and it is now in evidence before your Lordships. In this defence, he
supposes the charge which was made originally before the Commons, and
which the Commons voted, (though afterwards, for the convenience of
shortening it, the affair was brought before your Lordships in the way
in which it is,)--he supposes, I say, the whole to proceed from a
malicious intention; and I hope your Lordships will not think, and I
hope the Commons, reconsidering this matter, will not think, that, when
such an imputation of malice was made for the purpose of repelling this
corroborating argument which was used in the House of Commons to prove
his guilt, I was wrong in attempting to support the House of Commons
against his imputation of malice.
I must observe where I am limited and where I am not. I am limited,
strictly, fully, (and your Lordships and my country, who hear me, will
judge how faithfully I shall adhere to that limitation,) not to support
the credit of Nundcomar by any allegation against Mr. Hastings
respecting his condemnation or execution; but I am not at all limited
from endeavoring to support his credit against Mr. Hastings's charges of
other forgeries, and from showing you, what I hope to show you clearly
in a few words, that Nundcomar cannot be presumed guilty of forgery with
more probability than Mr. Hastings is guilty of bringing forward a light
and dangerous (for I use no other words than a light and dangerous)
charge of forgery, when it serves his purpose. Mr. Hastings charges
Nundcomar with two other forgeries. "These two forgeries," he says, "are
facts recorded in the very Proceedings which my accuser partially
quotes, proving this man to have been guilty of a most flagrant forgery
of a letter from Munny Begum, and of a letter from the Nabob Yeteram ul
Dowlah"; and therefore he infers malice in those who impute anything
improper to him, knowing that the proof stood so. Here he asserts that
there are records before the House of Commons, and on the Company's
Proceedings and Consultations, proving Nundcomar to have been guilty of
these two forgeries. Turn over the next page of his printed defence, and
you find a very extraordinary thing. You would have imagined that this
forgery of a letter from Munny Begum, which, he says, is recognized and
proved on the Journals, was a forgery charged by Munny Begum herself, or
by somebody on her part, or some person concerned in this business.
There is no other charge of it whatever, but the charge of Warren
Hastings himself. He wants you to discredit a man for forgery upon no
evidence under heaven but that of his own, who thinks proper, without
any sort of authority, without any sort of reference, without any sort
of collateral evidence, to charge a man with that very direct forgery.
"You are," he says, "well informed of the reasons which first induced me
to give any share of my confidence to Nundcomar, with whose character I
was acquainted by an experience of many years. The means which he
himself took to acquire it were peculiar to himself. He sent a messenger
to me at Madras, on the first news of my appointment to this Presidency,
with pretended letters from Munny Begum and the Nabob Yeteram ul Dowlah,
the brother of the Nabob Jaffier Ali Khân, filled with bitter invectives
against Mahomed Reza Khân, and of as warm recommendations, as I
recollect, of Nundcomar. I have been since informed by the Begum that
the letter which bore her seal was a complete forgery, and that she was
totally unacquainted with the use which had been made of her name till I
informed her of it. Juggut Chund, Nundcomar's son-in-law, was sent to
her expressly to entreat her not to divulge it. Mr. Middleton, whom she
consulted on the occasion, can attest the truth of this story."
Mr. Middleton is dead, my Lords. This is not the Mr. Middleton whom your
Lordships have heard and know well in this House, but a brother of that
Mr. Middleton, who is since dead. Your Lordships find, when we refer to
the records of the Company for the proof of this forgery, that there is
no other than the unsupported assertion of Mr. Hastings himself that he
was guilty of it. Now that was bad enough; but then hear the rest. Mr.
Hastings has charged this unhappy man, whom we must not defend, with
another forgery; he has charged him with a forgery of a letter from
Yeteram ul Dowlah to Mr. Hastings. Now you would imagine that he would
have given his own authority at least for that assertion, which he says
was proved. He goes on and says, "I have not yet had the curiosity to
inquire of the Nabob Yeteram ul Dowlah whether his letter was of the
same stamp; but I cannot doubt it."
Now here he begins, in this very defence which is before your Lordships,
to charge a forgery upon the credit of Munny Begum, without supporting
it even by his own testimony,--and another forgery in the name of
Yeteram ul Dowlah, which he said he had not even the curiosity to
inquire into, and yet desires you, at the same time, to believe it to be
proved. Good God! in what condition do men of the first character and
situation in that country stand, when we have here delivered to us, as a
record of the Company, Mr. Hastings's own assertions, saying that these
forgeries were proved, though you have for the first nothing but his own
unsupported assertion, and for the second his declaration only that he
had not the curiosity to inquire into it! I am not forbidden by the
Commons to state how and on what slight grounds Warren Hastings charges
the natives of the country with forgery; neither am I forbidden to bring
forward the accusation which Mr. Hastings made against Nundcomar for a
conspiracy, nor the event of it, nor any circumstance relative to it. I
shall therefore proceed in the best manner I can. There was a period,
among the revolutions of philosophy, when there was an opinion, that, if
a man lost one limb or organ, the strength of that which was lost
retired into what was left. My Lords, if we are straitened in this, then
our vigor will be redoubled in the rest, and we shall use it with double
force. If the top and point of the sword is broken off, we shall take
the hilt in our hand, and fight with whatever remains of the weapon
against bribery, corruption, and peculation; and we shall use double
diligence under any restraint which the wisdom of the Commons may lay
upon us, or your Lordships' wisdom may oblige us to submit to.
