This doctrine brought down upon Nietzsche's head the pious wrath

of all the world's humanitarians, but empiric experiment has more

than once proved its truth. The history of the hopelessly futile and

fatuous effort to improve the negroes of the Southern United States by

education affords one such proof. It is apparent, on brief reflection,

that the negro, no matter how much he is educated, must remain, as a

race, in a condition of subservience; that he must remain the inferior

of the stronger and more intelligent white man so long as he retains

racial differentiation. Therefore, the effort to educate him has

awakened in his mind ambitions and aspirations which, in the very

nature of things, must go unrealized, and so, while gaining nothing

whatever materially, he has lost all his old contentment, peace of mind

and happiness. Indeed, it is a commonplace of observation in the United

States that the educated and refined negro is invariably a hopeless,

melancholy, embittered and despairing man.

Nietzsche, to resume, regarded it as absolutely essential that there

be a class of laborers or slaves--his "third caste"--and was of the

opinion that such a class would exist upon earth so long as the human

race survived. Its condition, compared to that of the ruling class,

would vary but slightly, he thought, with the progress of the years. As

man's mastery of nature increased, the laborer would find his task less

and less painful, but he would always remain a fixed distance behind

those who ruled him. Therefore, Nietzsche, in his philosophy, gave no

thought to the desires and aspirations of the laboring class, because,

as we have just seen, he held that a man could not properly belong to

this class unless his desires and aspirations were so faint or so well

under the control of the ruling class that they might be neglected.

All of the Nietzschean doctrines and ideas apply only to the ruling

class. It was at the top, he argued, that mankind grew. It was only in

the ideas of those capable of original thought that progress had its

source. William the Conqueror was of far more importance, though he was

but a single man, than all the other Normans of his generation taken

together.

Nietzsche was well aware that his "first caste" was necessarily small

in numbers and that there was a strong tendency for its members to drop

out of it and seek ease and peace in the castes lower down. "Life,"

he said, "is always hardest toward the summit--the cold increases,

the responsibility increases."[3] But to the truly efficient man

these hardships are but spurs to effort. His joy is in combating and

in overcoming--in pitting his will to power against the laws and

desires of the rest of humanity. "I do not advise you to labor," says

Zarathustra, "but to fight. I do not advise you to compromise and

make peace, but to conquer. Let your labor be fighting and your peace

victory.... You say that a good cause will hallow even war? I tell you

that a good war hallows every cause. War and courage have done more

great things than charity. Not your pity, but your bravery lifts up

those about you. Let the little girlies tell you that 'good' means

'sweet' and 'touching.' I tell you that 'good' means 'brave.'... The

slave rebels against hardships and calls his rebellion superiority. Let

your superiority be an acceptance of hardships. Let your commanding be

an obeying.... Let your highest thought be: 'Man is something to be

surpassed.'... I do not advise you to love your neighbor--the nearest

human being. I advise you rather to flee from the nearest and love the

furthest human being. Higher than love to your neighbor is love to the

higher man that is to come in the future.... Propagate yourself upward.

Thus live your life. What are many years worth? I do not spare you....

Die at the right time!"[4]

The average man, said Nietzsche, is almost entirely lacking in this

gorgeous, fatalistic courage and sublime egotism. He is ever reluctant

to pit his private convictions and yearnings against those of the mass

of men. He is either afraid to risk the consequences of originality or

fearful that, since the majority of his fellows disagree with him, he

must be wrong. Therefore, no matter how strongly an unconventional idea

may possess a man, he commonly seeks to combat it and throttle it, and

the ability to do this with the least possible expenditure of effort we

call self-control. The average man, said Nietzsche, has the power of

self-control well developed, and in consequence he seldom contributes

anything positive to the thought of his age and almost never attempts

to oppose it.

We have seen in the preceding chapter that if every man, without

exception, were of this sort, all human progress would cease, because

the ideas of one generation would be handed down unchanged to the

next and there would be no effort whatever to improve the conditions

of existence by the only possible method--constant experiment with

new ideas. Therefore, it follows that the world must depend for its

advancement upon those revolutionists who, instead of overcoming their

impulse to go counter to convention, give it free rein. Of such is

Nietzsche's "first caste" composed. It is plain that among the two

lower castes, courage of this sort is regarded, not as an evidence of

strength, but as a proof of weakness. The man who outrages conventions

is a man who lacks self-control, and the majority, by a process we

have examined in our consideration of slave-morality, has exalted

self-control, which, at bottom, is the antithesis of courage, into a

place of honor higher than that belonging, by right, to courage itself.

