SOME CRITICISMS
If we inquire what was thought at home of the failure at Spion Kop
after the high hopes which the advent of Sir Charles Warren in Natal
had raised, we must look back for a moment to the beginning of the
operations and note the great interest with which the news from Natal
was day by day eagerly read by the public. The excitement caused
by the second attempt of Sir Redvers Buller to relieve Ladysmith
by a turning movement to the left of Potgieter’s Drift was greatly
increased when his telegram, dated 23rd January, 6.30 P.M., was
received, stating that General Warren held the position he had gained
two days before, and that ‘an attempt will be made to-night to seize
Spion Kop, the Salient which forms the left of the enemy’s position
facing Trichard’s Drift and divides it from the position facing
Potgieter’s.’
The public remained in suspense until the announcement came that
Spion Kop had been captured and that Warren considered it tenable.
Then there were loud rejoicings everywhere, too soon, alas, disturbed
by sinister rumours of failure, coming in some mysterious way from
the Continental Press, and then the brief telegram of 25th January:
‘Warren’s garrison, I am sorry to say, I find this morning had in
the night abandoned Spion Kop’; followed subsequently by another
exonerating Colonel Thorneycroft from all blame.
The position in consequence thus presented itself to the public: The
attack on Spion Kop had for some unknown reason proved a failure,
and the relief of Ladysmith had been thereby indefinitely postponed.
Somebody was to blame. Sir Redvers Buller said Warren’s garrison had
abandoned Spion Kop, but he exonerated Thorneycroft. The natural
inference was that Warren was the man to be hanged. Then came the
reaction, and the fickle public turned to rend the unsuccessful
Generals. This state of feeling was not improved by the publication,
after many weeks’ delay, of the despatches in which Sir Redvers
Buller throws the whole blame upon Sir Charles Warren, and not only
exonerates Thorneycroft but considers that he saved the situation;
in which also Lord Roberts is of opinion that Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft’s assumption of responsibility and authority was
needless, unwarrantable, and wholly inexcusable; that Sir Charles
Warren should have visited Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening;
that ‘there was a want of organisation and system which acted most
unfavourably on the defence’; and that the failure of the attempt
to relieve Ladysmith was probably in part due to errors of judgment
and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles
Warren; but that it must also be ascribed to Sir Redvers Buller’s
disinclination to assert his authority.
With the dismay felt at the folly of the Government in making such a
wanton exhibition to the world of the shortcomings of our commanders
in the field there was mingled a grim satisfaction that in censuring
all concerned the public disappointment was avenged. Lord Roberts had
administered a rough sort of justice. There had been a failure, and
all the leading actors in the business were blamed; but the one who
came off worst was Sir Charles Warren. Sir Redvers Buller had thrown
the blame on Sir Charles Warren, but had supported Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft. No one spoke for Sir Charles Warren, who was not
allowed to speak for himself. Consequently the critics took up the
parable, and Sir Charles Warren was blamed for everything that
occurred.
We doubt very much whether, if Spion Kop had been held and the relief
of Ladysmith had followed, we should have heard much of the criticism
that has been freely used; its seizure would have been regarded as a
brilliant tactical success, as indeed it was regarded at the time,
and it is only necessary to point to the English newspapers and the
letters of the Press correspondents before the abandonment was known
to show this.
Now a tactical operation cannot be right or wrong merely because some
subsequent action makes it futile. We have the evidence of the Boers
that they considered Spion Kop the key of the position and that, had
it been held, Ladysmith would probably have been won. Surely, then,
the blame of failure should not be thrown upon the General who
ordered it to be taken, but on the officer who abandoned it without
sufficient reason and without consulting him.
Mr. Oppenheim has written a defence of this officer in the
‘Nineteenth Century,’ in which he says that Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft had to come to some decision, and that he had
held on all day hoping for the presence or intervention of a
superior officer. But Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft was himself a
brigadier-general commanding the colonels in command of two brigades,
and the only use he made of this position was to force them to
withdraw; while Major-General Coke, his superior officer, was on the
summit from half-past three to half-past six, and Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft does not appear to have made any effort to get
instructions from him or to refer to him before ordering a retirement
at dark.
Mr. Oppenheim states that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft did not know
that stores of ammunition, water, food, &c., were on their way up;
but this is no excuse, because, if he had gone to his proper post of
command, he would have known it; but he stuck to his own corps, and
never really exercised the command until he decided to retire. He
also states that all agreed it was impossible to hold the hill. But
Colonel Hill and Major-General Coke evidently did not agree. Colonel
Hill had made preparations for intrenching, and knew where the tools
and sandbags were, although Colonel Thorneycroft did not.
Two great faults were committed on the summit of Spion Kop, for
neither of which can Sir Charles Warren be held responsible. The
one was the position of the intrenchments, with regard to which Sir
Charles Warren had given special instructions. There are two methods
adopted for intrenching a hill when attacked by an advancing force.
The usual method is to intrench the crest nearest to the enemy,
but this involves moving across the top of the hill without cover.
The other method is to intrench the crest farthest away from the
enemy in the first place, as this gives complete security to the
attack, neither rifle nor shell fire being able to touch it, and
when opportunity offers, after artillery cannonading, or at night,
to advance to the other crest nearest the enemy and intrench there;
but at Spion Kop, owing perhaps to the fog, neither one nor the other
method was adopted, the trenches were placed in the middle of the
plateau, and, as made, were not of much use--too little earth was
thrown up, and a little earth will not resist a Mauser bullet. If
earth is used it must be in considerable quantity, and there was not
much available. There were, however, plenty of stones, with which the
Boers soon construct their cover. Badly-made trenches placed in an
absolutely wrong and a most exposed position, contrary to Sir Charles
Warren’s instructions, constituted the first fault.
The second fault committed on the summit was crowding line upon
line to give the firing line moral support. The result was carnage.
The officers commanding brigades and Colonel Thorneycroft clamoured
for reinforcements to give this moral support. Major-General Coke
several times checked the upward move of reinforcements, but in the
end gave way to urgent messages and let them go on until by 3.30 P.M.
the small summit was crowded with five battalions besides details.
Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Warren, Major-Generals Coke and
Lyttelton, and Colonel àCourt all thought two battalions on the top
sufficient.
Both these faults were due to want of proper training of both
officers and men.
We shall now consider Sir Redvers Buller’s despatches and memorandum
of 30th January 1900 in some detail, and make some very adverse
criticisms. It is with reluctance that we do so, but it must be
remembered that Sir Redvers has no one but himself to blame that
these despatches are before the public. It was his own doing that
they saw the light in the first instance, and it is equally his own
doing that the portions omitted in the first instance have lately
been published too. It is only, therefore, in justice to Sir Charles
Warren, who has not been allowed to reply, that we examine these
despatches critically.
It will not be forgotten that a despatch written a month earlier
on the Zoutspan Drift action was perused by critics at home with
amazement and perplexity. The easy insouciance with which the
late Adjutant-General of the Forces, who for seven years had been
primarily responsible for the training of the officers and men of the
army, referred to their want of training when tried in the field, it
was felt, could not easily be surpassed.
‘I suppose,’ he wrote, ‘our officers will learn the value of
scouting in time, but in spite of all one can say, up to this
our men seem to blunder into the middle of the enemy, and suffer
accordingly.’
But his despatches of 30th January throw this one into the shade in
their complete detachment from all responsibility, and recall, more
than anything else, the reports of an umpire at peace manœuvres,
which praise this side and blame that, with the comfortable assurance
that the writer is an independent observer, on whom no one can turn
the tables.
In the first of the two despatches of 30th January Sir Redvers Buller
gives no indication, as we have already pointed out, of what he
intended Sir Charles Warren to do when he sent him across the Tugela.
He merely regrets that an expedition, which he thinks should have
succeeded, failed, and refers to Sir Charles Warren’s despatch for
particulars. The only comment on Sir Charles Warren’s dispositions
was that he had ‘mixed up all the brigades, and the positions he held
were dangerously insecure.’
In the second despatch, while maintaining the same attitude of
irresponsibility, he adopts the _rôle_ of the captious critic. He
objects to Sir Charles Warren’s statement that three and a-half days’
supplies were insufficient to advance by the left through Acton
Homes, because, he says, he had promised to keep--and was actually
keeping--Sir Charles filled up. As if this in any way affected the
amount of provisions he could carry with him when once he had cleared
the position in front and moved forward and away from the Tugela.
From this trivial and futile criticism Sir Redvers jumps suddenly
to 23rd January, on which day, he says, he went over to see Sir
Charles Warren and pointed out that he had no further report, and no
intimation of the special arrangements foreshadowed in a telegram
from him on the 19th. It might from this be supposed that since the
19th Sir Redvers had had no communication with Sir Charles Warren,
was getting anxious, and thought it time after four days’ silence to
inquire what he was doing; it would hardly occur to any one that he
was in constant telegraphic communication with Warren, and that he
had been with him both on the 21st and the 22nd of the month.
What were the special arrangements referred to in Sir Charles
Warren’s letter of the 19th, and why is it suggested that they were
kept, so to speak, up his sleeve, until his Commander could stand it
no longer?
‘On January 20th,’ said Sir Redvers Buller in his telegraphic
despatch of 27th January, ‘Sir Charles Warren, as I have reported,
drove back the enemy and obtained possession of the southern
crests of the higher tableland, which extends from the line Acton
Homes-Honger’s Poort to the Western Ladysmith Hills.’ We may
conclude, therefore, that on the 20th Sir Charles Warren was too
fully occupied to telegraph what were the special arrangements he
had mentioned in his telegram of the night before. On the 21st Sir
Redvers Buller saw him and was able to discuss the matter verbally
with him, and if he did not do so surely it was his own fault, as he
might very easily have asked him anything he wanted to know.
These special arrangements were apparently three:
(1) Continual bombardment; then
(2) To advance on both sides of an arête or gully, outflanking the
enemy on either side as he advanced; and finally
(3) To proceed without wagons when he had driven the enemy out.
They resulted, as we have seen, from the reconnaissances of the
18th, which impressed Sir Charles Warren with the difficulties of
any advance with fifteen miles of wagons. He therefore proposed to
keep the wagons at Venter’s Laager until he was able to advance, and
then send them back across the river. There was no great secret about
these proposals. With the first and second Sir Redvers apparently
concurred, and with the third he did not. If he thought Sir Charles
had anything else in view, why did he not ask him?
Sir Redvers Buller, in his despatch of 30th January, then goes on
to say that he further pointed out to Sir Charles Warren ‘that for
four days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle
fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, that the
position admitted of no second line and the supports were massed
close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a
panic or sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down
the hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to
be prolonged, and that he must either attack, or I should withdraw
his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his
left.’
