CAPTURE OF SPION KOP AND ITS ABANDONMENT
On 23rd January the command at the front was divided into two attacks
under Sir Charles Warren; the left attack under Lieutenant-General
Clery, with his two brigades, the 2nd and 5th; and the right attack
under Major-General Talbot Coke with the 10th and 11th Brigades. Thus
Major-General Coke had the command of the attack on Spion Kop and
orders were issued by him and made to him in reference to the column
of attack.
Major-General Woodgate having been selected for the command of this
column, it devolved upon Major-General Coke as commander of the 5th
Division and of the right attack to make all the arrangements in
connection with it in consultation with Sir Charles Warren. He gave
orders that the column should consist of two and a half battalions
of Major-General Woodgate’s Brigade, the 2nd Royal Lancaster, 2nd
Lancashire Fusiliers, and two companies South Lancashire, to which
Sir Charles Warren added 200 of Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry, half
the 17th Company Royal Engineers, and two companies of the Connaught
Rangers to intrench half-way up in case of a check during the assault.
All the arrangements for the water supply, food, ammunition,
Artillery and Engineers’ services and for the wounded were arranged
between Sir Charles Warren and Major-General Coke, with the aid
of the officers commanding the Army Service Corps and the Royal
Artillery, the Commanding Royal Engineer and the Principal Medical
Officer. Sir Redvers Buller was asked by telegram to send over the
mountain guns and also the East Indian water-carriers who were said
to be in his camp. Sir Charles Warren had a long interview with
Major-Generals Talbot Coke and Woodgate, in which, it is understood,
the subjects of the attack and the intrenchments were discussed, and
the orders to Major-General Woodgate for the attack, founded on
those of the previous day, were issued by Major-General Talbot Coke.
At seven o’clock in the evening of 23rd January Major-General
Woodgate started with the column for the attack, the troops carrying
rations for the following day with them. Mr. Bennet Burleigh in ‘The
Natal Campaign’ gives the following graphic account of the march:
‘The force proceeded in the gloaming down the slope, moving
rearward along the deep dongas to get upon the south side of Thaba
Emanyama. Painfully going forward, scrambling over boulders and
rocks in the darkness, the column, in two thin lines, silently,
slowly neared the mountain. No smoking, no talking--the orders
not to fire but to use the bayonet--the men held grimly onward.
Almost every man carried a rifle, including General Woodgate....
Whenever a difficult part was reached Thorneycroft went ahead with
two or three of his men to discover the best way of surmounting the
obstacle, or ascertaining if Boers lay behind interposing ledges.
General Woodgate, though far from well, persisted in leading his
men. In steep places he had in several instances to be pushed and
pulled to assist him onward.’
The column arrived half-way up at half-past one o’clock in the
morning of the 24th, and carried the summit at half-past three,
some of Thorneycroft’s men and of the Royal Engineers and South
Lancashires rushing the position with fixed bayonets with a loss
of only three men wounded. The cheers of the successful assailants
were heard at the bivouac at Three Tree Hill, and when day broke the
summit of Spion Kop was seen to be enveloped in thick mist, which
no doubt had assisted the assaulting column to arrive at the top
undiscovered.
Early in the morning the troops intrenched themselves as well as the
darkness would admit, and from the bottom of the hill the Sappers
commenced making a zigzag path to the summit for the water mules and
the mountain battery to ascend, and later straight slides at the
steep places for the naval 12-pr. guns which Sir Redvers Buller was
to send over.
About half-past five o’clock in the morning the Boers, who had fled
at the first assault, returned with strong reinforcements, and, as
the mist lifted from time to time, commenced firing at our troops
from a kopje to the north, some 400 or 500 yards away. Our trenches,
owing to the rocky nature of the plateau on the top, were very
shallow, and, owing probably to the darkness and fog, were wrongly
placed in the middle of the plateau.
At 7 A.M. Sir Charles Warren rode over from Three Tree Hill to
the foot of Spion Kop, whence the ascent of the column had taken
place, examined the approaches, and gave the Imperial Light Infantry
instructions how they should advance to the support of the column
without attracting the fire of the enemy. He then returned to Three
Tree Hill, but the mist still prevented any signalling from the
top of Spion Kop, and it was not until after nine o’clock that Sir
Charles Warren received by the hands of Lieut.-Colonel àCourt, who
had returned from the top, the following letter from Major-General
Woodgate, written about two hours before:
‘Spion Kop: 24th January 1900.
