various tribes had made their own appeal for help. They had made it to the
United States government and also, a little later on, to the Indian tribes
of Kansas. Along about the first of November, a mixed delegation[534] of
Creeks, Seminoles, and Chickasaws had made its appearance[535] at Leroy
and, finding there the United States Creek agent, George A. Cutler, had
consulted with him "in reference to the intentions of the Federal
government regarding the protection due them under treaty stipulations."
Cutler advised the Indians to talk the matter over with Senator Lane and
accompanied them to Fort Scott, Lane's headquarters, for the purpose.
Arriving there, they learned that Lane had gone to Washington and had left
his command in charge of Colonel James Montgomery. Colonel Montgomery
counselled with the Indians as Cutler had done and helped them to reach
the decision that it would be best to proceed to Washington and lay their
complaints before the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. At the same time,
Montgomery notified[536] President Lincoln of their intention.
Still accompanied by Agent Cutler, the delegation resumed its journey,
going by way of Fort Leavenworth. There they conferred[537] with General
Hunter and left greatly strengthened in their resolution of proceeding to
Washington; for Hunter, too, thought that such a trip might compel the
government to realize the Indian's very real distress and its own
obligation to relieve it. We are fain to believe that General Hunter
personally believed in the military necessity of securing Indian Territory
even though he did do all he could to oppose the project of Senator Lane
in the early months of 1862 and even though he did disapprove of the
formation of the department of Kansas and his own assignment to it
instead of to that of Missouri, which would have been his preference. If
he at any time to date had wavered[538] in his opinion as to the needs of
the Indians and their legitimate claim upon the United States government
for protection, Carruth's letter of November twenty-sixth ought to have
settled the matter, unless, indeed, its rather savage tone had created
prejudice instead of working conviction as was intended.
... I have from the first believed it would be good policy to let
loose the northern Indians, under the employ of government; it
certainly would be better for the border States to have the Indian
country for a battle ground than to have it remain a shelter for rebel
hordes the coming winter....[539]
The visit of the Indians to Washington proved very opportune. By the
twenty-seventh of December, they were back at Fort Leavenworth and
considerably reassured. Superintendent Coffin had a council with them on
the twenty-eighth "at the Fort to good satisfaction." He says of his
interview,
I gave them Presents of Pipes, tobacco, and Sugar, and they went on
their way to Fort Scott rejoicing they seem to be in fine
Spirits,[540] but are at a Loss what to do for a living til Lanes Army
goes down there into the Indian Territory they want very much to get
Some of the Funds now due the Creeks....[541]
A more pathetic appeal, and one more immediately telling in its effects,
was that made to the brother Indians of Kansas. It came direct from
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la and when it reached the Delawares found in them a ready
response. It invited their cooperation[542] in the war and asked for men
and ammunition.[543] This is the Delaware reply:[544]
We are much rejoiced to receive your letter by James McDaniel[545] and
David Balon. Our Agent has sent it to our great Father, the
President, "at Washington," and to Gen. Hunter at "Fort Leavenworth."
It gives us great pleasure to hear that you are good and true friends
to the President, and to the Government of the United States. We hope
you will continue to be their friend. If bad men of the South ask you
to go to war against the President, stop your ears, don't listen to
them, they are your worst enemies, they are trying to destroy you and
the Country.
Grand Children it does our hearts good, we rejoice to hear of the
victories you have gained over your enemies of the Government under
your brave leader Oputh-la-yar-ho-la.
Grand Children we are ready and willing to help you. Our brave
Warriors are ready to spill their Blood for you, and are only waiting
to hear from our great Father at Washington, we have asked of him the
privaledge of going to your assistance, and hope that our request will
be granted, we don't wish to go to War against the wishes of our great
Father the President. We have heard that the President will soon have
a large Army in the Indian Country to protect you, that he has
ordered Gen. Lane to march to your relief. We are confident that our
great Father is able and will protect his red children--Grand Children
we pray to the "great spirit" to protect you and keep you out of the
hands of the bad men of the South, who are trying to destroy you and
the Government--We have no fears as to the result of this war--the
President has large Armies in the field that will conquer and punish
the Rebels--We are proud of our Muscogee Children.
