3. Is the universal (Being) by itself present everywhere? Or does it
remain within itself, while from its innermost its powers descend on
all things, and is it in this sense that it is regarded as everywhere
present? Yes, doubtless. That is why it is said that souls are the rays
of this universal (Being), that it is built on itself, and that from
it, souls descend into various animals. The things which participate
in its unity, incapable as they are of possessing a complete nature
conformed to its nature, enjoy the presence of the universal (Being) in
this sense that they enjoy the presence of some of its powers. They are
not, however, entirely separated from it, because it is not separated
from the power which it communicates to each of them. If they do not
have more, it is only because they are not capable of receiving more
from the presence of the entire whole (Being). Evidently it is always
entirely present there where its powers are present. It however remains
separated, for if it became the form of any one particular being, it
would cease to be universal, to subsist everywhere in itself, and
it would be the accident of some other "being." Therefore, since it
belongs to none of these things, even of those that aspire to unite
themselves with it, it makes them enjoy its presence when they desire
it, and in the measure in which they are capable thereof; but it
does not belong to any of them in particular. It is not surprising,
therefore, that it should be present in all things, since it is not
present in any in a manner such as to belong to it alone. It is also
reasonable to assert that, if the soul share the passions of the
bodies, it is only by accident, that she dwells in herself, and belongs
neither to matter nor to body, that the whole of her illuminates
the whole world-body. It is not a contradiction to say that the
(Being) which is not present in any place is present to all things
each of which is in a place. What, indeed, would be surprising and
impossible would be that the universal (Being) could, while occupying
a determinate place, be present to things which are in a place, and
could at all be present in the sense in which we have explained it.
Reason forces us, therefore, to admit that the universal (Being) must,
precisely because it does not occupy any place, be entirely present
to the things to which it is present; and, since it is present to the
universe, be entirely present to each thing; otherwise, one part of it
would be here, and another there; consequently, it would be divisible,
it would be body. How otherwise could one divide the ("Being")? Is it
its life that shall within it be divided? If it be the totality of the
(being) that is life, no part of it would be that. Or will somebody
try to divide the Intelligence, so that one of its parts be here,
and the other there? In this case, neither of the two parts would
be intelligence. Or will the (Being) itself be divided? But if the
totality be the (Being), no one part of it would be that. It might be
objected that the parts of the bodies are still bodies themselves. But
that which is divided is not the body (as such), but a certain body
of a certain extent; now each of its parts possesses the form that
causes it to be named body; while the form not only does not have some
particular extension, but even any kind of extension at all.