council, it is well nigh impossible to obtain. Some intimidation[478]
seems to have been used, and there was a report of a collision[479]
between the Ross and Ridge factions some days previous to the meeting.
Drew's regiment, which, when organized, had been placed as a guard[480] on
the northern border, escorted[481] Commissioner Pike to Park Hill and
later took up its station on the treaty ground. Some of Stand Watie's
Confederate forces were also in the neighborhood.[482] In 1865, at the
Fort Smith Council, held for the readjustment of political relations with
the United States government, the Indians of the Neosho Agency gave[483] a
rather picturesque description of the way they had been prevailed upon to
sign the treaty with the Confederate States. The real object of the
Tahlequah meeting was evidently not revealed to them until they had
actually reached the treaty ground. Agent Dorn had told them that they had
to go to the meeting. They went and were there taken in hand by Pike who
said,
If you don't do what we lay before you, we can't say you shall live
happy.
The Indians
feeling badly, just looked on, and the white man went to work, got up
a paper and said I want you to sign that. The Indian did not want to,
but he compelled him. You know yourself that, under such
circumstances, he would do anything to save his life....
Now that the history of the diplomatic relations between the Indian tribes
and the Confederacy has been brought thus far, nothing seems more fitting
than to return to the consideration of the Federal government and its
representatives, its purposes, and its plans, beginning the account with
the Indian Office and Commissioner Dole. Dole's early attempt to prevail
upon the War Department to resume its occupation of Indian Territory was
followed up by the convincing letter of the thirtieth of May in which he
likened the Indians to the Union element in some of the border states and
ended by throwing the full responsibility for any disloyalty that might
appear among them upon the Federal authorities; inasmuch as they had
neglected and were still neglecting to give the support and protection
that any ordinary guardian is bound in honor to give to his wards. Dole
said in writing to Secretary Smith,
... Experience has shown that the presence of even a small force of
federal troops located in the disaffected States has had the effect to
preserve the peace, encourage the friends of the Union, and induce the
people to return to their allegiance.
That this same result would be produced in the Indian country I cannot
doubt, as they can have no inducement to unite with the enemies of the
United States unless we fail as a nation to give them that protection
guaranteed by our treaty stipulations, and which is necessary to
prevent designing and evil-disposed persons from having free
intercourse with them, to work out their evil purposes....[484]
Nothing came of Dole's application and thus was exemplified, as often
before and often since, a very serious defect in the American
administrative system by which the duty of doing a certain thing rests
upon one department and the means for doing it with quite another. It is
surely no exaggeration to say that hundreds and hundreds of times the
Indians have been the innocent victims of friction between the War and
Interior Departments.
But if the authorities at Washington were indifferent to the Indian's
welfare, Senator Lane was neither indifferent to nor ignorant of the
strategical importance of Indian Territory. With him the defence of Kansas
and the means of procuring that defence were everything. Indian Territory
and the Indian tribes came within the scope of the means. And so it
happened that, while he was organizing his Kansas brigade, he
commissioned[485] a man, E. H. Carruth, who had formerly posed as an
educator[486] among the Seminoles, to communicate with the various tribes
for the purpose of determining their real feelings towards the United
States government and of obtaining, if possible, an interview between Lane
and some of their accredited representatives. The interview was to take
place "at Fort Lincoln on the Osage or some point convenient
thereto."[487]
Now a considerable portion of the Creek tribe was in just the right mood
and in just the right situation to receive such overtures in the right
spirit. That portion consisted of those who, after the treaty of July
tenth had been negotiated in the manner already described, had rallied
around Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la; and who, in a Creek convention that had been