The United States government had already determined upon an expedition to
the Indian country and, yielding to the importunities of Senator Lane, who
represented General Hunter as in full accord with himself in the matter,
had decided to use the Kansas Indians in the making up of the attacking
force. It was well that the Indians had manifested a readiness to fight
and that the Delawares, particularly, had overcome their previous
aversion. The first official record of the fact that the decision to use
the Kansas Indians had been reached appears to be a communication[546]
from Assistant Adjutant-general E. D. Townsend to Surgeon-general C. A.
Finley, under date of December 31, 1861, notifying him that medical
supplies would soon be needed for a force of about twenty-seven thousand
men, about four thousand of whom were to be Indians, which was to be
concentrated at an early day near Fort Leavenworth. On the third of
January, Lane wrote[547] to Hunter, informing him, as if at first hand
and semi-officially, of the new plan. It is not to be wondered at that
General Hunter took offence at the officiousness and presumption Lane
displayed. In point of fact, it was a clear case of executive
interference.
Now that it had, to all appearances, gained a long-desired object, the
Indian Office lost no time in lending the War Department its hearty
cooperation. Commissioner Dole was especially enthusiastic and, under
instructions from Secretary Smith, prepared to go out to Kansas himself to
help organize the Indians for army service. He also sent particulars[548]
of the new movement to Superintendent Branch and a circular letter[549] to
the agents of the central superintendency, detailing the advantages that
would accrue to individual Indians should they enlist. Dole wrote these
letters on the sixth of January and was then expecting to be in
Leavenworth City for the making of final arrangements eight or ten days
"hence." He did not manage to get away, however, quite so soon; but the
agents went to work immediately and, even before Dole arrived in Kansas,
Agent Farnsworth, who had always been rather too eager for Indian
enlistment, was able to report[550] the initial steps taken. By the
twenty-first of January,[551] Dole was well on his way west. He reached
Kansas in due season and there learned[552] for the first time, that
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la had been completely overwhelmed, that the refugees were
on the Verdigris, and that General Hunter was subsisting them. This was
doleful news, indeed, and made the project of a southern expedition seem
more and more expedient.
General Hunter had done the best he could to relieve the awful sufferings
of the refugees; but, on the sixth of February, he was obliged to
inform[553] Dole that he could do no more, that he had practically reached
the end of his resources, and that, after the fifteenth of February, the
whole responsibility of subsisting the destitute Indians would have to
fall upon the Interior Department. Dole was almost at his wits' end. He
had no funds that he could use legitimately for the need that had arisen.
It was a case of emergency, however, and something certainly had to be
done. Before the fifteenth of December arrived, additional reports[554]
came in from Superintendent Coffin, detailing distress. Under the
circumstances it was necessary to act quickly and without congressional
authorization. Dole telegraphed[555] to Secretary Smith,
Six thousand Indians driven out of Indian territory, naked and
starving. General Hunter will only feed them until 15th. Shall I take
care of them on the faith of an appropriation?
He received a reply[556] that should have been dictated, not so much in
the spirit of generosity, as of simple justice:
Go on and supply the destitute Indians, Congress will supply the
means. War Department will not organize them.
With this approbation in hand, Dole went to work, purchased sufficient
supplies on credit, and appointed[557] a special agent, Dr. William Kile
of Illinois, who had been commissioned[558] by President Lincoln to act on
Lane's staff and was then in Kansas as Lane's brigade quartermaster, to
attend to their distribution. Meanwhile, the attention of Congress had
been called to the matter and a particularly strong letter of Dole's,
describing the utter misery of the exiles, was read in the Senate February
14, in support of a joint resolution for their relief.[559] It was
intended originally to apply only to the loyal Creeks, Seminoles, and
Chickasaws but had its title changed later so as to make it include the
Choctaws. On the third of March, Congress passed[560] an act providing
that the annuities of the "hostiles," Creeks, Chickasaws, Seminoles,
Wichitas, and Cherokees, should be applied, as might be necessary, to the
relief of refugees from Indian Territory. It was expressly stipulated in
this enactment[561] that the money should not be used for other than
Indian Territory tribes.