But Nietzsche pointed out that the act of denying or combating accepted

ideas is a thing which always tends to inspire other acts of the same

sort. It is true enough that a revolutionary idea, so soon as it

replaces an old convention and obtains the sanction of the majority,

ceases to be revolutionary and becomes itself conventional, but all the

same the mere fact that it has succeeded gives courage to those who

harbor other revolutionary ideas and inspires them to give these ideas

voice. Thus, it happens that courage breeds itself, and that, in times

of great conflict, of no matter what sort, the world produces more than

an average output of originality, or, as we more commonly denominate

it, genius. In this manner Nietzsche accounted for a fact that had been

noticed by many men before him: that such tremendous struggles as the

French Revolution and the American Civil War are invariably followed by

eras of diligent inquiry, of bold overturning of existing institutions

and of marked progress. People become accustomed to unrestrained combat

and so the desirability of self-control becomes less insistent.

Nietzsche had a vast contempt for what he called "the green-grazing

happiness of the herd." Its strong morality and its insistence upon

the doctrine that whatever is, is right--that "God's in his heaven;

all's well with the world"--revolted him. He held that the so-called

rights of the masses had no justifiable existence, since everything

they asserted as a right was an assertion, more or less disguised, of

the doctrine that the unfit should survive. "There are," he said, "only

three ways in which the masses appear to me to deserve a glance: first,

as blurred copies of their betters, printed on bad paper and from worn

out plates; secondly, as a necessary opposition to stimulate the master

class, and thirdly, as instruments in the hands of the master class.

Further than this I hand them over to statistics--and the devil."[5]

Kant's proposal that the morality of every contemplated action be

tested by the question, "Suppose everyone did as I propose to do?"

seemed utterly ridiculous to Nietzsche because he saw that "everyone"

always opposed the very things which meant progress; and Kant's

corollary that the sense of duty contemplated in this dictum was "the

obligation to act in reverence for law," proved to Nietzsche merely

that both duty and law were absurdities. "Contumely," he said, "always

falls upon those who break through some custom or convention. Such men,

in fact, are called criminals. Everyone who overthrows an existing law

is, at the start, regarded as a wicked man. Long afterward, when it

is found that this law was bad and so cannot be re-established, the

epithet is changed. All history treats almost exclusively of wicked men

who, in the course of time, have come to be looked upon as good men.

All progress is the result of successful crimes."[6]

Dr. Turck,[7] Miss Paget, M. Nordau and other critics see in all this

good evidence that Nietzsche was a criminal at heart. At the bottom of

all philosophies, says Miss Paget,[8] there is always one supreme idea.

Sometimes it is a conception of nature, sometimes it is a religious

faith and sometimes it is a theory of truth. In Nietzsche's case it is

"my taste." He is always irritated: "_I_ dislike," "_I_ hate," "_I_

want to get rid of" appear on every page of his writings. He delights

in ruthlessness, his fellow men disgust him, his physical senses are

acute, he has a sick ego. For that reason he likes singularity, the

lonely Alps, classic literature and Bizet's "clear yellow" music.

Turck argues that Nietzsche was a criminal because he got pleasure out

of things which outraged the majority of his fellow men, and Nordau, in

supporting this idea, shows that it is possible for a man to experience

and approve criminal impulses and still never act them: that there are

criminals of the chair as well as of the dark lantern and sandbag. The

answer to all of this, of course, is the fact that the same method of

reasoning would convict every original thinker the world has ever known

of black felony: that it would make Martin Luther a criminal as well

as Jack Sheppard, John the Baptist as well as the Borgias, and Galileo

as well as Judas Iscariot; that it would justify the execution of all

the sublime company of heroes who have been done to death for their

opinions, from Jesus Christ down the long line.

[1] "_Der Antichrist_," § 57.

[2] In "The Governance of England," (London: 1904) Sidney Low points

out (chap. X) that, despite the rise of democracy, the government of

Great Britain is still entirely in the hands of the landed gentry

and nobility. The members of this class plainly owe their power to

the military prowess of their ancestors, and their identity with the

present military and judicial class is obvious. The typical M.P., in

fact, also writes "J.P." after his name and "Capt." or "Col." before

it. The examples of Russia, Germany, Japan, Austria, Italy, Spain and

the Latin-American republics scarcely need be mentioned. In China the

military, judicial and legislative-executive functions are always

combined, and in the United States, while the military branch of the

second caste is apparently impotent, it is plain that the balance of

legislative power in every state and in the national legislature is

held by lawyers, just as the final determination of all laws rests with

judges.

[3] "_Der Antichrist_," § 55.

[4] The quotations are from various chapters in the first part of

"_Also sprach Zarathustra_."

[5] "_Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben_."

[6] "_Morgenröte_," § 20.

[7] "_Friedrich Nietzsche und seine philosophische Irrwege_," Leipsic,

1891.

[8] _North American Review_, Dec., 1904.

