On March 13th Lord Roberts occupied the capital of the Orange Free
State. On May 1st, more than six weeks later, the advance was resumed.
This long delay was absolutely necessary in order to supply the place of
the ten thousand horses and mules which are said to have been used up in
the severe work of the preceding month. It was not merely that a large
number of the cavalry chargers had died or been abandoned, but it was
that of those which remained the majority were in a state which made
them useless for immediate service. How far this might have been
avoided is open to question, for it is notorious that General French's
reputation as a horsemaster does not stand so high as his fame as a
cavalry leader. But besides the horses there was urgent need of every
sort of supply, from boots to hospitals, and the only way by which
they could come was by two single-line railways which unite into one
single-line railway, with the alternative of passing over a precarious
pontoon bridge at Norval's Pont, or truck by truck over the road bridge
at Bethulie. To support an army of fifty thousand men under these
circumstances, eight hundred miles from a base, is no light matter, and
a premature advance which could not be thrust home would be the greatest
of misfortunes. The public at home and the army in Africa became
restless under the inaction, but it was one more example of the absolute
soundness of Lord Roberts's judgment and the quiet resolution with which
he adheres to it. He issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the
Free State promising protection to all who should bring in their arms
and settle down upon their farms. The most stringent orders were issued
against looting or personal violence, but nothing could exceed the
gentleness and good humour of the troops. Indeed there seemed more need
for an order which should protect them against the extortion of their
conquered enemies. It is strange to think that we are separated by only
ninety years from the savage soldiery of Badajoz and San Sebastian.
The streets of the little Dutch town formed during this interval a
curious object-lesson in the resources of the Empire. All the scattered
Anglo-Celtic races had sent their best blood to fight for the common
cause. Peace is the great solvent, as war is the powerful unifier.
For the British as for the German Empire much virtue had come from
the stress and strain of battle. To stand in the market square of
Bloemfontein and to see the warrior types around you was to be assured
of the future of the race. The middle-sized, square-set, weather-tanned,
straw-bearded British regulars crowded the footpaths. There also
one might see the hard-faced Canadians, the loose-limbed dashing
Australians, fireblooded and keen, the dark New Zealanders, with a Maori
touch here and there in their features, the gallant men of Tasmania, the
gentlemen troopers of India and Ceylon, and everywhere the wild South
African irregulars with their bandoliers and unkempt wiry horses,
Rimington's men with the racoon bands, Roberts's Horse with the black
plumes, some with pink puggarees, some with birdseye, but all of the
same type, hard, rugged, and alert. The man who could look at these
splendid soldiers, and, remembering the sacrifices of time, money,
and comfort which most of them had made before they found themselves
fighting in the heart of Africa, doubt that the spirit of the race
burned now as brightly as ever, must be devoid of judgment and sympathy.
The real glories of the British race lie in the future, not in the past.
The Empire walks, and may still walk, with an uncertain step, but with
every year its tread will be firmer, for its weakness is that of waxing
youth and not of waning age.
The greatest misfortune of the campaign, one which it was obviously
impolitic to insist upon at the time, began with the occupation of
Bloemfontein. This was the great outbreak of enteric among the troops.
For more than two months the hospitals were choked with sick. One
general hospital with five hundred beds held seventeen hundred sick,
nearly all enterics. A half field hospital with fifty beds held three
hundred and seventy cases. The total number of cases could not have
been less than six or seven thousand--and this not of an evanescent and
easily treated complaint, but of the most persistent and debilitating
of continued fevers, the one too which requires the most assiduous
attention and careful nursing. How great was the strain only those who
had to meet it can tell. The exertions of the military hospitals and
of those others which were fitted out by private benevolence sufficed,
after a long struggle, to meet the crisis. At Bloemfontein alone, as
many as fifty men died in one day, and more than 1000 new graves in the
cemetery testify to the severity of the epidemic. No men in the campaign
served their country more truly than the officers and men of the medical
service, nor can any one who went through the epidemic forget the
bravery and unselfishness of those admirable nursing sisters who set the
men around them a higher standard of devotion to duty.
