CHAPTER XXXV.

AFFAIRS OF PORTUGAL. ROMANA’S DEATH. BADAJOZ TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.

MASSENA’S RETREAT.

♦1810.

EXPECTATIONS OF THE FRENCH.♦

Early in November, the besiegers before Cadiz fired a salute in honour

of Massena’s triumphant entrance into Lisbon. Such demonstrations

could not deceive the inhabitants of the Isle of Leon; but might

serve to depress the Spaniards, who had no such means of information;

and also to encourage the French themselves, whose confidence in

their fortune had by this time received some abatement, and whose

hopes of bringing the contest to an end rested chiefly now upon the

success of the campaign in Portugal. Massena had undertaken the

conquest of that kingdom in full expectation of outnumbering[16]

any disciplined force which could be opposed to him, and still more

certainly of outmanœuvring it; for the French Government well knew

with what misplaced parsimony the military plans of the English were

calculated; and they had neither reckoned upon the skill of the British

general, nor the resolution of the British ministry, nor the spirit

and exertions of the Portugueze people. He had been confirmed in this

expectance by the cautious system which Lord Wellington had, through

that parsimony, been compelled to observe during the siege of Ciudad

Rodrigo: and though it was by an accident of war that Almeida had

fallen into his hands, the speedy reduction of a place so important

at that juncture increased the habitual confidence of one who had

been accustomed to hear himself called the Child of Victory. That

presumption had received a lesson at Busaco, and a check for which

he was equally unprepared at the lines of Torres Vedras. Could Lord

Wellington have spared a sufficient force to have occupied Santarem,

as well as Abrantes; or had the orders of the Portugueze Regency for

removing all provisions, been carried into full effect in that part of

the country, he must soon have been compelled to retreat. The wonder,

however, is that so much devoted obedience was found to a measure, as

dreadful in its immediate consequences to the persons upon whom it

fell, as it was indispensable for the deliverance of the country. But

being allowed to take a position which was not to be forced without

a greater expense of life than his antagonist could afford; having

found the means of present subsistence, and possessing also that

impassibility, ... that utter recklessness of the sufferings which he

inflicted, ... that perfect destitution of humanity, ... which one

of his fellow-marshals ♦SEE VOL. II.♦ had said was necessary for a

commander in this atrocious war, he was enabled to wait for assistance,

and for the chance of events.

♦GARDANNE ENTERS PORTUGAL, AND MARCHES BACK AGAIN.♦

He had sent General Foy to give Buonaparte the fullest account of his

situation; and to supply his wants till farther orders or effectual

reinforcements should be received, he ordered General Gardanne, who

commanded on the Agueda, to escort a convoy of ammunition. Strong

reconnoitring parties were sent out frequently, both on the Coimbra

and Castello Branco roads, in the hope of meeting him; and one of these

parties had at length the mortification to ascertain that he had been

within three leagues of their advanced posts on the Zezere, and had

then turned back, a peasant having deceived him, by declaring that

the whole French army had withdrawn. Whether the man acted thus upon

the impulse of the moment, or had been sent from Abrantes upon this

hazardous service, he succeeded in alarming men who, from the want of

other tidings, were prepared to believe the worst. Gardanne’s corps

consisted of 3000 men; but they were so dispirited in their retreat,

that when Colonel Grant, with a handful of the Ordenanza, fired upon

them at Cardigos, they abandoned their convoy: nor did this active

officer desist from the pursuit, till they had lost all their baggage

and several hundred men; thus reaching the frontier in a manner which

had every appearance, and all the consequences, of a precipitate and

forced retreat. The Comte d’Erlon, General Drouet, who commanded the

9th corps, had meantime arrived there; and he determined to enter

Portugal, and open a communication with Massena. Advancing, therefore,

with 10,000 men, he left some 8000 under General Claparede, at Guarda,

to drive away the Portugueze force in his rear.

♦DROUET ENTERS WITH 10,000 MEN.♦

Silveira commanded the force in that quarter: the other divisions,

under Brigadier-General Miller, Colonels Wilson and Trant, shut in

the line of the Mondego to the confluence of the Alva. Trant was in

Coimbra, which he had recovered by a movement as important in its

effects upon the campaign, as it was promptly conceived and ably

executed. Wilson had occupied the road from Ponte de Murcella to

Thomar, establishing himself at Cabaços; but when the French had

occupied Thomar, they attacked him twice from thence, and at length

compelled him to fall back upon Espinhal. This was precisely in the

line of Drouet’s march; and he was thus placed between two fires,

the enemy who had driven him from Cabaços being now strongly posted

there. He therefore collected boats at Pena Cova, and crossed the

Mondego, timing this movement so critically, that the next day, when

the enemy had passed the Alva at Ponte de Murcella, and occupied Foz

d’Arouce and the neighbouring ♦DEC. 25.♦ villages, he re-crossed with

a regiment of militia and some cavalry at the same place, took post

the same evening at St. Andre, and captured some of their marauders

there in the act of pillage; being then so near the invading force,

that several of their stragglers came dropping in during the night,

thinking their comrades were in possession of the place, and did not

discover their mistake till they were captured. Early on the morrow

he moved on Foz d’Arouce; Drouet’s rear-guard had just quitted it;

the village had been sacked, and several of its inhabitants of both

sexes were lying dead in the streets, victims of those outrages and

cruelties which invariably marked the movements of the French in

Portugal. Wilson hung upon their flank and rear; and, cutting off their

stragglers and marauding parties, which was all that could be done with

so small a force, made about an hundred prisoners. Trant also marched

from Coimbra with part of the garrison, in the direction of Miranda de

Corvo, to harass the enemy, if he should take the Condeixa road; but

Drouet, having communicated with the party at Cabaços, who expected

his advance, halted at Espinhal, till he received instructions from

Massena to proceed with his corps and establish himself at Leyria.

Wilson then collected his division, and closed upon his rear, for the

purpose of impeding him in that marauding system upon which the whole

army depended for subsistence. Their detached parties were then brought

in daily contact; a sort of warfare in which the Portuguese were

fully equal to their invaders, and in which they had always the great

advantage of sure intelligence.

Claparede meantime had moved in the direction of Lamego. Silveira,

giving him the opportunity which he sought, attacked his advanced

guard at Ponte d’Abbade, and was repulsed: having thus exposed the

comparative weakness of his force and his own ♦RASH OPERATIONS OF

SILVEIRA.♦ want of skill, he was in his turn attacked at Villar de

Ponte, and made a precipitate retreat upon Lamego: the enemy pursued

him closely; and the Portuguese, with an honourable feeling, when

they evacuated the city, carried with them 140 soldiers from the

hospital, on their backs; for they had no other means of transport.

Silveira then crossed the Douro. Lamego was thus left to the invaders’

mercy, and Upper Beira open to their inroads. In consequence of this

rashness on Silveira’s part, Miller and Wilson were ordered toward

the Doura by General Bacellar. Silveira, however, had retreated with

such precipitation, that neither time nor opportunity was afforded

for co-operating with him; but Bacellar took a position on the Payva,

on the enemy’s left flank, and Wilson at Castrodayre, on their rear.

Claparede would willingly have pursued Silveira beyond the Doura,

that he might obtain the resources of a province which had not been

exhausted; but these divisions were closing upon him, and menacing his

communication with Almeida. He returned, therefore, to his position at

Guarda.

♦CONDUCT OF DROUET’S CORPS.♦

But the country which Wilson had previously occupied and protected

was thus left open to Drouet’s marauding parties; and no sooner was

his removal ascertained, than they were let loose, and carried

desolation along the banks of the Alva and to the very heart of the

Estella. No part of the country suffered at this time more dreadfully

than that which was exposed to this corps: it was in vain that the

miserable inhabitants sought to conceal themselves in the depths of

the great pine forest which extends over so large a portion of that

sandy region; no recesses escaped the search of men who were impelled

by hunger, by cruelty which seemed to have become in them a craving

and insatiable desire, and by a brutal appetite which rendered them

even more dreadful and more devilish than their thirst for blood. The

number of inhabitants who perished in the diocese of Leyria (one of

the smallest in the kingdom) during the four months that the French

retained possession there, was ascertained by official inquiries to be

not less than 20,000: and a great proportion of these were butchered in

the _Pinhal_, or died there of famine, and disease, and wretchedness.

♦1811.

THE FRENCH ARMY LEFT TO SUBSIST UPON THE COUNTRY.♦

If Buonaparte had been in all other respects the hero, the

philanthropist, and the philosopher, which he is represented to be

by men whose understandings seem to be as impenetrable as their

hearts, the history of this single campaign would nevertheless

stamp his character with indelible infamy. Expecting, what indeed

the event proved, that Lord Wellington had not a force with which

to act offensively against Massena in the field, he calculated upon

the resources of Lisbon, and made no arrangement for supplying the

invading troops with provisions in case of any unexpected obstacle to

their immediate and complete success. They were left as in Spain, to

support themselves how they could; and in the cruelties which such a

system inevitably occasioned, the evils of war received their only

possible aggravation. After the battle of Busaco this army subsisted

entirely upon what it could obtain by plunder. Throughout Portugal the

peasantry employ oxen for draught; these fell into the enemy’s hands,

wherever the orders of the Regency had not been obeyed; and though

those orders had met with an obedience unexampled in its extent, from

a devoted people, yet there were many who, in hope that the danger

might be averted, delayed parting with what it was ruin for them to

lose; and thus the French obtained a supply of cattle, which, though

it would have been inconsiderable for a British army, was not so for

men in whose way of preparing food nothing is wasted. But the supply

was not large; because kine are nowhere numerous in that country, where

there is little or no use made of their milk, and little demand for

their meat; and it was not lasting, because want of bread occasioned a

consumption of animal food unusual among the French; for wherever they

went they found the ovens and the mills destroyed. They bruised the

corn and then boiled it, and they roasted the maize, till with that

alacrity and cleverness which characterise the whole nation, they had

repaired the demolished mills, and in places where there were none,

constructed some of their own devising, turned by an ass at the end of

a lever, or by force of arm. The hand-mills which soon afterwards made

part of their regimental equipments were an invention of Marmont’s,

suggested probably by the inconveniences which Massena suffered at this

time. If the ingenuity with which they thus remedied one of their wants

is characteristic, the circumstance is not less so that finding no

other fit material for mill-stones they resorted to the churches, and

took for that purpose the slabs with which the graves were covered, or

the vaults closed!

