CHAPTER XVII.

DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPANY AND SHARE MANIA IN 1881.—EVENTS OF THE

“BUBBLE YEAR.”—CAUSES WHICH BROUGHT THE MANIA ABOUT.—WHY COMPANIES WERE

FIRST FORMED.—THE BARNATO CO.—THE CENTRAL CO.—THE FRANKFORT MINE.—THE

COSMOPOLITAN CO.—WONDERFUL INVESTMENTS.—SLOW RETURN OF CONFIDENCE.

The “ten claim clause,” which was passed by the legislative council of

Griqualand West under Governor Southey (_vide_ clause 18, Ordinance 10,

1874), and prohibited any person, firm or joint-stock company to have

registered in his name, or in the name of his or their accredited agent

at any time within six months, reckoned from the date of the

proclamation of a digging, more than one claim, and after that period

more than ten claims, was brought forward by some interested men as the

reason for the non-introduction of foreign capital into our digging

operations.

The rescinding of this clause in 1876 (Ordinance 12, Nov. 20th) effected

great changes, the alteration in the law throwing the road open for

capitalists to buy out small holders in the Kimberley and other mines,

virtually leading the way to the extraordinary mania for

company-mongering and share-rigging which existed in 1880 and 1881.

The repeal of this clause, however, which had never been in favor with

capitalists, because it obstructed them from “blocking” claims in the

mines, was hailed by some with delight, by others with foreboding, as

the latter believed it to prognosticate the approach of monopoly and the

departure of the individual digger. This repeal initiated a most

remarkable period in the history of the diamond fields, in which a mania

for company promoting and for mad speculation seized the whole

community, of which a repetition is now going on at the De Kaap gold

fields. It may not perhaps be a matter of surprise that the inhabitants

of a place, depending on a somewhat precarious industry and one of which

the proceeds are so liable to fluctuation, should be more or less imbued

with the spirit of gambling, nor is there anything unusual in the digger

deserting his mining operations to endeavor to gain wealth in a more

rapid manner by speculation. Such circumstances have been of frequent

occurrence in America and Australia, where many a man who had been

unlucky as a digger, using his acquired knowledge has realized a fortune

by speculating in shares or claims.

In the case of the sudden rise of the share mania in Kimberley, the most

extraordinary point was to be found in the fact that the place had long

thrown off the habits and appearance of a digging camp, and had assumed

the customs of a settled town, while all matters connected with share

transactions were conducted in so systematic a manner that the event

bore a close resemblance to one of those speculative fevers which

occasionally seize the home Stock Exchange. Kimberley was not alone in

this novel excitement; the infection spread throughout the whole of

South Africa, share transactions were eagerly carried on in all the

coast towns, and companies with large capitals were also formed to work

the diamond mines in the Free State, at Jagersfontein, Koffyfontein and

Oliphansfontein, and half a dozen others of which it can now only be

said

“Gaudet cognomine terra.”

It is no easy matter to fully trace why the cause of this wild desire

for speculation seized upon the community. It has often been stated that

it was simply an endeavor on the part of interested persons on the

diamond fields to defraud the outside public and get rid of their

worthless property. This, however, was not the case, although it must be

admitted that in many instances the actions of promoters of companies

were far from honorable. A more feasible answer to the question will be

found in the fact that for some time past there had existed in

Kimberley, companies which, although registered under the limited

liability act, were of a semi-private nature; for instance, the

“Compagnie Française” (French Diamond Mining Company) and the Cape

Diamond Mining Company, both of which had been formed in 1879, some

three years after the “ten claim clause” had been abolished. These

undertakings were believed to be most successful, and the general public

on the Fields were eager to participate in the profits of similar

enterprises. When this desire became apparent there were many

claim-holders who were desirous of realizing some ready money, or paying

off some existing mortgage, by the sale of a share in their diamond

operations, and hence the creation of new joint-stock undertakings.

That the first companies on the Fields, the British and Central, were

formed with a most legitimate object, it is quite impossible to deny,

and the reason for their formation is most easily to be seen. As the

mine attained a greater depth, the expenses of working naturally became

larger; elaborate machinery had to be erected, and more European labor

was therefore required. Under such circumstances it is not strange that

many diggers found it to their advantage to amalgamate with their

neighbors; moreover, it often occurred that those who formerly had been

actively employed in the mine were desirous of entering into other

pursuits, and yet were not willing to abandon all interest in digging

operations; consequently the formation of joint-stock companies

naturally suggested itself as a convenient way of meeting the

requirements of the case. It was under such circumstances that the first

companies in Kimberley were formed. The shares in these undertakings

very seldom passed out of the hands of the original holders and the

system gave every promise of success; it is true that there were

prophets of evil, who were ready even in those days to declare that this

step was one on the road to ruin, so far as the prosperity of Kimberley

was concerned, yet for a time the results of these companies in most

cases proved to be unmistakably satisfactory, and it was this _bona

fide_ success which encouraged the promotion of numerous other schemes

which were shortly afterward introduced.

