Let us consider what consequences may be drawn therefrom for the earth,
the stars, and especially for the heavens and the whole world. From
what we have seen, the parts of the world which suffer may possess
sensation in their relation with other parts. But is the entire world,
capable of feeling, as it is entirely impassible in its relations
with itself? If sensation demand on one hand an organ, and on the
other the sense-object, the world which includes everything, can have
neither organ to perceive, nor exterior object to be perceived. We may
therefore ascribe to the world a sort of intimate sensation, such as
we ourselves possess, and deny to it the perception of other objects.
When we feel something unusual in our bodies, we perceive it as being
external. Now as we perceive not only exterior objects, but even some
part of our body through some other part of the body itself, similarly
the world might very well perceive the sphere of the planets by means
of the sphere of the fixed stars; and perceive the earth with all the
objects it contains by means of the sphere of the planets? If these
beings (the stars and the planets) do not feel the passions felt
by other beings, why might they not also possess different senses?
Might not the sphere of the planets not only by itself possess sight
by itself, but in addition be the eye destined to transmit what it
sees to the universal Soul? Since she is luminous and animated, she
might see as does an eye, supposing that she did not feel the other
passions.[155] (Plato), however, said, "that the heavens have no need
of eyes." Doubtless the heavens have nothing outside of themselves to
see; and consequently, they may not have need of eyes, as we have; but
they contain something to contemplate, namely, themselves. If it should
be objected that it is useless for them to see themselves, it may be
answered that they were not made principally for this purpose, and that
if they see themselves, it is only a necessary consequence of their
natural constitution. Nothing therefore hinders them from seeing, as
their body is diaphanous.
IF SENSATION IS A SOUL-DISTRACTION, THE STARS A WOULD NOT INDULGE
THEREIN.
25. It would seem that in order to see, and in general to feel, mere
possession of the necessary organs by the soul, is not enough; the
soul must also be disposed to direct her attention to things of sense.
But it is usual for the (universal) Soul to be ever applied to the
contemplation of intelligible things; and mere possession of the
faculty of sensation would not necessarily imply its exercise, because
it would be entirely devoted to objects of a higher nature. So when
we apply ourselves to the contemplation of intelligible things, we
notice neither the sensation of sight, nor those of other senses; and,
in general, the attention that we give to one thing hinders us from
seeing the others. Even among us human beings, to wish to perceive one
of our members through another, as, for instance, looking at ourselves,
is both superfluous and vain, unless this has some very good purpose.
Moreover, it is a characteristic of an imperfect and fallible being to
contemplate some external thing, merely because it is beautiful. It may
therefore well be said that if to feel, hear and taste are distractions
of a soul that attaches herself to outer objects, the sun and the other
stars cannot see or hear, except accidentally. It would however not be
unreasonable to admit that they turn towards us through the exercise of
the senses of sight or hearing. Now, if they turn towards us, they must
be mindful of human affairs. It would be absurd that they should not
remember the men to whom they do so much good; how indeed would they do
good, if they had no memory?