Enteric fever is always endemic in the country, and especially at
Bloemfontein, but there can be no doubt that this severe outbreak had
its origin in the Paardeberg water. All through the campaign, while the
machinery for curing disease was excellent, that for preventing it was
elementary or absent. If bad water can cost us more than all the bullets
of the enemy, then surely it is worth our while to make the drinking
of unboiled water a stringent military offence, and to attach to every
company and squadron the most rapid and efficient means for boiling
it--for filtering alone is useless. An incessant trouble it would be,
but it would have saved a division for the army. It is heartrending
for the medical man who has emerged from a hospital full of water-born
pestilence to see a regimental watercart being filled, without protest,
at some polluted wayside pool. With precautions and with inoculation all
those lives might have been saved. The fever died down with the advance
of the troops and the coming of the colder weather.
To return to the military operations: these, although they were
stagnant so far as the main army was concerned, were exceedingly and
inconveniently active in other quarters. Three small actions, two of
which were disastrous to our arms, and one successful defence marked the
period of the pause at Bloemfontein.
To the north of the town, some twelve miles distant lies the ubiquitous
Modder River, which is crossed by a railway bridge at a place named
Glen. The saving of the bridge was of considerable importance, and might
by the universal testimony of the farmers of that district have been
effected any time within the first few days of our occupation. We
appear, however, to have imperfectly appreciated how great was the
demoralisation of the Boers. In a week or so they took heart, returned,
and blew up the bridge. Roving parties of the enemy, composed mainly of
the redoubtable Johannesburg police, reappeared even to the south of the
river. Young Lygon was killed, and Colonels Crabbe and Codrington with
Captain Trotter, all of the Guards, were severely wounded by such a
body, whom they gallantly but injudiciously attempted to arrest when
armed only with revolvers.
These wandering patrols who kept the country unsettled, and harassed
the farmers who had taken advantage of Lord Roberts's proclamation, were
found to have their centre at a point some six miles to the north of
Glen, named Karee. At Karee a formidable line of hills cut the British
advance, and these had been occupied by a strong body of the enemy
with guns. Lord Roberts determined to drive them off, and on March 28th
Tucker's 7th Division, consisting of Chermside's brigade (Lincolns,
Norfolks, Hampshires, and Scottish Borderers), and Wavell's brigade
(Cheshires, East Lancashires, North Staffords, and South Wales
Borderers), were assembled at Glen. The artillery consisted of the
veteran 18th, 62nd, and 75th R.F.A. Three attenuated cavalry brigades
with some mounted infantry completed the force.
The movement was to be upon the old model, and in result it proved to
be only too truly so. French's cavalry were to get round one flank, Le
Gallais's mounted infantry round the other, and Tucker's Division to
attack in front. Nothing could be more perfect in theory and nothing
apparently more defective in practice. Since on this as on other
occasions the mere fact that the cavalry were demonstrating in the rear
caused the complete abandonment of the position, it is difficult to
see what the object of the infantry attack could be. The ground was
irregular and unexplored, and it was late before the horsemen on their
weary steeds found themselves behind the flank of the enemy. Some of
them, Le Gallais's mounted infantry and Davidson's guns, had come from
Bloemfontein during the night, and the horses were exhausted by the long
march, and by the absurd weight which the British troop-horse is asked
to carry. Tucker advanced his infantry exactly as Kelly-Kenny had done
at Driefontein, and with a precisely similar result. The eight regiments
going forward in echelon of battalions imagined from the silence of the
enemy that the position had been abandoned. They were undeceived by a
cruel fire which beat upon two companies of the Scottish Borderers from
a range of two hundred yards. They were driven back, but reformed in
a donga. About half-past two a Boer gun burst shrapnel over the
Lincolnshires and Scottish Borderers with some effect, for a single
shell killed five of the latter regiment. Chermside's brigade was now
all involved in the fight, and Wavell's came up in support, but the
ground was too open and the position too strong to push the attack home.
