All this time there was another influence within the Indian

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The Slaveholding Indians

(1) As Slaveholder and Secessionist

(2) As Participants in the Civil War

(3) Under Reconstruction

Vol. I

[Illustration: INDIAN TERRITORY, 1861 [_From General Land Office_]]

The American Indian as

Slaveholder and Secessionist

AN OMITTED CHAPTER IN

THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE

SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY

BY ANNIE HELOISE ABEL, PH.D.

THE ARTHUR H. CLARK COMPANY

CLEVELAND: 1915

COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY

ANNIE HELOISE ABEL

TO MY FATHER AND MOTHER

CONTENTS

PREFACE 13

I GENERAL SITUATION IN THE INDIAN COUNTRY, 1830-1860 17

II INDIAN TERRITORY IN ITS RELATIONS WITH TEXAS AND ARKANSAS 63

III THE CONFEDERACY IN NEGOTIATION WITH THE INDIAN TRIBES 127

IV THE INDIAN NATIONS IN ALLIANCE WITH THE CONFEDERACY 207

APPENDIX A--FORT SMITH PAPERS 285

APPENDIX B--THE LEEPER OR WICHITA AGENCY PAPERS 329

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 359

INDEX 369

ILLUSTRATIONS

INDIAN TERRITORY, 1861 _Frontispiece_

MAP SHOWING FREE NEGRO SETTLEMENTS IN THE CREEK COUNTRY 25

PORTRAIT OF COLONEL DOWNING, CHEROKEE 65

PORTRAIT OF JOHN ROSS, PRINCIPAL CHIEF OF THE CHEROKEES 112

PORTRAIT OF COLONEL ADAIR, CHEROKEE 221

MAP SHOWING THE RETREAT OF THE LOYAL INDIANS 263

FORT MCCULLOCH 281

PREFACE

This volume is the first of a series of three dealing with the

slaveholding Indians as secessionists, as participants in the Civil War,

and as victims under reconstruction. The series deals with a phase of

American Civil War history which has heretofore been almost entirely

neglected or, where dealt with, either misunderstood or misinterpreted.

Perhaps the third and last volume will to many people be the most

interesting because it will show, in great detail, the enormous price that

the unfortunate Indian had to pay for having allowed himself to become a

secessionist and a soldier. Yet the suggestiveness of this first volume is

considerably larger than would appear at first glance. It has been

purposely given a sub-title, in order that the peculiar position of the

Indian, in 1861, may be brought out in strong relief. He was enough inside

the American Union to have something to say about secession and enough

outside of it to be approached diplomatically. It is well to note, indeed,

that Albert Pike negotiated the several Indian treaties that bound the

Indian nations in an alliance with the seceded states, under the authority

of the Confederate State Department, which was a decided advance upon

United States practice--an innovation, in fact, that marked the tremendous

importance that the Confederate government attached to the Indian

friendship. It was something that stood out in marked contrast to the

indifference manifested at the moment by the authorities at Washington;

for, while they were neglecting the Indian even to an extent that

amounted to actual dishonor, the Confederacy was offering him political

integrity and political equality and was establishing over his country,

not simply an empty wardship, but a bona fide protectorate.

Granting then that the negotiations of 1861 with the Indian nations

constitute a phase of southern diplomatic history, it may be well to

consider to what Indian participation in the Civil War amounted. It was a

circumstance that was interesting rather than significant; and the

majority will have to admit that it was a circumstance that could not

possibly have materially affected the ultimate situation. It was the

Indian country, rather than the Indian owner, that the Confederacy wanted

to be sure of possessing; for Indian Territory occupied a position of

strategic importance, from both the economic and the military point of

view. The possession of it was absolutely necessary for the political and

the institutional consolidation of the South. Texas might well think of

going her own way and of forming an independent republic once again, when

between her and Arkansas lay the immense reservations of the great tribes.

They were slaveholding tribes, too, yet were supposed by the United States

government to have no interest whatsoever in a sectional conflict that

involved the very existence of the "peculiar institution." Thus the

federal government left them to themselves at the critical moment and left

them, moreover, at the mercy of the South, and then was indignant that

they betrayed a sectional affiliation.

The author deems it of no slight advantage, in undertaking a work of this

sort, that she is of British birth and antecedents and that her

educational training, so largely American as it is, has been gained

without respect to a particular locality. She belongs to no section of

the Union, has lived, for longer or shorter periods in all sections, and

has developed no local bias. It is her sincere wish that no charge of

prejudice can, in ever so small a degree, be substantiated by the

evidence, presented here or elsewhere.

ANNIE HELOISE ABEL.

