CADIZ. BATTLE OF BARROSA. DEATH OF ALBURQUERQUE.
♦1811.♦
About the same time that the tide had thus turned in Portugal, came
tidings of a victory in Spain, which, if it led to no other result,
tended to raise the character of the British army, and the spirits of
the nation. When Soult marched against Badajoz, hoping to co-operate
with Massena in the conquest of Portugal, he made ♦EXPEDITION FROM
CADIZ.♦ such large drafts from the army before Cadiz, that it was
thought possible, by a well-concerted attack, to raise the blockade.
The plan was, that an expedition should sail from Cadiz, and force a
landing between Cape Trafalgar and Cape de Plata, or at Tarifa, or at
Algeciras. The Spanish force at St. Roques was then to join, and a
combined attack to be made upon the rear of the enemy’s line; while,
in the meantime, an attempt should be made from the Isle of Leon to
open a communication with them. D. Manuel de Lapeña was appointed
to the command. He had conducted the wreck of the central army
during the latter part of its retreat, under circumstances in which
no military skill could be displayed, but in which his patriotism
and ♦LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRAHAM.♦ moderation had been fully proved.
Lieutenant-General Graham, who commanded the British troops at Cadiz,
consented to act under him. This officer was now in his sixty-first
year. The former part of his life he had passed in the enjoyments of
domestic comfort, amusing himself with rural sports, with improving his
estates, and with literature: after eighteen years of happiness his
wife died on the way to the south of France, and Mr. Graham, seeking
for relief in change of place, and in active occupations, joined Lord
Hood as a volunteer when Toulon was taken possession of in 1793. Here
he distinguished himself greatly, and on his return to England obtained
permission to raise a regiment, but not without great difficulty and
express discouragement from the commander-in-chief. He was at Mantua
with Wurmser in 1796, and escaped by cutting his way through the
besiegers in a night sortie: and he bore a distinguished part at Malta
when Sir Alexander Ball, under circumstances the most painful, and with
means the most inadequate, by his wisdom and perseverance recovered
that island from the enemy. Nevertheless the time of life at which
he had entered the army, and the manner, impeded his promotion; and
he would probably never have risen in rank if General Moore had not
experienced great assistance from him in his retreat, and at the battle
of Coruña, and sent home so strong a recommendation that it could not
be neglected.
♦APPREHENSIONS OF THE ENEMY.♦
The expedition, though upon no extensive scale, was yet a great
exertion for a government so poor in means as the Regency, so feeble,
and with all its branches so miserably disorganised. The bustle in the
roads was visible from the enemy’s lines, as well as from the city;
in Cadiz the highest hopes were excited, and Marshal Victor felt no
little degree of alarm. He thought that when Soult had so considerably
weakened the blockading force, he ought to have placed Sebastiani’s
army at his disposal, in case of need: this had not been done, and
Victor, seeing the naval preparations, sent to that general, entreating
him to manœuvre so as to alarm the allies upon their landing, and
to endanger them; but his entreaties were of no effect, and Victor
complained in his public dispatches, that this corps, though numerous,
in good condition, and at leisure, had not given him the least
assistance.
♦FEBRUARY.
THE TROOPS LAND AT ALGECIRAS.♦
During the latter days of January and great part of the following
month, heavy rains delayed the expedition, and rendered all the roads
impracticable by which the allies could have approached the enemy. On
the 20th of February, the troops were embarked, waiting a favourable
opportunity to proceed into the Straits: General Graham had about 4000
British and Portugueze, the Spaniards were 7000. The British got to
sea the next day, and not being able to effect a landing near Cape
Trafalgar, nor at Tarifa, disembarked at Algeciras, from whence they
marched to Tarifa. The roads between the two towns were impassable for
carriages, and therefore the artillery, provisions, and stores, were
conveyed in boats, by indefatigable exertions of the seamen, against
every disadvantage of wind and weather. The Spanish transports were
thrice driven back, but reached Tarifa on the evening of the 27th, and
the next day they began their ♦THEY PASS THE PUERTO DE FACINAS.♦ march
to the Puerto de Facinas, a pass in that chain of mountains which,
bounding the plain of Gibraltar on the west, runs to the sea from the
Sierras of Ronda. To this point the road was practicable for carriages,
some days’ labour having been employed in making it so: from thence
it descends to those spacious plains which extend from the skirts of
the chain to Medina Sidonia, Chiclana, and the river Santi Petri: and
the roads below were in a dreadful state, the country being marshy,
intersected with a labyrinth of streams; one of which, the Barbate,
which receives the waters of the Lake of Janda, is a considerable
river. At Veger, about half way between Tarifa and the Isle of Leon,
the French had three companies of infantry and 180 horse. They had also
a small fort with two pieces of cannon at Casas Viejas, on the road to
Medina. These points it was hoped to surprise, and the troops therefore
encamped on the side of the mountain, taking every precaution to
conceal their movements from the enemy.