In the early part of the year 1881 there existed about a dozen companies

in the Kimberley mine, the total capital of which amounted roundly to

two millions and a half, and the shares in these undertakings were in

the hands of the most successful diggers on the Fields. These shares had

not, of course, been purchased with cash, but every claim-holder who put

his claim ground into a company received a certain amount of scrip for

his property. It is impossible to dispute the fact that claim property

had risen enormously in value during the few years previous to the

establishment of the first joint-stock undertaking, and it is manifest

that if claims were incorporated in a company at a price on which they

could yield a fair dividend, that price was a perfectly fair one. The

non-success of many of the subsequent undertakings was mainly due to the

fact that the promoters were blind to this very simple truth, and had

forgotten, or had never known, the first principles which should govern

joint-stock undertakings. In fact people who would never have dreamed of

buying a share in a business at £1,000, which would only secure a return

on five hundred, invested freely in shares in companies, the claims in

which would have given an admirable return on a small capital, but a

very poor one, if any at all, on the enormous sums at which they were

put in.

When once the idea that the joint-stock system was the most advantageous

method for working the mines gained a hold upon the community, the

excitement became intense, company after company was formed, and the

shares in every case were eagerly taken up by the public. When the

formation of a new undertaking was announced, the applications

universally doubled and trebled the number of shares proposed to be

allotted, and in fact a premium was invariably offered to a successful

applicant for the chance he had secured of obtaining a share in any new

venture.

The different lists for share applications were filled with marvelous

rapidity, and remained open but a very short time. Ebden Street, the

“Rue Quincampoix”[52] of Kimberley, was filled from morning to night

with a tumultuous and maddened crowd. The various offices of companies

in formation were simply stormed, and those who could not get in at the

door from the pressure of the crowd, threw their applications for shares

(to which were attached cheques and bank notes) through the windows,

trusting to chance that they might be picked up. It is difficult to

picture the eagerness, the plots, the rage of the excited multitude bent

on securing this, the magic scrip, which was to make the needy rich and

the embarrassed free.

It was astonishing how the mania seized on all classes in Kimberley,

from the highest to the lowest, just as Law’s scheme and the South Sea

bubble did during the previous century; how every one, doctors and

lawyers, masters and servants, shop-keepers and workmen, men of the pen

and men of the sword, magistrates and I. D. B.’s, Englishmen and

foreigners, rushed wildly into the wonderful game of speculation.

One financial agent told me he floated five companies in three weeks,

viz.: The Fry’s Gully, Du Toit’s Pan; the De Beer’s Central, De Beer’s;

the Barnato Co., Kimberley; the Frere Co., De Beer’s; and the Globe Co.,

Du Toit’s Pan; and that although the capital required for the five

companies was £496,000 only, yet £1,230,000 passed through his hands in

the short time I have mentioned.

Business of every kind was neglected, mining operations were all but

suspended, the sole topic being the share market and the profits to be

made there. Many made unexpected fortunes, and realized in a few months

gains larger than those a whole lifetime of work and economy could have

procured them had they continued their ordinary pursuits. Under these

circumstances it was only natural that many owners of worthless ground

took advantage of the general excitement to form companies which had

hardly the remotest possibility of success; it was evident that it

mattered very little to the general public, or the majority at all

events, what the company was, what the value of the claims might be or

where they were situated, so long as it was a diamond-mining company it

was quite sufficient to command public favor. The public bought shares

in the diamond-mining companies as to-day they are doing in the gold

companies, not to obtain dividends on their capital invested, but for

purposes of pure speculation.

One of the most flagrant instances of bogus company promoting which ever

came under notice was the imposition attempted at a farm named

Frankfort, situated in the Free State, about sixteen miles from

Kimberley.

This farm was prospected, diamonds found (?), a mine surveyed, claims

given out, dams dug, shafts sunk and machinery erected, simply to

bolster up a gigantic swindle, which but for the outspoken opinion of a

surveyor named Kitto would have been foisted, through a well known

European firm, who merely awaited his report, on the English public for

£450,000. To assist in gulling home investors an American adventurer was

actually sent to England with a parcel of beautiful diamonds, certified

by affidavit to have been found in this mine, in order that those

concerned in introducing the scheme to the public might give visible and

tangible proof of the enormous value of the property which they had for

disposal. Mr. Kitto’s report, however, decided the fate of what he terms

“one of the most shameful swindles ever attempted.”