At first, something like discipline was observed in the marauding

parties, and regular detachments with their respective officers

were sent on this degrading service; but it was found that these

detachments brought home little or nothing, while they who went forth

without orders and purveyed for themselves, returned driving before

them beasts well laden with the provisions they had discovered; they

were soon left, therefore, to take their course, without the slightest

attempt on the part of the generals at regulation or restraint; and

a system was thus tolerated, ... not to say encouraged, ... in which

it is even more dreadful to reflect upon the depravity on one side,

than the unspeakable miseries which were endured on the other. French

writers who were themselves engaged in this accursed expedition have

told us that the whole army had at times no other food than what was

obtained from hiding-places which the Portuguese who fell into their

hands had been made by torture to discover; and that acts of this kind

were as ordinary a topic of conversation among the soldiers as any

other incidents of their campaign! In excuse for this, they observe,

and truly, that the army must otherwise have perished, ... that they

were like starving sailors, when as the only means of prolonging their

own lives they kill and eat their comrades, in extremity of hunger. In

proportion as this apology, if such it may be called, be valid, is the

guilt of that tyrant by whose deliberate orders the army was detained

in such a situation; and inferior only to his guilt is that of the

commander by whom such orders were obeyed. Life is what every soldier

must hold himself ready to lay down whenever his military duty should

require the sacrifice; but woe to that soldier who acts as if life were

all that he had to lose!

The same writers, who by the plea of necessity excuse a system so

atrocious that even that plea cannot be admitted without doubt as

well as shuddering, tell us also of supererogatory crimes committed

by this army for which no motive but that of fiendish wickedness is

assignable, no palliation possible. When a family was hunted out among

the rocks, woods, or mountains by these hell-hounds, happy were the men

who did not endure torments, the women who did not suffer violation,

before they were murdered. The French officers, when any of them were

made prisoners, endeavoured always to reject the opprobrium of these

flagitious and undeniable deeds upon the Italians and Germans in their

army: but let us be just to human nature, which has neither made the

Italians and Germans more depraved than the French, nor the French than

the English. The Italians, indeed, having grown up in a country where

great crimes are notoriously committed with impunity, may have been

accustomed to regard such crimes with less repugnance than either the

Germans or the French. But French discipline had made all in its armies

of whatever stock good soldiers: the first thing needful for moral

improvement is to bring men under obedience, which is the root of civil

virtue: military discipline had done this; had moral discipline been

connected with it as it might and ought to have been, they who were

made good soldiers, if they had not by the same process been made good

men, would have been withheld from any open wickedness. But this was

systematically disregarded in Buonaparte’s armies; the more thoroughly

his servants had corrupted their feelings and hardened their hearts,

the better were they fitted for the work in which they were to be

employed. Under like circumstances, British soldiers might have been

equally wicked; but no British Government has ever been so iniquitous

as to place its soldiers in such circumstances. The only offence

deemed worthy of punishment in Massena’s army was insubordination

towards a superior. A wretch might sometimes be apprehended in an act

of atrocity so flagrant that it was not possible to let him escape;

but there was no attempt to prevent such horrors, not even when there

was the wish: they were known and suffered, ... by better minds in

despair, by others with unconcern. In such an army, the soldiers who

brought young and handsome women to the camp, as part of their booty,

were considered as humane; and humane by comparison they were, though

these women, ... whatever their former condition had been, ... were

played for as a stake at cards, were bartered for provisions or horses,

and were put up publicly to sale! It is related, that such women as

survived the first horrors of their situation became reconciled to it,

because of the terror in which they had previously lived, and because

their lives were now secure; that they attached themselves to those who

became, as it is called, their protectors; and that it was no uncommon

thing for a woman to pass from one such protector to another, rising

a step at every exchange, till she became at last the mistress of a

general!

♦SKILL OF THE MARAUDERS.♦

The skill which some of these marauders acquired in their search for

food, resembled the sagacity with which savages track their prey. That

they should detect with unerring certainty any place of concealment in

a dwelling or an out-house, might have been expected from the habits of

plunder which they had been indulged in in former campaigns; but when

they were questing in woods, or among rocks, or in the open country,

a new sense seemed to be developed in them. There were men in every

company who could discover a depôt of provisions by scent far off.

Such resources, however, could ill suffice for such an army; and the

reinforcements which they received bringing with them no supplies,

added as much to their difficulties as to their strength. Wine, which

was found in abundance at first, was lavishly consumed while it

lasted. Bread failed entirely; and in many corps the rations of maize

were reduced first to a half, then to a third. A third of the whole

army was at last employed in thus purveying from a wasted country, and

their comrades are described as stationing videttes to watch for their

coming, and communicate by signals the joyful intelligence if they came

with supplies; for little now was brought back by the most successful

marauders, and sometimes the whole produce of such an excursion was

consumed before they returned to their quarters. They had found when

they entered the kingdom whole towns and villages deserted at their

approach; more appalling spectacles were presented now in the recesses

to which they penetrated; whole families were seen there lying dead;

or in a state worse than death: and those who were not suffering from

famine or disease seemed to be bewildered in mind as well as rendered

wild in appearance, by perpetual terror and exposure.

The helpless and the most devoted were they who suffered thus, ...

old men, women, and children; and they who remaining to protect

wives, children, sisters, and parents, or to perish with them,

forewent for the performance of that duty the pursuit of vengeance.

Meantime, the greater part of the effective population were actively

employed. Everywhere in the rear of the enemy parties of the militia

and ordenanza were on the alert: and when General Foy, returning from

Paris, entered Portugal with an escort of 3000 men to rejoin the

invading army, Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, with eighty of the ordenanza,

took possession of a height which commanded a pass near the village

of Enxabarda, and kept up a fire upon them for two hours, as long

as daylight served. Above 200 of their dead were counted within the

distance of four leagues, the inclemency of the weather having killed

many of the wounded. The invaders were not prepared to encounter such

severe cold as is sometimes felt among these mountains. About three

hundred men of Drouet’s corps were frozen to ♦FELDZUG VON PORTUGAL,

P. 66.♦ death during a night march between Castello Branco and

Thomar. There was a peasant belonging to the latter district of great

bodily strength, and answerable hardihood, who, being deprived of his

former peaceful occupations, took up in its stead that of destroying

Frenchmen, that he might live by spoiling them as they did by spoiling

others; this man is said to have killed more than thirty of the

enemy, during the month of February, with his own hand, and to have

recovered from them about fifty horses and mules, which, with other

booty, he carried to Abrantes for sale. He continued to carry on this

single-handed war as long as they remained in the country; and became

so well known by his exploits that the French set a large price upon

his head; but he was in no danger of being betrayed by his countrymen,

and too wary to be entrapped. A cave in the mountains was his usual

abode. Some of the wretched inhabitants from the adjacent parts took

refuge near him, and felt themselves comparatively secure under his

protection.

Small parties from Abrantes cut off some 300 of the enemy during the

two first months of the year. In one of these desultory affairs, which

were all that occurred, while the two armies were waiting anxiously,

each with its own views, Captain Fenwick, a most enterprising young

officer, who commanded at Obidos, and had been engaged more than

twenty times with the French foraging parties, received a mortal

wound near Alcobaça: he was pursuing with some Portugueze recruits a

party of fourscore French, when one of them, as he was within a few

yards, turned round and shot him through the body. He had so won

the confidence and good will of the peasantry, many of whom he had

armed with French musquets, that they not only brought him the best

information, but were ready under his command to face any danger.

No man could have been more regretted for the excellent military

qualities which he had displayed, and the expectations which were

formed of him. The only other affair deserving of notice occurred at

Rio Mayor. General Junot made a reconnoisance thither from Alcanhede in

considerable force, having learned that there were stores of wine and

corn in the town. The piquet which was stationed there retired. Junot

rashly galloped into the town, and a soldier of the German hussars

waited for him and brought him down. But though this robber left some

of his blood upon that earth which had long been crying for it, the

wound was not fatal, the ball having lodged between the nose and the

cheek bone. A box of topazes which he designed as a present for Marie

Louise, was intercepted by a party of the Spanish army in Extremadura,

who with rare disinterestedness, foregoing all right to the prize,

delivered it to the government. There were seventy-three stones, valued

at 3250 dollars: as it was not possible in such times to discover from

what churches or what family they had been plundered, the Spanish

government disposed of them by raffle, and appropriated the produce

to the relief of faithful Spaniards in the province of Burgos and La

Mancha.

♦MASSENA PERSEVERES IN REMAINING, AGAINST NEY’S ADVICE.♦

Had Ney’s advice been followed, the French, as soon as they had

ascertained that it was hopeless to attack the lines of Torres Vedras,

would have retreated immediately to the frontier. Well had it been

for the credit of that army, and well for humanity, if this counsel

had been taken. But he and Massena were upon ill terms; Massena, by

his defence of Genoa, had acquired a character for endurance which

was supposed to influence him at this time and Buonaparte, in whose

calculations human sufferings were never regarded, undoubtedly expected

that there would be a change of ministry in England, and that the

first measure of the Whigs when in power would be to withdraw the army

from Portugal and leave Lisbon open to him. That party deceived him by

their hopes as much as they deceived themselves; and they in return

were duped by the falsehoods which the French Government published

for the purpose of deluding the French people. The only statements

which were allowed to be made public in France admitted, indeed, that

the English force, and still more the nature of the ground, rendered

the lines of Torres Vedras a strong position; but they affirmed that

within those lines there was so severe a famine, that people lay dead

and dying in the streets of Lisbon, while the French in their quarters

were abundantly supplied. But at this very time it was felt by the

invading army as no slight aggravation of their sufferings, that while

they were in want of every thing, there was plenty beyond that near

demarcation which they were unable to force, with all their courage and

their excellent skill in war. Throughout the tract which they occupied,

the towns of Torres Novas and Thomar were the only places where the

inhabitants had generally remained in their houses; but now, when they

who had erroneously chosen this as the least of two evils found that

the food was taken from them and their ♦STATE OF THE PEOPLE WITHIN THE

LINES.♦ children, they began to retire within the British lines, ...