♦LAPEÑA’S PROCLAMATION.♦
Lapeña, when the troops commenced their march, addressed a proclamation
to them, which at once disclosed the extent of his object, and the
confidence with which he expected to realize it. “Soldiers of the
fourth army,” said he, “the moment for which you have a whole year
been longing is at length arrived: a second time Andalusia is about
to owe to you her liberty, and the laurels of Mengibar and Baylen
will revive upon your brows. You have to combat in sight of the whole
nation assembled in its Cortes; the Government will see your deeds; the
inhabitants of Cadiz, who have made so many sacrifices for you, will
be eye-witnesses of your heroism; they will lift up their voices in
blessings and in acclamations of praise, which you will hear amid the
roar of musketry and cannon. Let us go then to conquer! my cares are
directed to this end; implicit obedience, firmness, and discipline,
must conduct you to it: if these are wanting, in vain will you seek
for fortune! and woe to him who forgets or abandons them: he shall die
without remission! The gold, whose weight makes cowards of those who
have plundered it from us, the bounties which a generous Government
will bestow, and the endless blessings of those who will call you their
deliverers, ... behold in these your reward!” At Facinas the operations
were to commence; here, therefore, the order of march was arranged, and
the troops formed into three divisions, the van being under General D.
Jose Lardizabal, the centre under Camp-Marshal the Prince of Anglona,
and the reserve under General Graham.
♦ADVANCE AGAINST VEGER.♦
At night-fall on the first of March, a detachment under Colonel D.
José Aymerich with two four-pounders, began its march to surprise
Veger. A squadron accompanied it under the first adjutant of the staff,
Major-General Wall, as far as the Fuente del Hierro, where these
two parties separated, Aymerich taking the direct line for Veger,
Wall going to the right across the lake of La Janda and the river
Barbate, to cut off the retreat of the enemy by the roads to Medina
and Chiclana. It was hardly probable that he should succeed in this
attempt, for the way was not only circuitous and full of difficulties,
but there was also another road, that of Conil, by which they might
make their retreat, and which lay so wide of the others, that it
could not be occupied: Wall’s movement, however, covered Aymerich’s,
and facilitated his operations. The Barbate is navigable as far as
Veger bridge, where it touches the foot of the high hill upon which
Veger stands. At this bridge Aymerich arrived in the morning; it was
fortified, and the French, under every advantage of situation, were
preparing to defend it, when Wall’s cavalry appeared on the other side;
upon this they retired by the Conil road fast enough to effect their
retreat. Three of their gun-boats and three pieces of cannon were taken
here; the enemy suffered no other loss, but the chief object in view
was accomplished, for the possession of this post secured the flank of
the allies.
Meantime the main body advanced against Casas Viejas: the distance
being twelve miles, Lapeña supposed, from the information of his
guides, that he should arrive some hours before daybreak. But there
were so many streams to cross, and so many intervening marshes,
that notwithstanding the hard labour of the pioneers, and the utmost
exertions of the artillery officers, these twelve miles were a
journey of twelve painful hours, so that he did not arrive in time to
reconnoitre the fort before it was broad day. The enemy having fired
a few shot, took post upon a hill behind the fort, on the Medina
road. The German hussars in the British service, and the Spanish
carbineers under General Whittingham, were ordered to wheel round upon
the enemy’s right, and surround them in that direction, while Baron
♦MARCH.♦ Carondelet, with another squadron of cavalry, forded the
Barbate, and crossing a flooded marsh, where the water was up to their
saddle-girths, advanced to charge them. Two battalions of infantry, the
one Spanish, the other English, crossed at the same time to support
him; and the enemy presently gave way, leaving about thirty killed and
wounded, thirty-three prisoners, two pieces of cannon, and all their
stores.
♦JUNCTION OF THE TROOPS FROM ST. ROQUES.♦
The troops from St. Roques joined this day, marching by way of Las
Casas de Castaño, and leaving a small detachment in Alcala de los
Gazules. This division, consisting of 1600 men, was added to the
centre, whose force now amounted to 6000; that of the vanguard was
2100, that of the rear 3100, 4300 being British and Portugueze, the
rest Spaniards. The cavalry were in a separate body under Whittingham.