One has really to call to mind that it is Sir Charles Warren’s
commanding officer who gives utterance to these observations, that
he personally saw the troops under Warren cross the Tugela, that
he issued to them the ‘no turning back’ order, that he addressed
General Woodgate’s Brigade when it had crossed and gave that General
instructions as to his attack, that from day to day he telegraphed
home encouraging accounts of the operations being carried out,
that he made no sign of disapproval, that he was in telegraphic
communication with Sir Charles Warren all the time and many messages
passed to and fro, that on three days out of the four--viz. on the
21st, 22nd, and 23rd--he was personally present with the force and
the dispositions of the troops were made subject to his approval,
that he had himself given directions how the howitzers were to be
disposed, and that in his telegraphic despatch of 27th January,
when all was over, he had stated that ‘the actual position held
was perfectly tenable but did not lend itself to advance.’ It was
surely unfair to himself as well as to Sir Charles Warren to make out
that for four days the troops remained in one position, and that a
dangerous one.
But if the dispositions were those of Sir Charles Warren, and he
alone was responsible for them, did they merit the disapproval with
which his chief stigmatises them? Is not the attack of a hill, whose
top is exposed to the enemy’s artillery fire and affords barely any
cover, best undertaken by seizing and holding the near crest line--in
other words, ‘perching on its edge’? If the attack intrench this near
crest, their reserves can remain lower down under cover; any shell
fire which does not hit the trench passes harmlessly over; reliefs,
also, can be safely carried out, and supplies of ammunition, water,
and food brought up to the firing line without exposure.
As we have already observed, and perhaps may be permitted to repeat
in this connection, had Sir Charles Warren’s instructions been
carried out at Spion Kop--and probably the fog made it difficult
to do so--his firing line would have been on the outer edge of the
hill, that farthest from the enemy, and not on the plateau, and what
better position could it have had? A small body could have held it,
which could have been relieved from time to time, and at nightfall
the other crest nearest to the enemy could have been seized and
intrenched. Then again reserves massed behind a hill are not in so
bad a position as Sir Redvers Buller’s despatch would imply, and when
he speaks of the danger of a possible sudden charge of the Boers
driving the whole lot of our men in disorder down the hill, he does
not appear to appreciate the distinctive qualities either of the foe
or of our own men. What would Tommy Atkins have more warmly welcomed,
or the Boers have more disliked, than a contest at close quarters
with cold steel?
Unfortunately, the feeble intrenchments which were constructed on
Spion Kop were too far advanced on the plateau of the hill, so
that the approach to them from the edge of the hill was exposed to
the shell and rifle fire of the enemy, and, equally unfortunately,
neither mountain battery nor naval guns were sent over by Sir
Redvers Buller in time to be of use in opposing the Boer fire.
In a previous chapter we noted that no sign of dissatisfaction with
Sir Charles Warren’s conduct appeared in any of Sir Redvers Buller’s
telegrams during the operations, and if these telegrams are compared
with the despatches they will be found to be glaringly inconsistent.
We find, further, that while in large matters, such as the attack
from the left, in which the strategy of the Commander-in-Chief might
be involved, Sir Redvers Buller contented himself with advocating
the course he preferred, and abstained from giving any order for its
adoption, in comparatively small matters, which would more obviously
lie within the province of the subordinate commander to determine,
he, on several occasions, caused his own views to be carried out.
Thus he substituted Major-General Woodgate for Major-General
Coke in the command of the column for the assault of Spion Kop,
because the one was able to climb better than the other; and he
nominated over the heads of experienced colonels Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft, a young and inexperienced major of a year’s standing,
holding the local rank of lieut.-colonel, to command on Spion Kop
after Major-General Woodgate was wounded, because he was a good
hard-fighting man. Neither physical strength and ability to climb nor
the gallantry of a fighting man are, however, the main qualifications
of a commander, and these efforts of the Commander-in-Chief to assert
himself in minor matters had, it would seem, something to say to the
failure of the enterprise.
That Sir Redvers Buller should endeavour to justify the retirement
of Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft is not difficult to understand; that
he should attempt to do so at the expense of his second-in-command
is inexplicable. It was only human nature that he should wish to
support the action of the gallant young officer, specially selected
by himself to command over the head of his seniors, who had fought
like a lion and had kept up the spirit of his men in depressing
circumstances.
But had the same warm and generous sentiment animated him towards
his second-in-command he could not have supported the retirement by
disparaging the work done by Sir Charles Warren, and by belittling or
ignoring altogether the efforts he had made to enable the garrison of
Spion Kop to hold on to the position.
Probably the unkindest cut of all, though no doubt the result of
thoughtlessness, was Sir Redvers Buller’s telegram of 25th January:
‘Warren’s garrison, I am sorry to say, I find this morning had in
the night abandoned Spion Kop.’ He might have said ‘Thorneycroft’s
garrison,’ and he could well have afforded to say ‘my garrison,’
but this would have been to abandon the _rôle_ of the irresponsible
critic.
So also he declined to hold any investigation into the circumstances
of the withdrawal as proposed by Sir Charles Warren. He says in his
despatch:
‘I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If
at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in
hand, intrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead
removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place
brought under regular military command, and careful arrangements
made for the supply of water and food to the scattered fighting
line, the hills would have been held, I am sure.
‘But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have
been ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one
succeeded him; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that guns
were coming up, and generally there was a want of organisation and
system that acted most unfavourably upon the defence.’
Such a string of inconsistencies and erroneous statements only
shows that not only did Sir Redvers Buller not think it necessary
to order an official investigation, but that he did not even think
it necessary before writing his despatch to take the trouble to
ascertain the facts for himself.
_At sundown_, before any defence could be taken regularly in hand,
the abandonment had not only been decided upon by Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft, but the preparations for retirement were actually
commenced. This he might have gathered from Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft’s report, in which he says: ‘When night began to close
in I determined to take some steps,’ &c., and there must have been
other reports, which have not been published, before him from which
he could have known the precise time when the retirement was arranged.
After categorically enumerating the various arrangements that should
have been made at nightfall in order to hold the position on the
following day, Sir Redvers Buller writes: ‘But no arrangements were
made.’ He does not say who should have made them, or who should have
carried them out, but the inference from what he says is that as
‘General Coke appears to have been ordered away just as he would have
been useful,’ he considers that Major-General Coke should have made
them.
But Major-General Coke did not receive the order to go and see Sir
Charles Warren until 9.30 P.M., some three hours after nightfall, and
after the order for withdrawal had been given.
In refutation of Sir Redvers Buller’s assertion that no arrangements
were made, in face of all the reports he had before him, some of
which have been published, showing what arrangements were made, let
us see if it can be ascertained what actually was done.
PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AND ARRANGEMENTS MADE
_Hospital and Ambulance Work._--A field hospital was established at
Wright’s farm and all the available ambulance and stretcher bearers
were assembled at the foot of Spion Kop ready for action. Mr. Winston
Spencer Churchill says that in ascending Spion Kop on the afternoon
of 24th January he passed through the ambulance village. Every
available stretcher belonging to every brigade was in use on Spion
Kop.
It may be here observed that the casualties of Spion Kop itself were
not so great as at Colenso, although, if the whole week’s fighting is
considered, they were greater.
_Food._--The troops went up Spion Kop with one day’s rations in hand,
and during the day the regimental wagons were collected at the foot,
within 600 feet of the summit. So that the troops on Spion Kop were
quite as near their food as they had been at Three Tree Hill.
_Ammunition._--Mr. Winston S. Churchill relates how he found a man
dragging down a box of ammunition all by himself. There was plenty
of ammunition on the summit at sunset, and it was unfortunate that
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft did not ascertain this.
Sir Charles Warren, in his despatch of 1st February 1900 (Blue Book,
p. 76), states that the Dorset Regiment carried down a large quantity
of ammunition in the dark, which otherwise would have fallen into the
hands of the enemy.
_Water Supply._--Majors H. N. Sargent and E. J. Williams were in
charge of the water supply, and their reports of 28th January have
been published. The former says:
‘All the available pack mules which could be procured, viz. 25,
were utilised in carrying biscuit tins filled with water up the
hill, the tins being refilled from water carts placed at the
foot of Spion Kop. Each tin contained 8½ to 9 gallons of water.
An officer was placed in charge of the water carts, and had a
plentiful supply of spare tins, in addition to those carried by
the mules. The mules were divided into two sections, each under an
officer. These two sections of mules conveyed to the troops up the
hill at each trip 425 gallons of water.
‘The water supply was kept going continuously during the day and
late at night, with the exception of one break, caused by an order
being given for one section of mules to bring up ammunition. In
addition to the water conveyed on mules, there was a spring at the
top of the hill under Royal Engineers’ charge, which yielded a fair
supply. I superintended generally the water supply myself, and made
frequent inquiries as to whether the troops were getting sufficient
quantity on top of the hill, and was told they were.’
Major Williams states that he took twelve mules with water to the
trees near the top of the hill, arriving there about noon, and
established a water depôt there; that the mules made a second
trip, and were then taken for ammunition; that the Royal Engineers
successfully dug for water at a place three quarters of the way up
the hill, that it was thick but fairly plentiful; that from 3 P.M. to
8 P.M. he impressed more mules and continued to hurry up water to the
water depôt, while men were also sent up with filled water bottles
for distribution to the fighting line. At 8 P.M. it was too dark
for the mules to work, and although several fell over the cliff in
getting up, there were at that time several full boxes of water at
different spots on the hill. He also says that supplies of all kinds
were plentiful at the foot of the hill.
Colonel A. W. Morris, Assistant Adjutant-General, who accompanied
Major-General Coke up Spion Kop, saw the water depôt supply by the
trees--some twenty tins of water. He says in his report of 28th
January:
‘Personally, I do not think the men were suffering very badly from
want of water. I consider that under the circumstances nothing
could have been better than the very difficult arrangements made
for water supply: it was not plentiful, but sufficient for the
purpose required.’
It seems clear from the above that there was a larger supply of water
on Spion Kop than there was at any other hill action in Natal.
_Guns._--Major-General Coke attempted to take up a machine gun, but
unfortunately it overturned. The mountain guns, the only guns that
Sir Redvers Buller could spare for the summit of Spion Kop, were, it
is believed, at Frere; at any rate, they were not in any way in Sir
Charles Warren’s command and did not arrive at the foot of Spion Kop
until 7.30 P.M. and then the men required rest. Shortly before noon
on the 24th Sir Redvers Buller offered to send over two naval guns
from Potgieter’s Drift, an offer which Sir Charles Warren accepted.
They arrived at Spion Kop long after dark.
