Opposite the sedan-chair was an opening with some steps cut through

the wall, and communicating with the plain below. It had been made for

the purpose of fetching orders from the King, should they be

necessary. The case happened. Crenan, who commanded, sent Conillac, an

officer in one of the defending regiments, to ask for some

instructions from the King. Conillac had been stationed at the foot of

the rampart, where what was passing above could not be seen. He

mounted the steps; and as soon as his head and shoulders were at the

top, caught sight of the chair, the King, and all the assembled

company. He was not prepared for such a scene; and it struck him with

such astonishment that he stopt short, with mouth and eyes wide

open--surprize painted upon every feature. I see him now as distinctly

as I did then. The King, as well as the rest of the company, remarked

the agitation of Conillac, and said to him with emotion, "Well,

Conillac! come up." Conillac remained motionless, and the King

continued, "Come up. What is the matter?" Conillac, thus addrest,

finished his ascent, and came toward the King with slow and trembling

steps, rolling his eyes from right to left like one deranged. Then he

stammered something, but in a tone so low that it could not be heard.

"What do you say?" cried the King. "Speak up." But Conillac was

unable; and the King, finding he could get nothing out of him, told

him to go away. He did not need to be told twice, but disappeared at

once. As soon as he was gone, the King looking round said, "I don't

know what is the matter with Conillac. He has lost his wits: he did

not remember what he had to say to me." No one answered.

Toward the moment of the capitulation, Madame de Maintenon apparently

asked permission to go away; for the King cried, "The chairmen of

madame!" They came and took her away; in less than a quarter of an

hour afterward the King retired also, and nearly everybody else. There

was much interchange of glances, nudging with elbows, and then

whisperings in the ear. Everybody was full of what had taken place on

the ramparts between the King and Madame de Maintenon. Even the

soldiers asked what meant that sedan-chair, and the King every moment

stooping to put his head inside of it. It became necessary gently to

silence these questions of the troops. What effect this sight had upon

foreigners present, and what they said of it, may be imagined. All

over Europe it was as much talked of as the camp of Compiègne itself,

with all its pomp and prodigious splendor.

BARON DE MONTESQUIEU

Born near Bordeaux in 1689, died in Paris in 1755; studied

law and became a councilor in 1716; president of the

Bordeaux Parliament; devoted himself to a study of

literature and jurisprudence; published "Persian Letters" in

1721, which secured him an election to the Academy in 1728;

traveled in Austria, Italy, Germany, Holland and England;

published "Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans" in 1734,

and "Spirit of the Laws" in 1748.[37]

I

OF THE CAUSES WHICH DESTROYED ROME[38]

While the sovereignty of Rome was confined to Italy, it was easy for

the commonwealth to subsist: every soldier was at the same time a

citizen; every Consul raised an army, and other citizens marched into

the field under his successor: as their forces were not very numerous,

such persons only were received among the troops as had possessions

considerable enough to make them interested in the preservation of the

city; the Senate kept a watchful eye over the conduct of the generals,

and did not give them an opportunity of machinating anything to the

prejudice of their country.

[Footnote 37: Montesquieu is declared by Mr. Saintsbury to deserve the

title of "the greatest man of letters of the French eighteenth

century." He places him above Voltaire because "of his far greater

originality and depth of thought."]

[Footnote 38: From the "Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans," of

which an English translation was issued as early as 1751.]

But after the legions had passed the Alps and crossed the sea, the

soldiers whom the Romans had been obliged to leave during several

campaigns in the countries they were subduing, lost insensibly that

genius and turn of mind which characterized a Roman citizen; and the

generals having armies and kingdoms at their disposal were sensible of

their own strength, and would no longer obey.

The soldiers therefore began to acknowledge no superior but their

general; to found their hopes on him only, and to view the city as

from a great distance: they were no longer the soldiers of the

republic, but of Sulla, of Marius, of Pompey, and of Cæsar. The Romans

could no longer tell whether the person who headed an army in a

province was their general or their enemy.