Many a laughable story is told of how diamonds were turned out of, or—to

be more accurate—put into this mine. One probable investor on going down

a shaft to examine the ground at the bottom had a hail-storm of little

diamonds showered on him (some of which lit on the brim of his hat)

which were meant for him to unearth in the loose ground at the bottom.

This wonderful discovery of the diamond’s new “locate” did not tend to

increase this gentleman’s opinion of the proffered investment! On

another occasion an astute matron interested in the swindle roundly

bullied her servants for their carelessness in finding only seven

diamonds instead of eight, with which she had “salted” the wash-up.

To make a long story short, the “best laid schemes of mice and men gang

aft agley,” the bubble burst, and the proprietors of this wonderful mine

allowed the knowledge of its startling richness to sink into oblivion,

and found consolation and support in ministering to the bodily wants of

those whom business or pleasure took to that worked-out and forsaken

Golconda.

As another example of how things were managed in those days when the

share mania was at its height, I may mention the case of a well-known

citizen who conceived the happy idea of putting into a company certain

claims in the Bulfontein mine which were then in his possession. These

claims were twenty-six and one-half in number, and the services of an

energetic promoter (who was to be paid £500 if he pushed the company

through) having been secured, a prospectus pithily written was submitted

to several well-known men who agreed to become provisional directors.

The capital of the company was stipulated to be £30,000, in 6,000 shares

of £5 each, of which £1 was payable on application, a similar sum to be

paid on allotment. The vendor, however, reserved 3,000 shares for

himself, so that only 3,000 were offered to the public. The _modus

operandi_ of floating this company was somewhat unique. It was known

that locally the company could not go through, as the unkind assertion

that “half of the ground was in the street” was generally believed, but

that difficulty the diplomatic promoter overcame by sending copies of

the prospectus to agents in the Colony and Natal fully a week before it

was allowed to see the light of day on the Fields. This turned out to be

a rather clever dodge, for, before its publication in the local prints,

the secretary had in his possession sufficient applications by wire, the

forms for which duly signed afterward came to hand, to insure the safety

of the company. Locally there were but few applications. The first

instalment of the company, however, was only just subscribed for and the

share allotment made, when the collapse in the share market took place.

What, however, is a singular thing in reference to this company is, that

the money paid on application and that paid on allotment, which must

have amounted to some thousands of pounds, has never yet been accounted

for. The directors fell away one by one, no work was done or machinery

ordered, and eventually the vendor became his own chairman, directors

secretary, trustee, manager and the general _multum in parvo_ of the

Cosmopolitan Diamond Mining Company, Bulfontein mine! It has transpired

that the shareholders’ money had not even been devoted to paying the

licenses on the claims, for I find that up to Feb. 1887, there was an

amount due to the London and South African Exploration Company (limited)

of £2,008 for licenses on the claims from Sept. 1st, 1880. When this

company was introduced to the public, one of the clauses of the

prospectus read as follows:

“The well-known and regular returns of the Bulfontein mine are

proverbial, and most of the companies recently formed at a very much

higher rate per claim, are even now at a respectable premium; which,

coupled with the fact that all difficulties and obstructions having

been removed by the settlement arrived at between the claim-holders

generally and the London and South African Exploration Company

(limited), the provisional directors have all confidence in the future

of this company.”

Although the vendor then stated that a settlement had been arrived at,

yet in March, 1884, when sued by the London and South African

Exploration Company for the rent which was due to them, this gentleman

pleaded that the company had no title! Either his first statement in the

prospectus or his last in pleading must have been audacious in the

extreme.

The London and South African Exploration Company withdrew from the case,

probably to bring it on again at a later period.[53] Some shareholders

are asking what has become of the money, and whether the company should

not be forced into liquidation, that the matter may be fully inquired

into. The promoter of the company was never fully paid, and many

outstanding accounts were never settled.

The floating of this company and its subsequent history forms a novel of

itself, and is another proof of the loose manner in which important

business involving thousands of pounds was transacted.

This was indeed a time when a visitor to Kimberley could not help being

struck with the remarkable amount of business, legitimate and

illegitimate, which was transacted in a place so lately a mere desert.

As I have already mentioned the streets were thronged with an eager

crowd, all engaged in the same pursuit, the purchase or sale of shares;

a pursuit which each one firmly believed to be the high road to fortune.