almost in a starving state. Lisbon, notwithstanding the great military

force which it then had to support, and though 200,000 fugitives had

taken shelter there, was constantly and plentifully supplied; and the

distress for food which was felt there, arose only from want of means

wherewith to purchase what was in the market. This was relieved by the

Government and by the religious houses, who in feeding the poor at this

time rendered unequivocal service to the community. Private charity

also was never more nobly manifested than in this exigency; among the

British officers, a weekly subscription was regularly raised in aid

of the destitute; and it is believed that not less than 80,000 of the

persons thus suddenly thrown upon the mercy of their fellow-creatures

were housed, fed, and clothed at the private cost of those who in their

own circumstances had very materially suffered from the interruption

which the war had occasioned to their trade, from the pressure of war

taxes, and of other requisitions rendered necessary by the exigencies

of a state which was struggling for existence. There had been more

danger from disease than from dearth, for no sooner had the army

retreated upon the lines than the military hospitals were filled, and

various other public and private buildings in or near the capital,

which were appropriated to the same use. The hospital stores of every

kind had been consumed, or carried off by Junot’s army, and had not

yet been re-supplied. Recourse was immediately had to the benevolent

feelings of the people, and clothing and other things needful for the

sick were liberally contributed. But during the time that the armies

remained in their respective positions, the fever in the hospitals

proved more destructive than the sword of the enemy. Meantime the

condition of the Portugueze who remained without the lines, though

within the protection of the allies, became every day more dreadful;

they were not within reach of that eleemosynary distribution by which

their less miserable countrymen were supported; any thing which the

country could afford was only to be obtained by rescuing it from

the enemy, or by marauding in those parts which were open to his

ravages; and when the men of the family perished in this pursuit, or

were rendered by over-exertion and disease incapable of following it,

there was no other resource for the women and children and the men

thus rendered helpless, than the scanty aid which the troops stationed

there could bestow. The British officers at Caldas da Rainha formed

a hospital for these unhappy persons, anxiety and inanition having

produced a fever: in that little, but then crowded town, the average

of burials was from twenty-five to thirty a day: a trench was dug, and

the dead laid along the side of it, till a Priest came once a day, and

with one funeral service consigned them to the common grave. Orphaned

children were wandering about with none to care for them, or give

them food: and frightful as the mortality was, it would have been far

greater but for a distribution of soup and maize bread, made once a day

by the British officers.

♦FALSE STATEMENTS IN FRANCE.♦

It was also asserted in France that the discontent of the Portugueze,

under the privations which their allies compelled them to endure, was

at its height; that Marshal Beresford had ordered every inhabitant to

be shot without process, who did not abandon his house upon the enemy’s

approach; that Trant and Silveira had been destroyed; and that not a

day passed in which English deserters did not come over. Germans and

Portugueze, it was said, were not accounted deserters, because they

only returned to their duty in joining the army of Napoleon. Such

representations obtained more credit among factious Englishmen than

in France, and Massena looked with far less hope to the result of his

operation than was expressed by these despondents. With that confident

ignorance which always characterised their speculations, they gave him

an additional army of more than 20,000 men, which was to join him

under Bessieres, and they called Sebastiani from Malaga to co-operate

in the united attack. “The whole effort,” said they, “will be directed

against Lord Wellington: the whole force is collecting and marching

to the different points of attack, with the knowledge of the allies,

but without their having any means of warding off the blow. The battle

must be fought at the time, and in the way we have always foretold: and

he must have firm nerves who can contemplate the probable issue with

composure.” “The crisis in Portugal,” said another self-constituted

director of public opinion, “may now be expected daily; and then let

the calumniators of Sir John Moore do justice to the memory of that

injured officer, who was goaded to commit his errors, and then abused

for being defeated! He had not interest enough to have his errors

christened exploits, and his flight victory.” Another demagogue,

after representing that it was England which caused the calamities

of Portugal, and the English, whom the Portugueze ought to hate and

execrate as the authors of their sufferings, asked triumphantly, “Who

is there mad enough to expect that we shall be able to put the French

out of the Peninsula, either by arms, or by negotiation? Where is the

man, in his senses, who believes, or will say that he believes, that

we shall be able to accomplish this? Suppose peace were to become the

subject of discussion, does any one believe that Napoleon would enter

into negotiations about Spain and Portugal? Does any one believe that

we must not leave them to their fate? This is bringing the matter to

the test. And if the reader is persuaded that we should not be able

to stipulate for the independence of the Peninsula, the question is

settled, and the result of the war is in reality ascertained!”

An immediate retreat, such as Ney advised, would have been attended

with a loss of reputation, which if Massena had been willing to

incur, would have been ill ♦SCHEMES OF CO-OPERATION FROM THE SIDE OF

ANDALUSIA.♦ brooked by Buonaparte. But in the position which the French

had taken, if they could by any means subsist there, they might look

for assistance from Soult, and so waiting, facilitate his operations,

by occupying the chief attention of the British army. The Spaniards

had nowhere displayed so little spirit as in Andalusia. The people

of Cadiz, contented with the security for which they were beholden

to their situation, seemed not inclined to make any effort against

their besiegers; Soult, therefore, might spare a sufficient force

for besieging Badajoz. His means for the siege were ample, and the

place must fall unless it were relieved by an army capable of meeting

the besiegers in the field; but such a force could be drawn only

from the lines of Torres Vedras. If the allies were thus weakened,

their position might be attacked; or should this still be thought

too hazardous, the passage of the Tagus might probably be effected.

This would put great part of Alemtejo in their power, and open the

communication with Seville and Madrid. If, on the other hand, Badajoz

were suffered to fall without an attempt at relieving it, the same

advantage would follow from the advance of the victorious army. Masters

of Badajoz, and the other less important fortresses, they might leave

Elvas behind them; and if they could win the heights opposite Lisbon,

they might from thence bombard the capital and destroy the shipping.

With these views, Massena made preparations for crossing the Tagus.

The British troops which were detached to the south bank, for the

purpose of defeating this intention, were cantoned in the villages

there, and suffered very much from ague in that low and unwholesome

country. Opposite Santarem the river is sometimes fordable; and once

the enemy took possession of an island, called Ilha dos Ingleses,

whence they carried off a guard of the ordenanza, and some cattle. The

possession of this islet might have greatly facilitated their passage,

but they were speedily dislodged by a company of ♦JANUARY.♦ the 34th,

which remained there for that time. To provide, however, against the

possibility of their effecting this movement, and also against the

advance of a force from the Alentejo frontier, measures had been taken

for fortifying a line from the Tagus opposite Lisbon to Setubal; orders

were issued for clearing and evacuating the country on their approach;

and the inhabitants (well knowing by Loison’s campaign what atrocities

were to be expected from such invaders) were required to retire within

this line.

♦OLIVENÇA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦

Soult and Mortier accordingly, as had been foreseen, advanced

from Seville in the latter end of December. Ballasteros, with his

ill-equipped and ill-disciplined, but indefatigable troops, was

driven out of the field; and Mendizabal, who, with 6000 foot and 2500

Portugueze and Spanish cavalry, had advanced to Llerena, and forced

Girard to retire from thence, was now himself compelled to fall back

upon Almendralejo and Merida, and finally upon Badajoz, throwing

3000 men into Olivença, a place which had been of great importance

in the Acclamation and Succession wars, but which it would at this

time have been more prudent to dismantle than to defend. Taking

immediate advantage of this error, Soult sent Girard against it with

the artillery of the advanced guard. The trenches were opened on the

12th of January. The commander, Don Manuel Herk, communicated with

Mendizabal on the 21st, assuring him of his determination and ability

to hold out: but a division of besieging artillery had arrived; it

was planted in battery that night; and in the morning as soon as

it opened, Herk surrendered at discretion. Mortier then immediately

invested Badajoz.

♦BADAJOZ INVESTED.♦

The city of Badajoz, which in the age of Moorish anarchy was sometimes

the capital of a short-lived kingdom, stands on the left bank of

the Guadiana, near to the spot where it receives the Gevora, and

about a league from the little river Caya, which on that part of

the frontier divides Spain from Portugal. Its population before the

war was estimated at 16,000. Elvas is in sight, at the distance of

twelve miles, standing on higher ground, and in a healthier as well as

stronger situation; for endemic diseases prevail at certain seasons in

the low grounds upon the Guadiana. Count La Lippe had made Elvas one of

the strongest fortifications in Europe. Badajoz is a place of the third

order; it has no advantage of natural strength, like its old rival; but

it had been well fortified, and was protected by two strong forts, S.

Christoval on the west, and Las Pardaleras on the east. The acquisition

of this city was of the utmost importance to the enemy; if Massena

could keep his ground till it fell, a communication would be opened for

him with Andalusia; Mortier’s army would be enabled to co-operate with

him and act against Abrantes; and against Lisbon itself, unless the

Transtagan lines, which were in progress, should be as formidable as

those of Torres Vedras: and supplies might then be drawn from Alentejo,

the western part of that province being a rich corn country.

♦DEATH OF ROMANA.♦

Lord Wellington had concerted his plans for the defence of this

important frontier with Romana; and a position behind the Gevora had

been fixed on for keeping open a communication with Badajoz. Romana’s

army re-crossed the Tagus, and began their march thither; British

troops were to follow, as soon as the reinforcements should arrive,

which westerly winds, unusually prevalent at that season, had long

delayed; ♦JAN. 23.♦ and Romana had named the following day for his

own departure, when he was cut off by sudden[17] death, occasioned by

ossification about the heart. Due honours were paid to his remains by

the Portugueze Government, as well as by the British army: his bowels

were buried close to the high altar at Belem, the burial-place of the

Portugueze kings, during the most splendid age of their history: his

heart and body were sent to his native place, Majorca; and a monument

was voted to him by the Cortes. Castaños was appointed to succeed him,

and sailed from Cadiz for Lisbon accordingly; but before he could

arrive, the consequences of Romana’s death had been severely felt.