Having gone through this business, and shown in what manner I am
restrained, where I am not to repel Mr. Hastings's defence, and where I
am left at large to do it, I shall submit to the strict injunction with
the utmost possible humility, and enjoy the liberty which is left to me
with vigor, with propriety, and with discretion, I trust.
* * * * *
My Lords, when the circumstance happened which has given occasion to the
long parenthesis by which my discourse has been interrupted, I remember
I was beginning to open to your Lordships the second period of Mr.
Hastings's scheme and system of bribery. My Lords, his bribery is so
extensive, and has had such a variety in it, that it must be
distinguished not only with regard to its kind, but must be likewise
distinguished according to the periods of bribery and the epochas of
peculation committed by him. In the first of those periods we shall
prove to your Lordships, I believe, without the aids that we hoped for,
(your Lordships allowing, as I trust you will do, a good deal for our
situation,)--we shall be able, I say, to prove that Mr. Hastings took,
as a bribe for appointing Munny Begum, three lac and an half of rupees;
we shall prove the taking at the same time the Rajeshaye bribes. Mr.
Hastings at that time followed bribery in a natural manner: he took a
bribe; he took it as large as he could; he concealed it as well as he
could; and he got out of it by artifice or boldness, by use of trick or
use of power, just as he was enabled: he acted like a wild, natural man,
void of instruction, discipline, and art.
The second period opened another system of bribery. About this time he
began to think (from what communication your Lordships may guess) of
other means by which, when he could no longer conceal any bribe that he
had received, he not only might exempt himself from the charge and the
punishment of guilt, but might convert it into a kind of merit, and,
instead of a breaker of laws, a violator of his trust, a receiver of
scandalous bribes, a peculator of the first magnitude, might make
himself to be considered as a great, distinguishing, eminent financier,
a collector of revenue in new and extraordinary ways, and that we should
thus at once praise his diligence, industry, and ingenuity. The scheme
he set on foot was this: he pretended that the Company could not exist
upon principles of strict justice, (for so he expresses it,) and that
their affairs, in many cases, could not be so well accommodated by a
regular revenue as by privately taking money, which was to be applied to
their service by the person who took it, at his discretion. This was the
principle he laid down. It would hardly be believed, I imagine, unless
strong proof appeared, that any man could be so daring as to hold up
such a resource to a regular government, which had three million of
known, avowed, a great part of it territorial, revenue. But it is
necessary, it seems, to piece out the lion's skin with a fox's tail,--to
tack on a little piece of bribery and a little piece of peculation, in
order to help out the resources of a great and flourishing state; that
they should have in the knavery of their servants, in the breach of
their laws, and in the entire defiance of their covenants, a real
resource applicable to their necessities, of which they were not to
judge, but the persons who were to take the bribes; and that the bribes
thus taken were, by a mental reservation, a private intention in the
mind of the taker, unknown to the giver, to be some time or other, in
some way or other, applied to the public service. The taking such bribes
was to become a justifiable act, in consequence of that reservation in
the mind of the person who took them; and he was not to be called to
account for them in any other way than as he thought fit.
My Lords, an act of Parliament passed in the year 1773, the whole drift
of which, I may say, was to prevent bribery, peculation, and extortion
in the Company's servants; and the act was penned, I think, with as much
strictness and rigor as ever act was penned. The 24th clause of Chap.
63, 13 Geo. III., has the following enactment: "And be it further
enacted by the authority aforesaid, that, from and after the first day
of August, 1774, no person holding or exercising any civil or military
office under the crown, or the said United Company, in the East Indies,
shall accept, receive, or take, directly or indirectly, by himself, or
any other person or persons on his behalf, or for his use or benefit,
of and from any of the Indian princes or powers, or their ministers or
agents, or any of the natives of Asia, any present, gift, donation,
gratuity, or reward, pecuniary or otherwise, upon any account, or on any
pretence whatsoever, or any promise or engagement for any present, gift,
donation, gratuity, or reward: and if any person, holding or exercising
any such civil or military office, shall be guilty of any such offence,
and shall be thereof legally convicted," &c., &c. It then imposes the
penalties: and your Lordships see that human wisdom cannot pen an act
more strongly directed against taking bribes upon any pretence whatever.