Baltimore, September, 1914

I. THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE INDIAN COUNTRY, 1830-1860

Veterans of the Confederate service who saw action along the

Missouri-Arkansas frontier have frequently complained, in recent years,

that military operations in and around Virginia during the War between the

States receive historically so much attention that, as a consequence, the

steady, stubborn fighting west of the Mississippi River is either totally

ignored or, at best, cast into dim obscurity. There is much of truth in

the criticism but it applies in fullest measure only when the Indians are

taken into account; for no accredited history of the American Civil War

that has yet appeared has adequately recognized certain rather interesting

facts connected with that period of frontier development; viz., that

Indians fought on both sides in the great sectional struggle, that they

were moved to fight, not by instincts of savagery, but by identically the

same motives and impulses as the white men, and that, in the final

outcome, they suffered even more terribly than did the whites. Moreover,

the Indians fought as solicited allies, some as nations, diplomatically

approached. Treaties were made with them as with foreign powers and not in

the farcical, fraudulent way that had been customary in times past. They

promised alliance and were given in return political position--a fair

exchange. The southern white man, embarrassed, conceded much, far more

than he really believed in, more than he ever could or would have

conceded, had he not himself been so fearfully hard pressed. His own

predicament, the exigencies of the moment, made him give to the Indian a

justice, the like of which neither one of them had dared even to dream. It

was quite otherwise with the northern white man, however; for he,

self-confident and self-reliant, negotiated with the Indian in the

traditional way, took base advantage of the straits in which he found him,

asked him to help him fight his battles, and, in the selfsame moment,

plotted to dispossess him of his lands, the very lands that had, less than

five and twenty years before, been pledged as an Indian possession "as

long as the grass should grow and the waters run."

From what has just been said, it can be easily inferred that two distinct

groups of Indians will have to be dealt with, a northern and a southern;

but, for the present, it will be best to take them all together.

Collectively, they occupied a vast extent of country in the so-called

great American desert. Their situation was peculiar. Their participation

in the war, in some capacity, was absolutely inevitable; but, preparatory

to any right understanding of the reasons, geographical, institutional,

political, financial, and military, that made it so, a rapid survey of

conditions ante-dating the war must be considered.

It will be remembered that for some time prior to 1860 the policy[1] of

the United States government had been to relieve the eastern states of

their Indian inhabitants and that this it had done, since the first years

of Andrew Jackson's presidency, by a more or less compulsory removal to

the country lying immediately west of Arkansas and Missouri. As a result,

the situation there created was as follows: In the territory comprehended

in the present state of Kansas, alongside of indigenous tribes, like the

Kansa and the Osage,[2] had been placed various tribes or portions of

tribes from the old Northwest[3]--the Shawnees and Munsees from Ohio,[4]

the Delawares, Kickapoos, Potawatomies, and Miamies from Indiana, the

Ottawas and Chippewas from Michigan, the Wyandots from Ohio and Michigan,

the Weas, Peorias, Kaskaskias, and Piankashaws from Illinois, and a few

New York Indians from Wisconsin. To the southward of all of those northern

tribal immigrants and chiefly beyond the later Kansas boundary, or in the

present state of Oklahoma, had been similarly placed the great[5] tribes

from the South[6]--the Creeks from Georgia and Alabama, the Cherokees

from Tennessee and Georgia, the Seminoles from Florida, and the Choctaws

and Chickasaws from Alabama and Mississippi.[7] The population of the

whole country thus colonized and, in a sense, reduced to the reservation

system, amounted approximately to seventy-four thousand souls, less than

seven thousand of whom were north of the Missouri-Compromise line. The

others were all south of it and, therefore, within a possible slave belt.

This circumstance is not without significance; for it is the colonized, or

reservation, Indians[8] exclusively that are to figure in these pages and,

since this story is a chapter in the struggle between the North and the

South, the proportion of southerners to northerners among the Indian

immigrants must, in the very nature of things, have weight. The relative

location of northern and southern tribes seems to have been determined

with a very careful regard to the restrictions of the Missouri Compromise

and the interdicted line of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes was

pretty nearly the boundary between them.[9] That it was so by accident may

or may not be subject for conjecture. Fortunately for the disinterested

motives of politicians but most unfortunately for the defenceless Indians,

the Cherokee land obtruded itself just a little above the thirty-seventh

parallel and formed a "Cherokee Strip" eagerly coveted by Kansans in later

days. One objection, be it remembered, that had been offered to the

original plan of removal was that, unless the slaveholding southern

Indians were moved directly westward along parallel lines of latitude,

northern rights under the Missouri Compromise would be encroached upon.