At 4 P.M. Sir Charles Warren sent Captain Hanwell, R.A., up Spion Kop
to arrange about placing these naval guns, and had Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft been properly exercising command he should have learnt
all about the guns from this officer. Slides were made in the morning
in the hillside in case the naval guns should arrive, and 3-inch
cable was got ready for hauling them up. These guns could have been
got up, but even if they had been placed on the slopes they would
have knocked out the pom-poms.
An Artillery officer, Lieutenant Dooner, was also on Spion Kop
all day telegraphing information to the Officer Commanding Royal
Artillery as to the effect of his fire.
Two guns of the 19th Battery Royal Field Artillery were ordered up
the hill to the lower slopes, and had just started when they were
met by the retiring force and turned back. Lord Dundonald also had
orders to take his machine gun up.
_Engineer Operations._--These seem to have been very complete.
Lieut.-Colonel Wood and his Staff Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Sim and
his Staff Officer, and the 17th Company of Royal Engineers were
engaged about Spion Kop all the time, and the 37th Company, sent from
Potgieter’s, arrived at midnight of 24th January.
During the 24th the whole of the picks, shovels, and sandbags in
possession of the force were carried up to the summit of Spion Kop,
and were there ready to be made use of at sundown. Colonel Hill knew
where they were deposited; Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft apparently did
not.
The 17th Company R.E. made the mule path and the gun slides, which
were ready the one at noon, the others in the afternoon. This company
and others were employed in developing the springs on the sides
of Spion Kop, and also made a dam. In the afternoon a message was
sent to the half of the 17th Company R.E. on the top of Spion Kop
directing the officer in command to be ready to make entrenchments
there at nightfall, and Colonel Sim was ordered to go up with a
working party of the Somersetshire Regiment.
It is not too much, then, to say that so far as Sir Charles Warren
was concerned everything was ready, and action would have been taken
during the night in regard to all the points mentioned by Sir Redvers
Buller had not the retirement prevented it.
Sir Redvers Buller was therefore mistaken when he wrote, ‘No
arrangements were made.’ Arrangements _were_ made, as stated in Sir
Charles Warren’s despatch and corroborated from so many sources. It
_was_ known on the top of Spion Kop that the guns were to go up, but
quite possibly Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft did not know it, as he did
not place himself in a position to know anything but what was going
on in the firing line, and at sundown, when everything should have
been done and could have been done, he ordered the withdrawal.
And yet this is the one act which Sir Redvers Buller singles out
for special commendation. Colonel Thorneycroft, he says, ‘saved the
situation’ and ‘exercised a wise discretion.’
Now, no one will withhold from this officer the praise due to his
gallantry, but his determination to retire from Spion Kop, in spite
of the ‘No surrender’ order sent to Colonel Crofton, in spite of the
protests of Colonel Hill, in spite of the remonstrances of other
officers, and in spite of the explicit orders of Sir Charles Warren
conveyed to him on the way down by Colonel Sim, was not so much an
error of judgment as an assumption of responsibility which, had it
been a determination to advance in spite of orders, might perhaps
have been justified by success, but as a determination to retire
was perfectly unjustifiable and led to the abrupt termination of an
enterprise which had been boldly commenced by the seizure of the key
of the position, and which, in the opinion of Lord Roberts, ought to
have succeeded.
If, then, the chief blame for this failure must lie upon the officer
who ordered and carried out the retirement from Spion Kop, the
officer in chief command, who assumed so detached a position in his
orders and despatches, and yet so constantly interfered when he
should have given his second-in-command a free hand, seems to be
rightly dealt with in the observations of Lord Roberts.
Had he furnished Sir Charles Warren with naval guns, with mountain
guns, and with a balloon in time to be of use, and not on urgent
request at the last moment; had he allowed Sir Charles Warren time to
continue his bombardment and supplied him with longer-ranging guns,
instead of urging him to attack on the threat of withdrawing the
force; had he even, after the decision to attack Spion Kop, at once
sent over the naval 12-prs. and another company of Royal Engineers to
help to get them up at sundown, the story might have been different.
But he did none of these things. He only appointed an inexperienced
young officer to take command at the top of Spion Kop over all his
seniors, and thinks that officer saved the situation by the wise
discretion he exercised in abandoning the position he was chosen to
defend.
If the memorandum ‘not necessarily for publication’ recently
published does not, to our mind, add much to the blame Sir Redvers
Buller had already thrown upon Sir Charles Warren, it certainly puts
more definitely the opinion the senior had formed of his junior,
and, in this light, should not have been concealed from the latter
for two years; but, on the other hand, the memorandum tends to lessen
our already waning confidence in Sir Redvers Buller.
The same sort of inconsistencies run through it that we have noticed
in the despatches. Thus he says: ‘On the 19th he (Sir Charles Warren)
attacked and gained a considerable advantage. On the 20th, instead
of pursuing it, he divided his force and gave Clery a separate
command.’ But there is no sort of agreement between this statement
and the telegram he sent at 9.15 P.M. on the 20th, wherein he relates
how Clery by judicious use of his artillery had fought his way up,
capturing ridge after ridge for about three miles, and the troops
were bivouacking on the ground he had gained.
So in the next sentence of the memorandum: ‘On the 21st I find
that his (Warren’s) right was in advance of his left, and that the
whole of his batteries, six, were crowded on one small position on
his right, while his left was unprotected by artillery, and I had
come out to tell him that the enemy on that flank had received a
reinforcement of at least 2,500. I suggested a better distribution of
his batteries, which he agreed to to some extent, but he would not
advance his left.’ How is it possible to reconcile this statement
with his telegram of 21st January, in which he said: ‘Warren has been
engaged all day, chiefly on his left, which he has swung round about
a couple of miles. The ground is very difficult, and, as the fighting
is all the time up-hill, it is difficult exactly to say how much we
gain, but I think we are making substantial progress’?
Finally his memorandum says: ‘On the 19th I ought to have assumed
command myself; I saw that things were not going well--indeed, every
one saw that. I blame myself now for not having done so.’ It was on
the 19th that Warren made his flank march to Venter’s Laager, that
he occupied the lower slopes of the Rangeworthy Hills, and that he
reported the result of his reconnaissances. What was not going well?
He had not been attacked, happily, in his flank march, he had decided
that the road by Fair View to Groote Hoek must be the route--and,
as we understand, Sir Redvers Buller says there can be no question
that was the only route--and he had captured positions on the hills.
Only a few paragraphs before in this same memorandum Sir Redvers
Buller says that on the 19th Sir Charles Warren attacked and gained
a considerable advantage. Is a considerable advantage indicative of
things not going well? Instances of these apparent contradictions
and inconsistencies in the actions, telegrams, and despatches of
Sir Redvers Buller could be multiplied. What does it all mean? Why
this sudden change of bearing towards his principal General? We
cannot say; but there is the painful fact that after the abandonment
of Spion Kop by the commander nominated by Sir Redvers Buller this
change of attitude is evident on comparing the telegrams with the
despatches.
In conclusion, whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have exhibited,
we can only say that the accusations made against him, and of which
for months he was kept in ignorance, do not stand the investigation
we have given them.
It has been stated in Parliament that in August 1900 Sir Charles
Warren, on his return home, wrote his own answer to the accusations,
of which he was then aware from the published despatches. Since then
the Government has been worried by Sir Redvers Buller into publishing
further accusations against Sir Charles Warren, who tells us, in his
recent letter to the newspapers, that he has asked the Government
in common justice to give his refutation the same publicity. At
present the Government has decided not to publish it, in order that
the personal controversy involved between two distinguished Generals
may not be prolonged. But is this quite fair to Sir Charles Warren?
Having made public all that is to be said against him, might he not
be allowed to show that he can justify himself?
APPENDIX
_EXTRACTS FROM DESPATCHES_[8]
A
FROM FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR
Army Headquarters, South Africa, Camp,
Dekiel Drift, Riet River: 13th February, 1900.
My Lord,--I have the honour to submit, for your Lordship’s
information, despatches from General Sir Redvers Buller, describing
the advance across the Tugela River on the 17th and 18th January,
1900, and the capture and evacuation of the Spion Kop position on the
23rd and 24th January, as well as certain minor operations between
the 19th and 24th January on the right or eastern line of advance.
2. The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the
despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the
accompanying documents themselves that the original intention was
to cross the Tugela at or near Trichard’s Drift, and thence by
following the road past ‘Fair View’ and ‘Acton Homes,’ to gain
the open plain north of Spion Kop, the Boer position in front of
Potgieter’s Drift being too strong to be taken by direct attack.
The whole force, less one brigade, was placed under the orders of
Sir Charles Warren, who, the day after he had crossed the Tugela,
seems to have consulted his General and principal Staff Officers,
and to have come to the conclusion that the flanking movement
which Sir Redvers Buller had mentioned in his secret instructions
was impracticable on account of the insufficiency of supplies. He
accordingly decided to advance by the more direct road leading
north-east, and branching off from a point east of ‘Three Tree Hill.’
The selection of this road necessitated the capture and retention
of Spion Kop, but whether it would have been equally necessary to
occupy Spion Kop, had the line of advance indicated by Sir Redvers
Buller been followed, is not stated in the correspondence. As Sir
Charles Warren considered it impossible to make the wide flanking
movement which was recommended, if not actually prescribed, in his
secret instructions, he should at once have acquainted Sir Redvers
Buller with the course of action which he proposed to adopt. There
is nothing to show whether he did so or not, but it seems only fair
to Sir Charles Warren to point out that Sir Redvers Buller appears
throughout to have been aware of what was happening. On several
occasions he was present during the operations. He repeatedly gave
advice to his subordinate commander, and on the day after the
withdrawal from Spion Kop he resumed the chief command.