This act of Parliament was in affirmance of the covenant entered into by
the servants of the Company, and of the explicit orders of the Company,
which forbid any person whatever in trust, "directly or indirectly, to
accept, take, or receive, or agree to accept, take, or receive, any
gift, reward, gratuity, allowance, donation, or compensation, in money,
effects, jewels, _or otherwise howsoever_, from any of the Indian
princes, sovereigns, subahs, or nabobs, or any of their ministers,
servants, or agents, exceeding the value of four thousand rupees, &c.,
&c. And that he, the said Warren Hastings, shall and will convey,
assign, and make over to the said United Company, for their sole and
proper use and benefit, all and every such gifts, rewards, gratuities,
allowances, donations, or compensations whatsoever, which, contrary to
the true intent and meaning of these presents, shall come into the
hands, possession, or power of the said Warren Hastings, or any other
person or persons in trust for him or for his use."
The nature of the covenant, the act of Parliament, and the Company's
orders are clear. First, they have not forbidden their
Governor-General, nor any of their Governors, to take and accept from
the princes of the country, openly and publicly, for their use, any
territories, lands, sums of money, or other donations, which may be
offered in consequence of treaty or otherwise. It was necessary to
distinguish this from every other species of acceptance, because many
occasions occurred in which fines were paid to the Company in
consequence of treaties; and it was necessary to authorize the receipt
of the same in the Company's treasury, as an open and known proceeding.
It was never dreamed that this should justify the taking of bribes,
privately and clandestinely, by the Governor, or any other servant of
the Company, for the purpose of its future application to the Company's
use. It is declared that all such bribes and money received should be
the property of the Company. And why? As a means of recovering them out
of the corrupt hands that had taken them. And therefore this was not a
license for bribery, but a prohibitory and penal clause, providing the
means of coercion, and making the prohibition stronger. Now Mr. Hastings
has found out that this very coercive clause, which was made in order to
enable his superiors to get at him and punish him for bribery, is a
license for him to receive bribes. He is not only a practitioner of
bribery, but a professor, a doctor upon the subject. His opinion is,
that he might take presents or bribes to himself; he considers the penal
clause which the Company attached to their prohibition, and by which all
such bribes are constructively declared to be theirs, in order to
recover them out of his hands, as a license to receive bribes, to extort
money; and he goes with the very prohibition in his hand, the very
means by which he was to be restrained, to exercise an unlimited
bribery, peculation, and extortion over the unhappy natives of the
country.
The moment he finds that the Company has got a scent of any one of his
bribes, he comes forward and says, "To be sure, I took it as a bribe; I
admit the party gave me it as a bribe: I concealed it for a time,
because I thought it was for the interest of the Company to conceal it;
but I had a secret intention, in my own mind, of applying it to their
service: you shall have it; but you shall have it as I please, and when
I please; and this bribe becomes sanctified the moment I think fit to
apply it to your service." Now can it be supposed that the India
Company, or that the act of Parliament, meant, by declaring that the
property taken by a corrupt servant, contrary to the true intent of his
covenant, was theirs, to give a license to take such property,--and that
one mode of obtaining a revenue was by the breach of the very covenants
which were meant to prevent extortion, peculation, and corruption? What
sort of body is the India Company, which, coming to the verge of
bankruptcy by the robbery of half the world, is afterwards to subsist
upon the alms of peculation and bribery, to have its strength recruited
by the violation of the covenants imposed upon its own servants? It is
an odd sort of body to be so fed and so supported. This new constitution
of revenue that he has made is indeed a very singular contrivance. It is
a revenue to be collected by any officer of the Company, (for they are
all alike forbidden, and all alike permitted,)--to be collected by any
person, from any person, at any time, in any proportion, by any means,
and in any way he pleases; and to be accounted for, or not to be
accounted for, at the pleasure of the collector, and, if applied to
their use, to be applied at his discretion, and not at the discretion of
his employers. I will venture to say that such a system of revenue never
was before thought of. The next part is an exchequer, which he has
formed, corresponding with it. You will find the board of exchequer made
up of officers ostensibly in the Company's service, of their public
accountant and public treasurer, whom Mr. Hastings uses as an accountant
and treasurer of bribes, accountable, not to the Company, but to
himself, acting in no public manner, and never acting but upon his
requisition, concealing all his frauds and artifices to prevent
detection and discovery. In short, it is an exchequer in which, if I may
be permitted to repeat the words I made use of on a former occasion,
extortion is the assessor, in which fraud is the treasurer, confusion
the accountant, oblivion the remembrancer. That these are not mere
words, I will exemplify as I go through the detail: I will show you that
every one of the things I have stated are truths, in fact, and that
these men are bound by the condition of their recognized fidelity to Mr.