Well-nigh every conveyance which arrived on the Fields brought new

comers, anxious to share in the supposed good fortune, all the hotels

were crowded, and from every drinking bar might be heard the popping of

champagne corks; for lucky speculators were lavish with their money,

believing as they did that they had hit on an inexhaustible mine of

wealth. Diggers who had hitherto scarcely managed to make both ends meet

now imagined themselves wealthy, as their claims had been put into

companies at a price sufficient to make them comfortable for life; men

who before had been contented to work hard for five or six pounds a week

secured positions as managers of companies with comparatively enormous

salaries, clerks and shopmen became secretaries, and assumed all the

dignity of their new positions, and lawyers were employed day and night,

drawing up agreements and trust deeds. The insatiate thirst for

speculation was not slaked by the opportunity afforded of drinking

fortune’s drams in mining ventures alone. Although 113 of these were

floated, yet some score of other schemes were thrown out as baits to

catch the unwary investor. Brick, coal, laundry, transport, ironmongery,

labor supply, theatres, clubs, hotels, aerated waters, in fact the

prosecution of every conceivable industry was changed from private hands

to those of managers and directors, some directors becoming veritable

“guinea pigs,” occupying seats at as many as from ten to fifteen boards

at the same time.

Extraordinary as it may seem, it is nevertheless a fact that in six

months the nominal capital of the diamond mining companies rose from two

millions and a half to over eight, and the companies in number from half

a dozen to seventy-one; of these thirteen existed in the Kimberley mine,

with a total capital of £2,685,000; eighteen at Du Toit’s Pan, with a

capital of £2,200,750. De Beers had thirteen companies, whose united

capital was £1,334,100, while at Bulfontein there were sixteen with the

more moderate sum of £871,100. In addition to these there were about

eleven companies formed to work the outside mines, and the capital

required for this purpose was estimated at £923,000. Some idea of the

large scale on which it was proposed to conduct these operations may be

formed from the fact that the total sum proposed to be devoted to the

purchase of machinery was no less than £650,700. Taking all these

matters into consideration, it does not require very great experience in

the art of finance to realize that the community of Kimberley was

playing at a very dangerous game, and one which would sooner or later be

attended with very serious results. Nor did the danger lie only in the

fact that Kimberley speculated far beyond its capital, from the

commencement to the end the hastily formed companies had but little

chance of success, their very trust deeds being irregular. Again, the

greed of the promoters exhausted the funds which should have been

devoted to the development of the property, claims were put in at a

price which rendered the payment of any but the most paltry dividends

impossible, whilst the favoritism and nepotism of directors caused

inefficient men to be appointed to posts the occupants of which should

have had the utmost possible practical experience.

All this ought to have been clear to the old residents on the Fields,

but for some unaccountable reason they seemed blind for the time to all

principles of common sense; the Kimberley investor—I mean, of course,

the _bona fide_ investor and not the mere speculator in shares—seemed to

throw his judgment aside altogether, and apparently believed that the

“bonanza” from which he was to derive his future wealth was to be found

in the ground, which, as he might have known, had scarcely paid for

working in the hands of the individual digger, and could not be

expected, even with the command of improved and costly machinery which

capital could secure, to pay even decent dividends.

For many months, until June 1881, in fact, shares continued to advance

in price to the most absurd premiums, and the most outrageous reports

were taken as truths, while the influx of a considerable amount of money

from colonial investors aided in fanning the breeze, which wafted the

place on the rocks and breakers of financial distress.

The first check which the mania received was given by the sudden action

taken by the local banks. The managers of these institutions had given

way to the general excitement, and in fact had conduced to it by freely

advancing money on all kinds of bogus paper, and now they suddenly

became alive to the fact that the security of the scrip of mining

companies might not be so sound as at first sight it appeared to be, and

refused, for the future, to make any advances on this class of property.

A loud cry of indignation was immediately raised from every quarter,

speculators who had been purchasing heavily and mortgaging their shares

to purchase more, and who now found that their system would receive a

fatal blow, naturally complained of these, as they termed them,

“arbitrary and injudicious proceedings” on the part of the financial

institutions.

By slow degrees the mania abated, at last shareholders commenced to

realize the fact that they had invested beyond their means, and what

made the matter more serious they found it impossible to sell at

anything like the price at which they had purchased. The natural

consequence of this was a material fall in nearly all classes of shares.