{{3. In his note[9] on Sir Charles Warren’s report,
accompanying despatch of 30th January 1900,[10] Sir
Redvers Buller expresses a very adverse opinion on the
manner in which Sir Charles Warren carried out the
instructions he had received. Without a knowledge of the
country and circumstances it is difficult to say whether
the delay, misdirection, and want of control, of which
Sir Redvers Buller complains, were altogether avoidable;
but, in any case, if he considered that his orders were
not being properly given effect to, it appears to me
that it was his duty to intervene as soon as he had
reason to believe that the success of the operations
was being endangered. This, indeed, is admitted by
Sir Redvers Buller himself, whose explanation of his
non-interference can hardly be accepted as adequate. A
most important enterprise was being attempted, and no
personal considerations should have deterred the officer
in chief command from insisting on its being conducted
in the manner which, in his opinion, would lead to the
attainment of the object in view, with the least possible
loss on our side.}}
As regards the withdrawal of the troops from the Spion Kop position,
which, though occupied almost without opposition in the early
morning of the 24th January, had to be held throughout the day under
an extremely heavy fire, and the retention of which had become
essential to the relief of Ladysmith, I regret that I am unable
to concur with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion in ordering the troops to
retire. Even admitting that due preparations may not have been made
for strengthening the position during the night, reorganising the
defence, and bringing up artillery--in regard to which Sir Charles
Warren’s report does not altogether bear out Sir Redvers Buller’s
contention--admitting also that the senior officers on the summit of
the hill might have been more promptly informed of the measures taken
by Sir Charles Warren to support and reinforce them, I am of opinion
that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft’s assumption of responsibility and
authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night the enemy’s fire,
if it did not cease altogether, could not have been formidable, and,
though lamp signalling was not possible at the time, owing to the
supply of oil having failed, it would not have taken more than two or
three hours at most for Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to communicate
by messenger with Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren, and to
receive a reply. Major-General Coke appears to have left Spion Kop at
9.30 P.M. for the purpose of consulting with Sir Charles Warren, and
up to that hour the idea of a withdrawal had not been entertained.
Yet almost immediately after Major-General Coke’s departure
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft issued an order, without reference to
superior authority, which upset the whole plan of operations, and
rendered unavailing the sacrifices which had already been made to
carry it into effect.
On the other hand, it is only right to state that Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very gallant manner
throughout the day, and it was doubtless due, in a great measure,
to his exertions and example that the troops continued to hold the
summit of the hill until directed to retire.
5. The conduct of Captain Phillips, Brigade-Major of the 10th
Brigade, on the occasion in question, is deserving of high
commendation. He did his best to rectify the mistake which was
being made, but it was too late. Signalling communication was not
re-established until 2.30 A.M. on the 25th January, and by that time
the naval guns could not have reached the summit of the hill before
daybreak. Major-General Coke did not return, and Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft had gone away. Moreover, most of the troops had begun
to leave the hill, and the working parties, with the half company of
Royal Engineers, had also withdrawn.
6. It is to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren did not himself
visit Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening, knowing as he did
that the state of affairs there was very critical, and that the
loss of the position would involve the failure of the operations.
He was, consequently, obliged to summon Major-General Coke to his
headquarters in the evening in order that he might ascertain how
matters were going on, and the command on Spion Kop thus devolved
on Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft; but Major-General Coke was not
aware of this. About midday, under instructions from Sir Redvers
Buller, Sir Charles Warren had directed Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft
to assume command on the summit of the hill, with the temporary
rank of Brigadier-General, but this order was not communicated to
Major-General Coke, who, until he left the position at 9.30 P.M., was
under the impression that the command had devolved on Colonel Hill,
as senior officer, after Colonel Crofton had been wounded. Omissions
or mistakes of this nature may be trivial in themselves, yet may
exercise an important influence on the course of events; and I think
that Sir Redvers Buller is justified in remarking that ‘there was a
want of organisation and system which acted most unfavourably on the
defence.’
7. The attempt to relieve Ladysmith, described in these despatches,
was well devised, and I agree with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking
that it ought to have succeeded. That it failed may, in some measure,
be due to the difficulties of the ground and the commanding positions
held by the enemy--probably also to errors of judgment and want
of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But
whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure
must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme
command to assert his authority and see that what he thought best
was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless assumption of
responsibility by a subordinate officer.
8. The gratifying feature in these despatches is the admirable
behaviour of the troops throughout the operations.
I have the honour to be, My Lord,
Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant,
ROBERTS, _Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa_.
B
FROM GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.
(_Through Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief,
Cape Town._)
Spearman’s Hill: 30th January, 1900.
Sir,--I have the honour to report that General Sir Charles Warren’s
Division having arrived at Estcourt, less two battalions, 10th
Brigade, which were left at the Cape, by the 7th January, it moved to
Frere on the 9th.
{{I attach a copy of Natal Army Orders of the 8th
January,[11] giving full particulars of the intended move
and organisation of the force.}}
The column moved as ordered, but torrents of rain fell on the
9th, which filled all the spruits, and, indeed, rendered many of
them impassable for many hours. To forward supply alone took 650
ox wagons, and as in the 16 miles from Frere to Springfield there
were three places at which all the wagons had to be double spanned,
and some required three spans, some idea may be formed of the
difficulties, but these were all successfully overcome by the willing
labours of the troops. {{I attach a statement of the supply trains.}}
The 4th Brigade reached Springfield on the 12th, in support of the
mounted troops who had surprised and seized the important position of
Spearman’s Hill, commanding Potgieter’s Drift, on the 11th.
By the 13th all troops were at Springfield and Spearman’s Hill, and
supply was well forward.
On the 16th, a reserve of 17 days’ supply having been collected,
General Sir C. Warren, in command of the 2nd Division, the 11th
Brigade of the 5th Division, the Brigade Division Royal Field
Artillery, 5th Division, and certain corps troops, including the
Mounted Brigade, moved from Springfield to Trichard’s Drift, which is
about six miles west of Potgieter’s.
{{I attach a copy of the orders[12] under which Sir C.
Warren acted, and enclose his report of his operations
(C).}}
On the night of the 23rd, General Warren attacked Spion Kop, which
operation he has made the subject of a special report. On the
morning of the 25th, finding that Spion Kop had been abandoned in
the night, I decided to withdraw General Warren’s force; the troops
had been continuously engaged for a week, in circumstances entailing
considerable hardships, there had been very heavy losses on Spion
Kop. General Warren’s dispositions had mixed up all the brigades,
and the positions he held were dangerously insecure. I consequently
assumed the command, commenced the withdrawal of the ox and heavy
mule transport on the 25th; this was completed by midday the 26th;
by double spanning the loaded ox wagons got over the drift at the
rate of about eight per hour. The mule wagons went over the pontoon
bridge, but all the mules had to be taken out and the vehicles passed
over by hand. For about seven hours of the night the drift could not
be used as it was dangerous in the dark, but the use of the pontoon
went on day and night. In addition to machine guns, six batteries of
Royal Field Artillery, and four howitzers, the following vehicles
were passed: ox wagons, 232; 10-span mule wagons, 98; 6-span, 107;
4-span, 52; total, 489 vehicles. In addition to these, the ambulances
were working backwards and forwards evacuating the sick and wounded.
By 2 P.M., the 26th, all the ox wagons were over, and by 11.30 P.M.
all the mule transports were across and the bridge clear for the
troops. By 4 A.M., the 27th, all the troops were over, and by 8 A.M.
the pontoons were gone and all was clear. The troops had all reached
their new camps by 10 A.M. The marches averaged for the mounted
troops about 7 miles, and for the infantry and artillery an average
of 5 miles.
Everything worked without a hitch, and the arrangements reflected
great credit on the Staff of all degrees; but I must especially
mention Major Irwin, R.E., and his men of the Pontoon Troop, who were
untiring. When all men were over, the chesses of the pontoon bridge
were so worn by the traffic that I do not think they would have
lasted another half hour.
Thus ended an expedition which I think ought to have succeeded. We
have {{suffered heavily (for casualty return, _see_ K), very heavy
losses, and}} lost many whom we can ill spare; but, on the other hand,
we have inflicted as great or greater losses upon the enemy than they
have upon us, and they are, by all accounts, thoroughly disheartened;
while our troops are, I am glad and proud to say, in excellent fettle.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
REDVERS BULLER,
_General Officer Commanding_.
C
FROM LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR CHARLES WARREN TO
THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF
Hatting’s Farm: 29th January, 1900.
Sir,--I have the honour to make the following report on the
operations on the north side of the Tugela, west of Spion Kop, from
the 17th to the 27th of January, 1900:--
1. On the 8th January field orders were published constituting the
10th Brigade of the 5th Division a Corps Brigade, and placing the
4th Brigade in the 5th Division. The 5th Division thus constituted
marched from Frere on the 10th instant, arriving at Springfield on
the 12th instant.
2. On the 15th January I received your secret instructions to command
a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt’s Drift, to the
west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed forward refusing my
right (namely, Spion Kop), and bringing my left forward to gain the
open plain north of Spion Kop. This move was to commence as soon as
supplies were all in, and the 10th Brigade (except two companies)
removed from Springfield Bridge to Spearman’s Hill.
3. I was provided with 4 days’ rations, with which I was to cross
the Tugela, fight my way round to north of Spion Kop, and join your
column opposite Potgieter’s.
4. On the 15th January I made the arrangements for getting supplies,
and moved the 10th Brigade on the following day; and on the evening
of the 16th January I left Springfield with a force under my
command, which amounted to an Army Corps (less one brigade), and by a
night march arrived at Trichardt’s Drift, and took possession of the
hills on the south side of the Tugela.
5. On the 17th January I threw pontoon bridges across the Tugela,
passed the infantry across by ponts, and captured the hills
immediately commanding the drift on the north side with two brigades
commanded by Generals Woodgate and Hart. The Commander-in-Chief was
present during part of the day, and gave some verbal directions to
General Woodgate.
The Mounted Brigade passed over principally by the drift, and went
over the country as far as Acton Homes, and on the following day
(18th) had a successful action with a small party of Boers, bringing
in 31 prisoners.
During the night of the 17th, and day of the 18th, the whole of the
wagons belonging to the force were brought across the Tugela, and the
artillery were in position outside of Wright’s Farm.
6. On the 19th two brigades advanced, occupying the slopes of the
adjoining hills on the right, and the wagons were successfully
brought to Venter’s Spruit.
In the evening, after having examined the possible roads by which
we could proceed, I assembled the General Officers and the Staff,
and the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, and Commanding Royal
Engineer, and pointed out to them that of the two roads by which we
could advance the eastern one, by Acton Homes, must be rejected,
because time would not allow of it, and with this all concurred. I
then pointed out that the only possible way of all getting through
by the road north of Fair View would be by taking 3 or 4 days’ food
in our haversacks, and sending all our wagons back across the Tugela;
but before we could do this we must capture the position in front of
us.
7. On the following day, 20th January, I placed two brigades and
six batteries of artillery at the disposal of General Sir C. F.
Clery, with instructions to attack the Boer positions by a series of
outflanking movements (copy of instructions herewith[13]), and by the
end of the day, after fighting for 12 hours, we were in possession of
the whole part of hills, but found a strongly entrenched line on the
comparatively flat country beyond us.