Hastings to keep back his secrets, to change the accounts, to alter the
items, to make him debtor or creditor at pleasure, and by that means to
throw the whole system of the Company's accounts into confusion.
I have shown the impossibility of the Company's having intended to
authorize such a revenue, much less such a constitution of it as Mr.
Hastings has drawn from the very prohibitions of bribery, and such an
exchequer as he has formed upon the principles I have stated. You will
not dishonor the legislature or the Company, be it what it may, by
thinking that either of them could give any sanction to it. Indeed, you
will not think that such a device could ever enter into the head of any
rational man. You are, then, to judge whether it is not a device to
cover guilt, to prevent detection by destroying the means of it; and at
the same time your Lordships will judge whether the evidence we bring
you to prove that revenue is a mere pretext be not stronger than the
strange, absurd reasons which he has produced for forming this new plan
of an exchequer of bribery.
My Lords, I am now going to read to you a letter in which Mr. Hastings
declares his opinion upon the operation of the act, which he now has
found the means, as he thinks, of evading. My Lords, I will tell you, to
save you a good deal of reading, that there was certain prize-money
given by Sujah ul Dowlah to a body of the Company's troops serving in
the field,--that this prize-money was to be distributed among them; but
upon application being made to Mr. Hastings for his opinion and sanction
in the distribution, Mr. Hastings at first seemed inclined to give way
to it, but afterwards, upon reading and considering the act of
Parliament, before he allowed the soldiery to receive this public
donation, he thus describes his opinion of the operation of the act.
_Extract of a Letter from Mr. Hastings to Colonel Champion, 31 August,
1774._
"Upon a reference to the new act of Parliament, I was much disappointed
and sorry to find that our intentions were entirely defeated by a clause
in the act, (to be in force after the 1st of August, 1774,) which
divests us of the power to grant, and expressly prohibits the army to
receive, the Nabob's intended donation. Agreeable to the positive sense
of this clause, notwithstanding it is expressed individually, there is
not a doubt but the army is included with all other persons in the
prohibition from receiving presents or donations; a confirmation of
which is, that in the clause of exceptions, wherein 'counsellors-at-law,
physicians, surgeons, and chaplains are permitted to receive the fees
annexed to their profession,' no mention whatever is made of any
latitude given to the army, or any circumstances wherein it would be
allowable for them to receive presents.... This unlucky discovery of an
exclusion by act of Parliament, which admits of no abatement or evasion
wherever its authority extends, renders a revisal of our proceedings
necessary, and leaves no option to our decision. It is not like the
ordinances of the Court of Directors, where a favorable construction may
be put, and some room is left for the interposition of the authority
vested in ourselves,--but positive and decisive, admitting neither of
refinement nor misconstruction. I should be happy, if in this instance a
method could be devised of setting the act aside, which I should most
willingly embrace; but, in my opinion, an opposition would be to incur
the penalty."
* * * * *
Your Lordships see, Mr. Hastings considered this act to be a most
unlucky discovery: indeed, as long as it remained in force, it would
have been unlucky for him, because it would have destroyed one of the
principal sources of his illegal profits. Why does he consider it
unlucky? Because it admits of no reservation, no exception, no
refinement whatever, but is clear, positive, decisive. Now in what case
was it that Mr. Hastings made this determination? In the case of a
donation publicly offered to an army serving in the field by a prince
then independent of the Company. If ever there was a circumstance in
which any refinement, any favorable construction of the act could be
used, it was in favor of a body of men serving in the field, fighting
for their country, spilling their blood for it, suffering all the
inconveniences of that climate. It was undoubtedly voluntarily offered
to them by the party, in the height of victory, and enriched by the
plunder of whole provinces. I believe your Lordships will agree with me,
that, if any relaxation, any evasion, of an act of Parliament could be
allowed, if the intention of the legislature could for a moment be
trifled with, or supposed for a moment doubtful, it was in this
instance; and yet, upon the rigor of the act, Mr. Hastings refuses that
army the price of their blood, money won solely almost by their arms for
a prince who had acquired millions by their bravery, fidelity, and
sufferings. This was the case in which Mr. Hastings refused a public
donation to the army; and from that day to this they have never received
it.
If the receipt of this public donation could be thus forbidden, whence
has Mr. Hastings since learned that he may privately take money, and
take it not only from princes, and persons in power, and abounding in
wealth, but, as we shall prove, from persons in a comparative degree of
penury and distress? that he could take it from persons in office and
trust, whose power gave them the means of ruining the people for the
purpose of enabling themselves to pay it? Consider in what a situation
the Company must be, if the Governor-General can form such a secret
exchequer of direct bribes, given _eo nomine_ as bribes, and accepted as
such, by the parties concerned in the transaction, to be discovered only
by himself, and with only the inward reservation that I have spoken of.