In spite, however, of the tightness in the local money market, the

community by no means lost entire confidence in their pet schemes. To

show the justness of these opinions, I will mention one company in

particular, the “Barnato.” This was the smallest company in the

Kimberley mine, consisting of four claims only, and was introduced to

the public in March, 1881, at the enormous sum of £25,000 a claim, with

an addition of £15,000 for working expenses, almost double the value put

by any other company on their claims. The application list for shares

was open for an hour only, when the required capital was subscribed for

twice over, and in two days the shares were at twenty-five per cent,

premium, at which price they changed hands freely. The faith of the

investors in this company’s shares was fully borne out. During the

succeeding eighteen months (before the company’s claims were covered

over with reef) it actually paid dividends on this exorbitant capital to

the tune of thirty-one per cent., distributing among its shareholders no

less a sum than £35,650. The Central Company also paid in dividends

during the first three-quarters after its formation fifty-one per cent.,

reaching a grand total during its first two and a half years of some

eighty per cent., the amount in figures amounting to £321,985, 18s. 6d.

But the majority of companies never paid any dividend at all for years,

and some are even now not out of debt.

When it became apparent that the place had not a sufficient amount of

capital to support its enormous number of mining undertakings, many

plans were formed for the introduction of capital from Europe, and in

the hope of this object meeting with a successful issue, speculators

still continued to buy and sell shares, but as time went on and it

became perfectly clear that the hope of any benefit being derived from

this source must be abandoned, the value of scrip gradually became lower

and lower, until at last in many cases it was all but nil, and where

there were calls unpaid a minus quantity.

The decline in the value of shares in the market was enormous. Central

shares in the Kimberley mine, which had an easy sale in March, 1881, at

£400[54] per share were in 1884 almost unsalable at £25. Rose Innes

shares which were sought after at £53 sank to £5, and a similar fall

also occurred in the shares of all the companies in the other mines of

the province. In the mines of the Free State the depreciation in the

value of shares was more extraordinary still. An instance I well

remember. A friend of mine after years of application to business,

combined with indomitable perseverance, amassed a large fortune, when he

was tempted to speculate in the Koffyfontein mine, to which I have

already alluded, during the months of June and July, 1881. He bought

during the height of the mania 1,200 Koffyfontein shares at £28 each,

which were afterward within two years realized in his estate at 6d a

share. He thus lost over £30,000 on the one venture. This was far from

being an unparalleled instance of men being completely ruined by the

unprecedented fall which took place in shares at that time. Though the

diamond mania did not convey such widespread disaster as the South Sea

bubble or the Mississippi scheme, yet it will be years before the effect

of the South African “bubble year” of 1881 is forgotten.

On the time arriving when dividends were expected to be declared, in but

very few instances were the directors able to do so. Ground which had

yielded well in the hands of private owners often proved entirely

unremunerative under the joint-stock system, and the reason of this was

evident; the digger when working on his own account required no office

with a highly paid staff; he was his own manager and secretary, he

looked keenly after his own interests, and would never have dreamed of

trusting the most vital matters in his business to a possibly

incompetent servant.

In spite of the fact that, generally speaking, the company system had

proved a failure, but little attempt was made to mend matters. Things

drifted from bad to worse, until at last Kimberley entered on the worst

financial crisis that it had ever experienced. The companies with few

exceptions were more or less in difficulties. Pressed for their

liabilities by the banks, they had in turn to put the greatest pressure

on such shareholders as had not paid all the instalments on their

shares, and in very many cases their action was useless, as the

shareholders were unable to meet the demands made on them. The

consequence was that the companies had to go into liquidation and work

in the mines came to a partial stand-still. Kimberley was no longer the

Kimberley of the past.

It may be safely said that in its rash and reckless speculation

Kimberley was almost guilty of financial suicide, for not only was an

all but fatal blow given to the industry which supported the place, but

all confidence in its resources was for a time destroyed in the minds of

its colonial neighbors and the home investing public. The good, sound

investments, yielding large returns, to be made here, would startle the

quiet folk who are satisfied with the “three per cents.” As an instance

of the dividend paying capacity of some companies some months ago, I

cannot help mentioning the Elma at Old De Beers; in November, 1883, the

market value of its £10 paid-up shares was from 16 shillings to 20

shillings, when with good management in less than eight months it paid a

monthly dividend averaging from two to three per cent., or for the

investor who was lucky enough to buy in at the low prices, at the rate

of 360 per cent. per annum.

The fact of Griqualand with its incalculable mineral wealth being now

united to the colony by the line of railway opened at the end of

1885,[55] the knowledge that owing to this the cost of the production of

diamonds must be vastly diminished, together with the lessening of

theft, which the extension of the Diamond Trade Act to the colony and

the re-enactment of a similar ordinance by the government of the Free

State must produce, will tend to give a spurt to digging operations.

I shall next treat of the political stages through which the Diamond

Fields have passed from their discovery to the present time.

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