The whole force, when thus united, consisted of 11,200 foot, 800
horse[20]. They had twenty-four pieces of cannon. Lapeña’s plan was now
to march by Veger, upon the Santi Petri, and attack the intrenchments
there which formed the left of the enemy’s lines. Thus the pass of the
river would be laid open, and a communication established with the
Isle of Leon, from whence the army might receive provisions, which it
now began to want, and might be reinforced with artillery, foot, and
horse: thus too they might combine their operations with those which
would be made from the Spanish line of defence, and from the bay, in
such manner, that while the success appeared almost certain, the risk,
even in case of defeat, would be avoided, which must be incurred upon
any other plan from the nature of the ground and the want of stores.
Victor did not suspect that any difficulties upon this head could
influence the movements of the allies, and he seems to have expected
that his position would be attacked in a more vital part. He reinforced
with a battalion of voltigeurs General Cassagne, who occupied Medina
Sidonia with three battalions and a regiment of chasseurs; and he took
a position himself with ten battalions at the Cortijo de Guerra, the
intermediate point between Medina and Chiclana, from whence he could
bear upon the allies in case they should advance upon either. General
Lapeña, however, had no thought of moving upon Medina: “it was strong
by nature,” he said, “fortified with seven pieces of cannon, besides
some in its castle, and distant only two leagues from the Cortijo.”
♦THE FRENCH ATTACK ZAYAS, AND ARE REPULSED.♦
Camp-Marshal D. Jose de Zayas, who commanded in the Isle of Leon,
meantime had well performed his part of the concerted operations. He
pushed a body of troops over the Santi Petri, near the coast, on the
first, threw a pontoon bridge across, and formed a tete-du-pont the
following evening. The French General Villatte was immediately ordered
to attack this point during the night, and, in French customary phrase,
to drive the Spaniards into the sea. About midnight the enemy made
their attack with three regiments, and by dint of superior numbers
forced their way into the works at various points. Zayas speedily
reinforced the post, and drove them out with the bayonet: it was wholly
an affair of the bayonet, for the troops were too much intermingled
to permit of firing. Some of the French had reached the middle of
the bridge, others crossed it, probably as the best means of saving
themselves when they found that they had pushed on too far; they fell
in with the Spaniards who were hastening to assist their comrades, and
in this manner effected their escape.
♦PASSAGE OF THE LAKE OF JUNDA.♦
Having failed in this attempt, Victor marched towards Chiclana, and
ordered Cassagne to join him from the Cortijo, rightly concluding that
Lapeña meant to attack the French lines at Santi Petri, which, should
he succeed, would enable him to receive reinforcements from the Isle,
and then he would march upon Chiclana. The Spanish general thought to
deceive him into a belief that the attack would be made by Medina, and
for this purpose left a party at Casas Viejas to mount guard, and keep
up fires, as if the whole force was there, while on the third they
proceeded to Veger. An excess of caution seems to have been Lapeña’s
failing; lest the enemy from Medina, which was about ten miles from the
beaten road, should think of attacking him upon his march, he chose a
by-road on the left of the Barbate, unfrequented, because there is the
lake of Junda to be crossed on the way. This lake is a considerable
piece of water, between the two roads from Tarifa to Medina Sidonia and
to Chiclana. The bottom consists of mud; but to render it fordable, a
stone causeway had been built, rather under than in the water, about
six feet wide, and some 500 yards in length, bushes and poles being
fixed at intervals to mark its edge, and prevent the traveller from
stepping into the mud. At this time the water upon the causeway was
in some places more than mid-deep. The Spaniards were some hours in
passing, Lapeña exhorting them from his horse; and many of the officers
made the men carry them across, while our officers were encouraging
their soldiers by example, and General Graham was in the water on foot.
On the evening of the 4th, they advanced from Veger, by way of Conil,
towards Santi Petri. This place Lapeña hoped to reach by daybreak;
but upon entering a wood about ten miles from the village, and about
as much in extent, his advanced guard was suddenly attacked by some
cavalry who sallied from the cover. The enemy were repelled, but the
column halted while the wood was explored; and this, with the doubt and
hesitation of the guides, heightened by the fears and feelings which
night excited, and the local circumstances of a country where carriages
seldom or never passed, caused a delay of two hours, so that they did
not get out of the wood till it was broad day; and the hope which
Lapeña had with little reason indulged, of surprising his vigilant
enemy, was destroyed. The three divisions therefore advanced in as many
columns; their movements could not possibly be concealed; the enemy did
not appear to molest them, but an officer of the French staff was seen
singly reconnoitring them. The operation was to commence from a height
called the Cabeza del Puerco: they halted here to refresh themselves,
and Lapeña harangued the van which was destined to make the attack.
♦POSITION OF THE ENEMY.♦
The lines which were to be attacked formed the left of the French
works. They were supported by the sea on one side, on the other
by the channel of Alcornocal, and the fortified mill of Almansa.