Under the most difficult and hopeless circumstances that noble Spaniard

had still kept his army in the field, and had repeatedly annoyed the

enemy and obstructed their measures, without ever exposing himself

♦FEB. 6.♦ to any considerable loss. The troops, therefore, had full

confidence in him; but when Mendizabal met them at Elvas, and took

the command, they had no such reliance upon their new leader. On the

same day the Portugueze cavalry, under General Madden, drove the

French beyond the Gevora; but being unsupported, they were driven back

with some loss by General Latour Maubourg, and the whole force then

entered, some into Badajoz, some into Fort Christoval. On the morrow

a sortie was made, with more gallantry than good fortune, and with

the loss of eighty-five officers, and 500 men killed and wounded: Don

Carlos d’España was among the latter. The courage of the men in this

sally was not more remarkable than the total want of arrangement in

their leaders: when they had won the first battery they could not

disable the guns, because they had forgotten to take spikes with

them! Not discouraged by this severe loss, the troops came out on the

9th. The enemy’s cavalry retired before them across the Gevora, and

they took up their intended position on the heights of S. Christoval,

between the Gevora, the Caya, and the Guadiana. From thence Mendizabal

communicated with Elvas and Campo Mayor, and there he fancied himself

in perfect security. The position, indeed, was strong, and while it was

held, Badajoz could not be taken. Lord Wellington had advised Romana

to occupy it, but he had advised him to intrench it also, and the

necessity of so doing had been repeatedly ♦DESTRUCTION OF HIS ARMY.♦

represented to Mendizabal in vain. Well understanding with what an

antagonist he had to deal, Mortier would instantly have attacked him if

the Gevora and Guadiana had not at this time overflowed their banks.

Losing, however, no time in his operations, he carried Las Pardaleras

by assault on the night of the 11th. On the 18th all things were ready

for the passage of the Guadiana, and a few shells from a well-planted

howitzer had the effect of making Mendizabal remove his whole army out

of the protection of the fort. Thus he abandoned the main advantage of

his position, and yet took no other precaution against an attack than

that of destroying a bridge over the Gevora; but soldiers seldom fail

to know when they are ill commanded, and Romana’s men now deserted

in troops, rather than be exposed to the certain destruction which

they foresaw. That very night Mortier threw a flying bridge over the

Guadiana, forded the Gevora where it was waist-deep, and surprised

Mendizabal on the heights. The camp was taken standing, with all the

baggage and artillery: the cavalry fled, notwithstanding the efforts

of their officers to rally them; 850 men were killed; more than 5000

taken; some escaped into the city; some, with better fortune, into

Elvas; the rest dispersed. The loss of the French, in killed and

wounded, was only 170; so cheaply was this important success obtained.

♦GOVERNOR OF BADAJOZ KILLED.♦

This was the first consequence of Romana’s death; far worse were to

ensue. Relieved from all inquietude on that side, Mortier now pressed

the siege; and yet not with that full confidence of success which the

consciousness of his own strength and adequate preparations might else

have given him, because he knew that the governor, Don Rafael Menacho,

intended to have emulated Zaragoza in the defence which he should make.

This governor was killed upon the walls by a cannon ball, when the

garrison were making their last sortie to prevent the covered ♦IMAZ

APPOINTED TO SUCCEED HIM.♦ way from being crowned. Don José de Imaz

succeeded to the command: he was an officer of reputation, who had

escaped with the troops from Denmark, had shared their sufferings under

Blake, borne a part in their victory under the Duque del Parque, and

followed their fortunes through evil and good till the present time.

In the official accounts of the French it was said that the English,

according to their custom, had remained tranquil spectators of the

destruction of their allies. They had, indeed, been so in the early

part of the campaign, to the bitter mortification of the army and of

the general, who, by the half measures of his Government, was placed

in this most painful situation. The ill effects of the Walcheren

expedition were felt more in the timid temporizing policy which

ensued, than in the direct loss, lamentable as that had been; for the

ministry having spent then where they ought to have spared, spared now

where they ought to have spent. Just views, right feeling, and public

opinion (which in these days is, whether right or wrong, more powerful

with a British ministry than any or all other considerations) made

them continue the contest; while secret apprehension of ill success,

insensibly produced by the constant language of their opponents, who

spoke with more than oracular confidence of defeat and total failure as

the only possible event, withheld them from prosecuting it with vigour.

They considered always what was the smallest force with which Lord

Wellington could maintain his ground, never entrusting him with one

that might render success calculable, and not yet venturing to believe

that British courage would render it not less certain by land than it

was by sea. Some excuse for this weak policy, which even to themselves

needed excuse, they found in the prepossessions of the king, who,

although upon some points of the highest importance he took clearer

and juster views than the ablest of his ministers, could never in his

latter days be brought to contemplate war upon the enlarged scale which

the French Revolution had introduced; but looked upon an army of 20,000

men to be as great a force as it had been in the early part of his

reign. Against this prepossession the ministers had always to contend

while the king was capable of business; and when his fatal malady

removed that impediment, Marquis Wellesley could not yet persuade his

colleagues that the parsimony which protracts a war is more expensive

than the liberal outlay which enables a general to prosecute it with

vigour, and thereby bring it to a successful end.

Had Lord Wellington found a reinforcement of 10,000 men when he fell

back upon his lines, Massena, being entirely without provisions at

that time, must have retreated as precipitately as Soult had done from

Porto. That they were not attacked before they took up a position for

the winter, and that no operations against them were undertaken while

they remained there, the French imputed either to want of enterprise,

or want of skill in the British commander, undervaluing both, as much

as they overrated the force at his disposal. But though they were thus

unjust in their censures of Lord Wellington, the imputation which they

cast upon the British Government had been to all appearance justified

up to this time, except in the case of Badajoz, on which occasion it

was now made. Nothing but the grossest negligence and incapacity on

his own part could have exposed Mendizabal to the total discomfiture

which had befallen him. After the loss of his army it was impossible

for Lord Wellington to detach a force sufficient for raising the

siege, while Massena continued in his position; but it was of such

importance to preserve Badajoz, that the British general determined to

attack him, strongly as he was posted, as soon as the long-looked for

reinforcements should arrive. But the opportunity which both generals

at this time desired of thus deciding the issue of the invasion was not

afforded them: the winds continued to disappoint Lord Wellington in

his expectations of succour; and no patience on the part of the French

could enable them longer to endure the privations to which the system

of their wicked Government had exposed them. They consoled themselves

under those privations by thinking that no English army could have

supported them; for that the sufferings which they had borne patiently

would have driven Englishmen to desert. But their endurance had been

forced now to its utmost extent. Reports were current, that if Massena

would not engage in some decisive operations, which might deliver them

from their sufferings, he should be set aside, and Ney, in whose

intrepidity they had the fullest confidence, be called upon to command

them. That degree of distress had been reached at which discipline

itself, even in the most intelligent army, gives way; and the men, when

nothing was left of which to plunder the inhabitants, began to plunder

from each other, without regard of rank, the ♦FELDZUG VON PORTUGAL,

30.♦ stronger from the weaker. Massena, therefore, was compelled, while

it was yet possible to secure supplies for the march, to determine upon

retreating to that frontier which he had passed with such boastful

anticipations of triumph.

♦THE FRENCH BEGIN THEIR RETREAT.♦

The first information of his purpose came through a channel which was

entitled to so little credit, that it seems to have obtained none. On

the evening of the first of March, a Portugueze boy was apprehended in

Abrantes with articles of provision, which were with reason suspected

to be for an enemy, because the boy was not ready with an answer

when he was asked for whom he was catering. Being carried before the

governor, he confessed that he was servant to the commanding officer of

a French regiment, who had sent him to purchase these things, because

the army was about to return to the north of Portugal. The next day,

♦MARCH.♦ he added, Massena would review the troops on the south of the

Zezere, and the retreat would commence on the evening of the fifth.

That a boy in such a situation should have acquired this knowledge,

is a remarkable proof of his sagacity, and of the indiscretion of the

officer from whom he must have obtained it; for it was verified in all

its parts.

Such a movement was, however, so probable, that it had for some days

been expected. The first apparent indication of it was given by the

French setting fire to their workshops, stores, and bridge-materials

at Punhete, on the 3rd. They had previously been sending the

heavy artillery, the baggage, and the sick to the rear. On the

4th, transports with 7000 British troops on board anchored in the

Tagus; and that same day the enemy’s advanced corps withdrew from

Santarem. Lieutenant Claxton, who commanded the gun-boats appointed

to co-operate with the troops in Alentejo, saw them departing, as he

was reconnoitring under that city. No time was lost in occupying it by

the allies; and when it was seen how the natural advantages of that

position had been improved by all the resources of military skill, Lord

Wellington’s prudence in waiting till time and hunger had done his work

was acknowledged by those who before had been inclined to censure him

for inactivity and want of enterprise. The opportunity which he had

so long desired, and so anxiously expected, had now arrived; and in

the sure confidence of intellectual power, he saw that the deliverance

of the Peninsula might be secured in that campaign, if Badajoz were

defended as it might and ought to be. No sooner, therefore, had it

been ascertained that the enemy was retreating, than he despatched

the intelligence to Elvas, desiring the commander to communicate it

to the governor of Badajoz, assuring him that he should speedily be

succoured, and urging him, in reliance upon that assurance, to defend

the fortress to the last extremity. That intelligence was despatched

on the 6th. General Imaz received it on the 9th. The next day a breach

was made, and Mortier summoned him ♦BADAJOZ SURRENDERED.♦ to surrender.

The garrison at this time consisted of 7500 effective men: the townsmen

might have been made effective also; provisions and ammunition were in

abundance; and the intelligence which Lord Wellington received from

thence on the very day that Massena’s retreat was made known to Imaz,

was, that the place might probably hold out a month; so well was it

stored, so ably garrisoned, and so little injury had it received. The

general, however, like every man who, in such a situation, is inclined

to act a dishonourable part, called a council of war. The director of

engineers delivered it as his opinion, that 5000 men would be required

to resist an assault, and that then the surrender could only be delayed

two or three days: if there was an evident probability of being

succoured in that time, it would be their duty to hold out, though

it should be to the last man; without such a probability, no farther

sacrifice ought to be made. Twelve officers voted with him; one of them

qualifying his vote with the condition, that unless the garrison were

permitted to march out by the breach, and incorporate themselves with

the nearest Spanish army, no terms should be accepted. Imaz delivered

his opinion in these words: “Notwithstanding that our second line of

defence is not formed; that we have very few guns in the batteries of

Santiago, St. José, and St. Juan, and no support for withstanding the

assault, I am of opinion that, by force of valour and constancy, the

place be defended till death.” In this he was followed by General Don

Juan José Garcia. The commandant of artillery, Don Joaquin Caamaño,

gave his vote for holding out in very different terms, and with as

different a spirit. “The enemy,” said he, “not having silenced the

fire of the place, the flanks which command the ascent of the breach

being in a state of defence, the breach being mined, the pitch barrels

ready, and the entrance covered by the parapet which we formed during

the night, I think we ought to stand an assault; or make our way out to

join the nearest corps, or the neighbouring forts.” This opinion, which

did not, like that of the governor, invalidate itself, was followed

by Camp-Marshal Don Juan Mancio. It is due to those who did their

duty thus to particularise their names. In the votes of an unworthy

majority Imaz found all he wanted; and even in their excuse, it must

be remembered that this traitorous governor did not inform them of

Massena’s retreat, and the assurance which he had received of certain

and speedy relief. Romana, whose fear of democracy made him everywhere

at variance with the popular authorities, had ordered the Junta of

Extremadura to leave Badajoz, and retire to Valencia de Alcantara.