Yet slavery was not conscientiously excluded from Kansas in the days

antecedent to its organization as a territory. Within the Indian country,

and it was all Indian country then, slavery was allowed, at least on

sufferance, both north and south of the interdicted line. It was even

encouraged by many white men who made their homes or their living there,

by interlopers, licensed traders, and missionaries;[10] but it flourished

as a legitimate institution only among the great tribes planted south of

the line. With them it had been a familiar institution long before the

time of their exile. In their native haunts they had had negro slaves as

had had the whites and removal had made no difference to them in that

particular. Since the beginning of the century refuge to fugitives and

confusion of ownership had been occasions for frequent quarrel between

them and the citizens of the Southern States. Later, when questions came

up touching the status of slavery on strictly federal soil, the Indian

country and the District of Columbia often found themselves listed

together.[11] Moreover, after 1850, it became a matter of serious import

whether or no the Fugitive Slave Law was operative within the Indian

country; and, when influenced apparently by Jefferson Davis,

Attorney-general Cushing gave as his opinion that it was, new

controversies arose. Slaves belonging to the Indians were often enticed

away by the abolitionists[12] and still more often were seized by southern

men under pretense of their being fugitives.[13] In cases of the latter

sort, the Indian owners had little or no redress in the federal courts of

law.[14]

In point of fact, during all the years between the various dates of Indian

removal and the breaking out of the Civil War, the Indian country was

constantly beset by difficulties. Some of the difficulties were

incident to removal or to disturbances within the tribes but most of them

were incident to changes and to political complications in the white man's

country. Scarcely had the removal project been fairly launched and the

first Indian emigrants started upon their journey westward than events

were in train for the overthrow of the whole scheme.

[Illustration: MAP SHOWING FREE NEGRO SETTLEMENTS IN THE CREEK COUNTRY

[_From Office of Indian Affairs_]]

When Calhoun mapped out the Indian country in his elaborate report of

1825, the selection of the trans-Missouri region might well have been

regarded as judicious. Had the plan of general removal been adopted then,

before sectional interests had wholly vitiated it, the United States

government might have gained and, in a measure, would have richly deserved

the credit of doing at least one thing for the protection and preservation

of the aborigines from motives, not self-interested, but purely

humanitarian. The moment was opportune. The territory of the United States

was then limited by the confines of the Louisiana Purchase and its

settlements by the great American desert. Traders only had penetrated to

any considerable extent to the base of the Rockies; but experience already

gained might have taught that their presence was portentous and

significant of the need of haste; that is, if Calhoun's selection were to

continue judicious; for traders, as has been amply proved in both British

and American history, have ever been but the advance agents of settlers.

Unfortunately for the cause of pure philanthropy, the United States

government was exceedingly slow in adopting the plan of Indian removal;

but its citizens were by no means equally slow in developing the spirit of

territorial expansion. Their successful seizure of West Florida had fired

their ambition and their cupidity. With Texas annexed and lower Oregon

occupied, the selection of the trans-Missouri region had ceased to be

judicious. How could the Indians expect to be secure in a country that was

the natural highway to a magnificent country beyond, invitingly open to

settlement! But this very pertinent and patent fact the officials at

Washington singularly failed to realize and they went on calmly assuring

the Indians that they should never be disturbed again, that the federal

government would protect them in their rights and against all enemies,

that no white man should be allowed to intrude upon them, that they should

hold their lands undiminished forever, and that no state or territorial

lines should ever again circumscribe them. Such promises were decidedly

fatuous, dead letters long before the ink that recorded them had had time

to dry. The Mexican War followed the annexation of Texas and its conquests

necessitated a further use of the Indian highway. Soldiers that fought in

that war saw the Indian land and straightway coveted it. Forty-niners saw

it and coveted it also. Prospectors and adventurers of all sorts laid

plans for exploiting it. It entered as a determining factor into Benton's

great scheme for building a national road that should connect the Atlantic

and Pacific shores and with the inception of that came a very sudden and a

very real danger; for the same great scheme precipitated, although in an

indirect sort of way, the agitation for the opening up of Kansas and

Nebraska to white settlement, which, of course, meant that the recent

Indian colonists, in spite of all the solemn governmental guaranties that

had been given to them, would have to be ousted, for would not the

"sovereign" people of America demand it? Then, too, the Dred Scott

decision, the result of a dishonorable political collusion as it was,[15]

militated indirectly against Indian interests. It is true that it was only

in its extra-legal aspect that it did this but it did it none the less;

for, if the authority of the federal government was not supreme in the

territories and not supreme in any part of the country not yet organized

into states, then the Indian landed property rights in the West that

rested exclusively upon federal grant, under the Removal Act of 1830, were

virtually nil. It is rather interesting to observe, in this connection,

how inconsistent human nature is when political expediency is the thing at

stake; for it happened that the same people and the same party,

identically, that, in the second and third decades of the nineteenth

century, had tried to convince the Indians, and against their better

judgment too, that the red man would be forever unmolested in the western

country because the federal government owned it absolutely and could give

a title in perpetuity, argued, in the fourth and fifth decades, that the

states were the sole proprietors, that they were, in fact, the joint

owners of everything heretofore considered as national. Inferentially,

therefore, Indians, like negroes, had no rights that white men were bound

to respect.

