PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF VIRTUE OR VICE OF APPETITE.

Further, the soul's appetite is intemperate when it alone is active;

for then, in the absence of the principles that ought to command or

direct her, it alone does everything. Besides, the rational part,

whose function it is to see (by considering the notions it receives

from intelligence), is occupied with something else, for it does not

do everything simultaneously, being busy with some other action; it

considers other than corporeal things, so far as it can.[37] Perhaps

also the virtue or vice of the appetite depend considerably on the

good or evil condition of the organs; so that, in either case, nothing

is added to the soul.

THE SOUL ORIGINATES MOVEMENTS, BUT IS NOT ALTERED (AGAINST STOICS).

POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC THEORY OF PASSIONS.

3. There are desires and aversions in the soul, which demand

consideration. It is impossible to deny that pain, anger, joy, appetite

and fear are changes and affections which occur in the soul, and that

move her.[38] We must here draw a distinction, for it would be denying

the evidence to insist that there are in us no changes or perception

of these changes. We cannot attribute them to the soul, which would

amount to the admission[39] that she blushes, or grows pale, without

reflecting that these "passions," though produced by the soul, occur

in a different substance. For the soul, shame consists in the opinion

that something is improper; and, as the soul contains the body, or,

to speak more exactly, as the body is a dependency of the animating

soul, the blood, which is very mobile, rushes to the face. Likewise,

the principle of fear is in the soul; paleness occurs in the body

because the blood concentrates within the interior parts. In joy, the

noticeable dilation belongs to the body also; what the body feels is

not a "passion." Likewise with pain and appetite; their principle is

in the soul, where it remains in a latent condition; what proceeds

therefrom is perceived by sensation. When we call desires, opinions

and reasonings "movements of the soul," we do not mean that the soul

becomes excited in the production of these movements,[40] but that they

originate within her. When we call life a movement, we do not by this

word mean an alteration; for to act according to one's nature is the

simple and indivisible life of each part of the soul.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 83 / 381 题