called for August fifth had declared that the chiefs, who had signed a
treaty outside the National Council, had violated a fundamental law of the
tribe and had thereby forfeited their administrative rank. The criticism
applied to Motey Kennard and to Echo Harjo, the principal and the second
chief respectively. Kennard, as we have seen, was the leader of the Lower
Creeks and Harjo of the Upper. A further division in Creek ranks was now
inevitable and it came forthwith, the Non-treaty Party, made up mostly of
Upper Creeks, proceeding to recognize[488] Ok-ta-ha-hassee Harjo (better
known as "Sands") as the acting principal chief of the tribe. It also
betook itself westward so as to be as much as possible out of the reach of
the secessionists. When once in a position of at least temporary security,
it despatched Mik-ko Hut-kee (White Chief), Bob Deer, Jo Ellis, and
perhaps others to Washington to confer with the "Great Father."[489]
The Creek delegates, Mik-ko Hut-kee and his companions, went, on their way
to Washington, northward through Kansas, saw Superintendent Coffin[490]
and, later, Lane's agent, E. H. Carruth. This was about the second week of
September and Carruth was at Barnesville, Lane's headquarters. Carruth
received the Creeks kindly, read sympathetically the letter[491] that
they brought from their distressed chiefs, Sands and Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la,
assured the equally distressed delegates of the continued fatherly
interest of the United States government, and sent them on their way,
greatly comforted. It was while these Creek delegates were lingering at
Barnesville that Carruth made a special effort to induce the southern
Indians generally to send representatives for an interview with Lane. He
wrote personally to Ross,[492] to the two Creek chiefs,[493] and to the
Wichita chief, Tusaquach,[494] and, in addition, wrote to the Seminole
chiefs and headmen[495] and to the "loyal" Choctaws and Chickasaws.[496]
Presumably, Superintendent Coffin did not altogether approve of Senator
Lane's taking it upon himself to confer with the Indians who, after all,
were officially Coffin's charges; for, in October, we find him, likewise,
planning for an intertribal conference to be held at Humboldt.[497] It is
rather interesting to look back upon all this and to realize, as perforce
we must, that every plan for conferring with the southern tribes in the
interests of the United States government, at this critical time,
contemplated a meeting at some place outside of Indian Territory. Here
were agents of the Indian's "Great Father" offering protection to the red
men and yet giving incontestable proof in the very details of the offer
that they did not themselves dare to venture[498] beyond the Kansas
boundary. As a matter of fact, all such plans for a general conference
came to nothing, although, as late as November, Lane had still the idea of
one in mind. He was, at the time, hoping to meet the Indians at Leroy[499]
in Coffey County, Kansas, on the twenty-fourth. Lane also continued to
advocate the use of the friendly Indians as soldiers. A little earlier,
Agent Johnson had endorsed[500] Lane's plan in a letter to Commissioner
Dole; but the coming of General Hunter upon the scene considerably
affected the sphere of influence.
Dissatisfaction with Fremont on account of his extravagance, his haphazard
way of issuing commissions, his tardiness, and, above all, his general
military incompetence had crystallized in September; and, by orders[501]
of General Scott on the twenty-fourth of October, Hunter was directed to
relieve him. Hunter reached his post in early November and almost
immediately thereafter, either upon his own initiative or after
consultation with someone like Coffin (it could hardly have been with
Lane; for Lane had gone[502] to Washington, or with Branch; for Branch was
strongly opposed to the project intended), he telegraphed[503] to the War
Department "for permission to muster a Brigade of Kansas Indians into the
service of the United States, to assist the friendly Creek Indians in
maintaining their loyalty." Evidently, the request was not granted,[504]
but duties akin to it were, by arrangement of President Lincoln, conferred
upon Hunter which involved his assuming the responsibility of holding, if
such a plan were feasible, an intertribal council so as to renew the
confidence of the southern Indians in the United States government. A
letter[505] from Dole, outlining the plan, reveals an astonishing
ignorance of just how far those selfsame Indians had gone in their
defection, because of the loss of the confidence.