The crucial point has now been reached in this discussion. From the date

of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, the sectional affiliation of the Indian

country became a thing of more than passing moment. Whatever may have been

John C. Calhoun's ulterior and real motive in urging that the

trans-Missouri region be closed to white settlement forever, whether he

did, as some of his abolitionist enemies have charged, plan thus to block

free-state expansion and so frustrate the natural operations of the

Missouri Compromise, certain it is, that southern politicians, after his

time, became the chief advocates of Indian territorial integrity, the ones

that pleaded most often and most noisily that guaranties to Indians be

faithfully respected. They had in mind the northern part of the Indian

country and that alone; but, no doubt, the circumstance was purely

accidental, since at that time, the early fifties, the northern[16] was

the only part likely to be encroached upon.[17] Their interest in the

southern part took an entirely different direction and that also may have

been accidental or occasioned by conditions quite local and present. For

this southern part, by the way, they recommended American citizenship and

the creation of American states[18] in the Union, also a territorial

organization immediately that should look towards that end. Such advice

came as early as 1853, at least, and was more natural than would at first

glance appear; for the southern tribes were huge in population, in land,

and in resources. They were civilized, had governments and laws modelled

upon the American, and more than all else, they were southern in origin,

in characteristics, and in institutions.

The project for organizing[19] the territories of Kansas and Nebraska

caused much excitement, as well it might, among the Indian immigrants,

even though the Wyandots, in 1852, had, in a measure, anticipated it by

initiating a somewhat similar movement in their own restricted

locality.[20] Most of the tribes comprehended to the full the ominous

import of territorial organization; for, obviously, it could not be

undertaken except at a sacrifice of Indian guaranties. At the moment some

of the tribes, notably the Choctaw and Chickasaw,[21] were having domestic

troubles that threatened a neighborhood war and the new fear of the white

man's further aggrandizement threw them into despair. The southern

Indians, generally, were much more exercised and much more alarmed than

were the northern.[22] Being more highly civilized, they were better able

to comprehend the drift of events. Experience had made them unduly

sagacious where their territorial and treaty rights were concerned, and

well they knew that, although the Douglas measure did not in itself

directly affect them or their country, it might easily become the

forerunner of one that would.

The border strife, following upon the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska

Bill, disturbed in no slight degree the Indians on the Kansas

reservations, which, by-the-by, had been very greatly reduced in area by

the Manypenny treaties of 1853-1854. Some of the reserves lay right in the

heart of the contested territory, free-state men intrenching themselves

among the Delawares and pro-slavery men among the Shawnees,[23] the former

north and the latter south of the Kansas River. But even remoteness of

situation constituted no safeguard against encroachment. All along the

Missouri line the squatters took possession. The distant Cherokee Neutral

Lands[24] and the Osage and New York Indian reservations[25] were all

invaded.[26] The Territorial Act had expressly excluded Indian land from

local governmental control; but the Kansas authorities of both parties

utterly ignored, in their administration of affairs, this provision. The

first districting of the territory for election purposes comprehended, for

instance, the Indian lands, yet little criticism has ever been passed

upon that grossly illegal act. Needless to say, the controversy between

slavocracy and freedom obscured and obliterated, in those years, all other

considerations.

As the year 1860 approached, appearances assumed an even more serious

aspect. Kansas settlers and would-be settlers demanded that the Indians,

so recently the only legal occupants of the territory, vacate it

altogether. So soon had the policy of granting them peace and undisturbed

repose on diminished reserves proved futile. The only place for the Indian

to go, were he indeed to be driven out of Kansas, was present Oklahoma;

but his going there would, perforce, mean an invasion of the property

rights of the southern tribes, a matter of great moment to them but

seemingly of no moment whatsoever to the white man. Some of the Kansas

Indians saw in removal southward a temporary refuge--they surely could not

have supposed it would be other than temporary--and were glad to go,

making their arrangements accordingly.[27] Some, however, had to be

cajoled into promising to go and some had to be forced. A few held out

determinedly against all thought of going. Among the especially obstinate

ones were the Osages,[28] natives of the soil. The Buchanan government

failed utterly to convince them of the wisdom of going and was, thereupon,

charged by the free-state Kansans with bad faith, with not being sincere

and sufficiently persistent in its endeavors to treat, its secret purpose

being to keep the free-state line as far north as possible. The breaking

out of the Civil War prevented the immediate removal of any of the tribes

but did not put a stop to negotiations looking towards that end.