‘Dear Sir Charles,--We got up about four o’clock, and rushed the
position with three men wounded. There were some few Boers, who
seemed surprised, and bolted after firing a round or so, having
one man killed. I believe there is another somewhere, but have
not found him in the mist. The latter did us well, and I pushed
on a bit quicker than I perhaps should otherwise have done, lest
it should lift before we got here. We have intrenched a position,
and are, I hope, secure; but fog is too thick to see, so I
retain Thorneycroft’s men and Royal Engineers for a bit longer.
Thorneycroft’s men attacked in fine style. I had a noise made later
to let you know that we had got in.
‘Yours &c.,
‘E. WOODGATE.’
Lieut.-Colonel àCourt expressed himself as quite satisfied that the
summit could be held--‘held till doomsday against all comers,’ he
said to Mr. Bennet Burleigh.
Not long after General Woodgate had written his letter to Sir Charles
Warren the Boer fire grew very hot, and he fell mortally wounded.
Colonel Blomfield of the Lancashire Fusiliers was also wounded soon
after, and Colonel Crofton of the Royal Lancasters, as senior
officer, then assumed the command.
As the mist cleared, it became evident to those below and on Three
Tree Hill that the schanzes held by our men on the top were exposed
to both frontal rifle fire and to shell fire from the left front,
and that a good deal of fighting was going on. Sir Charles Warren
therefore directed Major-General Coke to send up the Imperial Light
Infantry, who were posted at the foot of the hill, to reinforce
Colonel Crofton, the Dorset Regiment taking their place at the foot.
A little before ten o’clock a message was received by Sir Charles
Warren from Colonel Crofton which ran as follows:
‘Reinforce at once or all lost. General dead.’
Sir Charles Warren replied:
‘I am sending two battalions, and the Imperial Light Infantry are on
their way up. You must hold on to the last. No surrender.’
It is due to Colonel Crofton to state that the message he ordered to
be sent was, he says:
‘General Woodgate dead; reinforcements urgently required.’
The message was not written down by him, or by the signalling
officer, and it is impossible to trace how the alteration occurred.
The Dorset Regiment was then sent up, and subsequently the Middlesex
Regiment. Sir Charles Warren went over to see Major-General Coke and
directed him to go up himself to Spion Kop and, as Commander of the
5th Division and of the right attack, take command of the troops
there--some 5,500 men. Major-General Coke left for Spion Kop about 11
A.M., and arrived on the slopes, some 600 feet below the summit, at
noon.
At noon a message arrived from Sir Redvers Buller ordering Sir
Charles Warren to place Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft in command on
the summit. Sir Redvers Buller says he telegraphed to Sir Charles
Warren: ‘Unless you put some really good hard-fighting man in
command on the top you will lose the hill. I suggest Thorneycroft.’
Sir Charles Warren, though so much nearer the scene of operations
than Sir Redvers Buller, was in a much inferior position for seeing
what was going on at the top of Spion Kop, and, astonished though
he may have been at the selection of this gallant young officer to
supersede the colonels commanding brigades and regiments, he regarded
the intimation as an order--in fact, he says in his despatch it was
an order--and he at once signalled to Colonel Crofton: ‘With approval
of the Commander-in-Chief I place Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft in
command of the summit with the local rank of Brigadier-General.’
The confusion consequent upon this order will be considered further
on.
* * * * *
At the same time Major-General Lyttelton, who had been bombarding
all the morning with his artillery at Potgieter’s, apprised by Sir
Charles Warren of Colonel Crofton’s telegram and asked to give
assistance on his side of Spion Kop, demonstrated strongly by sending
two squadrons of Bethune’s Horse and the Scottish Rifles to reinforce
the extreme right on the top of the hill, while later the King’s
Royal Rifles crossed the river and moved against a high point of
Spion Kop. These troops did very good work, and in the afternoon Sir
Charles Warren wired to Major-General Lyttelton: ‘The assistance you
are giving most valuable. We shall try to remain _in statu quo_
during to-morrow. Balloon would be of incalculable value.’