Fortunately, about four o'clock, the horse batteries with French began
to make their presence felt from behind, and the Boers instantly quitted
their position and made off through the broad gap which still remained
between French and Le Gallais. The Brandfort plain appears to be ideal
ground for cavalry, but in spite of that the enemy with his guns got
safely away. The loss of the infantry amounted to one hundred and sixty
killed and wounded, the larger share of the casualties and of the honour
falling to the Scottish Borderers and the East Lancashires. The
infantry was not well handled, the cavalry was slow, and the guns were
inefficient--altogether an inglorious day. Yet strategically it was of
importance, for the ridge captured was the last before one came to the
great plain which stretched, with a few intermissions, to the north.
From March 29th until May 2nd Karee remained the advanced post.
In the meanwhile there had been a series of operations in the east which
had ended in a serious disaster. Immediately after the occupation of
Bloemfontein (on March 18th) Lord Roberts despatched to the east a
small column consisting of the 10th Hussars, the composite regiment,
two batteries (Q and U) of the Horse Artillery, some mounted infantry,
Roberts's Horse, and Rimington's Guides. On the eastern horizon forty
miles from the capital, but in that clear atmosphere looking only half
the distance, there stands the impressive mountain named Thabanchu (the
black mountain). To all Boers it is an historical spot, for it was at
its base that the wagons of the Voortrekkers, coming by devious ways
from various parts, assembled. On the further side of Thabanchu, to the
north and east of it, lies the richest grain-growing portion of the Free
State, the centre of which is Ladybrand. The forty miles which intervene
between Bloemfontein and Thabanchu are intersected midway by the Modder
River. At this point are the waterworks, erected recently with modern
machinery, to take the place of the insanitary wells on which the town
had been dependent. The force met with no resistance, and the small town
of Thabanchu was occupied.
Colonel Pilcher, the leader of the Douglas raid, was inclined to explore
a little further, and with three squadrons of mounted men he rode on
to the eastward. Two commandos, supposed to be Grobler's and Olivier's,
were seen by them, moving on a line which suggested that they were going
to join Steyn, who was known to be rallying his forces at Kroonstad,
his new seat of government in the north of the Free State. Pilcher, with
great daring, pushed onwards until with his little band on their tired
horses he found himself in Ladybrand, thirty miles from his
nearest supports. Entering the town he seized the landdrost and the
field-cornet, but found that strong bodies of the enemy were moving upon
him and that it was impossible for him to hold the place. He retired,
therefore, holding grimly on to his prisoners, and got back with small
loss to the place from which he started. It was a dashing piece of
bluff, and, when taken with the Douglas exploit, leads one to hope that
Pilcher may have a chance of showing what he can do with larger means
at his disposal. Finding that the enemy was following him in force, he
pushed on the same night for Thabanchu. His horsemen must have covered
between fifty and sixty miles in the twenty-four hours.
Apparently the effect of Pilcher's exploit was to halt the march of
those commandos which had been seen trekking to the north-west, and to
cause them to swing round upon Thabanchu. Broadwood, a young cavalry
commander who had won a name in Egypt, considered that his position was
unnecessarily exposed and fell back upon Bloemfontein. He halted on the
first night near the waterworks, halfway upon his journey.
The Boers are great masters in the ambuscade. Never has any race shown
such aptitude for this form of warfare--a legacy from a long succession
of contests with cunning savages. But never also have they done anything
so clever and so audacious as De Wet's dispositions in this action. One
cannot go over the ground without being amazed at the ingenuity of their
attack, and also at the luck which favoured them, for the trap which
they had laid for others might easily have proved an absolutely fatal
one for themselves.
The position beside the Modder at which the British camped had numerous
broken hills to the north and east of it. A force of Boers, supposed
to number about two thousand men, came down in the night, bringing with
them several heavy guns, and with the early morning opened a brisk fire
upon the camp. The surprise was complete. But the refinement of the Boer
tactics lay in the fact that they had a surprise within a surprise--and
it was the second which was the more deadly.
The force which Broadwood had with him consisted of the 10th Hussars
and the composite regiment, Rimington's Scouts, Roberts's Horse, the
New Zealand and Burmah Mounted Infantry, with Q and U batteries of Horse
Artillery. With such a force, consisting entirely of mounted men, he
could not storm the hills upon which the Boer guns were placed, and his
twelve-pounders were unable to reach the heavier cannon of the enemy.