All this time there was another influence within the Indian country, north

and south, that boded good or ill as the case might be. This influence

emanated from the religious denominations represented on the various

reserves. Nowhere in the United States, perhaps, was the rivalry among

churches that had divided along sectional lines in the forties and fifties

stronger than within the Indian country. There the churches contended with

each other at close range. The Indian country was free and open to all

faiths, while, in the states, the different churches kept strictly to

their own sections, the southern contingent of each denomination staying

close to the institution it supported. Of course the United States

government, through its civilization fund, was in a position to show very

pointedly its sectional predilections. It will probably never be known,

because so difficult of determination, just how much the churches aided or

retarded the spread of slavery.[29]

Among the tribes of Kansas, denominational strength was distributed as

follows: The Kickapoos[30] and Wyandots[31] were Methodists; but, while

the former were a unit in their adherence to the Methodist Episcopal

Church South, the latter were divided and among them the older church

continued strong. The American Baptist Missionary Union had a school on

the Delaware reservation and, previous to 1855, had had one also on the

Shawnee, which the political uproar in Kansas had obliged to close its

doors. These same Northern Baptists were established also among the

Ottawas, as the Moravians were among the Munsees and the Roman

Catholics[32] among the Osages and the Potawatomies. The Southern Baptists

were likewise to be found among the Potawatomies[33] and the Southern

Methodists among the Shawnees. The Shawnee Manual Labor School, under the

Southern Methodists, was, however, only very grudgingly patronized by the

Indians. Its situation near the Missouri border was partly accountable for

this as it was for the selection of the school as the meeting-place of the

pro-slavery legislature in 1855. The management of the institution was

from time to time severely criticized and the superintendent, the

Reverend Thomas Johnson, an intense pro-slavery agitator,[34] was strongly

suspected of malfeasance,[35] of enriching himself, forsooth, at the

expense of the Indians. The school found a formidable rival, from this and

many another cause, in a Quaker establishment, which likewise existed on

the Shawnee Reserve but independently of either tribal or governmental

aid.

If church influences and church quarrels were discernible among the

northern tribes, they were certainly very much more so among the southern.

The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (Congregational)

that had labored so zealously for the Cherokees, when they were east of

the Mississippi, extended its interest to them undiminished in the west;

and, in the period just before the Civil War,[36] was the strongest

religious force in their country. There it had no less than four mission

stations[37] and a flourishing school in connection with each. The same

organization was similarly influential among the Choctaws[38] or, in the

light of what eventually happened, it might better be said its

missionaries were. Both Southern and Northern Baptists and Southern

Methodists likewise were to be found among the Cherokees;[39]

Presbyterians[40] and Southern Methodists among the Chickasaws and

Choctaws; and Presbyterians only among the Creeks and Seminoles. In every

Indian nation south, except the Creek and Seminole,[41] the work of

denominational schools was supplemented, or maybe neutralized, by that of

public and neighborhood schools.

True to the traditions and to the practices of the old Puritans and of the

Plymouth church, the missionaries of the American Board,[42] so strongly

installed among the Choctaws and the Cherokees, took an active interest in

passing political affairs, particularly in connection with the slavery

agitation. On that question, they early divided themselves into two camps;

those among the Choctaws, led by the Reverend Cyrus Kingsbury,[43]

supporting slavery; and those among the Cherokees, led by the Reverend S.

A. Worcester,[44] opposing it. The actions of the former led to a

controversy with the American Board and, in 1855, the malcontents, or

pro-slavery sympathizers, expressed a desire to separate themselves and

their charges from its patronage.[45] When, eventually, this separation

did occur, 1859-1860, the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions (Old

School) stepped into the breach.[46]

The rebellious conduct of the Congregational missionaries met with the

undisguised approval of the Choctaw agent, Douglas H. Cooper,[47] formerly

of Mississippi. It was he who had already voiced a nervous apprehension,

as exhibited in the following document,[48] that the Indian country was in

grave danger of being abolitionized:

If things go on as they are now doing, in 5 years slavery will be

abolished in the whole of your superintendency.

(_Private_) I am convinced that something must be done speedily to

arrest the systematic efforts of the Missionaries to abolitionize the

Indian Country.

Otherwise we shall have a great run-away harbor, a sort of

Canada--with "underground rail-roads" leading to & through

it--adjoining Arkansas and Texas.

It is of no use to look to the General Government--its arm is

paralized by the abolition strength of the North.

I see no way except secretly to induce the Choctaws & Cherokees &

Creeks to allow slave-holders to settle among their people & control

the movement now going on to abolish slavery among them.

C--

Cooper sent this note, in 1854, as a private memorandum to the southern

superintendent, who at the time was Charles W. Dean. In 1859, it was

possible for him to write to Dean's successor, Elias Rector, in a very

different tone. The missionaries had then taken the stand he himself

advocated and there was reason for congratulation. Under such

circumstances, Cooper wrote,

I cannot close this report without calling your attention to the

admirable tone and feeling pervading the reports of superintendents of

schools and missionaries among the Choctaws, and particularly to that

of the Rev. Ebenezer Hotchkin, one of the oldest missionaries among

the Choctaws, who, in referring to past political disturbances, says:

"We have looked upon our rulers as the 'powers that be, are ordained

of God,' and have respected them for this reason. 'Whomsoever,

therefore, resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God'

(Romans, xiii, 2). This has been our rule of action during the

political excitement. We believe that the Bible is the best guide for

us to follow. Our best citizens are those most influenced by Bible

truth."