In the meantime all available sandbags and tools for intrenching
were sent by the hands of the troops going up, each man carrying
something. Two hundred gallons of water were well on their way, some
springs near the top were developed by the Engineers, the zigzag
pathway was completed, and coils of 3-inch cable got ready for
hauling up the naval guns.
Then followed an anxious time for Sir Charles Warren. The rifle and
shell fire of the Boers was extremely hot on the top, the signallers
had been hit and some of their apparatus destroyed, and for some
two or three hours he was unable to get any replies to repeated
inquiries. There was no news of the mountain guns or the naval 12-pr.
guns, which Sir Redvers Buller was to send across the river to
him--in fact, the former only left Springfield at eleven o’clock that
morning.
A little after two o’clock in the afternoon news of the situation
was received, sent an hour or so earlier by Major-General Coke, who
was then on the plateau of the slopes below Spion Kop. The report
was that the top of the hill was crowded with men exposed to shell
fire, but holding on well, that General Coke had stopped further
reinforcements beyond the point where he was, at the same time
letting the troops on the top know that help was close at hand, and
ammunition being pushed up. From the report of Major-General Coke,
recently published, it appears that on his way up he found the track
very much congested with men, and, on hearing that the troops were
crowded together on the top in a small space exposed to shell fire,
very judiciously stopped the reinforcements that had not passed him;
unfortunately he received urgent requests from the top soon after for
more men, and allowed them to proceed.
Major-General Coke seems to have started from the plateau for the
summit about three o’clock and to have reached it half an hour later,
and was then _de facto_ in command there over every one. For some
time he was unable to find any one in command on the summit, or in
touch with the signalling station at the Hospital Sangar. He was
unaware that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft had been placed in command
on the summit with the rank of Brigadier-General, although on his
way up he had received a report from that officer which he forwarded
with remarks to Sir Charles Warren, and which will be referred to
later. Failing to find any one in command he passed over to the
right and met Colonel Hill, who with the leading companies of the
Middlesex Regiment got to the summit about noon, and, understanding
that Colonel Crofton had been wounded, told Colonel Hill that the
command devolved upon him as the next senior officer, and gave him
detailed instructions as to intrenching at sundown. An hour later,
while still on the top, but separated from Colonel Hill, he received
the following message from him, sent at 5.5 P.M.:
‘We have now plenty of men for firing line, but the artillery fire
from our left (west) is very harassing. I propose holding out till
dark and then intrenching.’
The selection of Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to take command over
his seniors in the heat of action was a signal example of the danger
of a serious departure from precedent at such a time. The difficulty
of making a selection known and understood by all concerned was
enormous, and the risks of mistakes most serious. Lieut.-Colonel
A. W. Thorneycroft was only a major of six months’ standing in the
Royal Scots Fusiliers, who held the local rank of Lieut.-Colonel
while in command of a special corps. Brave and active to a degree, he
was selected by Sir Redvers Buller because he was known as ‘a good
hard-fighting man,’ and right well had he maintained his reputation
during that morning; but, just because he was such a man, he was at
the front in the thick of the fight. ‘The fight was too hot, too
close, too interlaced for him to attend to anything but to support
this company, clear those rocks, or line that trench.’[7] But the
commander on the top should have been out of the thick of it, able
to direct the general conduct of matters and to keep in touch with
his General below, leaving the actual fighting to his many able
subordinates; this meant a man of some experience in command, and
this Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, whatever else he was, certainly
was not. Thus, although both the Officers Commanding Artillery and
Engineers at the top of Spion Kop knew about the arrangements for
bringing up guns and intrenching at night, he seems to have heard
nothing about it, and so also about water, food, ammunition, &c.
After General Coke’s arrival on the summit many of the troops who had
formed the storming party were allowed to go down the hill to get
water and food.
About half-past four o’clock in the afternoon Sir Charles Warren
received Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft’s message, sent from the top two
hours before, in which the situation was described as follows:
‘Hung on till last extremity with the old force. Some of the
Middlesex here now, and I hear Dorsets are coming up, but force
really unable quite to hold so large a perimeter. Enemy’s guns on
north-west sweep the whole of the top of the hill. They also have
guns to east. Cannot you bring artillery fire to bear on north-west
guns? What reinforcements can you send to hold the hill to-night?
We are badly in want of water. There are many killed and wounded.
If you wish to really make a certainty of the hill for the night,
you must send more infantry and attack the enemy’s guns.’