In the giving of these new duties to General Hunter, there was not the
slightest intention of ignoring Senator Lane. In fact, Dole expressly
mentioned that Lane had called for just such an Indian conference[506] and
suggested that, if Hunter's military duties prevented his meeting the
Indians in person, Lane might take his place, "provided he can be spared
from his post." The whole affair was incident to the reorganization that
had recently, under general orders[507] of the ninth of November, taken
place in the Western Department, from which had resulted a Department of
Kansas, separate and distinct from the Department of Missouri. The
Department of Kansas included "the State of Kansas, the Indian Territory
west of Arkansas, and the Territories of Nebraska, Colorado, and Dakota"
and was to be under the command of Major-general David Hunter[508] with
headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. The idea governing this division of the
old western department was, ostensibly, as Nicolay and Hay express[509]
it, that Kansas might be protected, Indian Territory repossessed, and
Texas reached. As we shall presently see, a similar reorganization took
place, about the same time, in the Confederate western service and for
very much the same reason, the condition of the Indian country being a
very large proportion of that reason. It is barely possible that, as far
as the United States was concerned, Senator Lane's recommendation[510] of
the ninth of October was almost wholly accountable for the change.
It was, undoubtedly, high time that something vigorous was being done to
stay Confederate progress in Indian Territory. Indeed, events were
happening there at this very moment that made all plans for an
inter-tribal conference exceedingly out of date. The Confederate
government had now a large Indian force[511] in the field and expectations
of an increase, provided the necessary arms[512] were obtainable. On the
twenty-second[513] of November, by special orders[514] from Richmond,
Indian Territory had been erected into a separate military department and
Albert Pike, now a brigadier-general, assigned to the command of it. For
the present, however, things seem to have remained much as they were with
McCulloch nominally in command and Cooper in actual charge. Moreover, long
before Pike reappeared upon the scene, matters had come to an issue
between the secessionist and unionist Creeks.
Determined not to allow themselves to be over-persuaded or intimidated by
the secessionist element in their nation, the unionist Creeks, under
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, had withdrawn from active intercourse with the rival
faction and, resisting all attempts of Cooper and others to inveigle them
into an interview that might result in compromise, they had encamped at or
near the junction of the Deep and North Forks of the Canadian River.
Cooper resolved to attack them there and, for the purpose, gathered[515]
together an effective fighting force of about fourteen hundred men, all
Indians except for a detachment of Texas cavalry. On the fifth of
November, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la broke camp and took up the line of march for
Kansas, hoping that, in Kansas, he and his followers would receive either
succor or refuge. It has been estimated that Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la's force,
at this time, was less than two thousand men and that it comprised,
besides Creeks and Seminoles, some two or three hundred negroes. His
traveling cortege was, however, very much larger; for it included women
and children, the sick and the aged. Approximately half of the Creeks were
on the move for pastures new. For many of them it was a second exodus.
Colonel D. H. Cooper reached the deserted camp of Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la on
the fifteenth of November and, finding his enemy gone and locating his
trail, moved himself in a slightly northeasterly direction towards the Red
Fork of the Arkansas. He came up with the unionist Creeks at Round
Mountain on the night of the nineteenth and an indecisive engagement[516]
followed, both sides claiming the victory. Under cover of darkness,
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la managed to slip away and crossed into the Cherokee
country where there were plenty of disaffected full-bloods to give him
sympathy. It is more than likely that they had invited him there and had
prepared for his coming. Cooper did not attempt to pursue the Creek
refugees, having been called back to the Arkansas line, there to wait in
readiness to reenforce McCulloch should the Federals make a forward march
southward from Springfield, as then seemed probable. But that danger soon
passed, passed even before Cooper had had time to take the post indicated
or to leave his own camp at Concharta, after a brief recuperation. He was
now free to follow up the meagre advantage of the nineteenth.