That Junta had distinguished itself by its activity and zeal, and had

its members not been thus imprudently expelled, they might have given

to the defence of the city that civic character which had formed the

strength of Zaragoza, and Gerona, and Ciudad Rodrigo; and which, in

this instance, would have proved the salvation, as well as the glory of

the fortress.

On the eleventh of March, therefore, the garrison laid down their

arms, and were made prisoners of war. The empty stipulation that they

should march out by the breach was granted, curiously, as it proved,

to the disgrace of those who proposed it, ... for so insignificant was

this breach that some time was employed in enlarging it, to render it

practicable for their passage! “Thus,” in Lord Wellington’s words,

“Olivença and Badajoz were given up without any sufficient cause; while

Marshal Soult, with a corps of troops which never was supposed to

exceed 20,000 men, besides capturing these two places, made prisoners

and destroyed above 22,000 Spanish troops!” 17,500 were marched as

prisoners of war to France! Mortier, in his dispatches, endeavoured

to gloze over the conduct of General Imaz. “The death of Menacho,”

he said, “had possibly contributed to protract the siege for some

days; for his successor wished to give some proof of his talents,

and thereby occasioned a longer resistance.” This could deceive no

one. The Regency, when they communicated to the Cortes Mendizabal’s

official account of the fall of the place, informed them that they

were not satisfied with the conduct of Imaz, and had given the

commander-in-chief orders to institute an enquiry. But the surrender

of the city was not the only part of these unhappy transactions which

required investigation; and Riesco proposed that rigorous enquiry

should also be made concerning the action of the 19th of February, and

the consequent dispersion of Mendizabal’s army, in order that condign

punishment might be inflicted on those who were found culpable. “The

loss of Badajoz,” he said, “was a calamity of the greatest importance

at this time: it facilitated to the enemy a free communication with

Castille and Andalusia, gave them an entrance into Alentejo, and means

for besieging Elvas: it would also enable them to support Massena; so

that this fatal calamity might draw after it the conquest of Portugal.”

Calatrava proposed that it should also be explained why so considerable

a division had been shut up in Olivença, and no attempt made to succour

it. “My melancholy predictions concerning Extremadura,” said he, “have

been verified. The chiefs of the army of the left, instead of defending

that province and preserving the capital, have at length ended in

losing army, province, and capital. Well, indeed, may it be wondered

at, that the governor, after having himself voted for continuing the

defence, should immediately have capitulated, without sustaining an

assault, ... a contradiction which can no otherwise be explained,

than by supposing that the vote was given insincerely.” He concluded

by proposing, that notwithstanding the conduct of the governor, the

Cortes should make honourable mention of the heroic inhabitants of that

place, and the brave garrison. Del Monte said, it had been remarked

on this occasion, that the loss of a battle was followed always by

the surrender of a place besieged. This, he properly observed, was

a position not less perilous to get abroad, than it was false in

itself.... Another member, with indignant feeling, demanded, that when

the capitulation of Badajoz, and the votes of the council of war were

published, there should be added to them a statement of the situation

of Gerona when that city was surrendered. “At Badajoz,” said he,

“nothing has been alleged for surrendering, but that there was an open

breach; nothing was said of want ... nothing of sickness, nor of any

one of those causes which might have justified the surrender. Let then

the soldiers and the nation contrast with this the conduct of Gerona!

Months before that city was yielded, there was not merely an open

breach, but the walls were destroyed; ... the scarcity was such, that

boiled wheat was sometimes the only food; and for the sick, a morsel of

ass-flesh, when it could be had. In this state the governor of Gerona

ordered, that no man, on pain of death, should speak of capitulation.

By this path did they make their way to glory and immortality! The

soldier who would step beyond the common sphere has here what to

imitate. If Badajoz had resisted only four days longer, it would have

been relieved.”

This was a cutting reflection. But though the loss of that city

led to consequences grievously injurious to the allies, and to a

dreadful cost of lives, it did not produce all the evil which Riesco

apprehended; and that its evil effects did not extend thus far, was

owing to the spirit of the Portugueze people, who, unlike General

Imaz and his companions in infamy, had discharged their duty to the

utmost. Treachery, which had done much for France in other countries,

had not been found in Portugal; and popular feeling, which had done

more, was there directed with all the vehemence of vindictive justice

against the most unprovoked, the most perfidious, ♦SKILL AND BARBARITY

OF THE FRENCH IN THEIR RETREAT.♦ and the most inhuman of invaders.

But Massena’s military talents had never been more eminently shown,

and nothing could exceed the skill which was now manifested in all

his dispositions. His columns moved by angular lines converging to

a point, upon gaining which they formed in mass, and then continued

their retreat, Ney with the flower of the army covering the rear, while

Massena so directed the march of the main body, as to be always ready

to protect the rear guard, which whenever it was hardly pressed fell

back, and brought its pursuers with it upon the main army, waiting

in the most favourable position to receive them. This praise is due

to M. Massena and his generals, and the troops which they commanded:

but never did any general or any army insure such everlasting infamy

to themselves by their outrages and abominations, committed during

the whole of their tarriance in Portugal, and continued during their

retreat. Lord Wellington said, their conduct was marked by a barbarity

seldom equalled, and never surpassed: all circumstances considered, he

might have said it had never been paralleled. For these things were

not done in dark ages, nor in uncivilised countries, nor by barbarous

hordes, like the armies of Timour or Nadir Shah; it was in Europe, and

in the nineteenth century, that these atrocities were committed by the

soldiers of the most cultivated and most enlightened part of Europe,

mostly French, but in no small proportion Germans and Netherlanders.

Nor was the French army, like our own, raised and recruited from

the worst members of society, who enter the service in an hour of

drunkenness, or of necessity, or despair: the conscription brought into

its ranks men of a better description, both as to their parentage,

their breeding, and their prospects in life; insomuch, that the great

majority are truly described as sober, orderly, intelligent, and more

or less educated. Nor is it to be believed, that, although they acted

like monsters of wickedness in this campaign, they were in any degree

worse than other men by nature: on the contrary, the national character

of the French, Germans, and Netherlanders, authorises a presumption

that they were inclined to be, and would have been good and useful

members of society, if the service in which they were compulsorily

engaged had not made them children of perdition. How nefarious, then,

must have been the system of that Government which deliberately placed

its armies in circumstances where this depravation was inevitably

produced!... how deserving of everlasting infamy the individual by

whose absolute will that Government was directed!... and how deep

the guilt of those who were the willing and active agents of such a

Government, ... the devoted servants of such a ruler! No equitable

reader will suppose that any national reproach is intended in thus

dwelling upon the crimes which were committed throughout the Peninsular

war by the French and their allies: Englishmen under like circumstances

would have been equally depraved: the reproach is not upon a brave and

noble nation; it rests upon those alone on whom the guilt abides; and

as we tender the welfare and improvement of the human race, let us hope

that it may be perpetual!

The retreat of this abominable army was marked by havoc, conflagration,

and cruelties of every kind. The towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and

Pernes, with the villages which were near the British lines, suffered

least, because the enemy wished not to discover their intention

of retreating. In these places some of the corps had had their

head-quarters for four months, and some of the inhabitants had been

induced to remain: these people had now fresh proof of their delusion,

in supposing that honour or humanity were to be found in the armies

of Buonaparte: the French sacked their houses, and destroyed as many

as time permitted on the night of their departure; and when their

movements could no longer be concealed, they burnt, by Massena’s

orders, every town and village through which they passed.

♦HAVOC AT ALCOBAÇA.♦

The most venerable structure in Portugal was the convent of

Alcobaça. Its foundation was coeval with the monarchy. It had been

the burial-place of the kings of Portugal for many generations. The

munificence of nobles and princes, the craft of superstition, and the

industry and learning of its members in better times, had contributed

to fill this splendid pile with treasures of every kind. Its gorgeous

vestments, its vessels of plate and gold, and its almost matchless

jewelry, excited the admiration of the vulgar; the devotee and the

philosopher were equally astonished at the extraordinary articles in

its Relic-room; the artist and the antiquary beheld with wonder and

delight its exquisite monuments of ancient art; and its archives and

library were as important to Portugueze literature, as the collections

of the Museum or the Bodleian are in our own country. Orders were

issued from the French head-quarters to burn this place: that the work

of destruction might be complete, it was begun in time, and the mattock

and hammer were employed to destroy what the flames would have spared.

The tesselated pavement from the entrance to the high altar was broken

up with pickaxes, and the ornaments of the pillars destroyed nearly up

to the arches. The French, who at this very time inserted an article in

the capitulation of Badajoz, that no stipulations were therein made

respecting religion, because they were catholics like the Spaniards,

mutilated here the Crucifix and the images of the Virgin, as if they

studied in what manner they could most effectually shock and insult

the feelings of the Portugueze. They cut the pictures which they did

not burn; they broke open the tombs. Those of Pedro and Ignez de

Castro were covered with historical sculptures: rich as England is in

remains of this kind, we have none of equal antiquity which could be

compared with them for beauty, or for their value to the antiquarian;

and a story, hardly less generally known throughout Europe than the

most popular parts of classical history, had in an especial manner

sanctified these monuments. These, therefore, were especial objects

of the enemy’s malice, and more laborious mischief was exerted in

destroying them, the tombs being so well constructed as not without

difficulty to be destroyed. Fire was at length put to the monastery in

many parts, and troops set round it to prevent the people from making

any efforts to stop the conflagration. The edifice continued burning

for two-and-twenty days. Two of the Cistercian brethren were afterwards

appointed commissioners to search the ruins. They found some bones of

Queen Orraca and part of her clothes; the body of Queen Beatriz, in a

state of good preservation, and that of Pedro still entire, with the

skin and hair upon it[18]. A few fragments only of Ignez de Castro

could be found. These remains were deposited once more in the tombs,

and the monuments repaired, as far as reparation was possible. The most

valuable of the books and manuscripts had happily been removed in time.