So long as the people of Rome were corrupted by their tribunes only,

on whom they could bestow nothing but their power, the Senate could

easily defend themselves, because they acted consistently and with one

regular tenor, whereas the common people were continually shifting

from the extremes of fury to the extremes of cowardice; but when they

were enabled to invest their favorites with a formidable exterior

authority, the whole wisdom of the Senate was baffled, and the

commonwealth was undone.

The reason why free states are not so permanent as other forms of

government is because the misfortunes and successes which happen to

them generally occasion the loss of liberty; whereas the successes and

misfortunes of an arbitrary government contribute equally to the

enslaving of the people. A wise republic ought not to run any hazard

which may expose it to good or ill fortune; the only happiness the

several individuals of it should aspire after is to give perpetuity to

their state.

If the unbounded extent of the Roman empire proved the ruin of the

republic, the vast compass of the city was no less fatal to it.

The Romans had subdued the whole universe by the assistance of the

nations of Italy, on whom they had bestowed various privileges at

different times. Most of those nations did not at first set any great

value on the freedom of the city of Rome, and some chose rather to

preserve their ancient usages; but when this privilege became that of

universal sovereignty--when a man who was not a Roman citizen was

considered as nothing, and with this title was everything--the people

of Italy resolved either to be Romans or die: not being able to obtain

this by cabals and entreaties, they had recourse to arms; and rising

in all that part of Italy opposite to the Ionian sea, the rest of the

allies were going to follow their example. Rome, being now forced to

combat against those who were, if I may be allowed the figure, the

hands with which they shackled the universe, was upon the brink of

ruin; the Romans were going to be confined merely to their walls: they

therefore granted this so much wished-for privilege to the allies who

had not yet been wanting in fidelity; and they indulged it, by

insensible degrees, to all other nations.

But now Rome was no longer that city the inhabitants of which had

breathed one and the same spirit, the same love for liberty, the same

hatred of tyranny; a city in which a jealousy of the power of the

Senate and of the prerogatives of the great (ever accompanied with

respect) was only a love of equality. The nations of Italy being made

citizens of Rome, every city brought thither its genius, its

particular interests, and its dependence on some mighty protector:

Rome, being now rent and divided, no longer formed one entire body,

and men were no longer citizens of it but in a kind of fictitious way;

as there were no longer the same magistrates, the same walls, the same

gods, the same temples, the same burying-places, Rome was no longer

beheld with the same eyes; the citizens were no longer fired with the

same love for their country, and the Roman sentiments were

obliterated.

Cities and nations were now invited to Rome by the ambitious, to

disconcert the suffrages, or influence them in their own favor; the

public assemblies were so many conspiracies against the state, and a

tumultuous crowd of seditious wretches was dignified with the title of

Comitia. The authority of the people and their laws--nay, that people

themselves--were no more than so many chimeras; and so universal was

the anarchy of those times that it was not possible to determine

whether the people had made a law or not.

Authors enlarge very copiously on the divisions which proved the

destruction of Rome; but their readers seldom discover those divisions

to have been always necessary and inevitable. The grandeur of the

republic was the only source of that calamity, and exasperated

popular tumults into civil wars. Dissensions were not to be prevented;

and those martial spirits which were so fierce and formidable abroad

could not be habituated to any considerable moderation at home. Those

who expect in a free state to see the people undaunted in war and

pusillanimous in peace, are certainly desirous of impossibilities; and

it may be advanced as a general rule that whenever a perfect calm is

visible, in a state that calls itself a republic, the spirit of

liberty no longer subsists.

Union, in a body politic, is a very equivocal term: true union is such

a harmony as makes all the particular parts, as opposite as they may

seem to us, concur to the general welfare of the society, in the same

manner as discords in music contribute to the general melody of sound.

Union may prevail in a state full of seeming commotions; or in other

words, there may be a harmony from whence results prosperity, which

alone is true peace; and may be considered in the same view as the

various parts of this universe, which are eternally connected by the

action of some and the reaction of others.

In a despotic state, indeed, which is every government where the power

is immoderately exerted, a real division is perpetually kindled. The

peasant, the soldier, the merchant, the magistrate, and the grandee,

have no other conjunction than what arises from the ability of the one

to oppress the other without resistance; and if at any time a union

happens to be introduced, citizens are not then united, but dead

bodies are laid in the grave contiguous to each other.