The next opportunity to crush Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la came in the Battle of
Bird Creek [Chusto-Talasah, Little High Shoals, or the Caving Banks],[517]
fought December 9, 1861. On the twenty-ninth of the preceding month, a
part of Cooper's force had set out for Tulsey Town and an advance guard
had been sent up the Verdigris in the direction of a place, called
"Coody's Settlement," where Colonel John Drew with a detachment of his
regiment of Cherokee full-bloods was posted. The orders were that Drew
should effect a junction with Cooper's main force and, on December eighth
they were all encamped on Bird Creek in the southwestern corner of the
Cherokee Nation. At this juncture, word came that Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la
wished to treat for peace and Major Pegg, a Cherokee, with three
companions was sent forward to confer with him. They found the Creek
chief, surrounded by his warriors and ready for battle. It was evening and
Colonel Cooper had scarcely heard the news of the Creek determination to
fight when a message came that four companies of Drew's regiment,
horrified at the thought of fighting with their neighbors, had dispersed
and gone over to Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la. The incident did not promise well for
success on the morrow and the Battle of Bird Creek was another indecisive
engagement, although the Creeks, eager and resplendent with their yellow
corn-shuck badges, seem to have had all the advantage of position. Again
they made their escape and again Colonel Cooper was prevented from
following them, this time because he was exceedingly fearful lest the
Cherokee desertion might have a lasting and disastrous effect upon the
remaining Indian forces, particularly upon the small group that was all
that was left of the original First Cherokee Mounted Rifles. Cooper's
personal opinion was, that the defection was widespread among the
Cherokees and that it would be sheer folly to start out after
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la until more white troops had been added to the pursuing
force, by way both of reenforcement and of encouragement.
Instead, therefore, of continuing northward, Colonel Cooper drew off in
the direction of Fort Gibson and, from that point, sent for aid to Colonel
James McIntosh at Van Buren. He then occupied himself with his own troops
and prevailed upon John Ross to rally[518] the Cherokees. It was now the
nineteenth of December and the aged chief did his best to keep his people
true to the faith that the nation had pledged in the treaty of the seventh
of October. He recalled to their minds the fact that it was, by all odds,
the best treaty that the Cherokees had ever secured, the one that gave
them the fullest recognition of their rights as a semi-independent people,
and he might have added with sad, sad truth that it was the best that they
could ever hope to get. He made no such pessimistic reflection, however,
but concluded,
It is, therefore, our duty and interest to respect it, and we must, as
the interest of our common country demands it. According to the
stipulations of the treaty we must meet enemies of our allies whenever
the south requires it, as they are our enemies as well as the enemies
of the south; and I feel sure that no such occurrence as the one we
deplore would have taken place if all things were understood as I have
endeavored to explain them. Indeed the true meaning of our treaty is,
that we must know no line in the presence of our invader, be he who he
may....[519]
Colonel Cooper then addressed[520] the Indians and, after him, Major
Pegg;[521] but they were not convinced and many of them went home,
positively refusing to march farther with the army.
Meanwhile Cooper's call for reenforcements had reached McIntosh[522] and,
as the need seemed so urgent, McIntosh resolved to supply it and notified
Cooper to that effect. Subsequently, he decided[523] to take the field in
person and to head a column, separate from Cooper's. What induced him to
do this, nobody can well say. Cooper always felt that the incompleteness
of the victory over Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, which was soon to come, was mainly
attributable to the divided effort of the attacking force. In the two
former engagements, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la's force, such as it was, untrained
and miscellaneous, had greatly outnumbered the Confederate; but now the
two were more equally matched in point of numbers and the chances of
success were all on the southern side because of superior training and
equipment, so Cooper was probably correct in his conjecture. McIntosh's
excuse[524] for advancing precipitately and alone was, notwithstanding,
very reasonable. The scarcity of forage made it expedient to march
compactly; and the two generals had agreed, so McIntosh declared, when in
conference at Fort Gibson, "that either force should attack the enemy on
sight."