Major-General Coke saw this message at his position at the signal
station about three o’clock, just before leaving for the summit, and
added the following observation:
‘I have seen the above and have ordered the Scottish Rifles and the
King’s Royal Rifles to reinforce the Middlesex Regiment. The Dorset
Regiment and the Imperial Light Infantry have also gone up. We
appear to be holding our own at present.’
At six o’clock, before it got dark, Major-General Coke on the summit
wrote an account of the situation (received by Sir Charles Warren
at half-past seven), and having personally handed over command on
the summit to Colonel Hill, and assured himself that he understood
his duties and responsibilities, went back to the reserves half-way
down the hill which he chose for the command post. There he remained
until half-past nine in the evening, when, in obedience to an order
from Sir Charles Warren, he went down to see him, leaving his
deputy-assistant adjutant-general at the post to carry on the routine
duties of the command in his name during his absence. Some hours
before he started down the hill, water and provisions were arriving
regularly at the signal station and being passed to the top.
Down below Sir Charles Warren had been busy with arrangements for
sending up at night all that was necessary to enable the position
to be held next day. The mountain battery and naval 12-pr. guns,
however, only arrived at Trichard’s Drift between five and six
o’clock in the afternoon.
Colonel Wood, R.E., who was on the top during the day, was fully
informed of all that was to be done at sundown, although, of course,
it was not possible to know precisely when the guns would reach the
top until they actually came in from Trichard’s Drift.
The mountain battery arrived at the foot of Spion Kop about half-past
seven in the evening, completely tired out with their long march, and
it was arranged that they should rest there until midnight, when the
moon rose, and there would be plenty of time for them to ascend and
get their guns into position on the top before daybreak. Notice of
this was sent to Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft by the hand of a scout.
Major-General Coke could hardly have left the summit at 6.30 P.M.
when Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, as night was closing in, made up
his mind that the hill was untenable. He sent the following message
to Sir Charles Warren, which was not received that night:
‘The troops which marched up here last night are quite done up.
They have had no water, and ammunition is running short. I consider
that, even with the reinforcements which have arrived, it is
impossible to permanently hold this place so long as the enemy’s
guns can play on the hill. They have three long-range guns, three
of shorter range, and several Maxim-Nordenfeldts, which have swept
the whole of the plateau since 8 A.M. I have not been able to
ascertain the casualties, but they have been very heavy, especially
in the regiments which came up last night. I request instructions
as to what course I am to adopt. The enemy are now firing heavily
from both flanks, while a heavy rifle fire is being kept up in the
front. It is all I can do to hold my own. If my casualties go on at
the present rate I shall barely hold out the night. A large number
of stretcher-bearers should be sent up, and also all the water
possible. The situation is critical.’
But he did not wait for a reply. At the time he despatched this
message the intention to abandon the position had already been
taken, for at half-past six o’clock the companies of the Royal
Lancaster Regiment were ordered to form up near the dressing station
preparatory to retirement and Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft himself
says in his report:
‘When night began to close in I determined to take some steps, and
a consultation was held. The officer commanding Scottish Rifles and
Colonel Crofton were both of opinion that the hill was untenable.
I entirely agreed with their view, and so I gave the order for the
troops to withdraw on to the neck and ridge where the hospital was.’
By seven o’clock orders were issued for the troops to retire on the
Hospital Sangar, and the collecting of the men and bringing in of the
wounded commenced. It is said that Colonel Hill had a warm discussion
with Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, who, however, asserted his right as
brigadier-general commanding on the summit to order a retirement. He
neither sent word to Major-General Coke nor to Sir Charles Warren.
Why Colonel Hill did not tell Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft that the
former had only just left the hill remains unexplained.
At the time that Major-General Coke left his post in charge of his
Staff Officer the preparations for retirement had been in full swing
for three hours.