IX

WOMEN AND MARRIAGE

Nietzsche's faithful sister, with almost comical and essentially

feminine disgust, bewails the fact that, as a very young man, the

philosopher became acquainted with the baleful truths set forth in

Schopenhauer's immortal essay "On Women." That this daring work greatly

influenced him is true, and that he subscribed to its chief arguments

all the rest of his days is also true, but it is far from true to say

that his view of the fair sex was borrowed bodily from Schopenhauer or

that he would have written otherwise than as he did if Schopenhauer

had never lived. Nietzsche's conclusions regarding women were the

inevitable result, indeed, of his own philosophical system. It is

impossible to conceive a man who held his opinions of morality and

society laying down any other doctrines of femininity and matrimony

than those he scattered through his books.

Nietzsche believed that there was a radical difference between the

mind of man and the mind of woman and that the two sexes reacted in

diametrically different ways to those stimuli which make up what might

be called the clinical picture of human society. It is the function of

man, he said, to wield a sword in humanity's battle with everything

that makes life on earth painful or precarious. It is the function of

woman, not to fight herself, but to provide fresh warriors for the

fray. Thus the exercise of the will to exist is divided between the

two: the man seeking the welfare of the race as he actually sees it and

the woman seeking the welfare of generations yet unborn. Of course, it

is obvious that this division is by no means clearly marked, because

the man, in struggling for power over his environment, necessarily

improves the conditions under which his children live, and the woman,

working for her children, often benefits herself. But all the same the

distinction is a good one and empiric observation bears it out. As

everyone who has given a moment's thought to the subject well knows,

a man's first concern in the world is to provide food and shelter for

himself and his family, while a woman's foremost duty is to bear and

rear children. "Thus," said Nietzsche, "would I have man and woman: the

one fit for warfare, the other fit for giving birth; and both fit for

dancing with head and legs"[1]--that is to say: both capable of doing

their share of the race's work, mental and physical, with conscious and

superabundant efficiency.

Nietzsche points out that, in the racial economy, the place of woman

may be compared to that of a slave-nation, while the position of man

resembles that of a master-nation. We have seen how a weak nation,

unable, on account of its weakness, to satisfy its will to survive and

thirst for power by forcing its authority upon other nations, turns

to the task of keeping these other nations, as much as possible, from

enforcing their authority upon it. Realizing that it cannot rule, but

must serve, it endeavors to make the conditions of its servitude as

bearable as possible. This effort is commonly made in two ways: first

by ostensibly renouncing its desire to rule, and secondly, by attempts

to inoculate its powerful neighbors with its ideas in subterranean

and round-about ways, so as to avoid arousing their suspicion and

opposition. It becomes, in brief, humble and cunning, and with its

humility as a cloak, it seeks to pit its cunning against the sheer

might of those it fears.

The position of women in the world is much the same. The business

of bearing and rearing children is destructive to their physical

strength, and in consequence makes it impossible for them to prevail

by force when their ideas and those of men happen to differ. To take

away the sting of this incapacity, they make a virtue of it, and it

becomes modesty, humility, self-sacrifice and fidelity; to win in

spite of it they cultivate cunning, which commonly takes the form of

hypocrisy, cajolery, dissimulation and more or less masked appeals to

the masculine sexual instinct. All of this is so often observed in

every-day life that it has become commonplace. A woman is physically

unable to force a man to do as she desires, but her very inability to

do so becomes a sentimental weapon against him, and her blandishments

do the rest. The spectacle of a strong man ruled by a weak woman is no

rare one certainly, and Samson was neither the first nor last giant to

fall before a Delilah. There is scarcely a household in all the world,

in truth, in which the familiar drama is not being acted and reacted

day after day.

Now, it is plain from the foregoing that, though women's business in

the world is of such a character that it inevitably leads to physical

degeneration, her constant need to overcome the effects of this

degeneration by cunning produces constant mental activity, which, by

the law of exercise, should produce, in turn, great mental efficiency.

This conclusion, in part, is perfectly correct, for women, as a sex,

are shrewd, resourceful and acute; but the very fact that they are

always concerned with imminent problems and that, in consequence, they

are unaccustomed to dealing with the larger riddles of life, makes

their mental attitude essentially petty. This explains the circumstance

that despite their mental suppleness, they are not genuinely strong

intellectually. Indeed, the very contrary is true. Women's constant

thought is, not to lay down broad principles of right and wrong; not to

place the whole world in harmony with some great scheme of justice; not

to consider the future of nations; not to make two blades of grass grow

where one grew before; but to deceive, influence, sway and please men.

Normally, their weakness makes masculine protection necessary to their

existence and to the exercise of their overpowering maternal instinct,

and so their whole effort is to obtain this protection in the easiest

way possible. The net result is that feminine morality is a morality

of opportunism and imminent expediency, and that the normal woman has

no respect for, and scarcely any conception of abstract truth. Thus is

proved the fact noted by Schopenhauer and many other observers: that a

woman seldom manifests any true sense of justice or of honor.