The privilege of attacking Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la fell, under this
arrangement, supposing it was made, to McIntosh, who had been able to push
on in advance of Cooper. The Battle of Chustenahlah was fought in the
early afternoon of December 26, 1861, and ended in what seemed the
complete defeat of the Creeks. McIntosh reported that, although their
position was strong, they were forced to retreat
To the rocky gorges amid the deep recesses of the mountains, where
they were pursued by our victorious troops and routed in every
instance with great loss. They endeavored to make a stand at their
encampment, but their efforts were ineffectual, and we were soon in
the midst of it. The battle lasted until 4 o'clock, when the firing
gradually ceased....[525]
And then the Creeks fled, leaving practically everything in the shape of
property behind them. Cooper came up and detachments of his troops pursued
them almost to the Kansas line. The weather was bitterly cold, provisions
scarce, the country rough and bleak. The pursuit took the form of a seven
day scout; but the Creeks, no matter how great their dispersion, were
headed straight for Walnut Creek, Kansas.
Their coming was anticipated. Hearing of their approach, Superintendent
Coffin had directed[526] all the agents[527] under his charge to report to
him for duty at a place on the Verdigris River called Fort Roe[528] "about
thirty-five or forty miles from Leroy and Burlington." It was Coffin's
intention to meet the refugees upon their first arrival; but, as
Commissioner Dole was expected soon to be at Fort Leavenworth, he thought
it best to wait[529] and consult with him. It does not seem to have been
recorded on just what date the first of the Indian refugees crossed the
Kansas line, but they were very soon crossing in great numbers and, by the
time Coffin finally reached them, their condition was truly pitiable. They
took up their station on the bare prairies between the Verdigris and the
Arkansas Rivers and stretched themselves in almost hopeless confusion
over about two hundred miles of country. Fortunately the land upon which
they camped was Indian land, New York Indian land, and the few white men
thereon were legally intruders and could not consistently object to the
presence of the refugees. The numbers of the refugees were variously
estimated. Starting with about forty-five hundred,[530] they increased
daily and at an astonishing rate; for the exodus of the Creeks was but the
signal for the flight of other tribesmen from Indian Territory, of all
those, in fact, who were either tired of their alliance with the
Confederacy or had never been in sympathy with it and were only too eager
to take the first chance to escape from it.
The suffering of the refugees, due to destitution and exposure, was
something horrible to think upon. Superintendent Coffin had little to give
them. He appealed to General Hunter for an allowance from the army
supplies and Hunter sent down his chief commissary of subsistence, Captain
J. W. Turner, to do what he could to relieve the distress. Hunter also
sent Brigade-surgeon A. B. Campbell; for it was not simply food and
clothing, that were needed and roof shelter, but medical attendance. As
soon as possible, cheap blankets[531] were furnished and some condemned
army tents. The journey northward had been undertaken in the bitterest of
cold weather. With a raw northwest wind beating in their faces,
And over the snow-covered roads, they travelled all night and the next
day, without halting to rest. Many of them were on foot, without
shoes, and very thinly clad.... In this condition they had
accomplished a journey of about three hundred miles; but quite a
number froze to death on the route, and their bodies with a shroud of
snow, were left where they fell to feed the hungry wolves....
Families who in their country had been wealthy, and who could count
their cattle by the thousands and horses by hundreds, and owned large
numbers of slaves, and who at home had lived at ease and comfort, were
without the necessaries of life.[532]
When, sometime in early December, Commissioner Dole heard of the
resistance that the unionist Creeks were making to Colonel Cooper, he
immediately applied once more, through the Secretary of the Interior,
to the War Department for troops sufficient to assert Federal supremacy
south of the Kansas line, his immediate object being, the strengthening of
the force then opposed to Cooper. At the moment, Lane's expedition was
under consideration, Lane having managed to convince the Washington
authorities, both congressional and administrative, that an expedition
southward was absolutely necessary[533] for the protection of the
frontier.
[Illustration: Retreat of the Loyal Indians from the Indian Country under
A-poth-yo-ho-lo in the winter of 1861 [_From Office of Indian Affairs_]]