"Cuba; America: America; Cuba. The two names are inseparable." So we
said at the beginning of our history of the "Pearl of the Antilles." So
we must say at the beginning of a new era, the third, in these annals.
At the beginning the connection was between Cuba and America as a
whole--the continents of the western hemisphere. In this second case it
is between Cuba and America in the more restricted meaning of the United
States. There was a significant and to some degree influential forecast
of this relationship in the preceding era, in which Cuba was in contact
with England and with the rising British power in the New World. For
what was afterward to become the United States was then a group of
British colonies, and it was inevitable that relations begun in Colonial
times should be inherited by the independent nation which succeeded.
Moreover, Cuba was in those days brought to the attention of the future
United States in a peculiarly forcible manner by the very important
participation of Colonial troops, particularly from Connecticut and New
Jersey, in that British conquest of Havana which we have recorded in
preceding chapters.
It was nearly half a century, however, after the establishment of
American independence that any practical interest began to be taken in
Cuba by the great continental republic at the north. The purchase of the
Louisiana territory and the opening to unrestrained American commerce of
that Mississippi River which a former Governor of Cuba had discovered
and partially explored, had greatly increased American interest in the
Gulf of Mexico and had created some commercial interest in the great
Island which forms its southern boundary. Later the acquisition of
Florida called attention acutely to the passing away of Spain's American
Empire and to the concern which the United States might well feel in the
disposition of its remaining fragments. Already, in the case of Florida
in 1811 the United States Government had enunciated the principle that
it could not permit the transfer of an adjacent colony from one European
power to another. It will be pertinent to this narrative to recall that
action in fuller detail. The time was in the later Napoleonic wars, when
Spain was almost at the mercy of any despoiler. There was imminent
danger that Spain would transfer Florida to some other power, as she had
done a few years before with the Louisiana territory, or that it would
be taken from her. In these circumstances the Congress of the United
States on January 15, 1811, adopted a joint resolution in these terms:
"Taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain, and of her American
provinces; and considering the influence which the destiny of the
territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may have
upon their security, tranquility and commerce,
"Be it Resolved: That the United States, under the peculiar
circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot without serious inquietude
see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign
power; and that a due regard for their own safety compels them to
provide under certain contingencies for the temporary occupation of the
said territory; they at the same time declaring that the said territory
shall, in their hands, remain subject to future negotiations."
Then the same Congress enacted a law authorizing the President to take
possession of Florida or of any part of it, in case of any attempt of a
European power other than Spain herself to occupy it, and to use to that
end the Army and Navy of the United States. Nothing of the sort needed
to be done at that time, though a little later, during the War of 1812,
Florida was invaded by a British force and immediately thereafter was
occupied by an American army.
The enunciation of this principle by Congress marked an epoch in
American foreign policy, leading directly to the Monroe Doctrine a dozen
years later. It also marked an epoch in the history of Cuba, especially
so far as the relations of the Island with the United States were
concerned. For while this declaration by Congress applied only to
Florida, because Florida abutted directly upon the United States, the
logic of events presently compelled it to be extended to Cuba. This was
done a little more than a dozen years after the declaration concerning
Florida. By this time Florida had been annexed to the United States and
Mexico, Central America and South America had revolted against Spain and
declared their independence. Only the "Ever Faithful Isle," as Cuba then
began to be called, and Porto Rico remained to Spain of an empire which
once nominally comprised the entire western hemisphere. Cuba was not
like Florida geographically, abutting upon the United States. But it lay
almost within sight from the coast of Florida and commanded the southern
side of the Florida channel through which all American commerce from the
Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic Ocean must
pass, and thus it was invested with peculiar importance to the United
States. Nor was it lacking in importance to Great Britain and France.
Those powers possessed extensive and valuable holdings in the West
Indies and they were rivals for the reversionary title to these
remaining Spanish Islands, Cuba and Porto Rico. Each of them realized
that whichever of them should secure those two great Islands would, by
virtue of that circumstance, become the dominant power in the West
Indies. Moreover they both felt sure that Spain would soon have to
relinquish her hold upon them. This latter belief prevailed widely also
in the United States, and was by no means absent from Cuba itself.