I rejoice to believe the above sentiments are entertained by most, if

not all, the missionaries now among the Choctaws and Chickasaws, and

that they entirely repudiate the higher-law doctrine[49] of northern

and religious fanatics. It is but lately, as I learn, that the Choctaw

mission, for many years under the control of the American Board of

Commissioners for Foreign Missions (whose headquarters are at Boston)

has been cut off, because they preferred to follow the teachings of

the Bible, as understood by them, rather than obey the dogmas

contained in Dr. Treat's letter and the edicts of the parent board.

It is a matter of congratulation among the friends of the old Choctaw

missionaries, who have labored for thirty years among them, and intend

to die with armor on, that all connection with the Boston board has

been dissolved. If it had been done years ago, when their freedom of

conscience and of missionary action was attempted to be controlled by

the parent board, much of suspicion, of ill-feeling, and diminished

usefulness, which attached to the Choctaw missionaries in consequence

of their connection with and sustenance by a board avowedly and openly

hostile to southern institutions, would have been prevented.[50]

In the next year, 1860, Cooper was still sanguine as to affairs among the

Indians of his agency and he could report to Rector, unhesitatingly, as

if confident of official endorsement both at Forth Smith and at

Washington,[51]

Great excitement has prevailed along the Texas border, in consequence

of the incendiary course pursued in that State by horse thieves and

religious fanatics; but I am glad to say, as yet, so far as I am

informed, no necessity has existed in this agency for the organization

of "vigilance committees" ... No doubt we have among us

_free-soilers_; perhaps abolitionists in sentiment; but, so far as I

am informed, persons from the North, residing among the Choctaws and

Chickasaws, who entertain opinions unfriendly to our system of

domestic slavery, keep their opinions to themselves and attend to

their legitimate business.[52]

George Butler, the United States agent for the Cherokees, seems to have

been, no less than Cooper, an adherent of the State Rights Party and an

upholder of the institution of slavery. In 1859, he ascribed the very

great material progress of the Cherokees to the fact that they were

slaveholders.[53] Slavery, in Butler's opinion, had operated as an

incentive to all industrial pursuits. To an extent this may have been

true, since all Indians, no matter how high their type, have an aversion

for work. As Professor Shaler once said, they are the truest aristocrats

the world has ever known. But the slaveholders among the great tribes of

the South were, for the most part, the half-breeds, the cleverest and

often, much as we may regret to have to admit it, the most unscrupulous

men of the community.

Butler's commission as Indian agent expired in March, 1860, and he was not

reappointed, Robert J. Cowart of Georgia[54] being preferred. This man,

illiterate and unprincipled, immediately set to work to perform a task to

which his predecessor had proved unequal. The task was the removal of

white intruders from the Cherokee country. For some time past, the

southern superintendent and the agents under him, to say nothing of

Commissioner Greenwood and Secretary Thompson, the one a citizen of

Arkansas and the other of Mississippi, had resented most bitterly the

invasion of the Cherokee Neutral Lands by Kansas free-soilers and the

division of it into counties by the unlawfully assumed authority of the

Kansas legislature. The resentment was thoroughly justifiable; for the

whole proceeding of the legislature was contrary to the express enactment

of Congress; but no doubt, enthusiasm for the strict enforcement of the

federal law came largely from political predilections, precisely as the

Kansan's outrageous defiance of it came from a deep-rooted distrust of

the Buchanan administration.

There were, however, other intruders that Cowart and Rector and Greenwood

designed to remove and they wanted to remove them on the ground that they

were making mischief within the tribe and interfering with its

institutions, or, more specifically, with slavery. The intruders meant

were principally the missionaries against whom Greenwood had even the

audacity to lay the charge of inciting to murder. Newspapers of bordering

slave states were full of criticism,[55] just before the war, of these

same men and, notably, of the Reverend Evan[56] and John Jones, the

reputed ringleaders. The official excuse for removing them is rather

interesting because it is so similar to that given, some thirty years

earlier, in connection with the removal from Georgia. Ulterior motives can

so easily be hidden under cold official phrase.

That the cause of slavery within the Cherokee country was in jeopardy in

the spring and summer of 1860 can not well be denied. To the men of the

time the evidence was easily obtainable. Almost as if by magic, a "search

organization" started up among the full-bloods, an organization profoundly

secret in its membership and in its purposes, but believed to be for no

other object than the overthrow of the "peculiar institution." Its

existence was promptly reported to the United States government and, as

was to be expected, the missionaries were held responsible for both its

inception and its continuance. It was then that Greenwood made[57] his

most serious charge against these men and prepared, under color of law, to

have them removed. Later, in this same year of 1860, Quantrill, the

Hagerstown, Maryland man of Pennsylvania Dutch origin, who afterwards

became such a notorious frontier guerrilla in the interests of the

Confederate cause, leagued himself with some abolitionists for the sake

of making an expedition to the Cherokee country and rescuing negroes,

there held in bondage.[58] The timely distrust of Quantrill, however,

caused the enterprise to be abandoned even before its preliminaries had

been thoroughly well arranged; yet, had the rescue been carried to

completion, it would not have been entirely without precedent[59] and its

very contrivance indicated an uncertainty and a precariousness of

situation south of the Kansas line.

