Besides, the intelligible world has much more unity than the
sense-world; otherwise, there would be two sense-worlds, since the
intelligible sphere would not differ from the sense-sphere if the
former did not have more unity than the latter. In respect to unity,
therefore, the intelligible world would surpass the sense-sphere. It
would indeed be ridiculous to admit that one of the two spheres would
have an extension suitable to its nature; while the other, without any
necessity, would extend, and would withdraw from its centre. Why would
not all things conspire together to unity, in the intelligible world?
There, indeed, no one thing hinders another by impenetrability, any
more than the conception that you have of a notion or of a proposition
in no wise hinders the one that I have in myself, any more than
different notions mutually hinder each other in the same soul. To the
objection that such a union could not take place for (separate) beings,
an affirmative answer may be given, but only if one dare to suppose
that veritable beings are corporeal masses.