Indeed a party was organized in Cuba in the spring of 1822, for the
express purpose of seeking annexation to the United States, and in
September of that year did make direct overtures to that end to the
American Government. The President of the United States, James Monroe,
received these overtures in a cautious and non-committal manner. He sent
a confidential agent to Cuba to examine into conditions there and to
report upon them, but gave no direct encouragement to the annexation
movement.
At about this time the direction of the foreign affairs of Great Britain
came into the hands of George Canning, a statesman of exceptional vision
and aggressive patriotism, and one specially concerned with the welfare
of British interests in the New World. He was well aware of the
condition and trend of affairs in Cuba, and felt that the transfer of
that Island from Spain to any other power would be unfortunate for
British interests in the West Indies. When he learned of the Cuban
overtures for annexation to the United States, therefore, in December,
1822, he brought the matter to the careful consideration of the British
Cabinet and suggested to his colleagues that such annexation of Cuba by
the United States would be a very serious detriment to the British
Empire in the western hemisphere. He made no diplomatic representation
upon the subject either to Spain or to the United States, but he did
send a considerable naval force to the coastal waters of Cuba and Porto
Rico, apparently with the purpose of preventing, if necessary, any such
change in the sovereignty and occupancy of those Islands.
[Illustration: GEORGE CANNING]
In this Canning was probably over-anxious, since there is no indication
whatever that the American Government contemplated any such step or that
it would have attempted to take possession of Cuba if the Island had
been left unguarded. On the other hand, this action of Canning's very
naturally aroused American concern and provoked the suspicion that
England was planning the seizure or purchase of the Island. The result
was the formal application to Cuba of the principle which had already
been enunciated by Congress in respect to Florida. It was the
legislative branch of the United States Government that took that action
toward Florida. It was the executive and diplomatic branch which took
the action toward Cuba. This was done in a memorable state document
which formed a land-mark in the history of American foreign policy.
The American Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, on April 28, 1823,
wrote an official letter to Hugh Nelson, who at the beginning of that
year had become American minister to Spain. This letter contained
official instructions to Nelson concerning his conduct in the war which
was impending between Spain and France, because of the latter power's
intervention in Spanish affairs in behalf of King Ferdinand VII. It then
turned to the subject of Cuba and continued as follows:
[Illustration: JOHN QUINCY ADAMS]
"Whatever may be the issue of this war, it may be taken for granted that
the dominion of Spain upon the American continents, north and south, is
irrevocably gone. But the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico still remain
nominally, and so far really, dependent upon her, that she yet possesses
the power of transferring her own dominion over them, together with the
possession of them, to others. These islands are natural appendages to
the North American continent, and one of them almost in sight of our
shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of
transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our
Union. Its commanding position with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and
the West Indian seas, its situation midway between our southern coast
and the island of San Domingo, its safe and capacious harbor of the
Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same
advantages, the nature of its production and of its wants, furnishing
the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable
and mutually beneficial give it an importance in the sum of our national
interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared,
and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this
Union together. Such indeed are, between the interests of that island
and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral and political
relations formed by nature, gathering in the process of time, and even
now verging to maturity, that in looking forward to the probable course
of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely
possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our
Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity
of the Union itself.... There are laws of political as well as of
physical gravitation. And if an apple, severed by the tempest from its
native tree, cannot choose but to fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly
disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of
self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which,
by the same law of nature cannot cast her off from her bosom. The
transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the
interests of this Union.... The question both of our right and of our
power to prevent it, if necessary, by force, already obtrudes itself
upon our councils, and the Administration is called upon, in the
performance of its duties to the nation, at least, to use all the means
within its competency to guard against and forefend it."
That was the beginning of the policy of the United States toward Cuba.
In making that declaration Adams had general support and little or no
opposition. A few weeks afterward the ex-President, Thomas Jefferson,
writing to Monroe, expressed in part the same view, though he coupled it
with the suggestion of an alliance with Great Britain. He wrote:
"Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its
possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calamity to us.
Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against
all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it
were our own. But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war
for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or
the island will give herself to us when able to do so."