Ever since their compulsory removal from Georgia under circumstances truly

tragic, the Cherokees had been much given to factional strife. This was

largely in consequence of the underhand means taken by the state and

federal authorities to accomplish removal. The Cherokees had, under the

necessities of the situation, divided themselves into the Ross, or

Anti-removal Party, and the Ridge, or Treaty Party.[60] Removal took place

in spite of the steady opposition of the Rossites and the Cherokees went

west, piloted by the United States army. Once in the west a new division

arose in their ranks; for, as newcomers, they came into jealous contact

with members of their tribe who had emigrated many years previously and

who came to figure, in subsequent Cherokee history, as the Old Settlers'

Party.[61] In 1846, the United States government attempted to assume the

role of mediator in a settlement of Cherokee tribal differences but

without much success.[62] The old wrongs were unredressed, so the old

divisions remained and formed nuclei for new disintegrating issues. Thus,

in 1857, there were no less than three factions created in consequence of

a project for selling the Cherokee Neutral Lands[63]. Each faction had its

own opinion how best to dispose of the proceeds, should a sale take place.

In 1860, there were two factions, the selling and the non-selling[64].

This tendency of the Cherokees perpetually to quarrel among themselves and

to bear long-standing grudges against each other is most important;

inasmuch as that marked peculiarity of internal politics very largely

determined the unique position of the tribe with reference to the Civil

War.

The other great tribes had also occasions for quarrel in these same

critical years. The disgraceful circumstances of their removal had widened

the gulf, once simply geographical, between the Upper and the Lower

Creeks. They were now almost two distinct political entities, in each of

which there were a principal and a second chief. In 1833, provision had

been made for the accommodation of the Seminoles within a certain definite

part of the Creek country[65]--just such an arrangement, forsooth, as

worked so ill when applied to the Choctaws and Chickasaws; but it took

several years for the Seminoles to be suited. At length, when their

numbers had been considerably augmented by the coming of the new

immigrants from Florida, they took up their position, for good and all,

in the southwestern corner of the Creek Reserve, a politically distinct

community. By that time, the Creeks seem to have repented of their

generosity,[66] so, perhaps, it was well that the United States government

had not yielded to their importunity and consented to a like settlement of

the southern Comanches.[67] It had taken the Chickasaws a long time to

reconstruct their government after the political separation from the

Choctaws; but now they had a constitution,[68] all their own, a

legislature, and a governor. The Choctaws had attempted a constitution,

likewise, first the Scullyville, then the Doaksville, set up by a minority

party; but they had retained some semblance of the old order of things in

the persons of their chiefs.[69]

There were other Indians within the southern division of the Indian

country that were to have their part in the Civil War and in events

leading up to it or resulting from it. In the extreme northeastern corner,

were the Quapaws, the Senecas, and the confederated Senecas and Shawnees,

all members, with the Osages and the New York Indians of Kansas, of the

Neosho River Agency which was under the care of Andrew J. Dorn. In the far

western part, at the base of the Wichita Mountains, were the Indians of

the Leased District, Wichitas, Tonkawas,[70] Euchees, and others,

collectively called the "Reserve Indians." Most of them had been brought

from Texas,[71] because of Texan intolerance of their presence, and placed

within the Leased District, a tract of land west of the ninety-eighth

meridian, which, under the treaty of 1855, the United States had rented

from the Choctaws and Chickasaws. It was a part of the old Chickasaw

District of the Choctaw Nation. Outside of the Wichita Reserve and still

wandering at large over the plains were the hostile Kiowas and Comanches,

against whom and the inoffensive Reserve Indians, the Texans nourished a

bitter, undying hatred. They charged them with crimes that were never

committed and with some crimes that white men, disguised as Indians, had

committed. They were also suspected of manufacturing evidence that would

incriminate the red men and of plotting, in regularly-organized meetings,

their overthrow.[72]

Although the plan for colonizing some of the Texas Indians had been

completed in 1855, the Indian Office found it impossible to execute it

until the summer of 1859. This was principally because the War Department

could not be induced to make the necessary military arrangements.[73] In

point of fact, the southern Indian country was, at the time, practically

without a force of United States troops, quite regardless of the promise

that had been made to all the tribes upon the occasion of their removal

that they should _always be protected_ in their new quarters and,

inferentially, by the regular army. Even Fort Gibson had been virtually

abandoned as a military post on the plea that its site was unhealthful;

and all of Superintendent Rector's recommendations that Frozen Rock, on

the south side of the Arkansas a few miles away, be substituted[74] had

been ignored, not so much by the Interior Department, as by the War.