Villatte had about 4000 men to defend this position, but his force
had been considerably weakened in his unsuccessful attempt upon the
tete-du-pont. He had, however, very considerable advantage in the
nature of the broken ground, a thick wood through which the assailant
must advance, and the perfect knowledge, which, in the course of
twelve months’ undisturbed possession, he had acquired of every path
and every inequality of surface. This wood so covered the enemy, that
only four of their battalions in the first line were visible; they had
their right supported by the Torre Bermeja, and three guns in their
centre. Lardizabal, reinforced by part of the second division, advanced
to attack them: the remainder of the troops held a position upon the
Cabeza del Puerco, or hill of Barrosa, the cavalry being in advance
upon the right.
♦COMMUNICATION WITH THE ISLE OF LEON.♦
Villatte anticipated their movements, and fell upon both flanks of
Lardizabal’s advance at the same time; at first he had the advantage,
... but the regiment of Murcia, under its Colonel D. Juan Maria Muñoz,
checked his progress, Lardizabal with a battalion of the Canaries
attacked his right, and the Spanish guards, and the regiment of Africa,
under Brigadier D. Raymundo Ferrer, and Colonel D. Tomas Retortillo,
charged with the bayonet. The enemy were routed, and the communication
with the Isle of Leon was thus opened by this well-conducted and
successful attack. Two battalions of the French escaped and carried
off their field-pieces, the nature of the ground saving them. Lapeña’s
first object was thus accomplished, and in order to maintain the
important position that he had gained, which had in its front a thick
pine forest, extending to Chiclana, and which he apprehended the enemy
would use their utmost efforts to recover, he directed, in concert
with General Graham, that the British troops should move down from
Barrosa towards the Torre de Bermeja, leaving some Spanish regiments
under Brigadier Begines upon the heights. The position which it was
intended to occupy is formed by a narrow woody ridge, the right on
the sea cliff, the left falling down to the creek of Almansa on the
edge of a marsh. From the position of Barrosa to that of Bermeja, the
communication is easy, along a hard sandy beach upon the west. General
Graham’s division had halted on the eastern slope; his road therefore
lay through the wood, and having sent cavalry patroles toward Chiclana,
who saw nothing of the enemy, he began his march about noon.
General Lacy, the chief of the Spanish staff, was sent forward by
Lapeña to maintain the heights of Bermeja; here it was that the danger
was apprehended; and the firing had recommenced in that direction.
The nature of the ground was such, that what was passing at Barrosa
could not be seen at Bermeja; perhaps there was a deficiency in those
arrangements, by which, in a well-organized army, information of what
is passing in one part is rapidly conveyed to another; and there was
certainly the want of a good intelligence between General Graham and
the Spanish commander under whom he had consented to act. The British
troops had proceeded about half way, and were in the middle of the
wood, when they were informed that the enemy was appearing in force
upon the plain, and advancing towards the heights of Barrosa. That
position General Graham considered as the key to that of Santi Petri,
and immediately countermarched in order to support the troops who had
been left for its defence.
♦HEIGHTS OF BARROSA.♦
The heights of Barrosa extend to the shore on one side, and slope down
to the plain on the other towards a lake called the Laguna del Puerco:
the ridge itself was called Cabeza del Puerco by the Spaniards, but
it will retain the better name which was this day acquired for it.
Victor with 8000 men advanced against this point. The troops which
had been left there were the regiments of Siguenza and Cantabria,
a battalion of Ciudad Real, another of the Walloon guards, and a
battalion of the King’s German legion. Ignorant of Graham’s movements,
and knowing themselves unable to maintain the post against such very
superior numbers, they thought it best to form a junction with the
British, whose rear they should by this means cover, and be themselves
covered on the way by the pine forest through which they were to
pass. Accordingly they made this movement with perfect coolness and
in perfect order, General Whittingham covering one flank, Brigadier
D. Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon the other; for on both sides the enemy
endeavoured to envelope them.
♦GENERAL GRAHAM MARCHES BACK TO THE HEIGHTS.♦
Graham, meantime, was marching rapidly back, but at a distance from
the shore; whereas these troops kept near it, apparently to lessen the
danger of being turned on that side by the enemy’s light infantry.
In such intricate and difficult circumstances it was impossible to
preserve order in the columns; and before the troops were quite
disentangled from the wood, they saw that the detachment which they
were hastening to support had left the heights; that the left wing of
the French were rapidly ascending there, and their right stood upon the
plain, on the edge of the wood within cannon shot. General Graham’s
object in countermarching had been to support the troops in maintaining
the heights; “but a retreat,” he says, “in the face of such an enemy
(already within reach of the easy communication by the sea beach) must
have involved the whole allied army in all the danger of being attacked
during the unavoidable confusion of the different corps arriving on the
narrow ridge of Bermeja nearly at the same time.” Trusting, therefore,
to the courage of his men, and regardless of the numbers and position
of the enemy, he resolved immediately to attack them.
