How could that part of the soul that is superior to sensation and
passion remain unalterable, while admitting vice, false opinions, and
ignorance (or folly); when it has desires or aversions; when it yields
itself to joy or pain, to hate, jealousy, and appetite; when, in one
word, it never remains calm, but when all the things that happen to it
agitate it, and produce changes within it?
ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESIS OF CORPOREITY THE SOUL CANNOT REMAIN
IMPASSIBLE; AS IT IS IMPASSIBLE ALL TERMS TO THE CONTRARY ARE ONLY
FIGURATIVE.
If, (on the Stoic hypothesis) the soul were extended, and corporeal, it
would be difficult, or rather impossible for her to remain impassible
and unalterable when the above-mentioned occurrences take place within
her. If, on the contrary, she be a "being" that is unextended, and
incorruptible, we must take care not to attribute to her affections
that might imply that she is perishable. If, on the contrary, her
"being" be a number[28] or a reason,[29] as we usually say, how could
an affection occur within a number or a reason? We must therefore
attribute to the soul only irrational reasons, passions without
passivity; that is, we must consider these terms as no more than
metaphors drawn from the nature of bodies, taking them in an opposite
sense, seeing in them no more than mere analogies, so that we may say
that the soul experiences them without experiencing them, and that
she is passive without really being such (as are the bodies). Let us
examine how all this occurs.