It must be acknowledged that the Roman laws were too weak to govern

the republic; but experience has proved it to be an invariable fact

that good laws, which raise the reputation and power of a small

republic, become incommodious to it when once its grandeur is

established, because it was their natural effect to make a great

people but not to govern them.

The difference is very considerable between good laws and those which

may be called convenient; between such laws as give a people dominion

over others, and such as continue them in the possession of power when

they have once acquired it.

There is at this time a republic in the world (the Canton of Berne),

of which few persons have any knowledge, and which, by plans

accomplished in silence and secrecy, is daily enlarging its power. And

certain it is that if it ever rises to that height of grandeur for

which it seems preordained by its wisdom, it must inevitably change

its laws; and the necessary innovations will not be effected by any

legislator, but must spring from corruption itself.

Rome was founded for grandeur, and her laws had an admirable tendency

to bestow it; for which reason, in all the variations of her

government, whether monarchy, aristocracy, or popular, she constantly

engaged in enterprises which required conduct to accomplish them, and

always succeeded. The experience of a day did not furnish her with

more wisdom than all other nations, but she obtained it by a long

succession of events. She sustained a small, a moderate, and an

immense fortune with the same superiority, derived true welfare from

the whole train of her prosperities, and refined every instance of

calamity into beneficial instructions.

She lost her liberty because she completed her work too soon.

II

OF THE RELATION OF LAWS TO DIFFERENT HUMAN BEINGS[39]

Laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations

arising from the nature of things. In this sense all beings have their

laws; the Deity His laws, the material world its laws, the

intelligences superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man

his laws.

[Footnote 39: From "The Spirit of Laws." The translation of Thomas

Nugent was published in 1756.]

They who assert that a blind fatality produced the various effects we

behold in this world talk very absurdly; for can anything be more

unreasonable than to pretend that a blind fatality could be productive

of intelligent beings?

There is, then, a primitive reason; and laws are the relations

subsisting between it and different beings, and the relations of these

to one another.

God is related to the universe, as Creator and Preserver; the laws by

which He created all things are those by which He preserves them. He

acts according to these rules, because He knows them; He knows them,

because He made them; and He made them, because they are relative to

His wisdom and power.

Since we observe that the world, tho formed by the motion of matter,

and void of understanding, subsists through so long a succession of

ages, its motions must certainly be directed by invariable laws; and

could we imagine another world, it must also have constant rules, or

it would inevitably perish.

Thus the creation, which seems an arbitrary net, supposes laws as

invariable as those of the fatality of the atheists. It would be

absurd to say that the Creator might govern the world without these

rules, since without them it could not subsist.

These rules are a fixt and variable relation. In bodies moved, the

motion is received, increased, diminished, lost, according to the

relations of the quantity of matter and velocity; each diversity is

uniformity, each change is constancy.

Particular intelligent beings may have laws of their own making, but

they have some likewise which they never made. Before they were

intelligent beings, they were possible; they had therefore possible

relations, and consequently possible laws. Before laws were made,

there were relations of possible justice. To say that there is nothing

just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws is

the same as saying that before the describing of a circle all the

radii were not equal.

We must therefore acknowledge relations of justice antecedent to the

positive law by which they are established: as for instance, that if

human societies existed it would be right to conform to their laws; if

there were intelligent beings that had received a benefit of another

being, they ought to show their gratitude; if one intelligent being

had created another intelligent being, the latter ought to continue in

its original state of dependence; if one intelligent being injures

another, it deserves a retaliation; and so on.

But the intelligent world is far from being so well governed as the

physical. For tho the former has also its laws, which of their own

nature are invariable, it does not conform to them so exactly as the

physical world. This is because, on the one hand, particular

intelligent beings are of a finite nature, and consequently liable to

error; and on the other, their nature requires them to be free agents.

Hence they do not steadily conform to their primitive laws; and even,

those of their own instituting they frequently infringe.