8. On the 21st the Boers displayed considerable activity on our
left, and the Commander-in-Chief desired me to move two batteries
from right to left. At a subsequent date, during the day, I found it
impossible to proceed without howitzers, and telegraphed for four
from Potgieter’s. These arrived early on the morning of the 22nd, and
the Commander-in-Chief, arriving about the same time, directed me to
place two of these howitzers on the left, two having already been
placed on the right flank. I pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief
that it would be impossible to get wagons through by the road leading
past Fair View unless we first took Spion Kop, which lies within
about 2,000 yards of the road. The Commander-in-Chief agreed that
Spion Kop would have to be taken. Accordingly that evening orders
were drawn up giving the necessary instructions to General Talbot
Coke to take Spion Kop that night, but, owing to an absence of
sufficient reconnaissance, he requested that the attack might be put
off for a day.[14]
9. On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, the
attack on Spion Kop was decided upon, and Lieut.-Colonel àCourt, of
the Headquarters Staff, was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to
accompany General Woodgate, who was detailed to command the attacking
column. The account of the capture of Spion Kop is given in another
report.
10. On the morning of the 25th January the Commander-in-Chief
arrived, decided to retire the force, and assumed direct command.
The whole of the wagons of the 5th Division were got down to the
drift during the day, and were crossed over before 2 P.M. on the 26th
January.
11. The arrangements for the retirement of the 5th Division were
exceedingly well got out, and the retirement was made in good order
during the night of the 26th, the whole of the troops crossing to the
south side of the Tugela before daylight, and the wagons were packed,
and the troops bivouacked near the spruit about 2 miles to the east
of the pontoon bridges. About 10 P.M., previous to the retirement,
heavy musketry was heard to the north of our position, which has been
attributed to a Boer commando thinking we were going to make a night
attack.
{{12. I append reports[15] from Lieut.-General Sir C.
F. Clery, K.C.B., on the operations conducted by him
on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd, also from Major-General
Hildyard, C.B., for his operations on those dates.
13. I propose to forward as soon as possible a more
detailed report of the movements of brigades and units,
and acts of individuals.}}
C. WARREN, _Lieut.-General,
Commanding 5th Division_.
D
SIR REDVERS BULLER’S MEMORANDUM ‘NOT
NECESSARILY FOR PUBLICATION.’
{{Spearman’s Camp: 30th January, 1900.
Secretary of State,--In forwarding this report[16]
I am constrained to make the following remarks, not
necessarily for publication:
I had fully discussed my orders with General Warren
before he started, and he appeared entirely to agree
that the policy indicated of refusing the right and
advancing the left was the right one. He never, though,
attempted to carry it out. From the first there could be
no question but that the only practicable road for his
column was the one by Fair View. The problem was to get
rid of the enemy who were holding it.
The arrival of the force at Trichard’s was a surprise
to the enemy, who were not in strength. Sir C. Warren,
instead of feeling for the enemy, elected to spend two
whole days in passing his baggage. During this time
the enemy received reinforcements and strengthened
his position. On the 19th he attacked and gained a
considerable advantage. On the 20th, instead of pursuing
it, he divided his force, and gave General Clery a
separate command.
On the 21st I find that his right was in advance of
his left, and that the whole of his batteries, six, were
crowded on one small position on his right, while his
left was unprotected by artillery, and I had come out
to tell him that the enemy on that flank had received a
reinforcement of at least 2,500. I suggested a better
distribution of his batteries, which he agreed to, to
some extent, but he would not advance his left, and I
found that he had divided his fighting line into three
independent commands, independent of each other and
apparently independent of him, as he told me he could not
move any batteries without General Clery’s consent.
The days went on. I saw no attempt on the part of
General Warren either to grapple with the situation or
to command his force himself. By the 23rd I calculated
that the enemy, who were about 600 strong on the 16th,
were not less than 15,000, and General White confirmed
this estimate. We had really lost our chance by Sir C.
Warren’s slowness. He seems to me a man who can do well
what he can do himself, but who cannot command, as he
can use neither his Staff nor subordinates. I can never
employ him again on an independent command.
On the 19th I ought to have assumed command myself;
I saw that things were not going well--indeed, every
one saw that. I blame myself now for not having done
so. I did not, because I thought that if I did I should
discredit General Warren in the estimation of the troops;
and that if I were shot, and he had to withdraw across
the Tugela, and they had lost confidence in him, the
consequences might be very serious.
I must leave it to higher authority whether this
argument was a sound one. Anyhow, I feel convinced that
we had a good chance on the 17th, and that we lost it.
REDVERS BULLER, _General_.}}
E
FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, NATAL,
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR
(_By the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Cape Town_)
Spearman’s Hill: 30th January, 1900.
Sir,--In forwarding Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren’s report on the
capture and evacuation of Spion Kop, I have the honour to offer the
following observations. {{The figures in my report refer to those in
margin:--}}
1. Sir C. Warren is hardly correct in saying that he was only allowed
3½ days’ provisions. I had told him that transport for 3½ days would
be sufficient burden to him, but that I would keep him filled up as
he wanted it. That he was aware of this is shown by the following
telegram which he sent on the day in question. It is the only report
I had from Sir C. Warren:--
(Sent 7.54 P.M. Received 8.15 A.M.)
‘Left Flank: 19th January.
‘To Chief of the Staff,--I find there are only two roads by which
we could possibly get from Trichard’s Drift to Potgieter’s, on
the north of the Tugela--one by Acton Homes, the other by Fair
View and Rosalie; the first I reject as too long, the second is a
very difficult road for a large number of wagons, unless the enemy
is thoroughly cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some
special arrangements which will involve my stay at Venter’s Laager
for 2 or 3 days. I will send in for further supplies and report
progress.
‘C. WARREN.’
The reply to this was that 3 days’ supply was being sent.
2. I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd. I pointed out to him
that I had no further report and no intimation of the special
arrangements foreshadowed by this telegram of the 19th; that for four
days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle
fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill; that the
position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed
close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a
panic or a sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down
the hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be
prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw his
force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his
left. He said that he had the night before ordered General Coke to
assault Spion Kop, but the latter had objected to undertaking a night
attack on a position the road to which he had not reconnoitred, and
added that he intended to assault Spion Kop that night.
3. I suggested that as General Coke was still lame from the effects
of a lately broken leg, General Woodgate, who had two sound legs, was
better adapted for mountain climbing.
4. As no heliograph could, on account of the fire, be kept on the
east side of Spion Kop, messages for Sir C. Warren were received by
our signallers at Spearman, and telegraphed to Sir C. Warren; thus I
saw them before he did, as I was at the signal station. The telegram
Sir C. Warren quotes did not give me confidence in its sender, and,
at the moment, I could see that our men on the top had given way, and
that efforts were being made to rally them. I telegraphed to Sir C.
Warren: ‘Unless you put some really good hard-fighting man in command
on the top you will lose the hill. I suggest Thorneycroft.’
{{5. This is a mistake. _See_ =A= in Sir C. Warren’s
report. Colonel àCourt was sent down by General Woodgate
almost as soon as he gained the summit.}}
6. I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If at
sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in hand,
entrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead removed,
the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place brought under
regular military command, and careful arrangements made for the
supply of water and food to the scattered fighting line, the hills
would have been held, I am sure.
7. But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have been
ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one succeeded
him; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that guns were coming
up, and generally there was a want of organisation and system that
acted most unfavourably on the defence.
It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the
greatest gallantry throughout the day, and really saved the
situation. Preparations for the second day’s defence should have been
organised during the day, and have been commenced at nightfall.
As this was not done, I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise
discretion.
Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, but the enemy admitted
to our doctors that theirs were equally severe, and though we were
not successful in retaining the position, the losses inflicted on the
enemy and the attack generally have had a marked effect upon them.
I cannot close these remarks without bearing testimony to the gallant
and admirable behaviour of the troops: the endurance shown by the
Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex Regiment, and Thorneycroft’s
Mounted Infantry was admirable, while the efforts of the 2nd
Battalion Scottish Rifles and 3rd Battalion King’s Royal Rifles were
equally good, and the Royal Lancasters fought gallantly.
I am writing to catch the mail, and have not any particulars yet to
enable me to report more fully on details.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
REDVERS BULLER.
F
REPORT BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR CHARLES WARREN, K.C.B.,
UPON THE CAPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT EVACUATION OF SPION KOP
_Capture and Evacuation of Spion Kop_
Chief of the Staff,--I make the operations against Spion Kop in a
separate report, because they did not enter into my original plans.
Under the original instructions of the General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, of 15th January, 1900, I was to act as
circumstances required, but, according to instructions, was generally
to continue throughout refusing my right, and throwing my left
forward until I gained the open plain north of Spion Kop.
[Sidenote: 1]
Upon the 19th of January, on arrival at Venter’s Laager, I assembled
all the General Officers, Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and
Royal Engineers of Divisions, and Staff Officers together. I pointed
out to them that, with the three and a-half (3½) days’ provisions
allowed, it was impossible to advance by the left road through Acton
Homes. In this they unanimously concurred. I showed them that the
only possible road was that going over Fair View through Rosalie, but
I expressed my conviction that this could not be done unless we sent
the whole of our transport back across the Tugela, and attempted to
march through with our rations in our haversacks--without impedimenta.
The hills were cleared on the following day, and very strong
entrenchments found behind them. The Commander-in-Chief was present
on the 21st and 22nd January, and I pointed out the difficulties of
marching along the road, accompanied by wagons, without first taking
Spion Kop.
Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke to
occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation might be
deferred for a day in order that he might make a reconnaissance with
the Officers Commanding battalions to be sent there.
[Sidenote: 2]
On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and
told me that there were two courses open--(1) to attack, or (2)
to retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to
retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the previous
day.
[Sidenote: 3]
The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General
Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed Lieut.-Colonel
àCourt to accompany him as Staff Officer.
The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the Lancashire
Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion of Thorneycroft’s
Horse, and half company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies
of the Connaught Rangers and by the Imperial Light Infantry, the
latter having just arrived by Trichardt’s Drift.
The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful. General
Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th, reported that he
had entrenched a position and hoped he was secure, but that the fog
was too thick to permit him to see. The position was rushed without
casualties, other than three men wounded.
[Sidenote: A]
Lieut.-Colonel àCourt came down in the morning and stated that
everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to the
Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started on his
return to headquarters when a heliogram arrived from Colonel Crofton
(Royal Lancaster). The message was: ‘Reinforce at once, or all lost.
General dead.’
He also sent a similar message to headquarters. I immediately ordered
General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take command of the
troops. He started at once, and was accompanied by the Middlesex and
Dorsetshire Regiments.
I replied to Colonel Crofton: ‘I am sending two battalions, and the
Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must hold on to the
last. No surrender.’
This occurred about 10 A.M.
[Sidenote: 4]
Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief,
ordering me to appoint Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to the command of
the summit. I accordingly had heliographed: ‘With the approval of the
Commander-in-Chief, I place Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of
the summit, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.’