♦BATALHA.♦

Batalha was a structure equally sacred, and more beautiful. Had King

Emanuel completed the original design, it would have excelled all

other Gothic buildings; even in its unfinished state, it was the

admiration of all who beheld it. It was founded upon the spot where

the tent of Joam I. stood on the night before that battle which, for

inferiority of numbers on the part of the conqueror, may be compared

with Cressy, Poictiers, and Agincourt; and which, for the permanent

importance of its consequences, when considered in all their bearings,

is unparalleled. Here Joam was buried, after a long and glorious reign,

upon the scene of his triumph; and here his four sons were buried also,

men worthy of such a father; one of them being that Prince Henry whose

grave, it might have been thought, would have been equally respected

by all civilised nations. The monuments of these Infantes and of their

parents were in a state of correspondent beauty with the temple in

which they lay, and perfectly preserved. They were broken open by the

French, and the remains of the dead taken from their graves to be made

the mockery of these ruffians, who kicked about the head of Joam I. as

a football, and left the body in the pulpit, placed in the attitude of

one preaching.

♦DIRECTION OF THE ENEMY’S RETREAT.♦

Regnier’s corps, which was the enemy’s left, had moved from Santarem

upon Thomar, from thence towards Espinhal: their centre from Pernes,

by Torres Novas and Cham de Maçans, and the right from Leyria. The

two latter effected their junction on the 9th in the plain before

Pombal. What course the enemy would take in their retreat could not

be foreseen: had they intended to retire by the way which they had

entered, it was thought they would have sent a larger proportion by

the Espinal road. The centre of the allies had taken the same line

as that of the French; the right advanced upon Thomar, the left upon

Leyria. Our light troops had never lost sight of the enemy; and when

the centre and right joined before Pombal, the British advanced guard,

coming from Cham de Maçans, saw their junction from the heights. A

♦AFFAIR BEFORE POMBAL.♦ brisk affair took place that day before Pombal,

where the enemy had eight squadrons formed in different parts of the

plain, supported by their whole cavalry. The 1st hussars and the 16th

light dragoons attacked the most advanced of these squadrons, defeated

them one after another, and drove them all together in confusion on

their support, the troops composing which were repeatedly called upon

by their officers to advance, but would not move; for they were quite

dispirited, and satisfied with safety, seeing the allies were not in

sufficient force to pursue their advantage. Lord Wellington could not

collect a sufficient body to commence an operation before the 11th,

when Loison, with three corps, and Montbrun’s division of cavalry,

were leaving a position in front of Pombal. Having burnt the town,

they attempted to hold the old castle, which stands upon an eminence

above the Arunca; they were driven from thence, they then formed on

the farther side of the town, and our troops did not arrive in time to

complete the dispositions for attacking them while it was day; ... but

they were in time to rescue six women from the flames, whom the French

had stripped naked, shut into a house, and then set the house on fire!

During the night the enemy retired, and their rear took up a strong

position between Pombal and Redinha, formerly a city, now a town, but

bearing rather the appearance of a decayed village. They were posted

at the end of a defile in front of the ♦AFFAIR BEFORE REDINHA. MARCH

12.♦ town, their right in a wood upon the little river Danços, their

left extending to some heights upon the same stream, which has its

source about two miles above the town. The light division, under Sir

William Erskine, the Portugueze caçadores, under Colonel Elder, forming

part, attacked their right; and Lord Wellington, bearing testimony to

the merit of these allies, declared that he had never seen the French

infantry driven from a wood in more gallant style. Our troops then

formed in the plain beyond the defile with great celerity, and Sir

Brent Spencer led them against the heights, from which the French were

immediately driven; but their skill was conspicuous in every movement,

and no local advantage escaped them. Their retreat was by a narrow

bridge, and a ford close to it, over the Danços; our light troops

passed with them in pursuit, but they commanded these passages with

cannon, and gained time to form again upon the nearest heights, before

troops enough could pass over to make a fresh disposition for attacking

them. As soon as this was done, they fell back upon their main body

at Condeixa; and there they sent out regular parties to drive into

the camp all females above ten years of age, and these victims were

delivered to the soldiers!

There was now every reason to fear that Coimbra would share the fate

of Alcobaça, and Leyria, and Pombal, and that the enemy, getting into

Upper Beira, would lay waste in their destructive course a tract of

country which had hitherto been preserved from their ravages; or that

Massena would endeavour to obtain possession of Porto, and defend

himself there better than Soult had done. As soon as Lord Wellington

had ascertained that the enemy were directing their retreat toward

the Mondego, which was on the fourth day after they retired ♦MARCH

8.♦ from Santarem, he dispatched advices to General Bacelar, whose

head-quarters were at S. Pedro do Sul, directing him to send his

baggage across the Douro, to secure means for passing it himself, with

the troops under his command, and to take measures for defending the

passage both at Lamego and at Porto. It was supposed in this dispatch

that Colonel Trant would have retired from Coimbra upon the Vouga,

the bridge over which river he was now ordered to destroy, and then

proceed to Porto. Trant, however, had intercepted a letter from Drouet

to Claparede (who was then near Guarda), which led him to expect that

the French would speedily commence their retreat, and that it would be

in this direction; in consequence he destroyed an arch of the bridge

at Coimbra; and when the concentration of their force at Pombal and

Redinha made their course no longer doubtful, he withdrew his post from

Condeixa, and evacuated the suburb of S. Clara, which is on the ♦THE

FRENCH ENDEAVOUR TO GET POSSESSION OF COIMBRA.♦ left bank: this had

just been effected on the morning of the 11th, when General Montbrun

entered it with a large body of cavalry. Preparations had been made

for defending the passage, and happily at that time the Mondego was

not fordable. The rivers in that part of the country are rendered

impassable for cavalry by a few hours’ rain, the water pouring down to

them from the mountains on every side; but their course is so short,

that they fall as rapidly as they rise. Montbrun, having no guns with

him, could not return the fire of six six-pounders, the only artillery

which Trant possessed; he retired, therefore, from S. Clara to the

heights above it. This movement prevented him from discovering that

the river became fordable in the course of the evening, and continued

so for some days following. During the night Trant received advice

from Colonel Wilson, that the river had become passable at a place

some ten miles above the city; and from the other hand he was informed

that a few of the enemy’s dragoons had actually crossed near Montemor

o Velho. Measures were immediately taken for defending both fords; and

the field-pieces were fired occasionally, in the hope that they might

be heard at the advanced posts of the allied army, and Lord Wellington

thus be assured that Coimbra was not in the enemy’s possession; but the

wind was southerly, and the intention therefore failed. Not doubting

but that the French were in retreat and the allies in close pursuit,

Trant had no thought of retiring from his post, when he now received

dispatches from Bacelar, inclosing Lord Wellington’s instructions,

wherein he was supposed already to have withdrawn, and was ordered to

take upon himself the protection of Porto. These orders he obeyed, by

sending off the main body of the militia, during the night of the 12th,

toward Mealhada, remaining himself with a detachment at the bridge. In

the morning there was no indication of an attempt upon the town; only a

few dragoons were to be seen on the heights of S. Clara; he resolved,

therefore, to place his division in a position, and proceeded to join

it for that purpose; instructing the officer whom he left in command at

the bridge, to take nothing upon himself in case of any communication

from the enemy, but refer it to him, and act accordingly. An hour had

hardly elapsed, before Montbrun summoned the city to surrender. The

officer referred the summons to Trant: it had been merely made to keep

in check the garrison which Montbrun supposed to be still there, and

in force; for that general having found them ready on the 11th and

12th had advised Massena to retire by the Ponte de Murcella; and when

Lord Wellington came up with the main body, who were strongly posted

at Condeixa, to his great joy he perceived that they were sending

off their baggage in that direction. Immediately he inferred that

Coimbra was safe, and marching General Picton’s division upon their

left towards this road, now the only one open for their retreat, they

were instantly dislodged, leaving Condeixa in flames. The allies then

communicated with Coimbra; a detachment of cavalry, returning from

their demonstration against that important city, were made prisoners,

and Trant and Wilson were directed to move along the right bank of the

Mondego, and prevent the enemy from sending detached parties across.

In the order which Massena issued for burning every town and village,

Coimbra had been particularly mentioned.

On the 14th the French rear-guard were driven from a strong position

at Casal Nova, where they had encamped the preceding night. The whole

line of their retreat was full of advantageous positions, of which they

well knew how to avail themselves; but he who pursued them was also a

master in the art of war; and in his own retreat had acquired a perfect

knowledge of the ground. Their outposts were driven in: they were

dislodged by flank movements from the posts which they successively

took in the mountains, and were flung back with considerable loss upon

the main body at Miranda do Corvo, where it was well posted to receive

and support them. Here Regnier, with the second corps, effected his

junction, so that the whole French army was now assembled. General

Nightingale, who had pursued this column, rejoined the British army the

same day at Espinhal: and as it was now in the power of Lord Wellington

to turn their position, they abandoned it during the night.

A thick fog on the following morning gave them time, and favoured their

movements. Some deserters came in, who said that they were destroying

carriages, baggage, and ammunition. About nine the day cleared up,

and the troops, renewing the pursuit, passed through the smoking

ruins of Miranda do Corvo. Hitherto they had only seen proofs of the

cruelty of the enemy along the road; they now began to see proofs of

his distress; for from this place the road was strewn with the wreck

of a retreating army, broken carriages, baggage, carcasses of men and

beasts, the wounded and the dying. Amid this general havoc, nothing was

more shocking than the number of horses, asses, and mules, which the

French, when their strength failed, had hamstrung, and left to suffer

a slow death. To have killed them at once would have been mercy, but

mercy was a virtue which this army seemed to have forsworn: it even

appeared, by the manner in which these poor creatures were grouped,

that Massena’s troops had made the cruelties which they inflicted a

matter of diversion to themselves! Every day the bodies of women were

seen whom they had murdered. In one place some friars were hanging,

impaled by the throat upon the sharpened branches of a tree. Everywhere

peasants were found in the most miserable condition; poor wretches who

had fallen into the hands of the French, and been tortured to make

them discover where supplies were hid, or made to serve as guides, and

when their knowledge of the way ended, shot, that they might give no

information to the pursuers. The indignation of our army was what it

ought to be; men and officers alike exclaimed against the atrocious

conduct of their detestable enemies. “This,” said Lord Wellington, “is

the mode in which the promises have been performed, and the assurances

fulfilled, which were held out in the proclamation of the French

commander-in-chief, when he told the inhabitants of Portugal, that he

was not come to make war upon them, but, with a powerful army of an

hundred and ten thousand men, to drive the English into the sea! It

is to be hoped that the example of what has occurred in this country

will teach the people of this and of other nations, what value they

ought to place on such promises and assurances; and that there is no

security for life, or for any thing that renders life valuable, except

in decided resistance to the enemy.”

