13. Being the Good Himself, and not simply something good, the Divinity
cannot possess anything, not even the quality of being good. If He
possessed anything, this thing would either be good, or not good;
now in the principle which is good in Himself and in the highest
degree, there cannot be anything which is not good. On the other hand,
the statement that the Good possesses the quality of being good is
impossible. Since therefore (the Good) can possess neither the quality
of being good, or of not being good, the result is that He cannot
possess anything; that He is unique, and isolated from everything
else. As all other things either are good without being the Good, or
are not good, and as the Good has neither the quality of being good,
or of not being good, He has nothing, and this is the very thing that
constitutes His goodness. To attribute to Him anything, such as being,
intelligence, or beauty, would be to deprive Him of the privilege of
being the Good. Therefore when we deprive Him of all attributes, when
we affirm nothing about Him, when one does not commit the error of
supposing anything within Him, He is left as simple essence, without
attribution of things He does not possess. Let us not imitate those
ignorant panegyrists who lower the glory of those they praise by
attributing to them qualities inferior to their dignity, because they
do not know how to speak properly of the persons they are trying to
praise. Likewise, we should not attribute to the Divinity any of the
things beneath and after Him; we should recognize Him as their eminent
cause, but without being any of them. The nature of the Good consists
not in being all things in general, nor in being any of them in
particular. In this case, indeed, the Good would form no more than one
with all beings; consequently, He would differ from them only by His
own character; that is, by some difference, or by the addition of some
quality. Instead of being one, He would be two things, of which the
one--namely, what in Him was common with the other beings--would not be
the Good, while the other would be the Good (and would leave all beings
evil). Under this hypothesis, He would be a mixture of good and of not
good; he would no longer be the pure and primary Good. The primary Good
would be that in which the other thing would particularly participate,
a participation by virtue of which it would become the good. This thing
would be the good only by participation, whilst that in which it would
participate would be nothing in particular; which would demonstrate
that the good was nothing in particular. But if, in the principle under
discussion, the good be such--that is, if there be a difference whose
presence gives the character of goodness to the composite--this good
must derive from some other principle which must be the Good uniquely
and simply. Such a composite, therefore, depends on the pure and simple
Good. Thus the First, the absolute Good, dominates all beings, is
uniquely the Good, possesses nothing within Himself, is mingled with
nothing, is superior to all things, and is the cause of all things. The
beautiful and that which is "being" could not derive from evil, or from
indifferent principles; for the cause being more perfect, is always
better than its effects.