For some hours after this message I could get no information from
the summit. It appears that the signallers and their apparatus were
destroyed by the heavy fire.
I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state his view of
the situation. At 1.20 P.M. I heliographed to ascertain whether
Colonel Thorneycroft had assumed command, and at the same time asked
General Coke to give me his views on the situation on Spion Kop.
Still getting no reply, I asked whether General Coke was there, and
subsequently received his view of the situation (copy attached). He
stated that, unless the artillery could silence the enemy’s guns, the
men on the summit could not stand another complete day’s shelling,
and that the situation was extremely critical.
At 6.30 P.M. I asked if he could keep two battalions on the summit,
removing the remainder out of reach of shells; also whether two
battalions would suffice to hold the summit. This was in accordance
with a telegram on the subject sent me by the Commander-in-Chief.
Later in the evening I made arrangements to send two (naval) 12-prs.
and the Mountain Battery Royal Artillery to the summit, together with
half company Royal Engineers (and working parties, two reliefs of 600
men each), to strengthen the entrenchments and provide shell covers
for the men. I may here mention that the 17th Company Royal Engineers
proceeded at the same time as General Woodgate’s force, and were
employed until daylight upon the entrenchments, then upon road making
and water supply.
Sandbags were sent up early on the 24th instant.
While Colonel Sim was, with this party, ascending the hill, he met
Colonel Thorneycroft descending, having evacuated the position. {{For
the remainder of the account of the proceedings I attach the reports
made to me by Colonel Thorneycroft[17] and by General Coke,[18]
together with reports on the supply of food and water rendered by
officers thus engaged. The supply of ammunition was ample.}}
I wish to bring to notice that I heard from all but one expression of
the admirable conduct and bravery shown by officers and men suffering
under a withering artillery fire on the summit of the slopes, and
also of those who, with so much endurance, persisted in carrying up
water and food and ammunition to the troops during this day.
[Sidenote: 5]
During the day a Staff Officer of the Headquarters Staff was present
on the summit, and reported direct to the Commander-in-Chief.
At sunset I considered that the position could be held next day,
provided that guns could be mounted and effective shelter provided.
Both of these conditions were about to be fulfilled, as already
mentioned.
In the absence of General Coke, whom I ordered to come to report in
person as to the situation, the evacuation took place under orders,
given upon his own responsibility, by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft.
This occurred in the face of the vigorous protests of General Coke’s
Brigade-Major, the Officer Commanding the Middlesex Regiment, and
others.
[Sidenote: 6]
It is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether there
should be an investigation into the question of the unauthorised
evacuation of Spion Kop.
CHARLES WARREN, _Lieut.-General_.
G
{{FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL A. W. THORNEYCROFT,
THORNEYCROFT’S MOUNTED INFANTRY, COMMANDING ON SPION KOP,
TO THE CHIEF STAFF OFFICER TO GENERAL SIR C. WARREN.
Camp, Trichard’s Drift: 26th January, 1900.
Sir,--On the night of the 23rd January, 1900, I
rendezvoused with 18 Officers and 180 men, Thorneycroft’s
Mounted Infantry, 2nd Bat. Lancashire Fusiliers, 2nd
Bat. Royal Lancaster Regiment, and half company Royal
Engineers, the whole under the command of General
Woodgate. At 9 P.M. we started to march to the top of
Spion Kop. I led the way with a small advanced party,
crossed the dongas and advanced up the hill; on reaching
the first plateau the force closed up in formation,
and went on again. As the front broadened I got the
Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry into line, right across
the hill, and the remainder followed in successive lines
up the last slope, when we were suddenly challenged. I
had ordered the men to lie down when challenged; they
did so. The Boers opened fire from magazines. When I
thought that they had emptied their magazines I gave the
order to charge; an officer on my left gave the order to
charge also, and the whole line advanced at the double
and carried the crest line at 4 A.M., when I halted and
reformed the line. There were about ten men wounded
altogether. Orders were immediately given by General
Officer Commanding to form a trench and breastwork. There
was a mist on the hill, and in the darkness and mist it
was difficult to get the exact crest line for a good
field of fire, and the boulders made it difficult to
dig, but we made a rough trench and breastwork. At 4.30
a few Boers came up and began firing. The men lined the
trench, but the picquets in front replied to the fire,
and firing ceased for a time. The Boers then returned
with strong reinforcements from their camp, which lay
concealed in a hollow on the side of the hill, and which
was obscured in the mist; we sent out men in front to
enable them to get a better field of fire; with two lulls
in the firing the mist rose about 8 A.M., when the rifle
fire on both sides became heavy and the Boers opened fire
from three guns and a Maxim-Nordenfelt. The shrapnel fire
was very accurate and burst well, sweeping the whole
plateau. General Woodgate was wounded early in the action
and Colonel Blomfield assumed command, but he, too, was
wounded. At this time I was directing the movements
of the Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry, and sent out
reinforcements to the firing line which was in advance
of the trench; word was sent to me that General Sir C.
Warren had heliographed that I was to assume command. I
sent out more men to the flanks as the Boers were working
round, and the replacing of casualties gradually absorbed
all the men of the force. The firing became hotter on
both sides, the Boers gradually advancing; twice the men
charged out from the entrenchments in the centre and
kept them back, but at length the entrenchment became
the firing line in the centre (the left maintained their
advanced position).
The Boers closed in on the right and centre. Some
men of mixed regiments at right end of trench got up
and put up their hands; three or four Boers came out
and signalled their comrades to advance. I was the
only officer in the trench on the left, and I got up
and shouted to the leader of the Boers that I was the
Commandant and that there was no surrender.
In order not to get mixed up in any discussion I
called on all men to follow me, and retired to some
rocks further back. The Boers opened a heavy fire on us.
On reaching the rocks I saw a company of the Middlesex
Regiment advancing, I collected them up to the rocks, and
ordered all to advance again. This the men did, and we
re-occupied the trench and crest line in front.
As the companies of the Middlesex arrived I pushed
them on to reinforce, and was able to hold the whole
line again. The men on the left of our defence, who were
detached at some distance from the trench, had held
their ground. The Imperial Light Infantry reinforced
this part. The Boers then made a desperate endeavour to
shell us out of the position, and the fire caused many
casualties. The Scottish Rifles came up, and I pushed
them up to the right and left flanks as they arrived.
There was some discussion at this time as to who was
in command, and the Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles
said he would go and see General Talbot Coke, who was
reported to be at the foot of the hill, to get orders.
Up to this I had issued the orders, but as I only got
a verbal message I did not understand that I had the
temporary rank of Brigadier-General. I continued to
direct operations while the Officer Commanding Scottish
Rifles went to see General Talbot Coke. General Coke said
that Colonel Hill was in command, but I could not find
him. The heavy fire continued, and the Boers brought a
gun and Maxim-Nordenfelt to bear on us from the east,
thus sweeping the plateau from the east, north, and
north-west, and enfilading our trenches. The men held
on all along the line, notwithstanding the terrific
fire which was brought to bear on them, as the enemy’s
guns (which now numbered five and two Nordenfelts) were
absolutely unmolested. When night began to close in I
determined to take some steps, and a consultation was
held. The Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles and Colonel
Crofton were both of opinion that the hill was untenable.
I entirely agreed with their view, and so I gave the
order for the troops to withdraw on to the neck and
ridge where the hospital was. It was now quite dark, and
we went out to warn all to come in. The enemy still kept
up a dropping fire. The regiments formed up near the
neck, and marched off in formation, the Scottish Rifles
forming the rear guard. I was obliged, owing to want of
bearers, to leave a large number of wounded on the field.
In forming my decision as to retirement I was
influenced by the following:--
1. The superiority of the Boer artillery, inasmuch as
their guns were placed in such positions as to prevent
our artillery fire being brought to bear on them from the
lower slopes near camp, or indeed from any other place.
2. By my not knowing what steps were being taken to
supply me in the morning with guns, other than the
mountain battery which, in my opinion, could not have
lived under the long-range fire of the Boer artillery,
and their close-range rifle fire.
3. By the total absence of water and provisions.
4. By the difficulty of entrenching on the top of hill,
to make trench in any way cover from artillery fire with
the few spades at my disposal, the ground being so full
of rocks.
5. Finally, I did not see how the hill could be held
unless the Boer artillery was silenced, and this was
impossible.
Lieutenant Winston Churchill arrived when the troops
had been marched off.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
ALEC. THORNEYCROFT, _Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry_.}}
H
{{REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL TALBOT COKE, OFFICER
COMMANDING 10TH BRIGADE
_Attack on Spion Kop, 23rd, 24th, 25th January, 1900_
Pontoon Bridge: 25th January, 1900.
In accordance with your orders, General Woodgate
assumed command of the column for the night attack, and
settled his rendezvous near the Royal Engineer bivouac,
for 7 P.M., 23rd instant. I bivouacked on the hill upon
which the Connaught Rangers’ picquets are south of Three
Tree Hill.
The first shots were fired at 3.40 A.M.
The valley between my position and Spion Kop, and also
the top of that feature itself, was enveloped in mist
until about 8 A.M., when it could be seen that our force
held the schanzes on the summit. Shortly after it was
seen to be exposed to a frontal fire from rifles, and to
shell fire from its left front.
In accordance with orders communicated to me by you, to
send a battalion to reinforce, a signal message was sent
to the Imperial Light Infantry, which occupied a covering
position towards Wright’s Farm, to proceed at once to
support, moving by the right flank of the kop. The 2nd
Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment was ordered to the place
vacated by the Imperial Light Horse.
The position of Spion Kop was now seen to be exposed
to a cross fire of artillery, and by your instructions I
sent the Middlesex Regiment in support.
About 11.10 A.M., in consequence of the regrettable
news about General Woodgate, at your order I proceeded
to the kop myself. On arrival there, I found the track
leading up very much congested, and, from information
received, I formed the opinion that too many men were
getting into the trenches and stone cover above, and
becoming exposed to the artillery fire; I accordingly
checked reinforcements. Soon after this, on my way
up, an urgent message was received from Colonel Hill,
who commanded at this time on the right, calling for
reinforcements, as his line had actually fallen back
before, and lost some prisoners to the Boers, who were
pressing on in front. I accordingly sent up the rest of
the Imperial Light Infantry available.
I now met Major Bayly, a Staff Officer, from the 4th
Brigade, who informed me that an urgent message for help
had been received from Colonel Crofton, who commanded on
Spion Kop after General Woodgate was wounded. General
Lyttelton had accordingly despatched the Scottish Rifles
as an actual reinforcement, and a battalion of the King’s
Royal Rifles against the hill to the north-west of Spion
Kop. It was on the further slope of this hill that one of
the Vickers-Maxim guns was placed. (This battalion worked
its way some distance up the hill, but its action did not
materially affect the situation.)