Secretary Smith's telegram, as the reader has probably already observed,
had given to Dole a small piece of information that was not of slight
significance, signifying as it did a change of front by the War
Department. The War Department had rescinded its former action and had now
refused to organize the Indians for service. The objections to Lane's
enterprise must have been cumulative. Before the idea of it had embraced
the Indians and before it had become so closely identified with Lane's
name and personality, in fact, while it was more or less a scheme of
McClellan's, Hunter had interposed[562] objections, but purely on military
grounds. His force was scarcely equal to a movement southward.
Subsequently, Halleck interposed objections likewise and his reasons,[563]
whatever his motives may have been, were perfectly sound, indeed, rather
alarmingly so, since they broadly hinted at the miserably local interests
involved in the war in the west and the gross subordination of military
policies to political. Then came Lane with energy like the whirlwind, a
local politician through and through. He had absolutely no respect for
official proprieties and the military men, opposed to him, were men of
small calibre. He reached Kansas, joyfully intent upon putting into
immediate effect the power that Lincoln had conferred upon him, only to
find that there stood Hunter, fully prepared to contest authority with
him. The Adjutant-general had written[564] Hunter that Lane had not been
given a command independent of his own and that, if he so desired, he
might conduct the expedition southward in person. In the evening of the
twenty-sixth, Lane reached Leavenworth, and the very next day, Hunter
issued general orders[565] that he would command in person. Taken aback
and excusably indignant, Lane communicated[566] at once with John Covode
and requested him to impart the news to the President, to Stanton[567] and
the new Secretary of War, and to General McClellan.
Official sensitiveness was unquestionably at the bottom of the whole
trouble, yet Lincoln was very largely to blame for having yielded to
Lane's importunities. He frankly said that he had wished to keep the
affair out of McClellan's hands as far as possible.[568] He hoped to
profit by the services of both Hunter and Lane; but, if they could not
agree, then Lane must yield the precedence to Hunter. He must report for
orders or decline the service.[569] Military men, stationed in the west,
and civil officers of Kansas were all prejudiced against the "Lane
Expedition."[570] They expected it to be nothing but jayhawking and
marauding of the worst description. The Indians, however, were deeply
disappointed[571] when a halt came in the preparations.
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la personally addressed a communication[572] to Lincoln.
He wanted nobody but Lane to command the expedition. Pending a settlement,
Dole ordered[573] Coffin[574] to desist from further enrollment.
Secretary Stanton was declared opposed to the use of Indians in civilized
warfare.[575] Soon the orders for the expedition were countermanded with
the understanding, explicit or implied, that it should later proceed under
the personal direction of General Hunter.
The military situation in the middle west and the great desire on the part
of the Confederacy to gain Missouri and to complete her secession from the
old Union necessitated, at the opening of 1862, a thorough-going
reoerganization of forces concentrated in that part of the country.
Experience had shown that separate and independent commands had a tendency
to become too much localized, individual commanders too much inclined to
keep within the narrow margin, each of his instructions, for the good of
the service as a whole to be promoted. It was thought best, therefore, to
establish the Trans-Mississippi District of Department No. 2[576] and to
place in command of it, Major-general Earl Van Dorn. The district was to
comprise all of Louisiana north of the Red River, all of Indian Territory
proper, all of Arkansas, and all of Missouri west of the St. Francis. Wise
in the main, as the scheme for consolidation unquestionably was, it had
its weak points. The unrestricted inclusion of Indian Territory was
decidedly a violation of the spirit of the Pike treaties, if not of the
actual letter. Under the conditions of their alliance with the
Confederacy, the Indian nations were not obliged to render service outside
of the limits of their own country; but the Confederacy was obliged,
independent of any departmental reoerganization or regulations, to furnish
them protection.