Whether brutes be governed by the general laws of motion or by a

particular movement we can not determine. Be that as it may, they have

not a more intimate relation to God than the rest of the material

world; and sensation is of no other use to them than in the relation

they have either to other particular beings or to themselves.

By the allurements of pleasure they preserve the individual, and by

the same allurements they preserve their species. They have natural

laws, because they are united by sensation; positive laws they have

none, because they are not connected by knowledge. And yet they do not

invariably conform to their natural laws; these are better observed

by vegetables, that have neither understanding nor sense.

Brutes are deprived of the high advantages which we have; but they

have some which we have not. They have not our hopes, but they are

without our fears; they are subject like us to death, but without

knowing it; even most of them are more attentive than we to

self-preservation, and do not make so bad a use of their passions.

Man, as a physical being, is like other bodies, governed by invariable

laws. As an intelligent being, he incessantly transgresses the laws

established by God, and changes those of his own instituting. He is

left to his private direction, tho a limited being, and subject, like

all finite intelligences, to ignorance and error; even his imperfect

knowledge he loses; and as a sensible creature, he is hurried away by

a thousand impetuous passions. Such a being might every instant forget

his Creator; God has therefore reminded him of his duty by the laws of

religion. Such a being is liable every moment to forget himself;

philosophy has provided against this by the laws of morality. Formed

to live in society, he might forget his fellow creatures; legislators

have therefore by political and civil laws confined him to his duty.

FRANÇOIS AROUET VOLTAIRE

Born in Paris in 1694, died in 1778; his original name

Arouet; educated at the College of Louis-le-Grand; exiled

because of his freedom of speech; twice imprisoned in the

Bastille; resided in England in 1726-29; went to Prussia at

the invitation of Frederick the Great in 1750, remaining

three years, the friendship ending in bitter enmity; wrote

in Prussia his "Le Siècle de Louis XIV"; settled at Geneva

in 1756, and two years later at Ferney, where he lived until

his death in 1778; visited Paris in 1778, being received

with great honors; his works very numerous, one edition

comprizing seventy-two volumes.

I

OF BACON'S GREATNESS[40]

Not long since the trite and frivolous question following was debated

in a very polite and learned company, viz., Who was the greatest man,

Cæsar, Alexander, Tamerlane, Cromwell, etc.?

[Footnote 40: From the "Letters on England." Voltaire's visit to

England followed immediately upon his release from imprisonment in the

Bastille. During the two years he spent there, he acquired an intimate

knowledge of English life, and came to know most of the eminent

Englishmen of the time.

An English version of Voltaire's writings, in thirty-five volumes, was

published in 1761-69, with notes by Smollett and others. The "Letters

from England" seem to have first appeared in English in 1734.]

Somebody answered that Sir Isaac Newton excelled them all. The

gentleman's assertion was very just; for if true greatness consists in

having received from heaven a mighty genius, and in having employed

it to enlighten our own mind and that of others, a man like Sir Isaac

Newton, whose equal is hardly found in a thousand years, is the truly

great man. And those politicians and conquerors (and all ages produce

some) were generally so many illustrious wicked men. That man claims

our respect who commands over the minds of the rest of the world by

the force of truth, not those who enslave their fellow creatures; he

who is acquainted with the universe, not they who deface it.

The most singular and the best of all his pieces is that which, at

this time, is the most useless and the least read. I mean his "Novum

Scientiarum Organum." This is the scaffold with which the new

philosophy was raised; and when the edifice was built, part of it, at

least the scaffold was no longer of service.

Lord Bacon was not yet acquainted with nature, but then he knew, and

pointed out the several paths that lead to it. He had despised in his

younger years the thing called philosophy in the universities, and did

all that lay in his power to prevent those societies of men instituted

to improve human reason from depraving it by their quiddities, their

horrors of the vacuum, their substantial forms, and all those

impertinent terms which not only ignorance had rendered venerable, but

which had been made sacred by their being ridiculously blended with

religion.

He is the father of experimental philosophy. It must, indeed, be

confest that very surprizing secrets had been found out before his

time--the sea compass, printing, engraving on copper plates, oil

painting, looking-glasses; the art of restoring, in some measure, old

men to their sight by spectacles; gunpowder, etc., had been

discovered. A new world had been fought for, found, and conquered.

