11. This was no doubt the thought present to Plato when[64] he rightly
said, "These imitations of the eternal beings which enter into matter,
and which issue therefrom." Not without good reason did he employ the
terms "enter" and "issue"; he wanted us carefully to scrutinize the
manner in which matter participates in ideas. When Plato thus tries
to clear up how matter participates in ideas, his object is to show,
not how ideas enter into matter, as before so many have believed, but
their condition within it. Doubtless, it does seem astonishing that
matter remains impassible in respect to the ideas that are present
therein, while the things that enter in it are affected by each other.
We nevertheless have to acknowledge that the things which enter into
matter expel their predecessors, and that it is only the composite that
is affected. Nevertheless it is not every kind of composite that is
affected, but only that composite that happens to need the thing that
was introduced or expelled, so that its constitution becomes defective
by the absence of that (quality), or more complete by its presence.
Nothing is added to the nature of matter, however, by the introduction
of anything; the presence of that thing does not make matter what it
is, and matter loses nothing by its absence; matter remains what it was
since its origin. To be ornamented is to the interest of something that
admits of order or ornament; it can receive that ornament without being
changed, when it only puts it on, so to speak. But if this ornament
penetrate into it as something that forms part of its nature, it then
cannot receive it without being altered, without ceasing to be what it
was before, as for instance, ceasing to be ugly; without, by that very
fact, changing; without, for instance, becoming beautiful, though ugly
before. Therefore if matter become beautiful, though before ugly, it
ceases to be what it was before; namely, ugly; so that on being adorned
it loses its nature, so much the more as it was ugly only accidentally.
Being ugly enough to be ugliness itself, it could not participate in
beauty; being bad enough to be badness itself, it could not participate
in goodness. Therefore matter participates in the ideas without being
affected; and consequently, this participation must operate in another
manner; and, for instance, consist in appearance.[65] This kind of
participation solves the problem we had set ourselves; it enables us
to understand how, while being evil, matter can aspire to the Good
without ceasing to be what it was, in spite of its participation in the
Good. Indeed if this participation operate in a manner such that matter
remains without alteration, as we say, and if it always continue to be
what it was, there is no reason to be surprised if, though being evil,
it can participate in the Good; it does not swerve from its manner of
existence. On one hand, as for her, this participation is unavoidable,
it participates as long as it endures; on the other hand, as matter
continues to be what it is, by virtue of the kind of participation
which does not interfere with its nature, it undergoes no alteration
on the part of the principle which gives it something; it always
remains as bad as it was, because its nature persists. If matter really
participated in the Good, if matter were really modified thereby, its
nature would no longer be evil. Therefore, the statement that matter is
evil is true enough if it be considered to imply that it is impassible
in respect to Good; and this really amounts to saying that it is
entirely impassible.