His best game was obviously to continue his march to Bloemfontein. He
sent on the considerable convoy of wagons and the guns, while he with
the cavalry covered the rear, upon which the long-range pieces of the
enemy kept up the usual well-directed but harmless fire.
Broadwood's retreating column now found itself on a huge plain which
stretches all the way to Bloemfontein, broken only by two hills, both
of which were known to be in our possession. The plain was one which was
continually traversed from end to end by our troops and convoys, so that
once out upon its surface all danger seemed at an end. Broadwood had
additional reasons for feeling secure, for he knew that, in answer
to his own wise request, Colvile's Division had been sent out before
daybreak that morning from Bloemfontein to meet him. In a very few miles
their vanguard and his must come together. There were obviously no Boers
upon the plain, but if there were they would find themselves between two
fires. He gave no thought to his front therefore, but rode behind, where
the Boer guns were roaring, and whence the Boer riflemen might ride.
But in spite of the obvious there WERE Boers upon the plain, so placed
that they must either bring off a remarkable surprise or be themselves
cut off to a man. Across the veld, some miles from the waterworks, there
runs a deep donga or watercourse--one of many, but the largest. It cuts
the rough road at right angles. Its depth and breadth are such that a
wagon would dip down the incline, and disappear for about two minutes
before it would become visible again at the crown of the other side.
In appearance it was a huge curving ditch with a stagnant stream at the
bottom. The sloping sides of the ditch were fringed with Boers, who had
ridden thither before dawn and were now waiting for the unsuspecting
column. There were not more than three hundred of them, and four times
their number were approaching; but no odds can represent the difference
between the concealed man with the magazine rifle and the man upon the
plain.
There were two dangers, however, which the Boers ran, and, skilful as
their dispositions were, their luck was equally great, for the risks
were enormous. One was that a force coming the other way (Colvile's
was only a few miles off) would arrive, and that they would be ground
between the upper and the lower millstone. The other was that for once
the British scouts might give the alarm and that Broadwood's mounted men
would wheel swiftly to right and left and secure the ends of the long
donga. Should that happen, not a man of them could possibly escape. But
they took their chances like brave men, and fortune was their friend.
The wagons came on without any scouts. Behind them was U battery, then
Q, with Roberts's Horse abreast of them and the rest of the cavalry
behind.
As the wagons, occupied for the most part only by unarmed sick soldiers
and black transport drivers, came down into the drift, the Boers quickly
but quietly took possession of them, and drove them on up the further
slope. Thus the troops behind saw their wagons dip down, reappear,
and continue on their course. The idea of an ambush could not suggest
itself. Only one thing could avert an absolute catastrophe, and that was
the appearance of a hero who would accept certain death in order to warn
his comrades. Such a man rode by the wagons--though, unhappily, in the
stress and rush of the moment there is no certainty as to his name or
rank. We only know that one was found brave enough to fire his revolver
in the face of certain death. The outburst of firing which answered his
shot was the sequel which saved the column. Not often is it given to a
man to die so choice a death as that of this nameless soldier.
But the detachment was already so placed that nothing could save it from
heavy loss. The wagons had all passed but nine, and the leading battery
of artillery was at the very edge of the donga. Nothing is so helpless
as a limbered-up battery. In an instant the teams were shot down and the
gunners were made prisoners. A terrific fire burst at the same instant
upon Roberts's Horse, who were abreast of the guns. 'Files a bout!
gallop!' yelled Colonel Dawson, and by his exertions and those of Major
Pack-Beresford the corps was extricated and reformed some hundreds
of yards further off. But the loss of horses and men was heavy. Major
Pack-Beresford and other officers were shot down, and every unhorsed
man remained necessarily as a prisoner under the very muzzles of the
riflemen in the donga.