Almost the first thing that Van Dorn did, after assuming command of the
new military district, was to write,[577] from his headquarters at
Jacksonport in eastern Arkansas, to Price, advising him that Pike would
shortly be ordered to take position in southwestern Missouri, say in
Lawrence County near Mt. Vernon, "with instructions to cooperate with you
in any emergency." Van Dorn was then laboring under the impression that
Pike's force consisted of a majority of white troops, three regiments, he
thought, out of a brigade of eight or nine thousand men, whereas there was
only one white regiment in the whole Indian department. Colonel Cooper
complained[578] that this latter condition was the fact and insisted that
it was contrary to the express promises made, by authority,[579] to the
Choctaws and Chickasaws when he had begun his recruiting work among them
the previous summer. Had Van Dorn only taken a little trouble to inquire
into the real state of affairs among the Indians, he would, instead of
ordering Pike to bring the Indian regiments out of Indian Territory, have
seen to it that they stayed at home and that danger of civil strife among
the Cherokees was prevented by the presence of three white regiments, as
originally promised. At this particular time as it happened, Pike was not
called upon to move his force; for the order so to move did not reach him
until after the Federals, "pursuing General Price, had invaded
Arkansas."[580]
[Illustration: FORT McCULLOGH [_From Office of Indian Affairs_]]
It proved, however, to be but a brief stay of execution; for, as soon as
Van Dorn learned that Price had fallen back from Springfield, he
resolved[581] to form a junction with McCulloch's division in the Boston
Mountains and himself take command of all the forces in the field. He
estimated[582] that, should Pike be able to join him, with Price's and
McCulloch's troops already combined, he would have an army of fully
twenty-six thousand men to oppose a Federal force of between thirty-five
and forty thousand. Pike was duly informed[583] of the new arrangement and
ordered[584] to "hasten up with all possible dispatch and in person direct
the march of" his "command, including Stand Watie's, McIntosh's, and
Drew's regiments." His men were to "march light, ready for immediate
action."[585] The outcome of all these preparations was the Battle of Pea
Ridge[586] and that battle was the consummation, the culminating point, in
fact, of the Indian alliance with the Southern Confederacy. It was the
beginning of the end. It happened just at the time when the Richmond
legislators were organizing[587] the great Arkansas and Red River
superintendency,[588] which was intended to embrace all the tribes with
whom Albert Pike had made his treaties. Albert Pike retired from Pea Ridge
to his defences at Fort McCulloch, angry and indignant that the Indians
had been taken out of their own country to fight the white man's battles.
His displeasure was serious; for the Indian confidence in the Confederacy
depended almost wholly upon the promises and the assurances of the
Arkansas poet.
APPENDIX A--FORT SMITH PAPERS
_Copy_
TAHLEQUAH, January 9th 1857.
SIR:--Some time since I received a letter from you calling for information
in reference to the white intruders who were settling upon the Cherokee
Neutral Land. I have been creditably (credibly) informed that there are
several white families living upon the Neutral Land, some of them are
making improvements, others are in the employment of Cherokee Citizens,
living on the Neutral Land, from the best information that I can get, most
of the intruders are good citizens of the U-States. I have notified them
to leave, with the understanding that if they do not leave by spring, they
will be removed by the Military. My reason for not removing them at an
earlier date is, the weather is so cold and disagreeable that it would be
improper to turn women and children out of doors, therefore I will not
remove them til the winter breaks it maybe that the Military will have to
be employed in their removal: yet I shall make the effort to remove them
peacefully and without the military if possible. Very Respectfully, Your
ob't, Svt.
(Signed). GEO. BUTLER, Cherokee Agent.
Doct. C. W. Dean, Sup't. of Ind. Affs.
_Copy_
FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS, February 19th, 1859.
SIR: I deem it my duty as an independant citizen to apprize you, as the
head of the Indian Bureau, of a recent transaction of the Superintendent
of Indian Affairs at this place, and demand of you the proper action the
facts may impose.
A contract has been given to an intimate friend and relation of the
Superintendent, to feed the Witchita and other Indians inhabiting the
country between the 98th and 100th degrees, West Longitude, at a sum pr
ration, of one third, perhaps one half, more than other persons would have
fed these Indians for; which persons were denied the privilege of
contending for the contract, as no puplic notice inviting proposals was
made, and the contract was given privately.