Would not one suppose that these sublime discoveries had been made by

the greatest philosophers, and in ages much more enlightened than the

present? But it was far otherwise; all these great changes happened in

the most stupid and barbarous times. Chance only gave birth to most of

those inventions; and it is very probable that what is called chance

contributed very much to the discovery of America; at least it has

been always thought that Christopher Columbus undertook his voyage

merely on the relation of a captain of a ship which a storm had driven

as far westward as the Caribbean Island. Be this as it will, men had

sailed round the world, and could destroy cities by an artificial

thunder more dreadful than the real one; but, then, they were not

acquainted with the circulation of the blood, the weight of the air,

the laws of motions, light, the number of our planets, etc. And a man

who maintained a thesis on Aristotle's "Categories," on the universals

_a parte rei_, or such-like nonsense, was looked upon as a prodigy.

The most astonishing, the most useful inventions, are not those which

reflect the greatest honor on the human mind. It is to a mechanical

instinct, which is found in many men, and not to true philosophy that

most arts owe their origin.

The discovery of fire, the art of making bread, of melting and

preparing metals, of building houses, and the invention of the shuttle

are infinitely more beneficial to mankind than printing or the sea

compass; and yet these arts were invented by uncultivated, savage men.

What a prodigious use the Greeks and Romans made afterward of

mechanics! Nevertheless, they believed that there were crystal

heavens, that the stars were small lamps which sometimes fell into the

sea, and one of their greatest philosophers, after long researches,

found that the stars were so many flints which had been detached from

the earth.

In a word, no one before Lord Bacon was acquainted with experimental

philosophy, nor with the several physical experiments which have been

made since his time. Scarce one of them but is hinted at in his work,

and he himself had made several. He made a kind of pneumatic engine,

by which he guessed the elasticity of the air. He approached on all

sides, as it were, to the discovery of its weight, and had very near

attained it, but some time after Torricelli seized upon this truth. In

a little time experimental philosophy began to be cultivated on a

sudden in most parts of Europe. It was a hidden treasure which Lord

Bacon had some notion of, and which all the philosophers, encouraged

by his promises, endeavored to dig up.

But that which surprized me most was to read in his work, in express

terms, the new attraction, the invention of which is ascribed to Sir

Isaac Newton.

We must search, says Lord Bacon, whether there may not be a kind of

magnetic power which operates between the earth and heavy bodies,

between the moon and the ocean, between the planets, etc. In another

place he says, either heavy bodies must be carried toward the center

of the earth, or must be reciprocally attracted by it; and in the

latter case it is evident that the nearer bodies in their falling,

draw toward the earth, the stronger they will attract one another. We

must, says he, make an experiment to see whether the same clock will

go faster on the top of a mountain or at the bottom of a mine; whether

the strength of the weights decreases on the mountain and increases in

the mine. It is probable that the earth has a true attractive power.

This forerunner in philosophy was also an elegant writer, a historian,

and a wit.

His moral essays are greatly esteemed, but they were drawn up in the

view of instructing rather than of pleasing; and, as they are not a

satire upon mankind, like Rochefoucauld's "Maxims," nor written upon a

skeptical plan, like Montaigne's "Essays," they are not so much read

as those two ingenious authors.

II

ENGLAND'S REGARD FOR MEN OF LETTERS[41]

Neither the English nor any other people have foundations established

in favor of the polite arts like those in France. There are

universities in most countries, but it is in France only that we meet

with so beneficial an encouragement for astronomy and all parts of the

mathematics, for physic, for researches into antiquity, for painting,

sculpture, and architecture. Louis XIV has immortalized his name by

these several foundations, and this immortality did not cost him two

hundred thousand livres a year.

[Footnote 41: From the "Letters on England."]

I must confess that one of the things I very much wonder at is that as

the Parliament of Great Britain have promised a reward of £20,000 to

any person who may discover the longitude, they should never have once

thought to imitate Louis XIV in his munificence with regard to the

arts and sciences.

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