As Roberts's Horse turned and galloped for dear life across the flat,
four out of the six guns [Footnote: Of the other two one overturned and
could not be righted, the other had the wheelers shot and could not be
extricated from the tumult. It was officially stated that the guns of
Q battery were halted a thousand yards off the donga, but my impression
was, from examining the ground, that it was not more than six hundred.]
of Q battery and one gun (the rearmost) of U battery swung round and
dashed frantically for a place of safety. At the same instant every Boer
along the line of the donga sprang up and emptied his magazine into
the mass of rushing, shouting soldiers, plunging horses, and screaming
Kaffirs. It was for a few moments a sauve-qui-peut. Serjeant-Major
Martin of U, with a single driver on a wheeler, got away the last gun
of his battery. The four guns which were extricated of Q, under Major
Phipps-Hornby, whirled across the plain, pulled up, unlimbered, and
opened a brisk fire of shrapnel from about a thousand yards upon the
donga. Had the battery gone on for double the distance, its action would
have been more effective, for it would have been under a less deadly
rifle fire, but in any case its sudden change from flight to discipline
and order steadied the whole force. Roberts's men sprang from their
horses, and with the Burmese and New Zealanders flung themselves down
in a skirmish line. The cavalry moved to the left to find some drift by
which the donga could be passed, and out of chaos there came in a few
minutes calm and a settled purpose.
It was for Q battery to cover the retreat of the force, and most nobly
it did it. A fortnight later a pile of horses, visible many hundreds of
yards off across the plain, showed where the guns had stood. It was the
Colenso of the horse gunners. In a devilish sleet of lead they stood to
their work, loading and firing while a man was left. Some of the guns
were left with two men to work them, one was loaded and fired by a
single officer. When at last the order for retirement came, only ten
men, several of them wounded, were left upon their feet. With scratch
teams from the limbers, driven by single gunners, the twelve-pounders
staggered out of action, and the skirmish line of mounted infantry
sprang to their feet amid the hail of bullets to cheer them as they
passed.
It was no slight task to extricate that sorely stricken force from the
close contact of an exultant enemy, and to lead it across that terrible
donga. Yet, thanks to the coolness of Broadwood and the steadiness of
his rearguard, the thing was done. A practicable passage had been found
two miles to the south by Captain Chester-Master of Rimington's. This
corps, with Roberts's, the New Zealanders, and the 3rd Mounted Infantry,
covered the withdrawal in turn. It was one of those actions in which the
horseman who is trained to fight upon foot did very much better than the
regular cavalry. In two hours' time the drift had been passed and the
survivors of the force found themselves in safety.
The losses in this disastrous but not dishonourable engagement were
severe. About thirty officers and five hundred men were killed, wounded,
or missing. The prisoners came to more than three hundred. They lost
a hundred wagons, a considerable quantity of stores, and seven
twelve-pounder guns--five from U battery and two from Q. Of U battery
only Major Taylor and Sergeant-Major Martin seem to have escaped, the
rest being captured en bloc. Of Q battery nearly every man was killed or
wounded. Roberts's Horse, the New Zealanders, and the mounted infantry
were the other corps which suffered most heavily. Among many brave men
who died, none was a greater loss to the service than Major Booth of
the Northumberland Fusiliers, serving in the mounted infantry. With four
comrades he held a position to cover the retreat, and refused to leave
it. Such men are inspired by the traditions of the past, and pass on the
story of their own deaths to inspire fresh heroes in the future.
Broadwood, the instant that he had disentangled himself, faced about,
and brought his guns into action. He was not strong enough, however,
nor were his men in a condition, to seriously attack the enemy. Martyr's
mounted infantry had come up, led by the Queenslanders, and at the cost
of some loss to themselves helped to extricate the disordered force.
Colvile's Division was behind Bushman's Kop, only a few miles off, and
there were hopes that it might push on and prevent the guns and wagons
from being removed. Colvile did make an advance, but slowly and in a
flanking direction instead of dashing swiftly forward to retrieve the
situation. It must be acknowledged, however, that the problem which
faced this General was one of great difficulty. It was almost certain
that before he could throw his men into the action the captured guns
would be beyond his reach, and it was possible that he might swell the
disaster. With all charity, however, one cannot but feel that his
return next morning, after a reinforcement during the night, without
any attempt to force the Boer position, was lacking in enterprise.
[Footnote: It may be urged in General Colvile's defence that his
division had already done a long march from Bloemfontein. A division,
however, which contains two such brigades as Macdonald's and
Smith-Dorrien's may safely be called upon for any exertions. The
gunner officers in Colvile's division heard their comrades' guns in
'section--fire' and knew it to be the sign of a desperate situation.]