Two years later, in 1825, Henry Clay, then Secretary of State in the
Cabinet of President John Quincy Adams, instructed the American
ministers at the chief European capitals to make it known that the
United States for itself desired no change in the political condition of
Cuba; that it was satisfied to have it remain open to American commerce;
but that it "could not with indifference see it passing from Spain to
any other European power." A little later he added, referring to Cuba
and Porto Rico, that "we could not consent to the occupation of those
islands by any other European power than Spain, under any contingency
whatever."
This attitude of the American Government was sufficient to accomplish
the purpose desired. Although the power of Spain continued to decline,
no attempt was made by either France or England to acquire possession of
Cuba by either conquest or purchase. But in August, 1825, the British
Government laid before the American minister in London a proposal that
the United States should unite with Great Britain and France in a
tripartite agreement for the protection of Spain in her possession of
Cuba to the effect that none of the three would take Cuba for itself or
would acquiesce in the taking of it by either of the others. The
American minister reported this to the President, who promptly and
emphatically declined it. It was then that Henry Clay made the
pronouncement already quoted, that the United States could not consent
to the occupation of Cuba by any other European power than Spain, under
any contingency whatever.
A little later in the same year American interest in Cuba was again
appealed to from another source. Several of the former Spanish colonies
which had declared their independence, particularly Mexico and Colombia,
expressed much dissatisfaction that Cuba and Porto Rico should remain in
the possession of Spain. They desired to see the Spanish power entirely
expelled from the western hemisphere. They therefore began intriguing
for revolutions in those islands, and failing that prepared themselves
to take forcible possession of them. These plans encountered the serious
disapproval of the United States government, and on December 20, 1825,
Henry Clay wrote to the representatives of the Mexican and Colombian
governments urgently requesting them to refrain from sending the
military expeditions to Cuba which were being prepared; a request with
which they complied, Colombia readily but Mexico more reluctantly. Those
two countries had been specially moved to their proposed action by the
declaration of the famous Panama Congress, then in session, in favor of
"the freeing of the islands of Porto Rico and Cuba from the Spanish
yoke." It is interesting to recall, too, that in his instructions to the
United States delegates to that Congress, who unfortunately did not
arrive in time to participate in its deliberations, Clay declared that
"even Spain has not such a deep interest in the future fate of Cuba as
the United States."
Justice requires us, unfortunately, in concluding our consideration of
this early phase of Cuban-American relations, to confess that the
motives of the United States were not at that time altogether of the
highest character. To put it very plainly, there was much opposition to
the extension of Mexican or Colombian influence to Cuba because that
would have meant the abolition of human slavery in the island, and that
would have been offensive to the slave states of the southern United
States. Also some of the earliest movements in the United States toward
the annexation of Cuba were inspired by the wish to maintain the
institution of slavery in that island and to add it to the slave holding
area of the United States. It was on such ground that Senator Hayne and
others declared in the American Congress that the United States "would
not permit Mexico or Colombia to take or to revolutionize Cuba." James
Buchanan declared that under the control of one of those countries Cuba
would become a dangerous explosive magazine for the southern slave
States because Mexico and Colombia were free countries and "always
conquered by proclaiming liberty to the slave."
We have recalled these facts and circumstances in this place somewhat in
advance of their strict chronological order, by way of introduction to
the history of Cuba in the Nineteenth Century, because they really
dominate in spirit the whole story. It will be necessary to recur to
them again, briefly, in their proper place. But it is essential to bear
them in mind from the beginning, even through this anticipatory review
of them. Every page and line and letter of Cuban history in the
Nineteenth Century is colored by the Declaration of Independence of
1776, by the fact that the United States of America had arisen as the
foremost power in the Western Hemisphere. Through the inspiration which
it gave to the French Revolution, the United States was chiefly
responsible, as an alien force, for the complete collapse of Spain as a
great European power. Through its example and potential influence as a
protector it was responsible for the revolt and independence of the
Spanish colonies in Central and South America. Then through its
assertion of special interests in Cuba, because of propinquity, and
through the tangible influence of commercial and social intercourse,
together with a constantly increasing and formidable, though generally
concealed, political sway, it determined the future destinies of the
Queen of the Antilles.