The retreating army had no provisions except what they plundered on

the spot, and could carry on their backs, and live cattle, with which

they were well provided. As far as Condeixa the allied troops had

been supplied by transport from Lisbon, to their own admiration, so

excellent had been the previous arrangement. But as they advanced,

they suffered more privations than the enemy whom they were driving

out of the country, for the French left the land as a desert behind

them, and the commissariat could not keep up with the rapidity of such

a pursuit. The dragoons always kept sight, of the enemy; they were

constantly mounted before daybreak, their horses were never unsaddled,

and were obliged to carry their own sustenance, which, it may be

supposed, was sufficiently scanty. In the midst of a country where the

people regarded them not merely as allies, but as friends, brothers,

and deliverers, that people had not even shelter to afford them, and

none of the troops had tents; those which they occupied in the lines

were left there. But they reaped an abundant reward in the success of

their general’s well-concerted and patient plan, in the anticipated

applause of their own countrymen, in the blessings of the Portugueze,

and in that feeling, ... of all others the happiest which can fall to

a soldier’s lot, ... that they were engaged in a good cause, and that

the wickedness of the enemy rendered it as much a moral as a military

duty to labour for his destruction. With these feelings they attacked

them wherever they were found. Massena had taken up a formidable

position on the Ceyra, which falls into the Mondego a few leagues above

Coimbra, and is one of the Portugueze rivers in whose bed gold has been

found; a whole corps was posted as an advanced guard in front of Foz

de Arouce, on the left side of the river. Here Lord Wellington again

moved his divisions upon their right and left, and attacked them in

front. In this affair the French sustained a considerable loss, which

was much increased by a well-managed movement of the English 95th.

That regiment observed a body of the enemy moving off in two parallel

columns. There was a woody cover between them, into which the 95th got,

the fog and the closing evening enabling them to do so unperceived;

from thence they fired on both sides, and retiring instantly that the

fire was returned, left the two columns of the French to keep up a

heavy fire upon each other as they passed the cover. The darkness of

the night increased their confusion: many were drowned in crossing the

river, ... a mountain stream swoln by the rains, ... and it is said

that one column blew up the bridge while the other was upon it. Much

baggage, and some ammunition carriages, here fell into the hands of the

pursuers. The light division got into the enemy’s bivouac, and found

not only some of their plunder there, but their dinners on the fires. A

heavy fog had delayed the movements of the army, and prevented a more

serious attack, from which much had been expected.

♦MARCH 16.♦

Having blown up the bridge, the enemy’s rear-guard took a position

on the bank of the river, to watch the ford. The loss which they had

sustained on the preceding day was betrayed in part by the bodies which

they had thrown into the water to conceal it, but which were seen as

the stream bore them down. Lord Wellington was obliged to halt the

whole of the following day for supplies, the rains having rendered bad

roads almost impassable. Here, too, the ill news from Badajoz compelled

him to order toward that frontier a part of his army, which should

otherwise have continued in the pursuit. During the night, the French

moved off, and the pursuers forded the Ceyra on the 17th. On the 18th,

they advanced toward the Ponte de Murcella; the French, who, during the

whole of the retreat, made their marches by night, putting their troops

in motion a few hours after dusk, had retired over this bridge and

destroyed it, using the very mines which the British had constructed

for the same purpose, on their retreat in the preceding autumn. They

were now posted in force on the right of the Alva. Lord Wellington

turned their left by the Serra de Santa Quiteria, and manœuvred in

their front; this compelled them to retire upon Mouta. It was believed

that they had intended to remain some days in the position from which

they were thus driven, because many prisoners were taken who had been

sent out in foraging parties toward the Mondego, and ordered to return

to the Alva. During the night the staff corps constructed a bridge

which was ready at daybreak for the infantry. The cavalry passed at a

ford close by, and there was some difficulty in getting the artillery

across. On the 19th, they were assembled on the Serra de Mouta, the

enemy, as usual, having retired in the night. From this place they

continued their retreat with the utmost rapidity. Lord Wellington kept

up the pursuit with only the cavalry and the light division under Sir

William Erskine, supported by two divisions of infantry, and by the

militia on the right of the Mondego. The remainder of the army was

obliged to halt, till the supplies, which had been sent round from the

Tagus to the Mondego, should arrive; this was absolutely necessary,

for nothing could be found in the country.

♦RESISTANCE MADE BY THE PEASANTRY.♦

The peasants did not everywhere abandon their villages to the spoilers;

in some places they found means to arm themselves, and their appearance

deterred the enemy from making their intended attack, the pursuers

being so near at hand; in others they entered the burning villages with

the foremost of the allied army in time to extinguish the flames. There

is a village called Avo, six-and-thirty miles from Coimbra, containing

about 130 houses. The ordenanza of that district were collected there;

they repelled a body of 500 French in five different attacks, and saved

the village. The little town of Manteigas was less fortunate. The

inhabitants of the adjoining country, confiding in the situation of a

place which was, as they hoped, concealed in the heart of the Serra de

Estrella, had brought their women and children thither, and their most

valuable effects; but it was discovered, and in spite of a desperate

defence, the town was stormed, by a force as superior in number as in

arms. The officers carried off the handsomest women; the rest were

given up to the mercy of men as brutal as their leaders. But everywhere

the naked bodies of the straggling and wounded, which the English found

upon the way, showed well what vengeance these most injured people had

taken upon their unprovoked and inhuman enemies. In one place a party

of them were surprised in a church digging the dead out of their graves

in search of plunder.

As the French drew nearer the frontier, their foraging parties assumed

more confidence, and at the same time their wants becoming more

urgent, made them more daring. They passed the fords of the Mondego

near Fornos, in considerable numbers, to seek supplies in a country

as yet unravaged; but they were attacked by Wilson, who pursued them

across the river and captured a great number of beasts of burthen,

laden with plunder of every description, which they abandoned in their

flight. He took several prisoners also, and in consequence of the loss

which they had thus sustained a strong division was detached against

him, which took a position on the left bank of the river, so as to

cover the flank of the retiring columns from any further operations of

this militia force, till they had passed Celorico. Lord Wellington,

for want of supplies, was not able to proceed till the 26th, when he

advanced to Gouvea, halted, again the next day, and on the following

reached Celorico. The French were then at Guarda, which they occupied

in strength, and where they apparently intended to maintain themselves.

Between Celorico and that city, the inhabitants of a village, men and

women alike, were found dead or dying in the street, their ears and

noses cut off, and otherwise mangled in a manner not to be described.

The horror and indignation of the allies were raised to the highest

pitch by this dreadful sight; and the advanced guard coming up with

some hundreds of the guilty troops, whose retreat had been impeded by

the premature destruction of a bridge, gave them as little quarter as

they deserved. But as the enemy only passed through this part of the

country, it had not suffered so much as those places where they had

been stationary, and consequently had had leisure to prepare[19] for

the work of barbarous devastation which their Generals had determined

upon committing. Not having time now to destroy every thing before

them, they burnt only the principal houses: poorer habitations

escaped; and the peasants who had fled before the retreating army to

the mountains no sooner saw the allies come up, than they returned to

their dwellings, baked bread for their deliverers from the corn which

they had concealed, and did every thing in their power to assist them.

♦GUARDA.♦

Guarda stands upon a plain of the Serra de Estrella (the Mons Herminius

of the Romans) near the sources of the Zezere and the Mondego, and near

the highest part of that lofty range; its site is said to be higher

than that of any other city in Europe; the ascent to it continues

nearly four miles, by a road wide enough for two carts abreast, winding

in numberless sinuations along the edge of a deep precipice, the sides

of which are overspread with trees. The city indeed owes its origin to

this commanding situation, having grown round a watch tower (called

in those days _guarda_) which Sancho the First erected there in the

first age of the monarchy. Lord Wellington collected his army in the

neighbourhood and in the front of Celorico, with a view to dislodge

the enemy from this advantageous post. The following day he moved

forward in five columns, supported by a division in the valley of the

Mondego; the militia under Trant and Wilson covering the movement at

Alverca against any attempt which might have been made against it on

that side. So well were the movements concerted, that the heads of the

different columns made their appearance on the heights almost at the

same moment; upon which the enemy, without firing a shot, retired upon

Sabugal on the Upper Coa; for although Dumouriez, with his superficial

knowledge of the country, had spoken of Guarda as the key of Portugal,

and upon that authority it has been described as one of the finest

military positions in the kingdom, the French Generals perceived that

its apparent strength only rendered it more treacherous, and were too

prudent to attempt making a stand there, against one whom they now

could not but in their hearts acknowledge to be at least their equal in

the art of war. Their retreat was so rapid that they had not time to

execute the mischief which they intended; our troops entered in time to

save the Cathedral, the door of which was on fire: the wood of its fine

organ had been taken by the enemy for fuel, and the pipes for bullets.

They took a strong position, their right at Ruvina guarding the ford

of Rapoula de Coa, with a detachment at the bridge of Ferreiros; their

left was at Sabugal, and their 8th corps at Alfayates. The right of

the allied army was opposite Sabugal, their left at the bridge of

Ferreiros, and Trant and Wilson were sent across the Coa below Almeida,

to threaten the communication of that place with Ciudad Rodrigo and

with the enemy’s army.

♦THE COA.♦

The river Coa rises in the Sierra de Xalma, which forms a part of the

great Sierra de Gata; and entering Portugal by Folgozinho, falls into

the Douro near Villa Nova de Foscoa. The whole of its course is through

one of the most picturesque countries in Europe, and it is everywhere

difficult of access. ♦SABUGAL.♦ Sabugal stands on the right bank. This

town was founded about the year 1220, by Alonso X. of Leon, who named

it from the number of elder-trees (_sabugos_) growing about it: the

place is now remarkable for some of the largest chesnut-trees that

are anywhere to be seen. It was afterwards annexed to the Portugueze

dominions, and its old castle still remains a monument of king Diniz,

whose magnificent works are found over the ♦APRIL.♦ whole kingdom.