I now again received an urgent appeal for support, this
time for the centre and left. I sent the Scottish Rifles.
I now had only as a reserve Bethune’s Mounted Infantry
and the Dorsetshire Regiment. These I retained and they
were not engaged at the actual front.
The shell fire was most galling, and was aimed not
only at the summit, but at the crest of the spur leading
up, along which reinforcements and parties bringing back
wounded had to pass. The fire came--
1. From field guns firing shrapnel and common shell,
situated, as I endeavoured to point out in a signal
message to you, north-west of our position.
2. From a Vickers-Maxim, in about the same direction.
3. From a similar gun to the north-east.
All these were beyond the effective rifle fire, and
our supporting artillery on and about Three Tree Hill
and on the Dragoon’s Maxim position apparently could
not see them; consequently they poured, unchecked, an
uninterrupted cross fire on to our position from about 8
A.M. till dark--ten hours.
Losses were very heavy, owing to the numbers
necessarily assembled to hold back the Boer frontal
attack, established under cover, and in which they showed
gallantry in pushing forward to our lines. Colonel
Crofton was now reported wounded, and the command of the
troops in front devolved on Colonel Hill, Commanding 10th
Brigade.
So the situation continued until 6 P.M., when I wrote
a report and despatched it to you by Colonel Morris,
A.A.G. (I request that this document, to save labour,
may be attached). I first showed this to Colonel Hill,
and he concurred, even taking exception to my reference
to a retirement. I had no doubt that the infantry, which
had so gallantly held its own all day, would be able to
continue to do so when the shell fire abated at nightfall.
I accordingly went back to my reserves, having
personally handed over command at the summit to Colonel
Hill.
About 9.30 P.M., in consequence of your orders, I left
for your camp, leaving a Staff Officer (Captain Phillips)
behind. The narrative must now be his.
About 11.30 P.M. this officer, who was sleeping, was
awakened by the sound of men moving, and found a general
retirement proceeding.
He allowed no one to pass after this, stopped the
Scottish Rifles, and collected a large number of
stragglers of the Dorset, Middlesex, and Imperial Light
Infantry. Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and the bulk of the
Dorsets remained in position as posted in support to the
front line. The other corps had gone down the hill.
He then published memorandum attached,[19] to all
commanders, except Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, who had
gone on; but they did not act upon it, urging that they
had had distinct orders from Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft,
who, as far as I knew, was only assisting Colonel Crofton
in a portion of the front line, to retire.
We now held the spur to within about 300 yards of the
summit, but the summit itself was evacuated. Signal
communication could not be established at the moment, as
the lamp which the signalling officer counted upon ran
out of oil, and some time was lost in obtaining another.
About 1.30 A.M. a person, not by his speech an
Englishman, was brought in on suspicion by a picquet. He
made a statement to the effect that a naval gun would
shortly be brought up, and requested that it might not be
fired on. This was the first intimation of any naval gun
coming to Spion Kop.
About 2.20 A.M. a naval officer reported that he
had one 12-pr. gun below Spion Kop, near the donga on
the west. He said he had orders to take this up to
the summit. When asked whether he could do so before
daylight, he said he could not. As it would be impossible
to move the gun in any line after daybreak, on account
of hostile fire, he was told to stand by in a place of
safety. Signalling communication was now opened, and the
attached message[20] sent.
As Captain Phillips got no instructions, about 2.30
A.M. he ordered vehicles back to a place of safety.
All regimental wagons had been sent across by the
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General (B), 5th Division.
Shortly after 4 A.M., there still being no orders, and
a mass of transport, small-arm ammunition carts, &c.,
at the donga, steps were taken to cover this passage,
and, with the concurrence of the Officer Commanding
Dorsetshire Regiment, and Officer Commanding Scottish
Rifles, certain dispositions were made with the latter
battalion and about half the former. The other half of
the Dorsetshire Regiment were employed in carrying away a
large number of boxes (about 80) of small-arm ammunition,
brought back from the front and elsewhere.
The Imperial Light Infantry, Middlesex, and
Thorneycroft’s had apparently gone home. Bethune’s were
dismissed.
It was now light, and Boer ‘sniping’ commenced. Captain
Phillips reported to me at the donga, about 4.45 A.M.,
when I was in possession of your order as to the pontoon
crossing.
TALBOT COKE, _Major-General,
Commanding Right Attack_.}}
K
{{CASUALTIES
+------------+----------------+-----------------+--------------------+
| | | Officers | Men |
| Date | ---- +-----------------+--------------------+
| | |Killed |Killed |
| | | Wounded | Wounded |
| | | Missing| Missing|
+------------+----------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------+------+
| January | | | | | | | |
|17th to 20th| 5th Division | 1 | 12 | -- | 26 | 178 | -- |
|20th | 2nd ” | -- | 8 | -- | 4 | 102 | 2 |
|21st | 2nd ” | 1 | 8 | -- | 13 | 131 | 5 |
|22nd | 2nd ” | -- | 1 | -- | 1 | 19 | 1 |
|23rd | 2nd ” | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 14 | -- |
|24th | 2nd ” | 1 | 1 | -- | 4 | 12 | -- |
|24th | 5th ” | 21 | 22 | -- | 139 | 388 | 279 |
|24th | 4th Brigade | 6 | 11 | 6 | 32 | 120 | 2 |
|25th | 2nd Division | -- | -- | -- | -- | 10 | -- |
|26th | 2nd ” | -- | -- | -- | -- | 3 | -- |
|21st, 22nd, | 5th ” | -- | 1 | -- | 1 | 33 | -- |
| 23rd, 25th,| | | | | | | |
| 26th, 27th | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-------+------+
| | Totals | 30 | 64 | 6 | 221 | 1,010 | 289 |
| | | \-----><-----/ | \------><--------/ |
| | | 100 | 1,520 |
|23rd |General Barton’s| | | | | | |
| | force is not | | | | | | |
| | included in | | | | | | |
| | above. He lost | 1 | 1 | -- | 4 | 5 | 11 |
|20th |Lost by General | | | | | | |
| | Lyttelton, not | | | | | | |
| | shown above | -- | 1 | -- | 2 | 13 | 1 |
| | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-------+------+
| | | 1 | 2 | -- | 6 | 18 | 12 |
| | | \-----><----/ | \------><-----/ |
| | Grand Totals | 103 | 1,556 |
|Losses on | | | | | | | |
| 24th | | 28 | 34 | 6 | 175 | 520 | 281 |
| (included | | \-----><-----/ | \-------><------/ |
| above) | Totals | 68 | 976 |
+------------+----------------+-----------------+--------------------+
There are said to have been 243 buried on Spion Kop, so no doubt
many of those shown missing were killed.}}
INDEX
Abyssinia, 31
àCourt, Lieut.-Colonel, 117, 139, 140, 175, 215, 221, 224
Acton Homes, 72, 73, 77-81, 85-90, 93-97, 100, 110, 111, 120, 126,
165, 178, 179, 204, 213, 223
Admiralty, 27, 29, 30
Akaba, 26-28
Alcester, Lord, 29
Anderson, Lieut., 4
Arabi, 28
Arabia Petræa, 25, 32
Atkins, Mr. J. B., 84, 98
Bangor, N. Wales, 2
Barkly, Sir Henry, 12
Barton, Major-General, 237
Bastion Hill, 87, 99, 100, 107, 110, 111
Bayly, Major, 233
Baynes, Bishop, 83, 106
Bechuanaland, 2, 18-20, 32-35, 61
Belmont, 58
Berber, 39
Besant, Sir Walter, 4, 7
Biggarsberg, 164
Bloemfontein, 12
Bloemhof, 20
Blomfield, Colonel, 140, 229
Botha, General Louis, 167
Brand, President, 12, 13
Bridgnorth Grammar School, 2
British Association, 44
Buller, Sir Redvers, 55, 56, 60-62, 66-72, 74, 75, 78, 80-83, 85,
86, 95-99, 106, 108-117, 128, 136, 138, 142, 144, 147, 158,
159, 169-172, 175-180, 183-188, 192, 193, 195, 197-200,
203-209, 211, 215, 218, 222
Burleigh, Mr. Bennet, 85, 107, 137, 140, 157, 159
Burma, 46
Burton, Lieut., 28
Byng, Colonel, 107
Cairo, 40
Cambridge, Duke of, 14, 23, 30, 41
Cape Town, 12, 14, 35, 55, 60
Carlow, 2
Charrington, Lieut., 26, 27
Chatham, 2, 4, 24, 53
Chelmsford, Lord, 20
Cheltenham College, 3
Chief Commissioner of Police, 40, 41
Chieveley, 60, 63-66, 70, 78, 168
Childers, Right Hon. H. C. E., 40
Churchill, Mr. W. S., 80, 101, 107, 128, 155, 189, 231
Clarke, Sir Andrew, 32
Clery, Sir C. F., 62, 65-68, 84, 85, 103-106, 110, 135, 198, 215-218
Clydesdale, 88
Coke, Major-General Talbot, 112, 113, 116, 117, 135-137, 141-145,
148-151, 153, 154, 157, 173-175, 184, 187, 188, 192, 206, 207,
215, 220-227, 230, 232, 236
Colenso, 57, 60, 62, 66, 76, 79, 84, 90, 99, 100, 131, 189
Colesberg, 59
Colonial Office, 20
‘Contemporary Review,’ 119
Cornforth Hill, 18
Cradock, 12
Crimean War, 2
Crofton, Colonel, 140, 141, 143, 146, 152, 196, 208, 224, 225, 230,