♦BATTLE OF BARROSA.♦
Marshal Victor commanded the French; General Ruffin, whose name was
well known in the history of this wicked war, commanded the left upon
the hill; General Leval the right. Graham formed his troops as rapidly
as the circumstances required; there was no time to restore order in
his columns, which had unavoidably been broken in marching through
the wood. The brigade of guards, Lieutenant-Colonel Browne’s flank
battalion of the 28th, Lieutenant-Colonel Norcott’s two companies
of the 2nd rifle corps, and Major Acheson, with a part of the 57th
(separated from the regiment in the wood), formed on the right
under Brigadier-General Dilkes. Colonel Wheatley’s brigade, with
three companies of the Coldstream guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Jackson, (separated likewise from his battalion in the wood,) and
Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard’s flank battalion, formed on the left; Major
Duncan, opening a powerful battery of ten guns in the centre, protected
the formation of the infantry; and as soon as they were thus hastily
got together, the guns were advanced to a more favourable position, and
kept up a most destructive fire.
Leval’s division, notwithstanding the havoc which this battery made,
continued to advance in imposing masses, opening its fire of musketry.
The British left wing advanced against it, firing. The three companies
of guards, and the 87th, supported by the remainder of the wing,
charged them with right British bravery; Colonel Bilson with the
28th, and Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost with part of the 67th, zealously
supported their attack, which was decisive in this part of the field.
An eagle, the first which the British had won, was taken. It belonged
to the 8th regiment of light infantry, and bore a gold collar round
its neck, because that regiment had so distinguished itself as to have
received the thanks of Buonaparte in person. The enemy were closely
pursued across a narrow valley, and a reserve, which they had formed
beyond it, was charged in like manner, and in like manner put to the
rout. General Dilkes was equally successful on his side. Ruffin,
confident in his numbers and in his position, met him on the ascent.
A bloody contest ensued, but of no long duration, for the best troops
of France have never been able to stand against the British bayonet.
Ruffin was wounded and taken, and the enemy driven from the heights in
confusion. In less than an hour and a half they were in full retreat,
and in that short time more than 4000 men had fallen, ... for the
British loss in killed and wounded amounted to 1243; not a single
British soldier was taken. The French loss was more than 3000. General
Bellegrade was killed, General Rousseau mortally wounded and taken; the
prisoners were only 440, because there was no pursuit.
The 20th Portugueze regiment fought side by side with the British
in this memorable action. One squadron of the German Legion, which
had been attached to the Spanish cavalry, joined in time to make a
successful charge against a squadron of French dragoons, which it
completely routed. General Whittingham, with the rest of the cavalry,
was engaged, meantime, in checking a corps of horse and foot who were
attempting to win the height by the coast. The Walloon guards, and the
battalion of Ciudad Real, which had been attached to Graham’s division,
and had been left on the height, made the greatest exertions to rejoin
him; but it was not possible for them to arrive before the victory was
decided, and the troops were too much exhausted to think of pursuing
their advantage. They had been marching for twenty hours before the
battle.
The distance from Barrosa to Bermeja is about three miles; Lapeña could
not see what was passing at the great scene of action, and an attack
was made at the same time upon Bermeja by Villatte, who had received
reinforcements from Chiclana: the enemy were vigorously resisted
there, and were called off by Victor in consequence of his defeat.
When the Spanish general was informed of Graham’s brilliant action, he
entertained great hopes of succeeding in the farther movement which
had been intended. In the dispatch which he sent that night to Cadiz,
“The allied army,” he said, “had obtained a victory so much the more
satisfactory as circumstances rendered it more difficult; but the
valour of the British and Spanish troops, the military skill and genius
of General Graham, and the gallantry of the commandant-general of the
vanguard, D. Jose Lardizabal, had overcome all obstacles. I remain,” he
continued, “master of the enemy’s position, which is so important to me
for my subsequent operations.”
♦DIVERSION ON THE COAST.♦
But no attempt was made to profit by the bloody victory which had
been gained. General Graham remained some hours upon the heights
which he had won, and as no supplies came to him, the commissariat
mules having been dispersed at the beginning of the action, he left a
small detachment there, and then withdrew his troops, and early the
next morning crossed the Santi Petri. While he was on his march, two
landings were effected by way of diversion, between Rota and Catalina,
and between Catalina and Santa Maria, by the marines of the British
squadron, with 200 seamen and 80 Spanish marines: they stormed two
redoubts, and dismantled all the sea defences from Rota to St. Maria,
except Catalina. Preparations were made to attack the tete-du-pont
and the bridge of St. Maria, but the enemy advanced in force from
Puerto Real, and Sir Richard Keats, knowing that General Graham had now
re-entered the Isle of Leon, ordered the men to re-embark.