The enemy’s second corps were strongly posted with their right upon a

height immediately above the bridge and town, and their left extending

along the road to Alfayates, to a height which commanded all the

approaches to Sabugal from the fords above the town. They communicated

by Rendo with the sixth corps at Ruvina. It was only on the left above

Sabugal that they could be approached; our troops, therefore, were put

in motion on the morning ♦ACTION BEFORE SABUGAL.♦ of the 3rd of April,

to turn them in this direction, and to force the passage of the bridge

of Sabugal. The light division and the cavalry, under Sir W. Erskine

and Major-General Slade, were to cross the Coa by two separate fords

upon the right, the cavalry upon the right of the light division; the

third division, under Major-General Picton, at a ford on the left about

a mile above Sabugal; the fifth division, under Major-General Dunlop,

and the artillery at the bridge. The sixth division remained opposite

the enemy’s corps at Ruvina, and a battalion of the seventh observed

their detachment at the bridge of Ferreiros. Colonel Beckwith’s brigade

of the light division was the first that crossed, with two squadrons of

cavalry upon its right; the riflemen skirmished; the enemy’s picquets

fell back from the river as they advanced: they forded, gained the

opposite height, formed as the companies arrived, and moved forward

under a heavy fire. At this time so thick a rain came on, that it was

impossible to see any thing before them, and the troops pushing forward

in pursuit of the picquets, came upon the left of the main body,

which it was intended they should turn. The light troops were driven

back upon the 43rd regiment; and Regnier, who commanded the French,

perceiving, as soon as the atmosphere cleared, that the body which had

advanced was not strong, attacked it in solid column, supported by

artillery and horse. The allies repulsed it, and advanced in pursuit

upon the position. They found a strong enclosure in the front lined

with a battalion; and the enemy forming fresh and stronger bodies,

attacked them with the hussars on the right, and a fresh column on

the left. Our troops retired, took post behind a wall, formed again

under a heavy fire of grape, canister, and musketry, again repulsed

the enemy, again advanced against them, and took from them a howitzer

posted in the rear of the French battalion, which was formed under

cover of that in the stone enclosure: this gun had greatly annoyed the

allies. They had advanced with such impetuosity that their front was

somewhat scattered; a fresh column with cavalry attacked them; they

retired again to their post, where the battalions of the 52nd and the

1st Caçadores joined them: these troops once more repulsed the enemy,

and Colonel Beckwith’s brigade, with the first battalion of the 52nd,

again advanced upon them. Another column of the French, with cavalry,

charged their right: but they took post in the stone enclosure on the

top of the height, from whence they could protect the howitzer which

had been won, and they again drove back the enemy. Regnier had moved a

column on their left to renew the attack, when part of General Picton’s

division came up; the head of General Dunlop’s column forced the bridge

at the same time, and ascended the heights on the right flank; the

cavalry appeared on the high ground in rear of their left, and Regnier

then retreated across the hills towards Rendo, leaving the howitzer

in the hands of those by whom it had been so gallantly won; about

200 were left on the field, with six officers and 300 prisoners. Our

loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted to 161. What that of

the French was in wounded is not known. They retired in the greatest

disorder, cavalry, artillery, infantry, and baggage, all mixed. A

fog favoured them, otherwise a good account would have been given of

half their corps. Lord Wellington described this action, though the

unavoidable accidents of weather had materially interfered with the

operations, and impeded their success, as one of the most glorious that

British troops were ever engaged in.

Regnier joined the sixth corps at Rendo; for it had broken up from

its position at Ruvina as soon as the firing began; they retreated

to Alfayates, followed by our cavalry; that night they continued

their retreat, and entered the Spanish frontier on the fourth. On the

following day the advance of the allied army pushed on, and occupied

Albergaria, the first village on the Spanish border. An inhabited

village was what they had not seen before since their retreat in the

autumn, those excepted which were within the lines of Torres Vedras.

The villages in Spain had not been injured; it seemed as if the French

wished to make the Spaniards on this frontier compare their own

condition with that of the Portugueze, that they might become contented

with subjection. Massena’s soldiers even paid here for bread; and

arriving not only hungry, but with a longing desire for that which is

to them the most necessary article of food, they paid any price for it:

the peasants seeing that they were rich in plunder, and finding them in

the paying mood, made their charges accordingly. This sudden transition

from a devastated country to one which had been exempted from the

ravages of war, where the villages were clean, and the cottages

reminded Englishmen of those in their own land, was not less striking

than was the passing at once from a wild mountainous region to a fine

and well-wooded plain.

Some hope was entertained that the appearance of Trant and Wilson’s

force before Almeida might make the French apprehend a serious attack,

and induce them to evacuate it. But throughout the war they never

committed any error of this kind. It rarely happened in their service

that any person was appointed to a situation for which he was not well

qualified; and the commander of this fortress, General Brenier, was a

man of more than common qualifications. The Coa, after these divisions

crossed it at Cinco Villas, rose; and the governor concerted with

General Regnier an attack upon them, which, their retreat being thus

cut off, must have ended in their destruction, if Lord Wellington,

apprehending the danger, had not pushed forward a small corps, which

arrived just in time to divert the enemy’s attention, and save them. On

the eighth the last of Massena’s army crossed the Agueda, not a ♦THE

FRENCH CROSS THE FRONTIER.♦ Frenchman remaining in Portugal, except

the garrison of Almeida, which Lord Wellington immediately prepared

to blockade. The allies took up that position upon the Duas Casas,

which General Craufurd had occupied with the advanced guard during

the latter part of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, having their advanced

posts upon Galegos and the Agueda. Thus terminated the invasion of

Portugal, in which Massena, with 110,000 men, had boasted that he would

drive the English into the sea. A general of the highest reputation,

and of abilities no ways inferior to his celebrity, at the head of the

largest force which France could send against that country, was thus

in all his plans baffled by a British general, and in every engagement

beaten by British troops. An enemy the most presumptuous and insolent

that ever disgraced the profession of arms, the most cruel that ever

outraged human nature, had been humbled and exposed in the face of

Europe; ... it was in vain for the French Government to call their

retreat a change of position, ... however they might disguise and

misrepresent the transactions in Portugal, however they might claim

victories where they had sustained defeats, the map discovered here

their undeniable discomfiture; and the smallest kingdom in Europe, a

kingdom too which long misgovernment had reduced to the most deplorable

state of disorganization, had, by the help of England and the spirit of

its inhabitants, defied and defeated that tyrant before whom the whole

continent was humbled. Russia had been so foiled in arms and dressed in

negociation so as to become the ally of France, to co-operate in her

barbarous warfare against commerce, and to recognise her extravagant

usurpations. Prussia had been beaten and reduced to vassalage. Austria

was still farther degraded by being compelled to give a daughter of

its emperor in marriage to one whose crimes that emperor himself had

proclaimed to the world. Poles and Italians, Dutch and Germans, from

every part of divided and subjected Germany, filled up the armies

of this barbarian; and the Portugueze, ... the poor, degraded, and

despised Portugueze, ... the vilified, the injured, the insulted

Portugueze, ... were the first people who drove this formidable enemy

out of their country, and delivered themselves from the yoke.

♦MARCH 18.

OPINIONS OF THE WHIGS AT THIS TIME.♦

While Massena was retreating, and before the intelligence arrived in

England, a debate took place in both houses, upon a motion, that two

millions should be granted for the Portugueze troops in British pay.

The opposition did not let pass this opportunity of repeating their

opinions and their ♦MR. PONSONBY.♦ prophecies, ... in happy hour!

Mr. Ponsonby said, that our success consisted in having lost almost

the whole of Portugal, and having our army hemmed in between Lisbon

and Cartaxo; except that intermediate space, we had abandoned all

Portugal. ♦MR. FREEMANTLE.♦ Mr. Freemantle, after a panegyric upon

Sir John Moore’s retreat, said that the present campaign left Lord

Wellington incapable of quitting his intrenchments, and only waiting

the result of such movements as the enemy might be disposed to make.

“It rests with the enemy,” said he, “to choose his day, to make his

own dispositions, to wait for his reinforcements, to choose whether

he will continue to blockade you, or whether he will give you a fair

opportunity of contending with him in the field. If we are to judge

by the publications in France, he will decide upon the former; and

in this he will judge wisely. The result of all your victories, of

all your expenditure in men and money, of all your exertions, and of

all your waste of the military resources of this country, is ... the

position of your army at Lisbon, insulated and incapable of acting, but

at the discretion of the enemy: your allies in every other part of the

peninsula overwhelmed, and only manifesting partial and unavailable

hostility; your own resources exhausted, and your hopes of ultimate

success, to every mind which is not blinded by enthusiasm, completely

annihilated! Such is the result of a system founded upon the principle

of attempting to subdue Buonaparte by the force of your armies on the

continent! Will any man say that this has been a wise system? Will any

man, who is not determined, under any circumstances, to support the

measures of a weak and misguided government, contend that it has been

successful? that it has answered either the promises to your allies,

or the hopes to your country? that it has either contributed to their

security, or to your own benefit?”

♦GENERAL TARLETON.♦

General Tarleton also delivered it as his opinion, that we had lost the

whole of the peninsula, except the spot between Cartaxo and Lisbon;

that the Portugueze troops had never been of any actual service; that

we could not maintain ourselves in the country, for the fatal truth

must at length be told; and that when our army was to get out of it, he

was afraid it would be ♦LORD GRENVILLE.♦ found a difficult matter. Lord

Grenville, in the Upper House, spoke to the same purport, affirming

that the British army in Portugal did not possess more of the country

than the ground which it actually occupied, and that while we were

vainly draining our own resources, and hazarding our best means, we did

not essentially contribute to help Portugal, or to save it. It was, he

added, because he had the cause of Spain and Portugal sincerely and

warmly at heart, that he felt anxious we should pause in this wild and

mad career of thoughtless prodigality, look our own situation in the

face, and learn the necessity of economising our resources, that we

might be able, at a period more favourable than the present, to lend

to the cause of the nations of the Peninsula, or to that of any other

country similarly situated, that support and those exertions which,

when made under all the circumstances of our present situation, must be

found not only wholly unavailing to our allies, but highly injurious to

ourselves.

Two days after these opinions were delivered, the telegraph announced

the news of Massena’s retreat.