The victory left the Boers in possession of the waterworks, and
Bloemfontein had to fall back upon her wells--a change which reacted
most disastrously upon the enteric which was already decimating the
troops.
The effect of the Sanna's Post defeat was increased by the fact that
only four days later (on April 4th) a second even more deplorable
disaster befell our troops. This was the surrender of five companies
of infantry, two of them mounted, at Reddersberg. So many surrenders of
small bodies of troops had occurred during the course of the war that
the public, remembering how seldom the word 'surrender' had ever been
heard in our endless succession of European wars, had become very
restive upon the subject, and were sometimes inclined to question
whether this new and humiliating fact did not imply some deterioration
of our spirit. The fear was natural, and yet nothing could be more
unjust to this the most splendid army which has ever marched under the
red-crossed flag. The fact was new because the conditions were new, and
it was inherent in those conditions. In that country of huge distances
small bodies must be detached, for the amount of space covered by
the large bodies was not sufficient for all military purposes. In
reconnoitring, in distributing proclamations, in collecting arms, in
overawing outlying districts, weak columns must be used. Very often
these columns must contain infantry soldiers, as the demands upon the
cavalry were excessive. Such bodies, moving through a hilly country with
which they were unfamiliar, were always liable to be surrounded by a
mobile enemy. Once surrounded the length of their resistance was limited
by three things: their cartridges, their water, and their food. When
they had all three, as at Wepener or Mafeking, they could hold out
indefinitely. When one or other was wanting, as at Reddersberg or
Nicholson's Nek, their position was impossible. They could not break
away, for how can men on foot break away from horsemen? Hence those
repeated humiliations, which did little or nothing to impede the
course of the war, and which were really to be accepted as one of the
inevitable prices which we had to pay for the conditions under which
the war was fought. Numbers, discipline, and resources were with us.
Mobility, distances, nature of the country, insecurity of supplies, were
with them. We need not take it to heart therefore if it happened, with
all these forces acting against them, that our soldiers found themselves
sometimes in a position whence neither wisdom nor valour could rescue
them. To travel through that country, fashioned above all others for
defensive warfare, with trench and fort of superhuman size and strength,
barring every path, one marvels how it was that such incidents were not
more frequent and more serious. It is deplorable that the white flag
should ever have waved over a company of British troops, but the man who
is censorious upon the subject has never travelled in South Africa.
In the disaster at Reddersberg three of the companies were of the
Irish Rifles, and two of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers--the same
unfortunate regiments which had already been cut up at Stormberg. They
had been detached from Gatacre's 3rd Division, the headquarters of which
was at Springfontein. On the abandonment of Thabanchu and the disaster
of Sanna's Post, it was obvious that we should draw in our detached
parties to the east; so the five companies were ordered to leave
Dewetsdorp, which they were garrisoning, and to get back to the railway
line. Either the order was issued too late, or they were too slow in
obeying it, for they were only halfway upon their journey, near the
town of Reddersberg, when the enemy came down upon them with five guns.
Without artillery they were powerless, but, having seized a kopje, they
took such shelter as they could find, and waited in the hope of succour.
