of shell-fire against troops
in open formation. I myself saw at least forty shells, all of which
burst, fall among the ranks of the mounted infantry, who retired at a
contemptuous walk. There were no casualties.] Before morning they
were reinforced by Smith-Dorrien's brigade (Gordons, Canadians, and
Shropshires--the Cornwalls had been left behind) and some more mounted
Infantry. With daylight a fine advance was begun, the brigade moving up
in very extended order and the mounted men turning the right flank of
the defence. By evening we had regained the waterworks, a most important
point for Bloemfontein, and we held all the line of hills which command
it. This strong position would not have been gained so easily if it had
not been for Pole-Carew's and French's actions two days before, on their
way to join Rundle, which enabled them to turn it from the south.
Ian Hamilton, who had already done good service in the war, having
commanded the infantry at Elandslaagte, and been one of the most
prominent leaders in the defence of Ladysmith, takes from this time
onwards a more important and a more independent position. A thin,
aquiline man, of soft voice and gentle manners, he had already proved
more than once during his adventurous career that he not only possessed
in a high degree the courage of the soldier, but also the equanimity and
decision of the born leader. A languid elegance in his bearing covered
a shrewd brain and a soul of fire. A distorted and half-paralysed hand
reminded the observer that Hamilton, as a young lieutenant, had known
at Majuba what it was to face the Boer rifles. Now, in his forty-seventh
year, he had returned, matured and formidable, to reverse the results
of that first deplorable campaign. This was the man to whom Lord Roberts
had entrusted the command of that powerful flanking column which was
eventually to form the right wing of his main advance. Being reinforced
upon the morning after the capture of the Waterworks by the Highland
Brigade, the Cornwalls, and two heavy naval guns, his whole force
amounted to not less than seven thousand men. From these he detached a
garrison for the Waterworks, and with the rest he continued his march
over the hilly country which lies between them and Thabanchu.
One position, Israel's Poort, a nek between two hills, was held against
them on April 25th, but was gained without much trouble, the Canadians
losing one killed and two wounded. Colonel Otter, their gallant leader,
was one of the latter, while Marshall's Horse, a colonial corps raised
in Grahamstown, had no fewer than seven of their officers and several
men killed or wounded. Next morning the town of Thabanchu was seized,
and Hamilton found himself upon the direct line of the Boer retreat.
He seized the pass which commands the road, and all next day he waited
eagerly, and the hearts of his men beat high when at last they saw a
long trail of dust winding up to them from the south. At last the wily
De Wet had been headed off! Deep and earnest were the curses when out of
the dust there emerged a khaki column of horsemen, and it was realised
that this was French's pursuing force, closely followed by Rundle's
infantry from Dewetsdorp. The Boers had slipped round and were already
to the north of us.
It is impossible to withhold our admiration for the way in which the
Boer force was manoeuvred throughout this portion of the campaign. The
mixture of circumspection and audacity, the way in which French and
Rundle were hindered until the Wepener force had disengaged itself, the
manner in which these covering forces were then withdrawn, and finally
the clever way in which they all slipped past Hamilton, make a brilliant
bit of strategy. Louis Botha, the generalissimo, held all the strings in
his hand, and the way in which he pulled them showed that his countrymen
had chosen the right man for that high office, and that his was a master
spirit even among those fine natural warriors who led the separate
commandos.
Having got to the north of the British forces Botha made no effort to
get away, and refused to be hustled by a reconnaissance developing into
an attack, which French made upon April 27th. In a skirmish the night
before Kitchener's Horse had lost fourteen men, and the action of the
27th cost us about as many casualties. It served to show that the
Boer force was a compact body some six or seven thousand strong, which
withdrew in a leisurely fashion, and took up a defensive position at
Houtnek, some miles further on. French remained at Thabanchu, from which
he afterwards joined Lord Roberts' advance, while Hamilton now assumed
complete command of the flanking column, with which he proceeded to
march north upon Winburg.