♦THE CORTES DEMAND AN INQUIRY.♦
Such was the lame and impotent conclusion of an expedition which had
been long prepared and well concerted, in which the force employed
was adequate to the end proposed, and of which every part that was
attempted had been successfully effected. General Graham complained
loudly of Lapeña; and the people of Cadiz, the Cortes, and the
government, were at first equally disposed to impute the failure to the
Spanish commander. The Cortes voted an address to the Regency on the
9th, saying that the national congress, not being able longer to endure
the grief and bitterness of seeing the circumstances of the expedition
remain in doubt and obscurity, requested the executive government to
give them, as speedily as possible, a circumstantial account of the
proceedings of the Spanish army. When this account was laid before
them, they declared that the conduct of the general with regard to
the advantages which might have been obtained on the memorable day of
the battle was not sufficiently clear; “the Cortes, therefore,” said
they, “in discharge of its sovereign mission, and using the supreme
inspection which it has reserved to itself over whatever may influence
the salvation of the kingdom, desires that the council of Regency will
immediately institute a scrupulous investigation with all the rigour of
military law.”
♦OUTCRY IN ENGLAND AGAINST LAPEÑA.♦
If such was at first the prevailing opinion in Cadiz, it may well be
supposed that the Spanish general would be exposed to severe censure
in England. The story which obtained belief was, that Lapeña and the
Spaniards had been idle spectators of the action, whereas, if they
had only shown themselves upon the adjoining heights, the French would
have raised the blockade, and retired in dismay to Seville; and that
after the battle, while he and 12,000 Spaniards remained inactive, he
sent to General Graham, whose troops were without food, and had marched
sixteen hours before they came into action, desiring him to follow up
the victory, for that now was the time to deliver Cadiz. A vote of
thanks passed unanimously in both houses; but a few days afterwards,
when the ordnance estimates were before ♦APRIL 1. SPEECH OF MR. WARD.♦
the house, the honourable J. W. Ward said, “he hoped he might now be
allowed to ask for some explanation of the deplorable misconduct of
our allies; for of that conduct it would be idle to affect to speak in
doubtful terms, it was reprobated with equal indignation by all parties
throughout the country. Was it to be endured,” said he, “that while
the British troops were performing prodigies of valour in an unequal
contest, that those allies for whose independence they were fighting,
should stand by, cold-blooded spectators of deeds, the bare recital of
which should have been enough to warm every man of them into a hero?
If, indeed, they had been so many mercenaries, and had been hired to
fight for a foreign power and in behalf of a foreign cause; ... if
they had been so many Swiss, ... in that case their breach of duty,
however culpable, would have been less unaccountable, and perhaps more
excusable; but here, where they were allies bound to this country in
obligations greater than ever before one nation owed to another ...
our brave men lavishing those lives which their country had so much
better right to claim, in defence of that cause in which those allies
were principals ... in such a case, tamely to look on while the contest
between numbers and bravery hung in doubtful issue, ... this did appear
to him to betray an indifference, an apathy, which, if he could
suppose it to prevail among the Spaniards, must render, in his mind,
the cause of Spanish independence altogether hopeless.”
♦MR. PERCEVAL.♦
Mr. Perceval replied, “that Mr. Ward had expressed a stronger and
more determined censure upon the Spaniards than could be justified
by any evidence which had yet appeared. Had he expressed his regret
that the English had been left to fight the battle alone, and had he
required some explanation on the subject, such conduct would have been
perfectly natural and right; but it was neither just nor generous thus
upon insufficient grounds to prejudice men who were to undergo a legal
investigation. General Graham’s dispatches furnished no grounds for
these sweeping accusations; the Spanish troops which had been attached
to his division made every effort to come back and join in the action;
and when the situation of the rest of the army, posted at four miles’
distance, was taken into consideration, it required more information
than they possessed at present, even to justify the passing a censure
upon the whole Spanish army, or even upon any part of it.”
♦MR. WHITBREAD.♦
Mr. Whitbread now rose. “He should have been glad,” he said, “to have
joined in the general expression of exultation when the vote of thanks
was passed; ... he should have been glad to have added his mite to
the general tribute in applause of the heroism of that day, and to
have claimed the hero of that day as his much-valued friend. This he
should have been glad to have done, if he could have had sufficient
control over himself to have abstained from doing more. Mr. Perceval
had spoken like the advocate of the Spaniards; they must be defended
at all events, no matter how! And what was it that was attempted to be
defended? The English army was on the point of being sacrificed ...