Their assailants seem to have been detached from De Wet's force in the
north, and contained among them many of the victors of Sanna's Post. The
attack began at 11 A.M. of April 3rd, and all day the men lay among the
stones, subjected to the pelt of shell and bullet. The cover was good,
however, and the casualties were not heavy. The total losses were under
fifty killed and wounded. More serious than the enemy's fire was the
absence of water, save a very limited supply in a cart. A message was
passed through of the dire straits in which they found themselves, and
by the late afternoon the news had reached headquarters. Lord Roberts
instantly despatched the Camerons, just arrived from Egypt, to Bethany,
which is the nearest point upon the line, and telegraphed to Gatacre at
Springfontein to take measures to save his compromised detachment. The
telegram should have reached Gatacre early on the evening of the 3rd,
and he had collected a force of fifteen hundred men, entrained
it, journeyed forty miles up the line, detrained it, and reached
Reddersberg, which is ten or twelve miles from the line, by 10.30 next
morning. Already, however, it was too late, and the besieged force,
unable to face a second day without water under that burning sun, had
laid down their arms. No doubt the stress of thirst was dreadful,
and yet one cannot say that the defence rose to the highest point of
resolution. Knowing that help could not be far off, the garrison should
have held on while they could lift a rifle. If the ammunition was
running low, it was bad management which caused it to be shot away too
fast. Captain McWhinnie, who was in command, behaved with the utmost
personal gallantry. Not only the troops but General Gatacre also was
involved in the disaster. Blame may have attached to him for leaving
a detachment at Dewetsdorp, and not having a supporting body at
Reddersberg upon which it might fall back; but it must be remembered
that his total force was small and that he had to cover a long stretch
of the lines of communication. As to General Gatacre's energy and
gallantry it is a by-word in the army; but coming after the Stormberg
disaster this fresh mishap to his force made the continuance of his
command impossible. Much sympathy was felt with him in the army, where
he was universally liked and respected by officers and men. He returned
to England, and his division was taken over by General Chermside.
In a single week, at a time when the back of the war had seemed to be
broken, we had lost nearly twelve hundred men with seven guns. The men
of the Free State--for the fighting was mainly done by commandos from
the Ladybrand, Winburg, Bethlehem, and Harrismith districts--deserve
great credit for this fine effort, and their leader De Wet confirmed the
reputation which he had already gained as a dashing and indefatigable
leader. His force was so weak that when Lord Roberts was able to really
direct his own against it, he brushed it away before him; but the manner
in which De Wet took advantage of Roberts's enforced immobility, and
dared to get behind so mighty an enemy, was a fine exhibition of courage
and enterprise. The public at home chafed at this sudden and unexpected
turn of affairs; but the General, constant to his own fixed purpose,
did not permit his strength to be wasted, and his cavalry to be again
disorganised, by flying excursions, but waited grimly until he should be
strong enough to strike straight at Pretoria.
In this short period of depression there came one gleam of light from
the west. This was the capture of a commando of sixty Boers, or rather
of sixty foreigners fighting for the Boers, and the death of the gallant
Frenchman, De Villebois-Mareuil, who appears to have had the ambition of
playing Lafayette in South Africa to Kruger's Washington. From the time
that Kimberley had been reoccupied the British had been accumulating
their force there so as to make a strong movement which should coincide
with that of Roberts from Bloemfontein. Hunter's Division from Natal
was being moved round to Kimberley, and Methuen already commanded
a considerable body of troops, which included a number of the newly
arrived Imperial Yeomanry. With these Methuen pacified the surrounding
country, and extended his outposts to Barkly West on the one side, to
Boshof on the other, and to Warrenton upon the Vaal River in the centre.
On April 4th news reached Boshof that a Boer commando had been seen some
ten miles to the east of the town, and a force, consisting of Yeomanry,
Kimberley Light Horse, and half of Butcher's veteran 4th battery, was
sent to attack them. They were found to have taken up their position
upon a kopje which, contrary to all Boer custom, had no other kopjes
to support it. French generalship was certainly not so astute as Boer
cunning. The kopje was instantly surrounded, and the small force upon
the summit being without artillery in the face of our guns found itself
in exactly the same position which our men had been in twenty-four hours
before at Reddersberg. Again was shown the advantage which the mounted
rifleman has over the cavalry, for the Yeomanry and Light Horsemen left
their horses and ascended the hill with the bayonet. In three hours all
was over and the Boers had laid down their arms. Villebois was shot
with seven of his companions, and there were nearly sixty prisoners.
It speaks well for the skirmishing of the Yeomanry and the way in which
they were handled by Lord Chesham that though they worked their way up
the hill under fire they only lost four killed and a few wounded. The
affair was a small one, but it was complete, and it came at a time when
a success was very welcome. One bustling week had seen the expensive
victory of Karee, the disasters of Sanna's Post and Reddersberg, and the
successful skirmish of Boshof. Another chapter must be devoted to the
movement towards the south of the Boer forces and the dispositions which
Lord Roberts made to meet it.