The Houtnek position is dominated upon the left of the advancing British
force by Thoba Mountain, and it was this point which was the centre of
Hamilton's attack. It was most gallantly seized by Kitchener's Horse,
who were quickly supported by Smith-Dorrien's men. The mountain became
the scene of a brisk action, and night fell before the crest was
cleared. At dawn upon May 1st the fighting was resumed, and the position
was carried by a determined advance of the Shropshires, the Canadians,
and the Gordons: the Boers escaping down the reverse slope of the hill
came under a heavy fire of our infantry, and fifty of them were wounded
or taken. It was in this action, during the fighting on the hill, that
Captain Towse, of the Gordons, though shot through the eyes and totally
blind, encouraged his men to charge through a group of the enemy who had
gathered round them. After this victory Hamilton's men, who had fought
for seven days out of ten, halted for a rest at Jacobsrust, where
they were joined by Broadwood's cavalry and Bruce Hamilton's infantry
brigade. Ian Hamilton's column now contained two infantry brigades
(Smith-Dorrien's and Bruce Hamilton's), Ridley's Mounted Infantry,
Broadwood's Cavalry Brigade, five batteries of artillery, two heavy
guns, altogether 13,000 men. With this force in constant touch with
Botha's rearguard, Ian Hamilton pushed on once more on May 4th. On May
5th he fought a brisk cavalry skirmish, in which Kitchener's Horse and
the 12th Lancers distinguished themselves, and on the same day he took
possession of Winburg, thus covering the right of Lord Roberts's great
advance.
The distribution of the troops on the eastern side of the Free State
was, at the time of this the final advance of the main army, as
follows--Ian Hamilton with his mounted infantry, Smith-Dorrien's
brigade, Macdonald's brigade, Bruce Hamilton's brigade, and Broadwood's
cavalry were at Winburg. Rundle was at Thabanchu, and Brabant's colonial
division was moving up to the same point. Chermside was at Dewetsdorp,
and had detached a force under Lord Castletown to garrison Wepener.
Hart occupied Smithfield, whence he and his brigade were shortly to be
transferred to the Kimberley force. Altogether there could not have been
fewer than thirty thousand men engaged in clearing and holding down
this part of the country. French's cavalry and Pole-Carew's division had
returned to take part in the central advance.
Before entering upon a description of that great and decisive movement,
one small action calls for comment. This was the cutting off of twenty
men of Lumsden's Horse in a reconnaissance at Karee. The small post
under Lieutenant Crane found themselves by some misunderstanding
isolated in the midst of the enemy. Refusing to hoist the flag of shame,
they fought their way out, losing half their number, while of the other
half it is said that there was not one who could not show bullet
marks upon his clothes or person. The men of this corps, volunteer
Anglo-Indians, had abandoned the ease and even luxury of Eastern life
for the hard fare and rough fighting of this most trying campaign. In
coming they had set the whole empire an object-lesson in spirit, and now
on their first field they set the army an example of military virtue.
The proud traditions of Outram's Volunteers have been upheld by the men
of Lumsden's Horse. Another minor action which cannot be ignored is
the defence of a convoy on April 29th by the Derbyshire Yeomanry (Major
Dugdale) and a company of the Scots Guards. The wagons were on their
way to Rundle when they were attacked at a point about ten miles west of
Thabanchu. The small guard beat off their assailants in the most
gallant fashion, and held their own until relieved by Brabazon upon the
following morning.
This phase of the war was marked by a certain change in the temper of
the British. Nothing could have been milder than the original intentions
and proclamations of Lord Roberts, and he was most ably seconded in his
attempts at conciliation by General Pretyman, who had been made civil
administrator of the State. There was evidence, however, that this
kindness had been construed as weakness by some of the burghers,
and during the Boer incursion to Wepener many who had surrendered a
worthless firearm reappeared with the Mauser which had been concealed
in some crafty hiding-place. Troops were fired at from farmhouses which
flew the white flag, and the good housewife remained behind to charge
the 'rooinek' extortionate prices for milk and fodder while her husband
shot at him from the hills. It was felt that the burghers might have
peace or might have war, but could not have both simultaneously. Some
examples were made therefore of offending farmhouses, and stock was
confiscated where there was evidence of double dealing upon the part
of the owner. In a country where property is a more serious thing than
life, these measures, together with more stringent rules about the
possession of horses and arms, did much to stamp out the chances of an
insurrection in our rear. The worst sort of peace is an enforced peace,
but if that can be established time and justice may do the rest.
The operations which have been here described may be finally summed up
in one short paragraph. A Boer army came south of the British line and
besieged a British garrison. Three British forces, those of French,
Rundle, and Ian Hamilton, were despatched to cut it off. It successfully
threaded its way among them and escaped. It was followed to the
northward as far as the town of Winburg, which remained in the British
possession. Lord Roberts had failed in his plan of cutting off De Wet's
army, but, at the expense of many marches and skirmishes, the south-east
of the State was cleared of the enemy.