the Spaniards were in sight of them, within twenty minutes quick march
of them! and what did they? What were they? Why, just what they have
been described by his honourable friend ... cold-blooded spectators
of the battle! After coldly witnessing a band of heroes fighting and
dying for their cause, General Lapeña tells our small army, exhausted
with its unparalleled victory over numbers, that, forsooth, now was the
time to push its success. What did this redoubted general mean? Was it
insult, or treachery, or cowardice, ... each, or all? He did not mean
to complain of the Spanish people, but of their officers. He should
ever think of Barrosa as a day memorable for the glory of the Britons,
and no less memorable for the infamy of the Spaniards. Was it to be
endured, that our brave fellows should be so basely deserted, after an
excessive night-march, the moment they entered the field, against a foe
always formidable from discipline, and then doubly so from numbers? Why
were the two battalions withdrawn from the heights of Barrosa? why was
their position abandoned precipitately to the French? who gave this
order but a Spanish officer? What! should not this excite a jealousy?
Was this the first time a Spanish army had been cold-blooded spectators
of British heroism? Did they want this to remind them of the stately
indifference shown by Cuesta in the battle of Talavera? Was all sound
in Cadiz? Was there no French party there? Were British armies never
before betrayed till the battle of Barrosa? He said betrayed, for it
was nothing less; the two battalions never came up till our army had
repulsed the French, beaten them off, and was in hot pursuit of them
as fast as our army could pursue ... as fast as their exhausted limbs
could carry their noble hearts! Then what had been our allies?... At
Talavera nothing ... at Barrosa nothing ... or rather at both perhaps
worse than nothing. The allied force sailed from Cadiz ... the British
fought ... the Spaniards looked on. The British conquered; and yet
the siege was not raised. Again he asked, was all sound at Cadiz? Was
it true that General Graham had been obstructed and foiled in all his
plans ... that in the midst of the fight, while the British troops
were doing feats which perhaps British troops alone could do, their
allies were doing what, he hoped, such men alone were capable of ...
plundering the British baggage? Was this true? It was not the Spanish
people he complained of; he gave them every credit; but he gave their
leaders none. If all this was so, or nearly so, were the British armies
to be risked so worthlessly? Were they to be abandoned to treachery or
cowardice? For in either or both must have originated the unnatural,
ungrateful, and infamous treatment they had met with.”
♦REMARKS ON THE FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION.♦
Whatever error of judgment General Lapeña might have committed, the
charges thus brought against him and his army were as ill-founded as
they were intemperately urged. Instead of being cold-blooded spectators
of the battle, the main body of the Spaniards were four miles distant;
there was a thick wood between them and the scene of action, and they
were themselves actually engaged at the time. And it is worthy of
remark, that while invectives, which had no other tendency than to
produce a breach between England and Spain, were thus lavished upon the
Spaniards, by those politicians who would have had us abandon Spain
and Portugal to the tyrant’s pleasure, the French were endeavouring
to excite discontent between the two countries by accusations which
directly contradicted these aspersions. Marshal Victor affirmed in
his official account, that when he determined to attack the heights,
the Spaniards under Lapeña were at the time warmly engaged; the
cannonade and the fire of the musketry were extremely brisk, he said;
and with that falsehood which characterised the execrable system of
his government, he added, that the English, according to their custom,
had wished to place the Spaniards in the post of danger, and expose
themselves as little as possible.
Lapeña prayed that an immediate inquiry should be instituted, that
the inquiry should be made public, and that he should be punished if
he were found culpable. The inquiry was made, and the result was an
honourable acquittal. The proceedings were not published; and unhappily
the good opinion of the Spanish Government afforded no proof, scarcely
a presumption, of the deserts of those on whom it was bestowed. At
this very time they appointed Mahy, who had done nothing in Galicia,
but oppress the inhabitants and paralyse the efforts of a brave and
willing population, to another command; and Mendizabal, by whose
misconduct their best army had been destroyed, was sent to command
in the North. But though it cannot be inferred that General Lapeña
was not worthy of censure, because he was pronounced free from fault,
little investigation may suffice to show that the outcry raised against
him was intemperate, if not altogether unjust, and that the failure
of the expedition was owing to the disagreement between the British
and Spanish generals, more than to any misconduct on the part of the
latter. Whether prudently or not, General Graham had consented to act
under Lapeña; and whether the plan of operations was well concerted
or not, he had assented to it. That plan was, that the allies should
open a communication with the Isle of Leon, by breaking through the
left of the enemy’s line; this being done, they would receive supplies
and reinforcements, and might proceed to farther successes. It had
never been intended in this plan that the British should turn back to
attack a part of the French army, whose numbers were, to their own, in
the proportion of two to one, and who had every advantage of ground;
nor that they should cripple themselves by fighting upon ground, where
mere honour was all that could be gained. The memorial which Lapeña
addressed to the Cortes, praying for an inquiry into his conduct,
contains his justification. “He had assured General Graham,” he says,
“on the evening after the battle, that the troops from the isle should
come out, and that provisions should be sent to the English; and it
was with extreme surprise he learned that they had retreated without
his knowledge.” The cause of this movement is perfectly explicable;
the Spaniards in Cadiz and the island, never very alert in their
movements, were not ready with an immediate supply of provisions,
and the British troops after the battle were neither in a humour,
nor in a state, nor in a situation to wait patiently till it should
arrive. From this moment all co-operation was at an end. When the
Spanish general applied to his own Government, and to General Graham,
respecting farther operations, the former told him that they had
written to the British ambassador, and were waiting for his answer; the
latter that he was not in a condition to come out of the isle again,
but that he would cover the points of the line of defence. Lapeña
thus found himself deprived of that part of the allied force upon
whose skill and discipline his best hopes of success must have been
founded; “had he acted for himself,” he said, “he would have pursued
the enemy with the Spanish troops alone, but he was under the necessity
of consulting the Government which was so close at hand.” This alone
would have occasioned delay; but Lapeña was at that moment under a
charge of misconduct preferred against him by the British, and echoed
by the people and the Cortes; and thus in delays, formalities, and
examinations, the irrecoverable hours were lost.