233-235
Cronje, 162
Daniels Kuil, 17
Debe Nek, 16
Dekiel Drift, 203
Delagoa Bay, 14
Diamond Fields, 12
Diamond Fields Horse, 16, 17
Dooner, Lieut., 193
Doorn Kloof, 76, 77, 90
-- Kop, 63
Dordrecht, 15
Douglas, 59
Dover, 9
Drakensberg Mountains, 89, 98, 126
Dublin, 2
Dufferin, Lord, 39
Dundonald, Lord, 107
Durban, 56, 62
Egypt, 25, 27, 32
Election Address, 37, 38
Enfield, 10
Ermelo, 121
Eslin, 58
Estcourt, 62, 66
Everard, Dr., 120
Fair View, 77, 81, 86, 88, 92-95, 97, 101, 104, 110, 111, 199, 204,
214, 217, 219, 223
Ford, Commandant, 18
Forster, Right Hon. W. E., 32
Fort Canning, 48
French, Major-General, 59
Frere, 62-66, 76, 209, 212
Frere, Sir Bartle, 14, 192
Gaika War, 16, 23
Gatacre, Major-General, 57
Gibraltar, 2, 4, 133
Gill, Captain, 25-27
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., 28
Gomaperi, 18
Gordon, General C. G., 31
Goshenland, 33
Griqualand West, 2, 11-23, 25, 32
Grobelaar’s Kloof, 76
Groote Hoek, 81, 86-88, 90, 93, 94, 97, 111, 199
Grove, Sir George, 4
Guildford, 4
Hadendowa Arabs, 39
Hanwell, Captain, 193
Harrismith Pass, 79, 89, 98, 100
Hart, Major-General, 65, 72, 73, 84, 92, 105, 107, 108, 112, 218
Hatting’s Farm, 212, 215
Haydon, F. M., 4
-- S., 4
Haynes, Lieut., 28
Hewett, Sir W., 26
Hicks-Beach, Sir M., 23, 24
Hildyard, Major-General, 62, 65, 66, 74, 84, 107, 112, 215, 216
Hill, Colonel, 146, 149, 152, 153, 174, 194, 196, 208, 230, 233-235
Hongers Poort, 179
Hospital Sangar, 145, 152
Hughes, M. A., 1, 2
-- W., 2
Irwin, Major, 211
Isandhlwana, 19
Jamestown, 15
Jerusalem, 4, 7, 8, 9
Jubilee, Queen’s, 41
Kaal Kafirs, 17, 18
Kaffraria, 16
Kalahari Desert, 22
Keate-Award, 19
Kennedy, Quartermaster-Sergeant, 28
Khartoum, 31
Kimberley, 12, 14, 18-20, 56, 57, 163, 165
King William’s Town, 17
Kitchener, Lord, 60
Kruger, President, 33-36
Ladysmith, 55-57, 61, 62, 65-67, 69, 75, 77, 78, 80, 84, 88, 95-100,
107, 122, 123, 129, 160, 164, 168, 170-172, 179, 205, 208
Lancers Hill, 76, 77
Lanyon, Sir O., 12, 17, 18, 21, 22
Litako, 21
Llangwani, 131
Look-out Hill, 80
Lyttelton, Major-General, 73-75, 80, 83, 84, 143, 175, 233, 237
Mafeking, 36
Majesfontein, 57
Majuba, 33, 59
Manyering, 18
Matthews, Rt. Hon. H., 40, 42, 43
Maxwell, Dr. R., 119, 163
Methuen, Lord, 34, 56, 58, 60
Middle Drift, 73
Mitchell, Sir C., 50
Mobilisation, 47, 48
Modder River, 57, 60
Mokolokue’s Mountain, 19, 22
Moteto, 18
Monte Christo, 131
Morosi’s Mountain, 21
Morris, Colonel A. W., 192, 234
Moses Wells, 26
Mount Alice, 66, 77, 85, 120, 131
‘Murray’s Magazine,’ 42
Nakhl, 26, 28
Natal, 1, 55, 56, 61, 62, 70, 78, 85, 88, 101, 169, 192
‘National Review,’ 75, 124
New Forest Manœuvres, 53
Oliver’s Hoek, 89
Oppenheim, Mr., 173
Orange Free State, 11-14, 25, 57, 78, 88-90, 97, 98, 112
Orange River, 13, 23
Paarde Kloof, 18, 21
Pahang, 46
Palestine, 4, 32
Palmer, Professor, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 39
Perak, 46
Perie Bush, 16
Phillips, Captain, 153-157, 207, 235, 236
Pieters, 76, 102, 131
Pilcher, Colonel, 59
Platrand, 160
Police, 40, 41
Porrit’s Drift, 65
Port Elizabeth, 12
Potgieter’s Drift, 62, 65-68, 70, 73-78, 80-82, 84, 85, 87-90, 95-99,
107, 115, 125, 126, 143, 169, 193, 194, 204, 209, 210, 212,
214, 219
Pretoria, 14
Pretorius Farm, 63-65
Prince of Wales, 41
‘Punch,’ 42-44
Ramsay, Professor, 3
Ramsgate, 54
Rangeworthy Hills, 73, 79, 87, 91, 92, 96-102, 126, 129-132, 199
Red Sea Littoral, 39
Rhodes, Rt. Hon. Cecil, 15
Riet River, 203
Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, 57, 60, 81, 86, 97, 117, 158, 171, 196,
203, 208, 209
Robinson, Sir Hercules, 34
Rooi Grond, 36
Rosalie, 81, 86, 94, 95, 97, 101, 219, 223
Salisbury, Lord, 41
Sargent, Major H. N., 190
Scratchley, Sir Peter, 10, 11
Sekukuni’s Town, 21
Selangor, 46
Seymour, Sir B., 29
Seyolo, 16
Sheerness, 52
Sheffield, 37
Shoeburyness, 9, 10
Siam, 46
Sim, Lieut.-Colonel, 155, 157, 194, 196, 226
Singapore, 44, 49
Skiet’s Drift, 68, 76, 82
Smith, Sir Cecil, 51
Spearman’s Hill, 66, 69, 71, 74, 75, 209, 212, 217, 219, 220
Spion Kop, 67, 68, 72, 77, 80-82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 96,
98-101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 110-119, 123, 126, 129-135, 138,
139, 142-144, 147, 150, 156, 158-164, 167-174, 182-184, 186,
189, 190, 192-197, 200, 203-207, 210, 212, 214, 215, 219-227,
232-237
Springfield, 63-66, 69-72, 144, 209-213
Stanley, Colonel, 23
-- Dean, 5
Stellaland, 32
Stephenson, Captain, 29
Stormberg, 57
Straits Settlements, 44-47, 50
Suakin, 39, 40
Suez, 26, 29
Sugarloaf Hill, 87, 107
Syria, 25, 26
Tabi Ndoda, 16
Takoon, 18, 21
Tanglin, 48
‘Temple or the Tomb,’ 8
Thaba Njama, 120, 137, 165, 166
Thames District, 51, 52
Thorneycroft, Lieut.-Col. A. W., 136-138, 140, 142, 145-148, 150-158,
170-175, 184-189, 193-195, 205-207, 221-229, 231, 235, 236
Three Tree Hill, 104, 129, 132, 133, 138-141, 156, 189, 204, 232, 234
Tor, 27
Trafalgar Square, 40, 41
Transvaal, 32, 33, 36, 78, 90, 112, 119
Trichard’s Drift, 67, 69, 71, 72, 75, 78, 81, 85, 86, 90, 95, 100,
115, 150, 203, 210, 212, 213, 217, 219, 224, 227
Tugela, 1, 56, 62, 65-67, 69, 71, 72, 74-81, 87, 89, 92, 95, 99, 116,
118, 121, 125, 126, 132, 133, 159, 163, 164, 177, 178, 181,
203, 204, 212-216, 218, 219, 223
Underground Jerusalem, 5, 8
‘United Service Magazine,’ 123
Vaal Krantz, 76
-- River, 13, 17
Van Reenen’s Pass, 89, 113, 122, 165
Venter’s Laager, 73, 92, 93, 96, 180, 199, 219
-- Spruit, 93, 94, 125, 126, 128, 213
Villiers, Mr. J. E. de, 12
Waggon Drift, 84
Waltham Abbey, 10
Warren, Lieut.-General Sir C., Biographical Sketch, 1-54
Warren, Major-General Sir C., 1
-- Very Rev. John, 2
Waterboer, 11, 12
Weenen, 122
Wem Grammar School, 2
White, Sir George, 55, 56, 60, 218
Williams, Major E. J., 190, 191
Wilson, Captain Holmes, 130
-- Sir Charles, 4
Wolseley, Lord, 32
Wood, Lieut.-Colonel G. K., 150
Woodgate, Major-General, 72, 73, 84, 92, 116, 117, 135-141, 165, 181,
184, 185, 213, 215, 220, 221, 224, 226, 227, 229, 232, 233
Wright’s Farm, 72, 189, 213, 232
Zagazig, 27
Zanzibar, 14
Zoutspan Drift, 176
Zwart Kop, 77, 126
PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO. LTD., NEW-STREET SQUARE
LONDON
[Illustration: Plan showing ground on which operations of 17 to 25
Jan. 1900, took place.
London: Smith Elder & Co. _Stanford’s Geog^l Estab^t London._]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Warren was promoted to be Captain on 20th October 1869.
[2] 11th November 1882.
[3] See reproduction.
[4] See pages 67 to 69.
[5] Potgieter’s Drift.
[6] Called Three Tree Hill.
[7] ‘London to Ladysmith viâ Pretoria.’
[8] N.B.--Black marginal line indicates that portions so marked were
not published with the despatches, 1900.
[9] See D.
[10] See C.
[11] See pages 62 to 66.
[12] See pages 67 to 69.
[13] See page 103.
[14]
{{Hatting’s Farm: 30th January, 1900.
The Chief of Staff,--With reference to my report on the operations
on the Tugela, already forwarded, will you please attach the
accompanying addition?
C. WARREN, _Lieut.-General, Commanding 5th Division_.
Hatting’s Farm: 30th January, 1900.
I omitted to state that during the afternoon of the 22nd the
Commander-in-Chief proposed an attack upon the enemy’s position on
our left flank that night. I summoned at once the General Officers
available--namely, Generals Clery, Talbot Coke, and Hildyard.
General Clery, who was in command of the left attack, did not
consider it advisable to make this attack, because, if successful,
it would commit us to taking the whole line of the enemy’s
position, which he considered a hazardous proceeding, as we might
not be able to hold it. In this I concurred, more particularly as
it was evidently too late in the day to carry the operation out
effectively.
C. WARREN, _Lieut.-General, Commanding 5th Division_.
I continually proposed to General Warren that he should attack the
enemy’s right, which was _en l’air_ and not strong, and which it
was part of the original programme to try and turn, but I never
suggested doing this hurriedly or without adequate forethought and
preparation.--R. B.}}
[15] See pages 104 and 105 for substance of Sir C. F. Clery’s Report.
The Report of Major-General Hildyard is not reprinted.
[16] C.
[17] See G.
[18] See H.
[19] See page 154.
[20] See page 156.
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Section F in the Appendix is a reproduction of a Report by Sir
Charles Warren and has several sidenotes in the margin. The
Sidenote ‘A’ is referenced from section E. Sidenote ‘1’ appears
twice in one paragraph but is shown only once in this etext.
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the
text and consultation of external sources.
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
Pg 120: ‘Thaba Mjama’ replaced by ‘Thaba Njama’.
Index: ‘Sarjent’ replaced by ‘Sargent’.
Index: ‘Van Renen’ replaced by ‘Van Reenen’.