It is unnecessary to set forth this idea in greater detail, because

everyone is familiar with it and proofs of its accuracy are supplied

in infinite abundance by common observation. Nietzsche accepted it

as demonstrated. When he set out to pursue the subject further, he

rejected entirely the Schopenhauerean corollary that man should ever

regard woman as his enemy, and should seek, by all means within his

power, to escape her insidious influence. Such a notion naturally

outraged the philosopher of the superman. He was never an advocate

of running away: to all the facts of existence he said "yes." His

ideal was not resignation or flight, but an intelligent defiance and

opposition. Therefore, he argued that man should accept woman as a

natural opponent arrayed against him for the benevolent purpose of

stimulating him to constant efficiency. Opposition, he pointed out,

was a necessary forerunner of function, and in consequence the fact

that woman spent her entire effort in a ceaseless endeavor to undermine

and change the will of man, merely served to make this will alert and

strong, and so increased man's capacity for meeting and overcoming the

enemies of his existence.

A man conscious of his strength, observes Nietzsche, need have no

fear of women. It is only the man who finds himself utterly helpless

in the face of feminine cajolery that must cry, "Get thee behind me,

Satan!" and flee. "It is only the most sensual men," he says, "who

have to shun women and torture their bodies." The normal, healthy man,

despite the strong appeal which women make to him by their subtle

putting forward of the sexual idea--visually as dress, coquetry and

what not--still keeps a level head. He is strong enough to weather the

sexual storm. But the man who cannot do this, who experiences no normal

reaction in the direction of guardedness and caution and reason, must

either abandon himself utterly as a helpless slave to woman's instinct

of race-preservation, and so become a bestial voluptuary, or avoid

temptation altogether and so become a celibate.[2]

There is nothing essentially evil in woman's effort to combat and

control man's will by constantly suggesting the sexual idea to him,

because it is necessary, for the permanence of the race, that this

idea be presented frequently and powerfully. Therefore, the conflict

between masculine and feminine ideals is to be regarded, not as a

lamentable battle, in which one side is right and the other wrong, but

a convenient means of providing that stimulation-by-opposition without

which all function, and in consequence all progress, would cease. "The

man who regards women as an enemy to be avoided," says Nietzsche,

"betrays an unbridled lust which loathes not only itself, but also its

means."[3]

There are, of course, occasions when the feminine influence, by

its very subtlety, works harm to the higher sort of men. It is

dangerous for a man to love too violently and it is dangerous, too,

for him to be loved too much.' "The natural inclination of women

to a quiet, uniform and peaceful existence "--that is to say, to a

slave-morality--"operates adversely to the heroic impulse of the

masculine free spirit. Without being aware of it, women act like a

person who would remove stones from the path of a mineralogist, lest

his feet should come in contact with them--forgetting entirely that he

is faring forth for the very purpose of coming in contact with them....

The wives of men with lofty aspirations cannot resign themselves to

seeing their husbands suffering, impoverished and slighted, even

though it is apparent that this suffering proves, not only that its

victim has chosen his attitude aright, but also that his aims--some

day, at least--will be realized. Women always intrigue in secret

against the higher souls of their husbands. They seek to cheat the

future for the sake of a painless and agreeable present."[4] In other

words, the feminine vision is ever limited in range. Your typical woman

cannot see far ahead; she cannot reason out the ultimate effect of a

complicated series of causes; her eye is always upon the present or

the very near future. Thus Nietzsche reaches, by a circuitous route,

a conclusion supported by the almost unanimous verdict of the entire

masculine sex, at all times and everywhere.

Nietzsche quite agrees with Schopenhauer (and with nearly everyone

else who has given the matter thought) that the thing we call love is

grounded upon physical desire, and that all of those arts of dress

and manner in which women excel are mere devices for arousing this

desire in man, but he points out, very justly, that a great many other

considerations also enter into the matter. Love necessarily presupposes

a yearning to mate, and mating is its logical consequence, but the

human imagination has made it more than that. The man in love sees

in his charmer, not only an attractive instrument for satisfying his

comparatively rare and necessarily brief impulses to dalliance, but

also a worthy companion, guide, counsellor and friend. The essence of

love is confidence--confidence in the loved one's judgment, honesty

and fidelity and in the persistence of her charm. So large do

these considerations loom among the higher classes of men that they

frequently obscure the fundamental sexual impulse entirely. It is a

commonplace, indeed, that in the ecstasies of amorous idealization, the

notion of the function itself becomes obnoxious. It may be impossible

to imagine a man loving a woman without having had, at some time,

conscious desire for her, but all the same it is undoubtedly true that

the wish for marriage is very often a wish for close and constant

association with the one respected, admired and trusted rather than a

yearning for the satisfaction of desire.

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