♦DEATH OF ALBURQUERQUE.♦
It must have added to the grief of the true Spaniards in Cadiz upon
this occasion, when they remembered that they might at this day have
had a general who had every claim to the confidence of his men, his
government, and his allies, that distinguished services, unbounded
sacrifices, enterprise, talents, and devoted patriotism could give.
That general, the Duque de Alburquerque, whose name will ever be
regarded as the most illustrious of his illustrious line, had just at
this time fallen a victim to the malignity of the Junta of Cadiz. After
remaining in England eight months in a state of exile, intolerable to
one who was as capable as he was desirous of serving his country in the
field, he printed a statement of his conduct and case, which he had
withheld as long as any possible injury could be apprehended from its
publication. This he sent to the Cortes; it was received as the merits
of its author deserved; eulogiums never more justly merited were heard
from all sides; the Cortes declared that the duke and his army had
deserved well of their country, particularly for preserving the Isle
of Leon and Cadiz, and they desired that the Regency would recall him
from England that he might again be actively employed. In consequence
of this, he was appointed to the command in Galicia. The Junta of
Cadiz, however, acting as they had done in other cases, even of greater
importance, in contempt of the Government, drew up a reply to his
statement; it was addressed to the duke, and with insolence equal to
their ingratitude, and falsehood if possible surpassing both, they
called him, in direct terms, an impudent calumniator and an enemy to
his country. Each of the members of this body signed it individually;
it was printed as a hand-bill, and a copy of it was sent to London by
some private hand, and reached Alburquerque through the twopenny post,
that no possible mark of insult might be wanting to the transaction.
Alburquerque ought to have despised any attack from that quarter, and
more especially one which, by its intemperance and scurrility, so
plainly showed in what vile passions it had originated. But he wore
his heart for daws to peck at, and his enemies knew but too well the
infirmity of his nature. At first he endeavoured to repress or to
conceal his feelings, and drew up a short and dignified representation
to the Cortes; but this did not satisfy him; notwithstanding the
earnest dissuasions of his friends, he determined upon replying to the
Junta, and he devoted himself to this composition with an earnestness
which made him forgetful both of food and of sleep. Three days were
thus employed in a state of restless and feverish anxiety. The wound
all this while was rankling, and the venom of the Junta did its work.
On the fourth day a frenzy-fever seized him; he felt the approach of
the disease, and was perfectly sensible of the cause, for having sent
for D. J. M. Blanco White, he took from his pocket, as soon as he saw
him, a strip of paper on which he had written, “_como calumniador y
enemigo de la patria_,” ... the words which had stung him to the heart,
... and said, “When they ask why I have lost my senses, this paper
will answer for me.” ... A dreadful scene ensued; fits of tears were
followed by paroxysms of rage, and on the third day of his illness he
expired: happily in the course of the disease the sense of his own
wrongs, intolerable and fatal as it had proved, gave way to a deeper
feeling: he forgot himself in thinking of his country: his repeated
exclamations of vengeance upon Napoleon Buonaparte were so vehement
and loud that they were distinctly heard by the passers in the street;
and his last breath was spent in imprecations upon the tyrant whose
wickedness had caused all the unutterable miseries of Spain. Every
public honour which the British Government could bestow was paid to the
remains of this illustrious man, and his body was deposited in that
same vault in Henry VII.’s chapel wherein Marlborough’s had formerly
been laid, till it could be sent home, to rest with his ancestors[21].