Secretary Thompson thought that enough troops should be at his disposal to

enable him to carry out the United States Indian policy, but Secretary

Floyd demurred. He was rather disposed to dismantle such forts as there

were and to withdraw all troops from the Indian frontier,[75] a course of

action that would leave it exposed, so the dissenting Thompson

prognosticated, to "the most unhappy results."[76]

It happened thus that, when the United States surveyors started in 1858 to

establish the line of the ninety-eighth meridian west longitude and to run

other boundary lines under the treaty of 1855,[77] they found the country

entirely unpatrolled. Troops had been ordered from Texas to protect the

surveyors; but, pending their arrival, Agent Cooper, who had gone out to

witness the determination of the initial point on the line between his

agency and the Leased District, himself took post at Fort Arbuckle and

called upon the Indians for patrol and garrison duty.[78] It would seem

that Secretary Thompson had verbally authorized[79] Cooper to make this

use of the Indians; but they proved in the sequel very inefficient as

garrison troops. On the thirtieth of June, Lieutenant Powell, commanding

Company E, First United States Infantry, arrived at Fort Arbuckle from

Texas and relieved Cooper of his self-imposed task. The day following,

Cooper set out upon a sixteen day scout of the Washita country, taking

with him his Indian volunteers, Chickasaws[80] and a few Cherokees;[81]

and for this act of using Indian after the arrival of white troops, he was

severely criticized by the department. One thing he accomplished: he

selected a site for the prospective Wichita Agency with the recommendation

that it be also made the site[82] of the much-needed military post on the

Leased District. The site had originally been occupied by a Kechie village

and was admirably well adapted for the double purpose Cooper intended. It

lay near the center of the Leased District and near the sources of Cache

and Beaver Creeks. It was also, so reported Cooper, "not very distant from

the Washita, & Canadian" (and commanded) "the Mountain passes through the

Wichita Mountains to the Antelope Hills--to the North branch of Red River

and also the road on the South side of the Wichita Mountains up Red

River."

The colonization of the Wichitas and other Indians took place in the

summer of 1859 under the excitement of new disputes with Texas, largely

growing out of an unwarranted and brutal attack[83] by white men upon

Indians of the Brazos Agency. That event following so closely upon the

heels of Van Dorn's[84] equally brutal attack upon a defenceless Comanche

camp brought matters to a crisis and the government was forced to be

expeditious where it had previously been dilatory. The Comanches had come

in, under a flag of truce, to confer in a friendly way with the Wichitas.

Van Dorn, ignorant of their purpose but supposing it hostile, made a

forced march, surprised them, and mercilessly took summary vengeance for

all the Comanches had been charged with, whether justly or unjustly, for

some time past. After it was all over, the Comanches, with about sixty of

their number slain, accused the Wichitas of having betrayed them.

Frightened, yet innocent, the Wichitas begged that there be no further

delay in their removal, so the order was given and arrangements made.

Unfortunately, by the time everything was ready, the season was pretty far

advanced and the Indians reached their new home to find it too late to put

in crops for that year's harvest. Subsistence rations had, therefore, to

be doled out to them, the occasion affording, as always, a rare

opportunity for graft. Instead of calling for bids, as was customary,

Superintendent Rector entered into a private contract[85] with a friend

and relative of his own, the consequence being that the government was

charged an exorbitant price for the rations. Soon other troubles[86] came.

The Leased District proved to be already occupied by some northern Indian

refugees[87] and became, as time went on, a handy rendezvous for free

negroes; but, as soon as Matthew Leeper[88] of Texas became agent, the

stay of such was extremely short.[89]

Such were the conditions obtaining among the Indians west of Missouri and

Arkansas in the years immediately antedating the American Civil War; and,

from such conditions, it may readily be inferred that the Indians were

anything but satisfied with the treatment that had been and was being

accorded them. They owed no great debt of gratitude to anybody. They were

restless and unhappy among themselves. Their old way of living had been

completely disorganized. They had nothing to go upon, so far as their

relations with the white men were concerned, to make them hopeful of

anything better in the future, rather the reverse. Indeed at the very

opening of the year 1860, a year so full of distress to them because of

the great drouth[90] that ravaged Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma, the

worst that had been known in thirty years, there came occasion for a new

distrust. Proposals were made to the Creeks,[91] to the Choctaws,[92] and

to the Chickasaws to allot their lands in severalty, notwithstanding the

fact that one of the inducements offered by President Jackson to get them

originally to remove had been, that they should be permitted to hold their

land, as they had always held it, in common, forever. The Creeks now

replied to the proposals of the Indian Office that they had had experience

with individual reservations in their old eastern homes and had good

reason to be prejudiced against them. The Indians, one and all, met the

proposals with a downright refusal but they did not forget that they had

been made, particularly when there came additional cause for apprehension.

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