I assert this postively, as to the notice for proposals, and enclose you a
letter of Capt. J. H. Strain, confirmatory of the fact, that he was
willing to feed the Witchitas, for a sum far less than the records of your
Office must show the government has been pledged to pay another. The
character of this gentleman, who has been for years Sutler at Fort
Arbuckle, if unknown to you, can be avouched by the U. S. Senators from
this State.
The Seminoles are now fed under a contract given in the usual regular mode
of publishing invitations for proposals and awarding the contract to the
lowest bidder, at the sum of about seven cents pr ration. The Witchitas
are encamped only forty or fifty miles from the Seminoles and near the
Texas and Chickasaw lines, where corn and beef are much cheaper and more
abundant. In proof of this I refer you to late contracts for these
articles given at Fort Washita and Fort Arbuckle--the first being near the
Witchitas, and the other near the Seminoles. Captain Strain says he would
have fed the Witchitas for ten cents per ration, and if proposals had been
invited, the Contract would have been taken for a less sum.
There are some seven hundred Indians now fed, and thirteen cents pr ration
is the sum stated as allowed--I believe it is more, but the Indian Office
contains the proof of the exact sum. If the Contract had been given at
nine cents pr ration, it would have been a saving of twenty eight dollars
pr day, over the price said to be now paid, which would amount to eight
hundred and forty dollars pr month, and ten thousand and eighty dollars a
year. This is surprisingly large, for a small Indian contract, and at a
time too when the duty of government Officers to retrench expenses is so
imperiously demanded.
I am opposed to such favoriteism under any circumstances, and particularly
so, when the recipient can lay no claim to Democratic support.
I am credibly informed that the number of the Indians fed under this
contract, is rapidly increasing, and that efforts are all the time made to
induce the Texas Reserve Indians to claim relationship with the Wichitas,
and come into their camp and draw rations. One of the employees under this
Contract makes this statement, and says quite a number have already been
induced so to come. If the number is swelled to two thousand, as
conjectured here, the large price now paid will roll up the sum thus
disbursed to the Superintendents favorite so much that other notice will
be taken of it, unless you find it in your power to interfere.
I am tired of such conduct and such unfairness towards the government,
and now make the charge distinctly and demand of you that it be stopped.
Of course I have no desire to withhold my name, and can refer you to
Senators Sebastian and Johnson for an endorsement of my character.
Please acknowledge receipt of this. I am most respectfully, Your Obt.
Servant,
A. G. MAYERS.
Hon. J. W. Denver, Comr. Ind. Affairs,
Washington City, D. C.
P.S. I may add that I am not, nor have I ever been interested in these
sort of Contracts, and have no desire to be interested in this one.
A.G.M.
FORT SMITH 16th Feby. /59.
DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of yours of the 15th inst. You were correct in
understanding me to say, that I was willing to feed the Witchita Indians,
near Fort Arbuckle, at ten cents per ration.
Was the contract to be let to the lowest bidder, it would go below what I
said I was willing to take it at. Very Respectfully, Your Obt. Servant
J. H. STRAIN.
Gen. A. G. Mayers, Ft. Smith, Ark.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR. OFFICE INDIAN AFFAIRS,
May 12th 1859.
SIR, For your information and such action as you may deem necessary, I
transmit a copy of a letter, and its enclosures, addressed to this Office
by A. G. Mayers on the 21st ultimo, and of my reply of the 11th instant.
Very respectfully, Your Obt. Servant,
CHARLES E. MIX, Commissioner, ad interim.
E. Rector Esq, Superintendent &c,
Fort Smith, Arkansas.
_Copy_
FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS April 21st 1859
CHAS. E. MIX, Esq, Acting Comr. of Indian Affairs
Washington City D. C.
SIR:--Allow me to ask of you the favor to inform, officially whether the
funds provided by the Government for the subsistence of the Wichita
Indians has been turned over to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs at
this place or any other disbursing offices of the department, to carry out
the Contract made by the Supt. with C. B. Johnson for subsisting those
Indians after the facts reported by me in regard to the matter, in a
letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of date the 19th Feby 59--.
It has been stated to me that such monies have been so turned over to the
Superintendent, and statement has been contracted, I therefore wish to
know of you the truth of the matter, and am assured such information will
be readily afforded me.