The first intimation that Captain Phillips, Major-General Coke’s
Staff Officer, had of the retirement was being awakened at the
command post by the sound of men moving at 11.30 P.M. He then found
a general retirement proceeding. He at once stopped the flow of men
down the hill--the Scottish Rifles and a large number of stragglers
of the Dorset, Middlesex, and Imperial Light Infantry, whom he
collected. The reserves--Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and the bulk of
the Dorsets--remained in position as posted in support of the front
line. The other corps had gone down the hill, and Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft with them. Captain Phillips promulgated the following
memorandum to all commanders, but they did not act on it, urging
that they had distinct orders from Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft:
_‘Officers Commanding Dorsetshire and Middlesex Regiments, Scottish
Rifles, Imperial Light Horse_:
‘The withdrawal is absolutely without the authority of either
Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren. The former was called
away by the latter a little before 10 A.M. When General Coke left
the front about 6 P.M. our men were holding their own, and he left
the situation as such, and reported that he could hold on. Some
one, without authority, has given orders to withdraw, and has
incurred a grave responsibility. Were the General here, he would
order an instant reoccupation of the heights.
‘H. E. PHILLIPS,
‘_Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General_.’
At that time, 11.30 P.M., the spur was still held to within about 300
yards of the summit, but the summit itself was evacuated. Signalling
communication could not be established because the oil had run out.
In the meantime, at nine o’clock, Colonel Sim, R.E., with 200 men of
the Somersetshire Regiment, carrying tools, started to construct the
emplacements for the naval guns. Sir Charles Warren gave him a letter
to Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft explaining the work Colonel Sim had to
do and telling him it was of vital importance that the summit should
be held.
When the troops were being marched off to go down the hill by
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft about 10 P.M., Mr. Winston Spencer
Churchill arrived with the information that the mountain guns and a
naval 12-pr. gun were coming up during the night. As Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft was going down the hill about midnight he met
Lieut.-Colonel Sim, who gave him Sir Charles Warren’s letter. He said
it was too late, as the men, unsupported by guns, could not stay. He
ordered Lieut.-Colonel Sim to take his party back. Lieut.-Colonel Sim
sent them back and himself went on to ascertain if the retirement was
general, and, finding it was so, he walked up the valley to warn the
officer in command of the naval gun of the altered situation, and
prevent him risking his gun by moving it to the evacuated hill-top.
Half-past two on the morning of 25th January was an hour to be
remembered by many of the actors in this abortive enterprise. Captain
Phillips at the Commanding General’s post had managed to get the
signals to work and sent the following message:
‘Spion Kop: 25th January 1900. 2.30 A.M.
‘_General Officer Commanding Three Tree Hill_:
‘Summit of Spion Kop evacuated by our troops, which still hold
lower slopes. An unauthorised retirement took place. Naval guns
cannot reach summit before daylight; would be exposed to fire if
attempted to do so by day.’
About 2.30 A.M. the following message from Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft reached Sir Charles Warren:
‘24th January 1901 (no hour fixed).
‘Regret to report that I have been obliged to abandon Spion Kop,
as the position became untenable. I have withdrawn the troops in
regular order, and will come to report as soon as possible.
‘ALEC THORNEYCROFT,
‘_Lieut.-Colonel_.’
No messenger was sent down to acquaint Sir Charles Warren of the
intention to retire taken as early as 6.30 P.M.; no heed was paid to
the vigorous protests of either Colonel Hill or Captain Phillips,
and Sir Charles Warren’s positive instructions received on the way
down by the hand of Colonel Sim were treated with scant respect--in
fact, were ignored; and so it came to pass that Major-General Coke,
summoned by Sir Charles Warren at nine o’clock, and Lieut.-Colonel
Thorneycroft, unsummoned, arrived together at Sir Charles Warren’s
headquarters about 2.30 A.M. on the 25th, and for the first time he
heard of the abandonment of the hill after the retirement had been
completed, and found all his plans at once swept away.
Mr. Bennet Burleigh says in ‘The Natal Campaign’:
‘Had the troops but waited throughout the night until the guns
and Engineers arrived, the whole situation of affairs would have
been completely changed. I met the mountain battery, on the
evening of the battle, on its way up. The naval guns were a little
farther off, and the Engineers were also on the march. Then I and
everybody thought that the firing had been practically finished for
the day, and that Warren’s preparations for the absolute holding of
Spion Kop would be carried through before morning. That, in that
event, the Boers must beat a retreat all along the line none could
doubt.’
After a careful consideration of all the circumstances who can wonder
that Lord Roberts stated in his despatch of 13th February 1900 that
he was unable to concur with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion in ordering
the troops to retire, or can fail to agree with Lord Roberts that his
assumption of responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable?