three-fourths of a mile west of the pike a body of troops, which
proved to be Ricketts's and Wheaton's divisions of the Sixth Corps,
and then learned that the Nineteenth Corps had halted a little to the
right and rear of these; but I did not stop, desiring to get to the
extreme front. Continuing on parallel with the pike, about midway
between Newtown and Middletown I crossed to the west of it, and a
little later came up in rear of Getty's division of the Sixth Corps.
When I arrived, this division and the cavalry were the only troops in
the presence of and resisting the enemy; they were apparently acting
as a rear-guard at a point about three miles north of the line we
held at Cedar Creek when the battle began. General Torbert was the
first officer to meet me, saying as he rode up, "My God! I am glad
you've come." Getty's division, when I found it, was about a mile
north of Middletown, posted on the reverse slope of some slightly
rising ground, holding a barricade made with fence-rails, and
skirmishing slightly with the enemy's pickets. Jumping my horse over
the line of rails, I rode to the crest of the elevation, and there
taking off my hat, the men rose up from behind their barricade with
cheers of recognition. An officer of the Vermont brigade, Colonel A.
S. Tracy, rode out to the front, and joining me, informed me that
General Louis A. Grant was in command there, the regular division
commander, General Getty, having taken charge of the Sixth Corps in
place of Ricketts, wounded early in the action, while temporarily
commanding the corps. I then turned back to the rear of Getty's
division, and as I came behind it, a line of regimental flags rose up
out of the ground, as it seemed, to welcome me. They were mostly the
colors of Crook's troops, who had been stampeded and scattered in the
surprise of the morning. The color-bearers, having withstood the
panic, had formed behind the troops of Getty. The line with the
colors was largely composed of officers, among whom I recognized
Colonel R. B. Hayes, since president of the United States, one of the
brigade commanders. At the close of this incident I crossed the
little narrow valley, or depression, in rear of Getty's line, and
dismounting on the opposite crest, established that point as my
headquarters. In a few minutes some of my staff joined me, and the
first directions I gave were to have the Nineteenth Corps and the two
divisions of Wright's corps brought to the front, so they could be
formed on Getty's division, prolonged to the right; for I had already
decided to attack the enemy from that line as soon as I could get
matters in shape to take the offensive. Crook met me at this time,
and strongly favored my idea of attacking, but said, however, that
most of his troops were gone. General Wright came up a little later,
when I saw that he was wounded, a ball having grazed the point of his
chin so as to draw the blood plentifully.
Wright gave me a hurried account of the day's events, and when told
that we would fight the enemy on the line which Getty and the cavalry
were holding, and that he must go himself and send all his staff to
bring up the troops, he zealously fell in with the scheme; and it was
then that the Nineteenth Corps and two divisions of the Sixth were
ordered to the front from where they had been halted to the right and
rear of Getty.
After this conversation I rode to the east of the Valley pike and to
the left of Getty's division, to a point from which I could obtain a
good view of the front, in the mean time sending Major Forsyth to
communicate with Colonel Lowell (who occupied a position close in
toward the suburbs of Middletown and directly in front of Getty's
left) to learn whether he could hold on there. Lowell replied that
he could. I then ordered Custer's division back to the right flank,
and returning to the place where my headquarters had been established
I met near them Ricketts's division under General Keifer and General
Frank Wheaton's division, both marching to the front. When the men
of these divisions saw me they began cheering and took up the double
quick to the front, while I turned back toward Getty's line to point
out where these returning troops should be placed. Having done this,
I ordered General Wright to resume command of the Sixth Corps, and
Getty, who was temporarily in charge of it, to take command of his
own division. A little later the Nineteenth Corps came up and was
posted between the right of the Sixth Corps and Middle Marsh Brook.
All this had consumed a great deal of time, and I concluded to visit
again the point to the east of the Valley pike, from where I had
first observed the enemy, to see what he was doing. Arrived there, I
could plainly see him getting ready for attack, and Major Forsyth now
suggested that it would be well to ride along the line of battle
before the enemy assailed us, for although the troops had learned of
my return, but few of them had seen me. Following his suggestion I
started in behind the men, but when a few paces had been taken I
crossed to the front and, hat in hand, passed along the entire length
of the infantry line; and it is from this circumstance that many of
the officers and men who then received me with such heartiness have
since supposed that that was my first appearance on the field. But
at least two hours had elapsed since I reached the ground, for it was
after mid-day, when this incident of riding down the front took
place, and I arrived not later, certainly, than half-past 10 o'clock.
After re-arranging the line and preparing to attack I returned again
to observe the Confederates, who shortly began to advance on us. The
attacking columns did not cover my entire front, and it appeared that
their onset would be mainly directed against the Nineteenth Corps,
so, fearing that they might be too strong for Emory on account of his
depleted condition (many of his men not having had time to get up
from the rear), and Getty's division being free from assault I
transferred a part of it from the extreme left to the support of the
Nineteenth Corps. The assault was quickly repulsed by Emory,
however, and as the enemy fell back Getty's troops were returned to
their original place. This repulse of the Confederates made me feel
pretty safe from further offensive operations on their part, and I
now decided to suspend the fighting till my thin ranks were further
strengthened by the men who were continually coming up from the rear,
and particularly till Crook's troops could be assembled on the
extreme left.
In consequence of the despatch already mentioned, "Be ready when I
join you, and we will crush Sheridan," since learned to have been
fictitious, I had been supposing all day that Longstreet's troops
were present, but as no definite intelligence on this point had been
gathered, I concluded, in the lull that now occurred, to ascertain
something positive regarding Longstreet; and Merritt having been
transferred to our left in the morning, I directed him to attack an
exposed battery then at the edge of Middletown, and capture some
prisoners. Merritt soon did this work effectually, concealing his
intention till his troops got close in to the enemy, and then by a
quick dash gobbling up a number of Confederates. When the prisoners
were brought in, I learned from them that the only troops of
Longstreet's in the fight were of Kershaw's division, which had
rejoined Early at Brown's Gap in the latter part of September, and
that the rest of Longstreet's corps was not on the field. The
receipt of this information entirely cleared the way for me to take
the offensive, but on the heels of it came information that
Longstreet was marching by the Front Royal pike to strike my rear at
Winchester, driving Powell's cavalry in as he advanced. This renewed
my uneasiness, and caused me to delay the general attack till after
assurances came from Powell denying utterly the reports as to
Longstreet, and confirming the statements of the prisoners.
Between half-past and 4 o'clock, I was ready to assail, and decided
to do so by advancing my infantry line in a swinging movement, so as
to gain the Valley pike with my right between Middletown and the
Belle Grove House; and when the order was passed along, the men
pushed steadily forward with enthusiasm and confidence. General
Early's troops extended some little distance beyond our right, and
when my flank neared the overlapping enemy, he turned on it, with the
effect of causing a momentary confusion, but General McMillan quickly
realizing the danger, broke the Confederates at the reentering angle
by a counter charge with his brigade, doing his work so well that the
enemy's flanking troops were cut off from their main body and left to
shift for themselves. Custer, who was just then moving in from the
west side of Middle Marsh Brook, followed McMillan's timely blow with
a charge of cavalry, but before starting out on it, and while his men
were forming, riding at full speed himself, to throw his arms around
my neck. By the time he had disengaged himself from this embrace,
the troops broken by McMillan had gained some little distance to
their rear, but Custer's troopers sweeping across the Middletown
meadows and down toward Cedar Creek, took many of them prisoners
before they could reach the stream--so I forgave his delay.
My whole line as far as the eye could see was now driving everything
before it, from behind trees, stone walls, and all such sheltering
obstacles, so I rode toward the left to ascertain how matters were
getting on there. As I passed along behind the advancing troops,
first General Grover, and then Colonel Mackenzie, rode up to welcome
me. Both were severely wounded, and I told them to leave the field,
but they implored permission to remain till success was certain.
When I reached the Valley pike Crook had reorganized his men, and as
I desired that they should take part in the fight, for they were the
very same troops that had turned Early's flank at Winchester and at
Fisher's Hill, I ordered them to be pushed forward; and the alacrity
and celerity with which they moved on Middletown demonstrated that
their ill-fortune of the morning had not sprung from lack of valor.
Meanwhile Lowell's brigade of cavalry, which, it will be remembered,
had been holding on, dismounted, just north of Middletown ever since
the time I arrived from Winchester, fell to the rear for the purpose
of getting their led horses. A momentary panic was created in the
nearest brigade of infantry by this withdrawal of Lowell, but as soon
as his men were mounted they charged the enemy clear up to the stone
walls in the edge of Middletown; at sight of this the infantry
brigade renewed its attack, and the enemy's right gave way. The
accomplished Lowell received his death-wound in this courageous
charge.
All our troops were now moving on the retreating Confederates, and as
I rode to the front Colonel Gibbs, who succeeded Lowell, made ready
for another mounted charge, but I checked him from pressing the
enemy's right, in the hope that the swinging attack from my right
would throw most of the Confederates to the east of the Valley pike,
and hence off their line of retreat through Strasburg to Fisher's
Hill. The eagerness of the men soon frustrated this anticipation,
however, the left insisting on keeping pace with the centre and
right, and all pushing ahead till we regained our old camps at Cedar
Creek. Beyond Cedar Creek, at Strasburg, the pike makes a sharp turn
to the west toward Fisher's Hill, and here Merritt uniting with
Custer, they together fell on the flank of the retreating columns,
taking many prisoners, wagons, and guns, among the prisoners being
Major-General Ramseur, who, mortally wounded, died the next day.
When the news of the victory was received, General Grant directed a
salute of one hundred shotted guns to be fired into Petersburg, and
the President at once thanked the army in an autograph letter. A few
weeks after, he promoted me, and I received notice of this in a
special letter from the Secretary of War, saying:
"--that for the personal gallantry, military skill, and just confidence
in the courage and patriotism of your troops, displayed by you on the
19th day of October at Cedar Run, whereby, under the blessing of
Providence, your routed army was reorganized, a great National
disaster averted, and a brilliant victory achieved over the rebels
for the third time in pitched battle within thirty days, Philip H.
Sheridan is appointed a major-general in the United States Army."
The direct result of the battle was the recapture of all the
artillery, transportation, and camp equipage we had lost, and in
addition twenty-four pieces of the enemy's artillery, twelve hundred
prisoners, and a number of battle-flags. But more still flowed from
this victory, succeeding as it did the disaster of the morning, for
the reoccupation of our old camps at once re-established a morale
which for some hours had been greatly endangered by ill-fortune.
It was not till after the battle that I learned fully what had taken
place before my arrival, and then found that the enemy, having
gathered all the strength he could through the return of
convalescents and other absentees, had moved quietly from Fisher's
Hill, in the night of the 18th and early on the morning of the 19th,
to surprise my army, which, it should be remembered, was posted on
the north bank of Cedar Creek, Crook holding on the left of the
Valley pike, with Thoburn's division advanced toward the creek on
Duval's (under Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes) and Kitching's
provisional divisions to the north and rear of Thoburn. The
Nineteenth Corps was on the right of Crook, extending in a
semi-circular line from the pike nearly to Meadow Brook, while the
Sixth Corps lay to the west of the brook in readiness to be used as a
movable column. Merritt's division was to the right and rear of the
Sixth Corps, and about a mile and a half west of Merrit was Custer
covering the fords of Cedar Creek as far west as the Middle road.
General Early's plan was for one column under General Gordon,
consisting of three divisions of infantry (Gordon's, Ramseur's, and
Pegram's), and Payne's brigade of cavalry to cross the Shenandoah
River directly east of the Confederate works at Fisher's Hill, march
around the northerly face of the Massanutten Mountain, and again
cross the Shenandoah at Bowman's and McInturff's fords. Payne's task
was to capture me at the Belle Grove House. General Early himself,
with Kershaw's and Wharton's divisions, was to move through
Strasburg, Kershaw, accompanied by Early, to cross Cedar Creek at
Roberts's ford and connect with Gordon, while Wharton was to continue
on the Valley pike to Hupp's Hill and join the left of Kershaw, when
the crossing of the Valley pike over Cedar Creek became free.
Lomax's cavalry, then in the Luray Valley, was ordered to join the
right of Gordon on the field of battle, while Rosser was to carry the
crossing of Cedar Creek on the Back road and attack Custer. Early's
conceptions were carried through in the darkness with little accident
or delay, Kershaw opening the fight by a furious attack on Thoburn's
division, while at dawn and in a dense fog Gordon struck Crook's
extreme left, surprising his pickets, and bursting into his camp with
such suddenness as to stampede Crook's men. Gordon directing his
march on my headquarters (the Belle Grove House), successfully turned
our position as he gained the Valley pike, and General Wright was
thus forced to order the withdrawal of the Nineteenth Corps from its
post at the Cedar Creek crossing, and this enabled Wharton to get
over the stream there unmolested and join Kershaw early in the
action.
After Crook's troops had been driven from their camps, General Wright
endeavored to form a line with the Sixth Corps to hold the Valley
pike to the left of the Nineteenth, but failing in this he ordered
the withdrawal of the latter corps, Ricketts, temporarily commanding
the Sixth Corps, checking Gordon till Emory had retired. As already
stated, Wharton was thus permitted to cross Cedar Creek on the pike,
and now that Early had a continuous line, he pressed his advantage so
vigorously that the whole Union army was soon driven from its camps
in more or less disorder; and though much disjointed resistance was
displayed, it may be said that no systematic stand was made until
Getty's division, aided by Torbert's cavalry, which Wright had
ordered to the left early in the action, took up the ground where, on
arriving from Winchester, I found them.
When I left my command on the 16th, little did I anticipate that
anything like this would happen. Indeed, I felt satisfied that Early
was, of himself, too weak to take the offensive, and although I
doubted the Longstreet despatch, yet I was confident that, even
should it prove true, I could get back before the junction could be
made, and at the worst I felt certain that my army was equal to
confronting the forces of Longstreet and Early combined. Still, the
surprise of the morning might have befallen me as well as the general
on whom it did descend, and though it is possible that this could
have been precluded had Powell's cavalry been closed in, as suggested
in my despatch from Front Royal, yet the enemy's desperation might
have prompted some other clever and ingenious scheme for relieving
his fallen fortunes in the Shenandoah Valley.
CHAPTER IV.
GENERAL EARLY REORGANIZES HIS FORCES--MOSBY THE GUERRILLA--GENERAL
MERRITT SENT TO OPERATE AGAINST MOSBY--ROSSER AGAIN ACTIVE--GENERAL
CUSTER SURPRISED--COLONEL YOUNG SENT TO CAPTURE GILMORE THE
GUERRILLA--COLONEL YOUNG'S SUCCESS--CAPTURE OF GENERAL KELLY AND
GENERAL CROOK--SPIES--WAS WILKES BOOTH A SPY?--DRIVING THE
CONFEDERATES OUT OF THE VALLEY--THE BATTLE OF WAYNESBORO'--MARCHING
TO JOIN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
Early's broken army practically made no halt in its retreat after the
battle of Cedar-Creek until it reached New Market, though at Fisher's
Hill was left a small rear-guard of cavalry, which hastily decamped,
however, when charged by Gibbs's brigade on the morning of the 20th.
Between the date of his signal defeat and the 11th of November, the
enemy's scattered forces had sufficiently reorganized to permit his
again making a reconnoissance in the valley as far north as Cedar
Creek, my army having meanwhile withdrawn to Kernstown, where it had
been finally decided that a defensive line should be held to enable
me to detach troops to General Grant, and where, by reconstructing
the Winchester and Potomac railroad from Stephenson's depot to
Harper's Ferry, my command might be more readily, supplied. Early's
reconnoissance north of Cedar Creek ended in a rapid withdrawal of
his infantry after feeling my front, and with the usual ill-fortune
to his cavalry; Merritt and Custer driving Rosser and Lomax with ease
across Cedar Creek on the Middle and Back roads, while Powell's
cavalry struck McCausland near Stony Point, and after capturing two
pieces of artillery and about three hundred officers and men chased
him into the Luray Valley.
Early got back to New Market on the 14th of November, and, from lack
of subsistence, being unable to continue demonstrations to prevent my
reinforcement of General Grant, began himself to detach to General
Lee by returning Kershaw's division to Petersburg, as was definitely
ascertained by Torbert in a reconnoissance to Mount Jackson. At this
time General Grant wished me to send him the Sixth Corps, and it was
got ready for the purpose, but when I informed him that Torbert's
reconnoissance had developed the fact that Early still retained four
divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, it was decided, on my
suggestion, to let the Sixth Corps remain till the season should be a
little further advanced, when the inclemency of the weather would
preclude infantry campaigning. These conditions came about early in
December, and by the middle of the month the whole of the Sixth Corps
was at Petersburg; simultaneously with its transfer to that line
Early sending his Second Corps to Lee.
During the entire campaign I had been annoyed by guerrilla bands
under such partisan chiefs as Mosby, White, Gilmore, McNeil, and
others, and this had considerably depleted my line-of-battle
strength, necessitating as it did large, escorts for my
supply-trains. The most redoubtable of these leaders was Mosby, whose
force was made up from the country around Upperville, east of the Blue
Ridge, to which section he always fled for a hiding-place when he
scented danger. I had not directed any special operations against
these partisans while the campaign was active, but as Mosby's men had
lately killed, within my lines, my chief quartermaster, Colonel Tolles,
and Medical Inspector Ohlenchlager, I concluded to devote particular
attention to these "irregulars" during the lull that now occurred; so
on the 28th of November, I directed General Merritt to march to the
Loudoun Valley and operate against Mosby, taking care to clear the
country of forage and subsistence, so as to prevent the guerrillas from
being harbored there in the future their destruction or capture being
well-nigh impossible, on account of their intimate knowledge of the
mountain region. Merritt carried out his instructions with his usual
sagacity and thoroughness, sweeping widely over each side of his
general line of march with flankers, who burned the grain and brought
in large herds of cattle, hogs and sheep, which were issued to the
troops.
While Merritt was engaged in this service the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad once more received the attention of the enemy; Rosser, with
two brigades of cavalry, crossing the Great North Mountain, capturing
the post of New Creek, with about five hundred prisoners and seven
guns, destroying all the supplies of the garrison, and breaking up
the railroad track. This slight success of the Confederates in West
Virginia, and the intelligence that they were contemplating further
raids in that section, led me to send, Crook there with one division,
his other troops going to City Point; and, I hoped that all the
threatened places would thus be sufficiently protected, but
negligence at Beverly resulted in the capture of that station by
Rosser on the 11th of January.
In the meanwhile, Early established himself with Wharton's division
at Staunton in winter quarters, posting his cavalry in that
neighborhood also, except a detachment at New Market, and another
small one at the signal-station on Three Top Mountain. The winter was
a most severe one, snow falling frequently to the depth of several
inches, and the mercury often sinking below zero. The rigor of the
season was very much against the success of any mounted operations,
but General Grant being very desirous to have the railroads broken up
about Gordonsville and Charlottesville, on the 19th of December I
started the cavalry out for that purpose, Torbert, with Merritt and
Powell, marching through Chester Gap, while Custer moved toward
Staunton to make a demonstration in Torbert's favor, hoping to hold
the enemy's troops in the valley. Unfortunately, Custer did not
accomplish all that was expected of him, and being surprised by
Rosser and Payne near Lacy's Springs before reveille, had to abandon
his bivouac and retreat down the valley, with the loss of a number of
prisoners, a few horses, and a good many horse equipments, for,
because of the suddenness of Rosser's attack, many of the men had no
time to saddle up. As soon as Custer's retreat was assured,
Wharton's division of infantry was sent to Charlottesville to check
Torbert, but this had already been done by Lomax, with the assistance
of infantry sent up from Richmond. Indeed, from the very beginning
of the movement the Confederates had been closely observing the
columns of Torbert and Custer, and in consequence of the knowledge
thus derived, Early had marched Lomax to Gordonsville in anticipation
of an attack there, at the same time sending Rosser down the valley
to meet Custer. Torbert in the performance of his task captured two
pieces of artillery from Johnson's and McCausland's brigades, at
Liberty Mills on the Rapidan River, but in the main the purpose of
the raid utterly failed, so by the 27th of December he returned,
many, of his men badly frost-bitten from the extreme cold which had
prevailed.
This expedition practically closed all operations for the season, and
the cavalry was put into winter cantonment near Winchester. The
distribution of my infantry to Petersburg and West Virginia left with
me in the beginning of the new year, as already stated, but the one
small division of the Nineteenth Corps. On account of this
diminution of force, it became necessary for me to keep thoroughly
posted in regard to the enemy, and I now realized more than I had
done hitherto how efficient my scouts had become since under the
control of Colonel Young; for not only did they bring me almost every
day intelligence from within Early's lines, but they also operated
efficiently against the guerrillas infesting West Virginia.
Harry Gilmore, of Maryland, was the most noted of these since the
death of McNeil, and as the scouts had reported him in Harrisonburg
the latter part of January, I directed two of the most trustworthy to
be sent to watch his movements and ascertain his purposes. In a few
days these spies returned with the intelligence that Gilmore was on
his way to Moorefield, the centre of a very disloyal section in West
Virginia, about ninety miles southwest of Winchester, where, under
the guise of a camp-meeting, a gathering was to take place, at which
he expected to enlist a number of men, be joined by a party of about
twenty recruits coming from Maryland, and then begin depredations
along the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Believing that Gilmore might
be captured, I directed Young to undertake the task, and as a
preliminary step he sent to Moorefield two of his men who early in
the war had "refugeed" from that section and enlisted in one of the
Union regiments from West Virginia. In about a week these men came
back and reported that Gilmore was living at a house between three
and four miles from Moorefield, and gave full particulars as to his
coming and going, the number of men he had about there and where they
rendezvoused.
With this knowledge at hand I directed Young to take twenty of his
best men and leave that night for Moorefield, dressed in Confederate
uniforms, telling him that I would have about three hundred cavalry
follow in his wake when he had got about fifteen miles start, and
instructing him to pass his party off as a body of recruits for
Gilmore coming from Maryland and pursued by the Yankee cavalry. I
knew this would allay suspicion and provide him help on the road;
and, indeed, as Colonel Whittaker, who alone knew the secret,
followed after the fleeing "Marylanders," he found that their advent
had caused so little remark that the trail would have been lost had
he not already known their destination. Young met with a hearty,
welcome wherever he halted on the way, and as he passed through the
town of Moorefield learned with satisfaction that Gilmore still made
his headquarters at the house where the report of the two scouts had
located him a few days before. Reaching the designated place about
12 o'clock on the night of the 5th of February, Young, under the
representation that he had come directly from Maryland and was being
pursued by the Union cavalry, gained immediate access to Gilmore's
room. He found the bold guerrilla snugly tucked in bed, with two
pistols lying on a chair near by. He was sleeping so soundly that to
arouse him Young had to give him a violent shake. As he awoke and
asked who was disturbing his slumbers, Young, pointing at him a
cocked six-shooter, ordered him to dress without delay, and in answer
to his inquiry, informed him that he was a prisoner to one of
Sheridan's staff. Meanwhile Gilmore's men had learned of his
trouble, but the early appearance of Colonel Whittaker caused them to
disperse; thus the last link between Maryland and the Confederacy was
carried a prisoner to Winchester, whence he was sent to Fort Warren.
The capture of Gilmore caused the disbandment of the party he had
organized at the "camp-meeting," most of the men he had recruited
returning to their homes discouraged, though some few joined the
bands of Woodson and young Jesse McNeil, which, led by the latter,
dashed into Cumberland, Maryland, at 3 O'clock on the morning of the
21st of February and made a reprisal by carrying off General Crook
and General Kelly, and doing their work so silently and quickly that
they escaped without being noticed, and were some distance on their
way before the colored watchman at the hotel where Crook was
quartered could compose himself enough to give the alarm. A troop of
cavalry gave hot chase from Cumberland, striving to intercept the
party at Moorefield and other points, but all efforts were fruitless,
the prisoners soon being beyond reach.
Although I had adopted the general rule of employing only soldiers as
scouts, there was an occasional exception to it. I cannot say that
these exceptions proved wholly that an ironclad observance of the
rule would have been best, but I am sure of it in one instance. A
man named Lomas, who claimed to be a Marylander, offered me his
services as a spy, and coming highly recommended from Mr. Stanton,
who had made use of him in that capacity, I employed him. He made
many pretensions, often appearing over anxious to impart information
seemingly intended to impress me with his importance, and yet was
more than ordinarily intelligent, but in spite of that my confidence
in him was by no means unlimited. I often found what he reported to
me as taking place within the Confederate lines corroborated by
Young's men, but generally there were discrepancies in his tales,
which led me to suspect that he was employed by the enemy as well as
by me. I felt, however, that with good watching he could do me
little harm, and if my suspicions were incorrect he might be very
useful, so I held on to him.
Early in February Lomas was very solicitous for me to employ a man
who, he said, had been with Mosby, but on account of some quarrel in
the irregular camp had abandoned that leader. Thinking that with two
of them I might destroy the railroad bridges east of Lynchburg, I
concluded, after the Mosby man had been brought to my headquarters by
Lomas about 12 o'clock one night, to give him employment, at the same
time informing Colonel Young that I suspected their fidelity,
however, and that he must test it by shadowing their every movement.
When Lomas's companion entered my room he was completely disguised,
but on discarding the various contrivances by which his identity was
concealed he proved to be a rather slender, dark-complexioned,
handsome young man, of easy address and captivating manners. He gave
his name as Renfrew, answered all my questions satisfactorily, and
went into details about Mosby and his men which showed an intimacy
with them at some time. I explained to the two men the work I had
laid out for them, and stated the sum of money I would give to have
it done, but stipulated that in case of failure there would be no
compensation whatever beyond the few dollars necessary for their
expenses. They readily assented, and it was arranged that they
should start the following night. Meanwhile Young had selected his
men to shadow them, and in two days reported my spies as being
concealed at Strasburg, where they remained, without making the
slightest effort to continue on their mission, and were busy, no
doubt, communicating with the enemy, though I was not able to fasten
this on them. On the 16th of February they returned to Winchester,
and reported their failure, telling so many lies about their
hazardous adventure as to remove all remaining doubt as to their
double-dealing. Unquestionably they were spies from the enemy, and
hence liable to the usual penalties of such service; but it struck me
that through them, I might deceive Early as to the time of opening
the spring campaign, I having already received from General Grant an
intimation of what was expected of me. I therefore retained the men
without even a suggestion of my knowledge of their true character,
Young meanwhile keeping close watch over all their doings.
Toward the last of February General Early had at Staunton two
brigades of infantry under Wharton. All the rest of the infantry
except Echol's brigade, which was in southwestern Virginia, had been
sent to Petersburg during the winter, and Fitz. Lee's two brigades of
cavalry also. Rosser's men were mostly at their homes, where, on
account of a lack of subsistence and forage in the valley, they had
been permitted to go, subject to call. Lomax's cavalry was at
Millboro, west of Staunton, where supplies were obtainable. It was
my aim to get well on the road before Early could collect these
scattered forces, and as many of the officers had been in the habit
of amusing themselves fox-hunting during the latter part of the
winter, I decided to use the hunt as an expedient for stealing a
march on the enemy, and had it given out officially that a grand
fox-chase would take place on the 29th of February. Knowing that
Lomas, and Renfrew would spread the announcement South, they were
permitted to see several red foxes that had been secured, as well as a
large pack of hounds which Colonel Young had collected for the sport,
and were then started on a second expedition to burn the bridges. Of
course, they were shadowed as usual, and two days later, after they had
communicated with friends from their hiding-place, in Newtown, they
were arrested. On the way north to Fort Warren they escaped from their
guards when passing through Baltimore, and I never heard of them again,
though I learned that, after the assassination of, Mr. Lincoln,
Secretary Stanton strongly suspected his friend Lomas of being
associated with the conspirators, and it then occurred to me that the
good-looking Renfrew may have been Wilkes Booth, for he certainly bore
a strong resemblance to Booth's pictures.
On the 27th of February my cavalry entered upon the campaign which
cleared the Shenandoah Valley of every remnant of organized
Confederates. General Torbert being absent on leave at this time, I
did not recall him, but appointed General Merritt Chief of Cavalry.
for Torbert had disappointed me on two important occasions--in the
Luray Valley during the battle of Fisher's Hill, and on the recent
Gordonsville expedition--and I mistrusted his ability to conduct any
operations requiring much self-reliance. The column was composed of
Custer's and Devin's divisions of cavalry, and two sections of
artillery, comprising in all about 10,000 officers and men. On
wheels we had, to accompany this column, eight ambulances, sixteen
ammunition wagons, a pontoon train for eight canvas boats, and a
small supply-train, with fifteen days' rations of coffee, sugar, and
salt, it being intended to depend on the country for the meat and
bread ration, the men carrying in their haversacks nearly enough to
subsist them till out of the exhausted valley.
Grant's orders were for me to destroy the Virginia Central railroad
and the James River canal, capture Lynchburg if practicable, and then
join General Sherman in North Carolina wherever he might be found, or
return to Winchester, but as to joining Sherman I was to be governed
by the state of affairs after the projected capture of Lynchburg.
The weather was cold, the valley and surrounding mountains being
still covered with snow; but this was fast disappearing, however,
under the heavy rain that was coming down as the column moved along
up the Valley pike at a steady gait that took us to Woodstock the
first day. The second day we crossed the North Fork of the
Shenandoah on our pontoon-bridge, and by night-fall reached Lacy's
Springs, having seen nothing of the enemy as yet but a few partisans
who hung on our flanks in the afternoon.
March 1 we encountered General Rosser at Mt. Crawford, he having been
able to call together only some five or six hundred of his troops,
our unsuspected march becoming known to Early only the day before.
Rosser attempted to delay us here, trying to burn the bridges over
the Middle Fork of the Shenandoah, but two regiments from Colonel
Capehart's brigade swam the stream and drove Rosser to Kline's Mills,
taking thirty prisoners and twenty ambulances and wagons.
Meanwhile General Early was busy at Staunton, but not knowing my
objective point, he had ordered the return of Echol's brigade from
southwestern Virginia for the protection of Lynchburg, directed
Lomax's cavalry to concentrate at Pond Gap for the purpose of
harassing me if I moved toward Lynchburg, and at the same time
marched Wharton's two brigades of infantry, Nelson's artillery, and
Rosser's cavalry to Waynesboro', whither he went also to remain till
the object of my movement was ascertained.
I entered Staunton the morning of March 2, and finding that Early had
gone to Waynesboro' with his infantry and Rosser, the question at
once arose whether I should continue my march to Lynchburg direct,
leaving my adversary in my rear, or turn east and open the way
through Rockfish Gap to the Virginia Central railroad and James River
canal. I felt confident of the success of the latter plan, for I
knew that Early numbered there not more than two thousand men; so,
influenced by this, and somewhat also by the fact that Early had left
word in Staunton that he would fight at Waynesboro', I directed
Merritt to move toward that place with Custer, to be closely followed
by Devin, who was to detach one brigade to destroy supplies at
Swoope's depot. The by-roads were miry beyond description, rain
having fallen almost incessantly since we left Winchester, but
notwithstanding the down-pour the column pushed on, men and horses
growing almost unrecognizable from the mud covering them from head to
foot.
General Early was true to the promise made his friends in Staunton,
for when Custer neared Waynesboro' he found, occupying a line of
breastworks on a ridge west of the town, two brigades of infantry,
with eleven pieces of artillery and Rosser's cavalry. Custer, when
developing the position of the Confederates, discovered that their
left was somewhat exposed instead of resting on South River; he
therefore made his dispositions for attack, sending around that flank
the dismounted regiments from Pennington's brigade, while he himself,
with two brigades, partly mounted and partly dismounted, assaulted
along the whole line of breastworks. Pennington's flanking movement
stampeded the enemy in short order, thus enabling Custer to carry the
front with little resistance, and as he did so the Eighth New York
and First Connecticut, in a charge in column, broke through the
opening made by Custer, and continued on through the town of
Waynesboro', never stopping till they crossed South River. There,
finding themselves immediately in the enemy's rear, they promptly
formed as foragers and held the east bank of the stream till all the
Confederates surrendered except Rosser, who succeeded in making his
way back to the valley, and Generals Early, Wharton, Long, and
Lilley, who, with fifteen or twenty men, escaped across the Blue
Ridge. I followed up the victory immediately by despatching Capehart
through Rock-fish Gap, with orders to encamp on the east side of the
Blue Ridge. By reason of this move all the enemy's stores and
transportation fell into our hands, while we captured on the field
seventeen battle flags, sixteen hundred officers and men, and eleven
pieces of artillery. This decisive victory closed hostilities in the
Shenandoah Valley. The prisoners and artillery were sent back to
Winchester next morning, under a guard of 1,500 men, commanded by
Colonel J. H. Thompson, of the First New Hampshire.
The night of March 2 Custer camped at Brookfield, Devin remaining at
Waynesboro'. The former started for Charlottesville the next morning
early, followed by Devin with but two brigades, Gibbs having been
left behind to blow up the iron railroad bridge across South River.
Because of the incessant rains and spring thaws the roads were very
soft, and the columns cut them up terribly, the mud being thrown by
the sets of fours across the road in ridges as much as two feet high,
making it most difficult to get our wagons along, and distressingly
wearing on the animals toward the middle and rear of the columns.
Consequently I concluded to rest at Charlottesville for a couple of
days and recuperate a little, intending at the same time to destroy,
with small parties, the railroad from that point toward Lynchburg.
Custer reached Charlottesville the 3d, in the afternoon, and was met
at the outskirts by a deputation of its citizens, headed by the
mayor, who surrendered the town with medieval ceremony, formally
handing over the keys of the public buildings and of the University
of Virginia. But this little scene did not delay Custer long enough
to prevent his capturing, just beyond the village, a small body of
cavalry and three pieces of artillery. Gibbs's brigade, which was
bringing up my mud-impeded train, did not arrive until the 5th of
March. In the mean time Young's scouts had brought word that the
garrison of Lynchburg was being increased and the fortifications
strengthened, so that its capture would be improbable. I decided,
however, to move toward the place as far as Amherst Court House,
which is sixteen miles short of the town, so Devin, under Merritt's
supervision, marched along the James River, destroying the canal,
while Custer pushed ahead on the railroad and broke it up. The two
columns were to join at New Market, whence I intended to cross the
James River at some point east of Lynchburg, if practicable, so as to
make my way to Appomattox Court House, and destroy the Southside
railroad as far east as Farmville. Owing to its swollen condition
the river was unfordable but knowing that there was a covered bridge
at Duguidsville, I hoped to secure it by a dash, and cross there, but
the enemy, anticipating this, had filled the bridge with inflammable
material, and just as our troops got within striking distance it
burst into flames. The bridge at Hardwicksville also having been
burned by the enemy, there was now no means of crossing except by
pontoons. But, unfortunately, I had only eight of these, and they
could not be made to span the swollen river.
Being thus unable to cross until the river should fall, and knowing
that it was impracticable to join General Sherman, and useless to
adhere to my alternative instructions to return to Winchester, I now
decided to destroy still more thoroughly the James River canal and
the Virginia Central railroad and then join General Grant in front of
Petersburg. I was master of the whole country north of the James as
far down as Goochland; hence the destruction of these arteries of
supply could be easily compassed, and feeling that the war was
nearing its end, I desired my cavalry to be in at the death.
On March 9 the main column started eastward down the James River,
destroying locks, dams, and boats, having been preceded by Colonel
Fitzhugh's brigade of Devin's division in a forced march to Goochland
and Beaver Dam Creek, with orders to destroy everything below
Columbia. I made Columbia on the 10th, and from there sent a
communication to General Grant reporting what had occurred, informing
him of my condition and intention, asking him to send forage and
rations to meet me at the White House, and also a pontoon-bridge to
carry me over the Pamunkey, for in view of the fact that hitherto it
had been impracticable to hold Lee in the trenches around Petersburg,
I regarded as too hazardous a march down the south bank of the
Pamunkey, where the enemy, by sending troops out from Richmond, might
fall upon my flank and rear. It was of the utmost importance that
General Grant should receive these despatches without chance of
failure, in order that I might, depend absolutely on securing
supplies at the White House; therefore I sent the message in
duplicate, one copy overland direct to City Point by two scouts,
Campbell and Rowan, and the other by Fannin and Moore, who were to go
down the James River in a small boat to Richmond, join the troops in
the trenches in front of Petersburg, and, deserting to the Union
lines, deliver their tidings into General Grant's hands. Each set of
messengers got through, but the copy confided to Campbell and Rowan
was first at Grant's headquarters.
I halted for one day at Columbia to let my trains catch up, for it
was still raining and the mud greatly delayed the teams, fatiguing
and wearying the mules so much that I believe we should have been
forced to abandon most of the wagons except for the invaluable help
given by some two thousand negroes who had attached themselves to the
column: they literally lifted the wagons out of the mud. From
Columbia Merritt, with Devin's division, marched to Louisa Court
House and destroyed the Virginia Central to Frederick's Hall.
Meanwhile Custer was performing similar work from Frederick's Hall to
Beaver Dam Station, and also pursued for a time General Early, who,
it was learned from despatches captured in the telegraph office at
Frederick's Hall, was in the neighborhood with a couple of hundred
men. Custer captured some of these men and two of Early's
staff-officers, but the commander of the Valley District, accompanied
by a single orderly, escaped across the South Anna and next day made
his way to Richmond, the last man of the Confederate army that had so
long contended with us in the Shenandoah Valley.
At Frederick's Hall, Young's scouts brought me word from Richmond
that General Longstreet was assembling a force there to prevent my
junction with Grant, and that Pickett's division, which had been sent
toward Lynchburg to oppose my march, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, were
moving east on the Southside railroad, with the object of
circumventing me. Reasoning that Longstreet could interpose
effectually only by getting to the White House ahead of me, I pushed
one column under Custer across the South Anna, by way of Ground
Squirrel bridge, to Ashland, where it united with Merritt, who had
meanwhile marched through Hanover Junction. Our appearance at
Ashland drew the Confederates out in that direction, as was hoped,
so, leaving Colonel Pennington's brigade there to amuse them, the
united command retraced its route to Mount Carmel church to cross the
North Anna. After dark Pennington came away, and all the troops
reached the church by midnight of the 15th.
Resuming the march at an early hour next morning, we took the road by
way of King William Court House to the White House, where, arriving
on the 18th, we found, greatly to our relief, the supplies which I
had requested to be sent there. In the meanwhile the enemy had
marched to Hanover Court House, but being unable either to cross the
Pamunkey there or forestall me at the White House on the south side
of the river, he withdrew to Richmond without further effort to
impede my column.
The hardships of this march far exceeded those of any previous
campaigns by the cavalry. Almost incessant rains had drenched us for
sixteen days and nights, and the swollen streams and well-nigh
bottomless roads east of Staunton presented grave difficulties on
every hand, but surmounting them all, we destroyed the enemy's means
of subsistence, in quantities beyond computation, and permanently
crippled the Virginia Central railroad, as well as the James River
canal, and as each day brought us nearer the Army of the Potomac, all
were filled with the comforting reflection that our work in the
Shenandoah Valley had been thoroughly done, and every one was buoyed
up by the cheering thought that we should soon take part in the final
struggle of the war.
CHAPTER V.
TRANSFERRED TO PETERSBURG--GENERAL RAWLINS CORDIAL WELCOME--GENERAL
GRANT's ORDERS AND PLANS--A TRIP WITH MR. LINCOLN AND GENERAL GRANT
--MEETING GENERAL SHERMAN--OPPOSED TO JOINING THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
--OPENING OF THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN--GENERAL GRANT AND GENERAL RAWLINS.
The transfer of my command from the Shenandoah Valley to the field of
operations in front of Petersburg was not anticipated by General
Grant; indeed, the despatch brought from Columbia by my scouts,
asking that supplies be sent me at the White House, was the first
word that reached him concerning the move. In view of my message the
general-in-chief decided to wait my arrival before beginning spring
operations with the investing troops south of the James River, for he
felt the importance of having my cavalry at hand in a campaign which
he was convinced would wind up the war. We remained a few days at
the White House resting and refitting the cavalry, a large amount of
shoeing being necessary; but nothing like enough horses were at hand
to replace those that had died or been disabled on the mud march from
Staunton to the Pamunkey River, so a good many of the men were still
without mounts, and all such were sent by boat to the dismounted camp
near City Point. When all was ready the column set out for Hancock
Station, a point on the military railroad in front of Petersburg, and
arriving there on the 27th of March, was in orders reunited with its
comrades of the Second Division, who had been serving with the Army
of the Potomac since we parted from them the previous August.
General Crook, who had been exchanged within a few days, was now in
command of this Second Division. The reunited corps was to enter
upon the campaign as a separate army, I reporting directly to General
Grant; the intention being thus to reward me for foregoing, of my own
choice, my position as a department commander by joining the armies
at Petersburg.
Taking the road across the Peninsula, I started from the White House
with Merritt's column on the 25th of March and encamped that night at
Harrison's Landing. Very early next morning, in conformity with a
request from General Grant, I left by boat for City Point, Merritt
meanwhile conducting the column across the James River to the point
of rendezvous, The trip to City Point did not take long, and on
arrival at army headquarters the first person I met was General John
A. Rawlins, General Grant's chief-of-staff. Rawlins was a man of
strong likes and dislikes, and positive always both in speech and
action, exhibiting marked feelings when greeting any one, and on this
occasion met me with much warmth. His demonstrations of welcome
over, we held a few minutes' conversation about the coming campaign,
he taking strong ground against a part of the plan of operations
adopted, namely, that which contemplated my joining General Sherman's
army. His language was unequivocal and vehement, and when he was
through talking, he conducted me to General Grant's quarters, but he
himself did not enter.
General Grant was never impulsive, and always met his officers in an
unceremonious way, with a quiet "How are you" soon putting one at his
ease, since the pleasant tone in which he spoke gave assurance of
welcome, although his manner was otherwise impassive. When the
ordinary greeting was over, he usually waited for his visitor to open
the conversation, so on this occasion I began by giving him the
details of my march from Winchester, my reasons for not joining
Sherman, as contemplated in my instructions, and the motives which
had influenced me to march to the White House. The other provision
of my orders on setting out from Winchester--the alternative return
to that place--was not touched upon, for the wisdom of having ignored
that was fully apparent. Commenting on this recital of my doings,
the General referred only to the tortuous course of my march from
Waynesboro' down, our sore trials, and the valuable services of the
scouts who had brought him tidings of me, closing with the remark
that it was, rare a department commander voluntarily deprived himself
of independence, and added that I should not suffer for it. Then
turning to the business for which he had called me to City Point, he
outlined what he expected me to do; saying that I was to cut loose
from the Army of the Potomac by passing its left flank to the
southward along the line of the Danville railroad, and after crossing
the Roanoke River, join General Sherman. While speaking, he handed
me a copy of a general letter of instructions that had been drawn up
for the army on the 24th. The letter contained these words
concerning the movements of my command:
"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under
General Davies, will move at the same time (29th inst.) by the Weldon
road and the Jerusalem plank-road, turning west from the latter
before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column before
reaching Stony Creek. General Sheridan will then move independently
under other instructions which will be given him. All dismounted
cavalry belonging to the Army of the Potomac, and the dismounted
cavalry from the Middle Military Division not required for guarding
property belonging to their arm of the service, will report to
Brigadier-General Benham to be added to the defenses of City Point."
When I had gone over the entire letter I showed plainly that I was
dissatisfied with it, for, coupled with what the General had outlined
orally, which I supposed was the "other instructions," I believed it
foreshadowed my junction with General Sherman. Rawlins thought so
too, as his vigorous language had left no room to doubt, so I
immediately began to offer my objections to the programme. These
were, that it would be bad policy to send me down to the Carolinas
with a part of the Army of the Potomac, to come back to crush Lee
after the destruction of General Johnston's army; such a course would
give rise to the charge that his own forces around Petersburg were
not equal to the task, and would seriously affect public opinion in
the North; that in fact my cavalry belonged to the Army of the
Potomac, which army was able unaided to destroy Lee, and I could not
but oppose any dispersion of its strength.
All this was said in a somewhat emphatic manner, and when I had
finished he quietly told me that the portion of my instructions from
which I so strongly dissented was intended as a "blind" to cover any
check the army in its general move, to the left might meet with, and
prevent that element in the North which held that the war could be
ended only through negotiation, from charging defeat. The fact that
my cavalry was not to ultimately join Sherman was a great relief to
me, and after expressing the utmost confidence in the plans unfolded
for closing the war by directing every effort to the annihilation of
Lee's army, I left him to go to General Ingalls's quarters. On the
way I again met Rawlins, who, when I told him that General Grant had
intimated his intention to modify the written plan of operations so
far as regarded the cavalry, manifested the greatest satisfaction,
and I judged from this that the new view of the matter had not
previously been communicated to the chief-of-staff, though he must
have been acquainted of course with the programme made out on the
24th of March.
Toward noon General Grant sent for me to accompany him up the river.
When I joined the General he informed me that the President was on
board the boat--the steamer Mary Martin. For some days Mr. Lincoln
had been at City Point, established on the steamer River Queen,
having come down from Washington to be nearer his generals, no doubt,
and also to be conveniently situated for the reception of tidings
from the front when operations began, for he could not endure the
delays in getting news to Washington. This trip up the James had
been projected by General Meade, but on account of demands at the
front he could not go, so the President, General Grant, and I
composed the party. We steamed up to where my cavalry was crossing
on the pontoon-bridge below the mouth of the Dutch Gap canal, and for
a little while watched the column as it was passing over the river,
the bright sunshine presaging good weather, but only to delude, as
was proved by the torrents of rain brought by the succeeding days of
March. On the trip the President was not very cheerful. In fact, he
was dejected, giving no indication of his usual means of diversion,
by which (his quaint stories) I had often heard he could find relief
from his cares. He spoke to me of the impending operations and asked
many questions, laying stress upon the one, "What would be the result
when the army moved out to the left, if the enemy should come down
and capture City Point?" the question being prompted, doubtless, by
the bold assault on our lines and capture of Fort Steadman two days
before by General Gordon. I answered that I did not think it at all
probable that General Lee would undertake such a desperate measure to
relieve the strait he was in; that General Hartranft's successful
check to Gordon had ended, I thought, attacks of such a character;
and in any event General Grant would give Lee all he could attend to
on the left. Mr. Lincoln said nothing about my proposed route of
march, and I doubt if he knew of my instructions, or was in
possession at most of more than a very general outline of the plan of
campaign. It was late when the Mary Martin returned to City Point,
and I spent the night there with General Ingalls.
The morning of the 27th I went out to Hancock Station to look after
my troops and prepare for moving two days later. In the afternoon I
received a telegram from General Grant, saying: "General Sherman will
be here this evening to spend a few hours. I should like to have you
come down." Sherman's coming was a surprise--at least to me it was
--this despatch being my first intimation of his expected arrival.
Well knowing the zeal and emphasis with which General Sherman would
present his views, there again came into my mind many misgivings with
reference to the movement of the cavalry, and I made haste to start
for Grant's headquarters. I got off a little after 7 o'clock, taking
the rickety military railroad, the rails of which were laid on the
natural surface of the ground, with grading only here and there at
points of absolute necessity, and had not gone far when the
locomotive jumped the track. This delayed my arrival at City Point
till near midnight, but on repairing to the little cabin that
sheltered the general-in-chief, I found him and Sherman still up
talking over the problem whose solution was near at hand. As already
stated, thoughts as to the tenor of my instructions became uppermost
the moment I received the telegram in the afternoon, and they
continued to engross and disturb me all the way down the railroad,
for I feared that the telegram foreshadowed, under the propositions
Sherman would present, a more specific compliance with the written
instructions than General Grant had orally assured me would be
exacted.
My entrance into the shanty suspended the conversation for a moment
only, and then General Sherman, without prelude, rehearsed his plans
for moving his army, pointing out with every detail how he would come
up through the Carolinas to join the troops besieging Petersburg and
Richmond, and intimating that my cavalry, after striking the
Southside and Danville railroads, could join him with ease. I made
no comments on the projects for moving, his own troops, but as soon
as opportunity offered, dissented emphatically from the proposition
to have me join the Army of the Tennessee, repeating in substance
what I had previously expressed to General Grant.
My uneasiness made me somewhat too earnest, I fear, but General Grant
soon mollified me, and smoothed matters over by practically repeating
what he had told me in regard to this point at the close of our
interview the day before, so I pursued the subject no further. In a
little while the conference ended, and I again sought lodging at the
hospitable quarters of Ingalls.
Very early the next morning, while I was still in bed, General
Sherman came to me and renewed the subject of my joining him, but
when he saw that I was unalterably opposed to it the conversation
turned into other channels, and after we had chatted awhile he
withdrew, and later in the day went up the river with the President,
General Grant, and Admiral Porter, I returning to my command at
Hancock Station, where my presence was needed to put my troops in
march next day.
During the entire winter General Grant's lines fronting Petersburg
had extended south of the Appomattox River, practically from that
stream around to where the Vaughn road crosses Hatcher's Run, and
this was nearly the situation Wilien the cavalry concentrated at
Hancock Station, General Weitzel holding the line north of the
Appomattox, fronting Richmond and Bermuda Hundred.
The instructions of the 24th of March contemplated that the campaign
should begin with the movement of Warren's corps (the Fifth) at
3 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, and Humphreys's (the Second) at
6; the rest of the infantry holding on in the trenches. The cavalry
was to move in conjunction with Warren and Humphreys, and make its
way out beyond our left as these corps opened the road.
The night of the 28th I received the following additional
instructions, the general tenor of which again disturbed me, for
although I had been assured that I was not to join General Sherman,
it will be seen that the supplemental directions distinctly present
that alternative, and I therefore feared that during the trip up the
James River on the morning of the 28th General Grant had returned to
his original views:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"City Point, Va., March 28, 1865.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN:
"The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughn road at 3 A.M.
tomorrow morning. The Second moves at about 9 A.M., having but about
three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on
the right of the Fifth Corps, after the latter reaches Dinwiddie
Court House.
"Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being
confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the
nearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and
passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the
enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the
enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out if possible.
Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be
attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with
the full reliance that the army will engage or follow the enemy, as
circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will
probably be able to communicate with you; should I not do so, and you
find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may
cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable
I would like you to cross the Southside road, between Petersburg and
Burkeville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much
detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which I would
like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible; make your
destruction of that road as complete as possible; you can then pass
on to the Southside road, west of Burkeville, and destroy that in
like manner.
"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads,
which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may
return to this army, selecting your road farther south, or you may go
on into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select
the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so
that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General."
These instructions did not alter my line of march for the morrow, and
I trusted matters would so come about as not to require compliance
with those portions relative to the railroads and to joining Sherman;
so early on the 29th I moved my cavalry out toward Ream's Station on
the Weldon road, Devin commanding the First Division, with Colonels
Gibbs, Stagg, and Fitzhugh in charge of the brigades; the Third
Division under Custer, Colonels Wells, Capehart and Pennington being
the brigade commanders. These two divisions united were commanded by
Merritt, as they had been since leaving Winchester. Crook headed the
Second Division, his brigades being under General Davies and Colonels
John I. Gregg and Smith.
Our general direction was westward, over such routes as could be
found, provided they did not embarrass the march of the infantry.
The roads, from the winter's frosts and rains, were in a frightful
state, and when it was sought to avoid a spot which the head of the
column had proved almost bottomless, the bogs and quicksands of the
adjoining fields demonstrated that to make a detour was to go from
bad to worse. In the face of these discouragements we floundered on,
however, crossing on the way a series of small streams swollen to
their banks. Crook and Devin reached the county-seat of Dinwiddie
about 5 o'clock in the evening, having encountered only a small
picket, that at once gave way to our advance. Merritt left Custer at
Malon's crossing of Rowanty Creek to care for the trains containing
our subsistence and the reserve ammunition, these being stuck in the
mire at, intervals all the way back to the Jerusalem plank-road; and
to make any headway at all with the trains, Custer's men often had to
unload the wagons and lift them out of the boggy places.
Crook and Devin camped near Dinwiddie Court House in such manner as
to cover the Vaughn, Flatfoot, Boydton, and Five Forks roads; for, as
these all intersected at Dinwiddie, they offered a chance for the
enemy's approach toward the rear of the Fifth Corps, as Warren
extended to the left across the Boydton road. Any of these routes
leading to the south or west might also be the one on which, in
conformity with one part of my instructions, I was expected to get
out toward the Danville and Southside railroads, and the Five Forks
road would lead directly to General Lee's right flank, in case
opportunity was found to comply with the other part. The place was,
therefore, of great strategic value, and getting it without cost
repaid us for floundering through the mud.
Dinwiddie Court House, though a most important point in the campaign,
was far from attractive in feature, being made up of a half-dozen
unsightly houses, a ramshackle tavern propped up on two sides with
pine poles, and the weatherbeaten building that gave official name to
the cross-roads. We had no tents--there were none in the command--so
I took possession of the tavern for shelter for myself and staff, and
just as we had finished looking over its primitive interior a rain
storm set in.
The wagon containing my mess equipment was back somewhere on the
road, hopelessly stuck in the mud, and hence we had nothing to eat
except some coffee which two young women living at the tavern kindly
made for us; a small quantity of the berry being furnished from the
haversacks of my escort. By the time we got the coffee, rain was
falling in sheets, and the evening bade fair to be a most dismal one;
but songs and choruses set up by some of my staff--the two young
women playing accompaniments on a battered piano--relieved the
situation and enlivened us a little. However, the dreary night
brought me one great comfort; for General Grant, who that day had
moved out to Gravelly Run, sent me instructions to abandon all idea
of the contemplated raid, and directed me to act in concert with the
infantry under his immediate command, to turn, if possible, the right
flank of Lee's army. The despatch made my mind easy with respect to
the objectionable feature of my original instructions, and of course
relieved me also from the anxiety growing out of the letter received
at Hancock Station the night of the 28th; so, notwithstanding the
suspicions excited by some of my staff concerning the Virginia
feather-bed that had been assigned me, I turned in at a late hour and
slept most soundly.
The night of the 29th the left of General Grant's infantry--Warren's
corps--rested on the Boydton road, not far from its intersection with
the Quaker road. Humphreys's corps was next to Warren; then came
Ord, next Wright, and then Parke, with his right resting on the
Appomattox. The moving of Warren and Humphreys to the left during
the day was early discovered by General Lee. He met it by extending
the right of his infantry on the White Oak road, while drawing in the
cavalry of W. H. F. Lee and Rosser along the south bank of Stony
Creek to cover a crossroads called Five Forks, to anticipate me
there; for assuming that my command was moving in conjunction with
the infantry, with the ultimate purpose of striking the Southside
railroad, Lee made no effort to hold Dinwiddie, which he might have
done with his cavalry, and in this he made a fatal mistake. The
cavalry of Fitz. Lee was ordered at this same time from Sunderland
depot to Five Forks, and its chief placed in command of all the
mounted troops of General Lee's army.
At daylight on the 30th I proceeded to make dispositions under the
new conditions imposed by my modified instructions, and directed
Merritt to push Devin out as far as the White Oak road to make a
reconnoissance to Five Forks, Crook being instructed to send Davies's
brigade to support Devin. Crook was to hold, with Gregg's brigade,
the Stony Creek crossing of the Boydton plank road, retaining Smith's
near Dinwiddie, for use in any direction required. On the 29th W. H.
F. Lee conformed the march of his cavalry with that of ours, but my
holding Stony Creek in this way forced him to make a detour west of
Chamberlin's Run, in order to get in communication with his friends
at Five Forks.
The rain that had been falling all night gave no sign of stopping,
but kept pouring down all day long, and the swamps and quicksands
mired the horses, whether they marched in the roads or across the
adjacent fields. Undismayed, nevertheless, each column set out for
its appointed duty, but shortly after the troops began to move I
received from General Grant this despatch, which put a new phase on
matters:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"GRAVELLY RUN, March 30, 1865.
"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN:
"The heavy rain of to-day will make it impossible for us to do much
until it dries up a little, or we get roads around our rear repaired.
You may, therefore, leave what cavalry you deem necessary to protect
the left, and hold such positions as you deem necessary for that
purpose, and send the remainder back to Humphrey's Station where they
can get hay and grain. Fifty wagons loaded with forage will be sent
to you in the morning. Send an officer back to direct the wagons
back to where you want them. Report to me the cavalry you will leave
back, and the position you will occupy. Could not your cavalry go
back by the way of Stony Creek depot and destroy or capture the store
of supplies there?
"U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General."
When I had read and pondered this, I determined to ride over to
General Grant's headquarters on Gravelly Run, and get a clear idea of
what it was proposed to do, for it seemed to me that a suspension of
operations would be a serious mistake. Mounting a powerful gray
pacing horse called Breckenridge (from its capture from one of
Breckenridge's staff-officers at Missionary Ridge), and that I knew
would carry me through the mud, I set out accompanied by my Assistant
Adjutant-General, Colonel Frederick C. Newhall, and an escort of
about ten or fifteen men. At first we rode north up the Boydton
plank-road, and coming upon our infantry pickets from a direction
where the enemy was expected to appear, they began to fire upon us,
but seeing from our actions that we were friends, they ceased, and
permitted us to pass the outposts. We then struggled on in a
northeasterly direction across-country, till we struck the Vaughn
road. This carried us to army headquarters, which were established
south of Gravelly Run in an old cornfield. I rode to within a few
yards of the front of General Grant's tent, my horse plunging at
every step almost to his knees in the mud, and dismounted near a
camp-fire, apparently a general one, for all the staff-officers were
standing around it on boards and rails placed here and there to keep
them from sinking into the mire.
Going directly to General Grant's tent, I found him and Rawlins
talking over the question of suspending operations till the weather
should improve. No orders about the matter had been issued yet,
except the despatch to me, and Rawlins, being strongly opposed to the
proposition, was frankly expostulating with General Grant, who, after
greeting me, remarked, in his quiet way: "Well, Rawlins, I think you
had better take command." Seeing that there was a difference up
between Rawlins and his chief, I made the excuse of being wet and
cold, and went outside to the fire. Here General Ingalls met me and
took me to his tent, where I was much more comfortable than when
standing outside, and where a few minutes later we were joined by
General Grant. Ingalls then retired, and General Grant began talking
of our fearful plight, resulting from the rains and mud, and saying
that because of this it seemed necessary to suspend operations. I at
once begged him not to do so, telling him that my cavalry was already
on the move in spite of the difficulties, and that although a
suspension of operations would not be fatal, yet it would give rise
to the very charge of disaster to which he had referred at City
Point, and, moreover, that we would surely be ridiculed, just as
General Burnside's army was after the mud march of 1863. His better
judgment was against suspending operations, but the proposition had
been suggested by all sorts of complaints as to the impossibility of
moving the trains and the like, so it needed little argument to
convince him, and without further discussion he said, in that manner
which with him meant a firmness of purpose that could not be changed
by further complainings, "We will go on." I then told him that I
believed I could break in the enemy's right if he would let me have
the Sixth Corps; but saying that the condition of the roads would
prevent the movement of infantry, he replied that I would have to
seize Five Forks with the cavalry alone.
On my way back to Dinwiddie I stopped at the headquarters of General
Warren, but the General being asleep, I went to the tent of one of
his staff-officers. Colonel William T. Gentry, an old personal
friend with whom I had served in Oregon. In a few minutes Warren
came in and we had a short conversation, he speaking rather
despondently of the outlook, being influenced no doubt by the
depressing weather.
From Warren's headquarters I returned, by the Boydton road to
Dinwiddie Court House, fording Gravelly Run with ease. When I got as
far as the Dabney road I sent Colonel Newhall out on it toward Five
Forks, with orders for Merritt to develop the enemy's position and
strength, and then rode on to Dinwiddie to endeavor to get all my
other troops up. Merritt was halted at the intersection of the Five
Forks and Gravelly Church roads when Newhall delivered the orders,
and in compliance moving out Gibbs's brigade promptly, sharp
skirmishing was brought on, Gibbs driving the Confederates to Five
Forks, where he found them behind a line of breastworks running along
the White Oak road. The reconnoissance demonstrating the intention
of the enemy to hold this point, Gibbs was withdrawn.
That evening, at 7 o'clock, I reported the position of the
Confederate cavalry, and stated that it had been reinforced by
Pickett's division of infantry. On receipt of this despatch, General
Grant offered me the Fifth Corps, but I declined to take it, and
again asked for the Sixth, saying that with it I believed I could
turn the enemy (Pickett's) left, or break through his lines. The
morning of the 31st General Grant replied the the Sixth Corps could
not be taken from its position in the line, and offered me the
Second; but in the mean time circumstances had changed, and no corps
was ordered.
CHAPTER VI.
BATTLE OF DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE--PICKETT REPULSED--REINFORCED BY THE
FIFTH CORPS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--TURNING THE CONFEDERATE LEFT--AN
UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS--RELIEVING GENERAL WARREN--THE WARREN COURT OF
INQUIRY--GENERAL SHERMAN'S OPINION.
The night of March 30 Merritt, with Devin's division and Davies's
brigade, was camped on the Five Forks road about two miles in front
of Dinwiddie, near J. Boisseau's. Crook, with Smith and Gregg's
brigades, continued to cover Stony Creek, and Custer was still back
at Rowanty Creek, trying to get the trains up. This force had been
counted while crossing the creek on the 29th, the three divisions
numbering 9,000 enlisted men, Crook having 3,300, and Custer and
Devin 5,700.
During the 30th, the enemy had been concentrating his cavalry, and by
evening General W. H. F. Lee and General Rosser had joined Fitzhugh
Lee near Five Forks. To this force was added, about dark, five
brigades of infantry--three from Pickett's division, and two from
Johnson's--all under command of Pickett. The infantry came by the
White Oak road from the right of General Lee's intrenchments, and
their arrival became positively known to me about dark, the
confirmatory intelligence being brought in then by some of Young's
scouts who had been inside the Confederate lines.
On the 31st, the rain having ceased, directions were given at an
early hour to both Merritt and Crook to make reconnoissances
preparatory to securing Five Forks, and about 9 o'clock Merritt
started for the crossroads, Davies's brigade supporting him. His
march was necessarily slow because of the mud, and the enemy's
pickets resisted with obstinacy also, but the coveted crossroads fell
to Merritt without much trouble, as the bulk of the enemy was just
then bent on other things. At the same hour that Merritt started,
Crook moved Smith's brigade out northwest from Dinwiddie to
Fitzgerald's crossing of Chamberlain's Creek, to cover Merritt's
left, supporting Smith by placing Gregg to his right and rear. The
occupation of this ford was timely, for Pickett, now in command of
both the cavalry and infantry, was already marching to get in
Merritt's rear by crossing Chamberlain's Creek.
To hold on to Fitzgerald's ford Smith had to make a sharp fight, but
Mumford's cavalry attacking Devin, the enemy's infantry succeeded in
getting over Chamberlain's Creek at a point higher up than
Fitzgerald's ford, and assailing Davies, forced him back in a
northeasterly direction toward the Dinwiddie and Five Forks road in
company with Devin. The retreat of Davies permitted Pickett to pass
between Crook and Merritt, which he promptly did, effectually
separating them and cutting off both Davies and Devin from the road
to Dinwiddie, so that to get to that point they had to retreat across
the country to B. Boisseau's and then down the Boydton road.
Gibbs's brigade had been in reserve near the intersection of the Five
Forks and Dabney roads, and directing Merritt to hold on there, I
ordered Gregg's brigade to be mounted and brought to Merritt's aid,
for if Pickett continued in pursuit north of the Five Forks road he
would expose his right and rear, and I determined to attack him, in
such case, from Gibbs's position. Gregg arrived in good season, and
as soon as his men were dismounted on Gibbs's left, Merritt assailed
fiercely, compelling Pickett to halt and face a new foe, thus
interrupting an advance that would finally have carried Pickett into
the rear of Warren's corps.
It was now about 4 o'clock in the afternoon and we were in a critical
situation, but having ordered Merritt to bring Devin and Davies to
Dinwiddie by the Boydton road, staff-officers were sent to hurry
Custer to the same point, for with its several diverging roads the
Court House was of vital importance, and I determined to stay there
at all hazards. At the same time orders were sent to Smith's
brigade, which, by the advance of Pickett past its right flank and
the pressure of W. H. F. Lee on its front, had been compelled to give
up Fitzgerald's crossing, to fall back toward Dinwiddie but to
contest every inch of ground so as to gain time.
When halted by the attack of Gregg and Gibbs, Pickett, desisting from
his pursuit of Devin, as already stated, turned his undivided
attention to this unexpected force, and with his preponderating
infantry pressed it back on the Five Forks road toward Dinwiddle,
though our men, fighting dismounted behind barricades at different
points, displayed such obstinacy as to make Pickett's progress slow,
and thus give me time to look out a line for defending the Court
House. I selected a place about three-fourths of a mile northwest of
the crossroads, and Custer coming up quickly with Capehart's brigade,
took position on the left of the road to Five Forks in some open
ground along the crest of a gentle ridge. Custer got Capehart into
place just in time to lend a hand to Smith, who, severely pressed,
came back on us here from his retreat along Chamberlain's "bed"--the
vernacular for a woody swamp such as that through which Smith
retired. A little later the brigades of Gregg and Gibbs, falling to
the rear slowly and steadily, took up in the woods a line which
covered the Boydton Road some distance to the right of Capehart, the
intervening gap to be filled with Pennington's brigade. By this time
our horse-artillery, which for two days had been stuck in the mud,
was all up, and every gun was posted in this line.
It was now near sunset, and the enemy's cavalry thinking the day was
theirs, made a dash at Smith, but just as the assailants appeared in
the open fields, Capehart's men opened so suddenly on their left
flank as to cause it to recoil in astonishment, which permitted Smith
to connect his brigade with Custer unmolested. We were now in good
shape behind the familiar barricades, and having a continuous line,
excepting only the gap to be filled with Pennington, that covered
Dinwiddie and the Boydton Road. My left rested in the woods about
half a mile west of the Court House, and the barricades extended from
this flank in a semicircle through the open fields in a northeasterly
direction, to a piece-of thick timber on the right, near the Boydton
Road.
A little before the sun went down the Confederate infantry was formed
for the attack, and, fortunately for us, Pennington's brigade came up
and filled the space to which it was assigned between Capehart and
Gibbs, just as Pickett moved out across the cleared fields in front
of Custer, in deep lines that plainly told how greatly we were
outnumbered.
Accompanied by Generals Merritt and Custer and my staff, I now rode
along the barricades to encourage the men. Our enthusiastic
reception showed that they were determined to stay. The cavalcade
drew the enemy's fire, which emptied several of the saddles--among
others Mr. Theodore Wilson, correspondent of the New York Herald,
being wounded. In reply our horse-artillery opened on the advancing
Confederates, but the men behind the barricades lay still till
Pickett's troops were within short range. Then they opened, Custer's
repeating rifles pouring out such a shower of lead that nothing could
stand up against it. The repulse was very quick, and as the gray
lines retired to the woods from which but a few minutes before they
had so confidently advanced, all danger of their taking Dinwiddie or
marching to the left and rear of our infantry line was over,
at least for the night. The enemy being thus checked, I sent a
staff-officer--Captain Sheridan--to General Grant to report what had
taken place during the afternoon, and to say that I proposed to stay at
Dinwiddie, but if ultimately compelled to abandon the place, I would do
so by retiring on the Vaughn road toward Hatcher's Run, for I then
thought the attack might be renewed next morning. Devin and Davies
joined me about dark, and my troops being now well in hand, I sent a
second staff-officer--Colonel John Kellogg--to explain my situation
more fully, and to assure General Grant that I would hold on at
Dinwiddie till forced to let go.
By following me to Dinwiddie the enemy's infantry had completely
isolated itself, and hence there was now offered the Union troops a
rare opportunity. Lee was outside of his works, just as we desired,
and the general-in-chief realized this the moment he received the
first report of my situation; General Meade appreciated it too from
the information he got from Captain Sheridan, en route to army
headquarters with the first tidings, and sent this telegram to
General Grant:
"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"March 31, 1865. 9:45 p.m.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT:
"Would it not be well for Warren to go down with his whole corps and
smash up the force in front of Sheridan? Humphreys can hold the line
to the Boydton plank-road, and the refusal along with it. Bartlett's
brigade is now on the road from G. Boisseau's, running north, where
it crosses Gravelly Run, he having gone down the White Oak road.
Warren could go at once that way, and take the force threatening
Sheridan in rear at Dinwiddie, and move on the enemy's rear with the
other two.
"G. G. MEADE, Major-General."
An hour later General Grant replied in these words:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
"DABNEY'S MILLS, March 311, 1865. 10:15 P. M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
"Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not to stop for
anything. Let Griffin (Griffin had been ordered by Warren to the
Boydton road to protect his rear) go on as he was first directed.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."
These two despatches were the initiatory steps in sending the Fifth
Corps, under Major-General G. K. Warren, to report to me, and when I
received word of its coming and also that Genera Mackenzie's cavalry
from the Army of the James was likewise to be added to my command,
and that discretionary authority was given me to use all my forces
against Pickett, I resolved to destroy him, if it was within the
bounds of possibility, before he could rejoin Lee.
In a despatch, dated 10:05 p.m., telling me of the coming of Warren
and Mackenzie, General Grant also said that the Fifth Corps should
reach me by 12 o'clock that night, but at that hour not only had none
of the corps arrived, but no report from it, so believing that if it
came all the way down to Dinwiddie the next morning, our opportunity
would be gone, I concluded that it would be best to order Warren to
move in on the enemy's rear while the cavalry attacked in front, and,
therefore, at 3 o'clock in the morning of April 1 sent this despatch
to General Warren:
"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, DINWIDDIE C. H.,
"April 1, 1865--3. A.M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL WARREN,
"Commanding Fifth Army Corps.
"I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court House, on the road leading
to Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile with General Custer's
division. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover
the road just this side of A. Adams's house, which leads across
Chamberlain's bed, or run. I understand you have a division at J.[G]
Boisseau's; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line and almost on
his flank. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at
daylight; if so, attack instantly and in full force. Attack at
daylight anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the road this side
of Adams's house, and if I do, you can capture the whole of them.
Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak
road, will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any
force that may escape you by a flank movement. Do not fear my
leaving here. If the enemy remains, I shall fight at daylight.
"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General."
With daylight came a slight fog, but it lifted almost immediately,
and Merritt moved Custer and Devin forward. As these divisions
advanced the enemy's infantry fell back on the Five Forks road, Devin
pressing him along the road, while Custer extended on the left over
toward Chamberlain's Run, Crook being held in watch along Stony
Creek, meanwhile, to be utilized as circumstances might require when
Warren attacked.
The order of General Meade to Warren the night of March 31--a copy
being sent me also--was positive in its directions, but as midnight
came without a sign of or word from the Fifth Corps, notwithstanding
that was the hour fixed for its arrival, I nevertheless assumed that
there were good reasons for its non-appearance, but never once
doubted that measures would be taken to comply with my despatch Of
3 A. M. and therefore hoped that, as Pickett was falling back slowly
toward Five Forks, Griffin's and Crawford's divisions would come in
on the Confederate left and rear by the Crump road near J.[G]
Boisseau's house.
But they did not reach there till after the enemy had got by. As a
matter of fact, when Pickett was passing the all-important point
Warren's men were just breaking from the bivouac in which their chief
had placed them the night before, and the head of Griffin's division
did not get to Boisseau's till after my cavalry, which meanwhile had
been joined by Ayres's division of the Fifth Corps by way of the
Boydton and Dabney roads. By reason of the delay in moving Griffin
and Crawford, the enemy having escaped, I massed the Fifth Corps at
J.[G] Boisseau's so that the men could be rested, and directed it to
remain there; General Warren himself had not then come up. General
Mackenzie, who had reported just after daybreak, was ordered at first
to stay at Dinwiddie Court House, but later was brought along the
Five Forks road to Dr. Smith's, and Crook's division was directed to
continue watching the crossings of Stony Creek and Chamberlain's Run.
That we had accomplished nothing but to oblige our foe to retreat was
to me bitterly disappointing, but still feeling sure that he would
not give up the Five Forks crossroads without a fight, I pressed him
back there with Merritt's cavalry, Custer advancing on the Scott
road, while Devin drove the rearguard along that leading from J.[G]
Boisseau's to Five Forks.
By 2 o'clock in the afternoon Merritt had forced the enemy inside his
intrenchments, which began with a short return about three-quarters
of a mile east of the Forks and ran along the south side of the White
Oak road to a point about a mile west of the Forks. From the left of
the return over toward Hatcher's Run was posted Mumford's cavalry,
dismounted. In the return itself was Wallace's brigade, and next on
its right came Ransom's, then Stewart's, then Terry's, then Corse's.
On the right of Corse was W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry. Ten
pieces of artillery also were in this line, three on the right of the
works, three near the centre at the crossroads, and four on the left,
in the return. Rosser's cavalry was guarding the Confederate trains
north of Hatcher's Run beyond the crossing of the Ford road.
I felt certain the enemy would fight at Five Forks--he had to--so,
while we were getting up to his intrenchments, I decided on my plan
of battle. This was to attack his whole front with Merritt's two
cavalry divisions, make a feint of turning his right flank, and with
the Fifth Corps assail his left. As the Fifth Corps moved into
action, its right flank was to be covered by Mackenzie's cavalry,
thus entirely cutting off Pickett's troops from communication with
Lee's right flank, which rested near the Butler house at the junction
of the Claiborne and White Oaks roads. In execution of this plan,
Merritt worked his men close in toward the intrenchments, and while
he was thus engaged, I ordered Warren to bring up the Fifth Corps,
sending the order by my engineer officer, Captain Gillespie, who had
reconnoitred the ground in the neighborhood of Gravelly Run Church,
where the infantry was to form for attack.
Gillespie delivered the order about 1 o'clock, and when the corps was
put in motion, General Warren joined me at the front. Before he
came, I had received, through Colonel Babcock, authority from General
Grant to relieve him, but I did not wish to do it, particularly on
the eve of battle; so, saying nothing at all about the message
brought me, I entered at once on the plan for defeating Pickett,
telling Warren how the enemy was posted, explaining with considerable
detail, and concluding by stating that I wished his troops to be
formed on the Gravelly Church road, near its junction with the White
Oak road, with two divisions to the front, aligned obliquely to the
White Oak road, and one in reserve, opposite the centre of these two.
General Warren seemed to understand me clearly, and then left to join
his command, while I turned my attention to the cavalry, instructing
Merritt to begin by making demonstrations as though to turn the
enemy's right, and to assault the front of the works with his
dismounted cavalry as soon as Warren became engaged. Afterward I
rode around to Gravelly Run Church, and found the head of Warren's
column just appearing, while he was sitting under a tree making a
rough sketch of the ground. I was disappointed that more of the
corps was not already up, and as the precious minutes went by without
any apparent effort to hurry the troops on to the field, this
disappointment grew into disgust. At last I expressed to Warren my
fears that the cavalry might expend all their ammunition before the
attack could be made, that the sun would go down before the battle
could be begun, or that troops from Lee's right, which, be it
remembered, was less than three miles away from my right, might, by
striking my rear, or even by threatening it, prevent the attack on
Pickett.
Warren did not seem to me to be at all solicitous; his manner
exhibited decided apathy, and he remarked with indifference that
"Bobby Lee was always getting people into trouble." With unconcern
such as this, it is no wonder that fully three hours' time was
consumed in marching his corps from J.[G] Boisseau's to Gravelly Run
Church, though the distance was but two miles. However, when my
patience was almost worn out, Warren reported his troops ready,
Ayres's division being formed on the west side of the Gravelly Church
road, Crawford's on the east side, and Griffin in reserve behind the
right of Crawford, a little different from my instructions. The
corps had no artillery present, its batteries, on account of the mud,
being still north of Gravelly Run. Meanwhile Merritt had been busy
working his men close up to the intrenchments from the angle of the
return west, along the White Oak road.
About 4 o'clock Warren began the attack. He was to assault the left
flank of the Confederate infantry at a point where I knew Pickett's
intrenchments were refused, almost at right angles with the White Oak
road. I did not know exactly how far toward Hatcher's Run this part
of the works extended, for here the videttes of Mumford's cavalry
were covering, but I did know where the refusal began. This return,
then, was the point I wished to assail, believing that if the assault
was made with spirit, the line could be turned. I therefore intended
that Ayres and Crawford should attack the refused trenches squarely,
and when these two divisions and Merritt's cavalry became hotly
engaged, Griffin's division was to pass around the left of the
Confederate line; and I personally instructed Griffin how I wished
him to go in, telling him also that as he advanced, his right flank
would be taken care of by Mackenzie, who was to be pushed over toward
the Ford road and Hatcher's Run.
The front of the corps was oblique to the White Oak road; and on
getting there, it was to swing round to the left till perpendicular
to the road, keeping closed to the left. Ayres did his part well,
and to the letter, bringing his division square up to the front of
the return near the angle; but Crawford did not wheel to the left, as
was intended. On the contrary, on receiving fire from Mumford's
cavalry, Crawford swerved to the right and moved north from the
return, thus isolating his division from Ayres; and Griffin,
uncertain of the enemy's position, naturally followed Crawford.
The deflection of this division on a line of march which finally
brought it out on the Ford road near C. Young's house, frustrated the
purpose I had in mind when ordering the attack, and caused a gap
between Ayres and Crawford, of which the enemy quickly took
advantage, and succeeded in throwing a part of Ayres's division into
confusion. At this juncture I sent word to General Warren to have
Crawford recalled; for the direction he was following was not only a
mistaken one, but, in case the assault at the return failed, he ran
great risk of capture. Warren could not be found, so I then sent for
Griffin--first by Colonel Newhall, and then by Colonel Sherman--to
come to the aid of Ayres, who was now contending alone with that part
of the enemy's infantry at the return. By this time Griffin had
observed and appreciated Crawford's mistake, however, and when the
staff-officers reached him, was already faced to the left; so,
marching across Crawford's rear, he quickly joined Ayres, who
meanwhile had rallied his troops and carried the return.
When Ayres's division went over the flank of the enemy's works,
Devin's division of cavalry, which had been assaulting the front,
went over in company with it; and hardly halting to reform, the
intermingling infantry and dismounted cavalry swept down inside the
intrenchments, pushing to and beyond Five Forks, capturing thousands
of prisoners. The only stand the enemy tried to make was when he
attempted to form near the Ford road. Griffin pressed him so hard
there, however, that he had to give way in short order, and many of
his men, with three pieces of artillery, fell into the hands of
Crawford while on his circuitous march.
The right of Custer's division gained a foothold on the enemy's works
simultaneously with Devin's, but on the extreme left Custer had a
very severe combat with W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, as well as with
Corse's and Terry's infantry. Attacking Terry and Corse with
Pennington's brigade dismounted, he assailed Lee's cavalry with his
other two brigades mounted, but Lee held on so obstinately that
Custer gained but little ground till our troops, advancing behind the
works, drove Corse and Terry out. Then Lee made no further stand
except at the west side of the Gillian field, where, assisted by
Corse's brigade, he endeavored to cover the retreat, but just before
dark Custer, in concert with some Fifth Corps regiments under Colonel
Richardson, drove ihe last of the enemy westward on the White Oak
road.
Our success was unqualified; we had overthrown Pickett, taken six
guns, thirteen battle-flags, and nearly six thousand prisoners. When
the battle was practically over, I turned to consider my position
with reference to the main Confederate army. My troops, though
victorious, were isolated from the Army of the Potomac, for on the
31st of March the extreme left of that army had been thrown back
nearly to the Boydton plank-road, and hence there was nothing to
prevent the enemy's issuing from his trenches at the intersection of
the White Oak and Claiborne roads and marching directly on my rear.
I surmised that he might do this that night or early next morning.
It was therefore necessary to protect myself in this critical
situation, and General Warren having sorely disappointed me, both in
the moving of his corps and in its management during the battle, I
felt that he was not the man to rely upon under such circumstances,
and deeming that it was to the best interest of the service as well
as but just to myself, I relieved him, ordering him to report to
General Grant.
I then put Griffin in command of the Fifth Corps, and directed him to
withdraw from the pursuit as quickly as he could after following the
enemy a short distance, and form in line of battle near Gravelly Run
Church, at right angles with the White Oak road, with Ayres and
Crawford facing toward the enemy at the junction of the White Oak and
Claiborne roads, leaving Bartlett, now commanding Griffin's division,
near the Ford road. Mackenzie also was left on the Ford road at the
crossing of Hatcher's Run, Merritt going into camp on the Widow
Gillian's plantation. As I had been obliged to keep Crook's division
along Stony Creek throughout the day, it had taken no active part in
the battle.
Years after the war, in 1879, a Court of Inquiry was given General
Warren in relation to his conduct on the day of the battle. He
assumed that the delay in not granting his request for an inquiry,
which was first made at the close of the war, was due to opposition
on my part. In this he was in error; I never opposed the ordering of
the Court, but when it was finally decided to convene it I naturally
asked to be represented by counsel, for the authorization of the
Inquiry was so peculiarly phrased that it made me practically a
respondent.
"NEW YORK CITY, May 3, 1880
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. HANCOCK, U. S. A.
"President Court of Inquiry, Governor's Island.
"Sir: Since my arrival in this city, under a subpoena to appear and
testify before the Court of which you are president, I have been
indirectly and unofficially informed that the Court some time ago
forwarded an invitation to me (which has not been received) to appear
personally or by counsel, in order to aid it in obtaining a knowledge
as to the facts concerning the movements terminating in the battle of
'Five Forks,' with reference to the direct subjects of its inquiry.
Any invitation of this character I should always and do consider it
incumbent on me to accede to, and do everything in my power in
furtherance of the specific purposes for which courts of inquiry are
by law instituted.
"The order convening the Court (a copy of which was not received by
me at my division headquarters until two days after the time
appointed for the Court to assemble) contemplates an inquiry based on
the application of Lieutenant Colonel G. K. Warren, Corps of
Engineers, as to his conduct while major-general commanding the Fifth
Army Corps, under my command, in reference to accusations or
imputations assumed in the order to have been made against him, and I
understand through the daily press that my official report of the
battle of Five Forks has been submitted by him as a basis of inquiry.
"If it is proposed to inquire, either directly or indirectly, as to
any action of mine so far as the commanding general Fifth Army Corps
was concerned, or my motives for such action, I desire to be
specifically informed wherein such action or transaction is alleged
to contain an accusation or imputation to become a subject of
inquiry, so that, knowing what issues are raised, I may intelligently
aid the Court in arriving at the facts.
"It is a long time since the battle of Five Forks was fought, and
during the time that has elapsed the official reports of that battle
have been received and acknowledged by the Government; but now, when
the memory of events has in many instances grown dim, and three of
the principal actors on that field are dead--Generals Griffin,
Custer, and Devin, whose testimony would have been valuable--an
investigation is ordered which might perhaps do injustice unless the
facts pertinent to the issues are fully developed.
"My duties are such that it will not be convenient for me to be
present continuously during the sessions of the Court. In order,
however, that everything may be laid before it in my power pertinent
to such specific issues as are legally raised, I beg leave to
introduce Major Asa Bird Gardner as my counsel.
"Very respectfully,
"P. H. SHERIDAN, Lieut.-General."
Briefly stated, in my report of the battle of Five Forks there were
four imputations concerning General Warren. The first implied that
Warren failed to reach me on the 1st of April, when I had reason to
expect him; the second, that the tactical handling of his corps was
unskillful; the third, that he did not exert himself to get his corps
up to Gravelly Run Church; and the fourth, that when portions of his
line gave way he did not exert himself to restore confidence to his
troops. The Court found against him on the first and second counts,
and for him on the third and fourth. This finding was unsatisfactory
to General Warren, for he hoped to obtain such an unequivocal
recognition of his services as to cast discredit on my motives for
relieving him. These were prompted by the conditions alone--by the
conduct of General Warren as described, and my consequent lack of
confidence in him.
It will be remembered that in my conversation with General Grant on
the 30th, relative to the suspension of operations because of the
mud, I asked him to let me have the Sixth Corps to help me in
breaking in on the enemy's right, but that it could not be sent me;
it will be recalled also that the Fifth Corps was afterward tendered
and declined. From these facts it has been alleged that I was
prejudiced against General Warren, but this is not true. As we had
never been thrown much together I knew but little of him. I had no
personal objection to him, and certainly could have none to his
corps. I was expected to do an extremely dangerous piece of work,
and knowing the Sixth Corps well--my cavalry having campaigned with
it so successfully in the Shenandoah Valley, I naturally preferred
it, and declined the Fifth for no other reason. But the Sixth could
not be given, and the turn of events finally brought me the Fifth
after my cavalry, under the most trying difficulties, had drawn the
enemy from his works, and into such a position as to permit the
realization of General Grant's hope to break up with my force Lee's
right flank. Pickett's isolation offered an opportunity which we
could not afford to neglect, and the destruction of his command would
fill the measure of General Grant's expectations as well as meet my
own desires. The occasion was not an ordinary one, and as I thought
that Warren had not risen to its demand in the battle, I deemed it
injudicious and unsafe under the critical conditions existing to
retain him longer. That I was justified in this is plain to all who
are disposed to be fair-minded, so with the following extract from
General Sherman's review of the proceedings of the Warren Court, and
with which I am convinced the judgment of history will accord, I
leave the subject:
"....It would be an unsafe and dangerous rule to hold the commander
of an army in battle to a technical adherence to any rule of conduct
for managing his command. He is responsible for results, and holds
the lives and reputations of every officer and soldier under his
orders as subordinate to the great end--victory. The most important
events are usually compressed into an hour, a minute, and he cannot
stop to analyze his reasons. He must act on the impulse, the
conviction, of the instant, and should be sustained in his
conclusions, if not manifestly unjust. The power to command men, and
give vehement impulse to their joint action, is something which
cannot be defined by words, but it is plain and manifest in battles,
and whoever commands an army in chief must choose his subordinates by
reason of qualities which can alone be tested in actual conflict.
"No one has questioned the patriotism, integrity, and great
intelligence of General Warren. These are attested by a long record
of most excellent service, but in the clash of arms at and near Five
Forks, March 31 and April 1, 1865, his personal activity fell short
of the standard fixed by General Sheridan, on whom alone rested the
great responsibility for that and succeeding days.
"My conclusion is that General Sheridan was perfectly justified in
his action in this case, and he must be fully and entirely sustained
if the United States expects great victories by her arms in the
future."
CHAPTER VII.
RESULT OF THE BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--RETREAT OF LEE--AN INTERCEPTED
DESPATCH--AT AMELIA COURT HOUSE--BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--THE
CONFEDERATES' STUBBORN RESISTANCE--A COMPLETE VICTORY--IMPORTANCE OF
THE BATTLE.
When the news of the battle at Five Forks reached General Grant, he
realized that the decisive character of our victory would necessitate
the immediate abandonment of Richmond and Petersburg by the enemy;
and fearing that Lee would escape without further injury, he issued
orders, the propriety of which must be settled by history, to assault
next morning the whole intrenched line. But Lee could not retreat at
once. He had not anticipated dissster at Five Forks, and hence was
unprepared to withdraw on the moment; and the necessity of getting
off his trains and munitions of war, as well as being obliged to
cover the flight of the Confederate Government, compelled him to hold
on to Richmond and Petersburg till the afternoon of the 2d, though
before that Parke, Ord, and Wright had carried his outer
intrenchments at several points, thus materially shortening the line
of investment.
The night of the 1st of April, General Humphreys's corps--the Second
--had extended its left toward the White Oak road, and early next
morning, under instructions from General Grant, Miles's division of
that corps reported to me, and supporting him with Ayres's and
Crawford's divisions of the Fifth Corps, I then directed him to
advance toward Petersburg and attack the enemy's works at the
intersection of the Claiborne and White Oak roads.
Such of the enemy as were still in the works Miles easily forced
across Hatcher's Run, in the direction of Sutherland's depot, but the
Confederates promptly took up a position north of the little stream,
and Miles being anxious to attack, I gave him leave, but just at this
time General Humphreys came up with a request to me from General
Meade to return Miles. On this request I relinquished command of the
division, when, supported by the Fifth Corps it could have broken in
the enemy's right at a vital point; and I have always since regretted
that I did so, for the message Humphreys conveyed was without
authority from General Grant, by whom Miles had been sent to me, but
thinking good feeling a desideratum just then, and wishing to avoid
wrangles, I faced the Fifth Corps about and marched it down to Five
Forks, and out the Ford road to the crossing of Hatcher's Run. After
we had gone, General Grant, intending this quarter of the field to be
under my control, ordered Humphreys with his other two divisions to
move to the right, in toward Petersburg. This left Miles entirely
unsupported, and his gallant attack made soon after was unsuccessful
at first, but about 3 o'clock in the afternoon he carried the point
which covered the retreat from Petersburg and Richmond.
Merritt had been sent westward, meanwhile, in the direction of Ford's
Station, to break the enemy's horse which had been collecting to the
north of Hatcher's Run. Meeting, with but little opposition, Merritt
drove this cavalry force in a northerly direction toward Scott's
Corners, while the Fifth Corps was pushed toward Sutherland's depot,
in the hope of coming in on the rear of the force that was
confronting Miles when I left him. Crawford and Merritt engaged the
enemy lightly just before night, but his main column, retreating
along the river road south of the Appomattox, had got across Namozine
Creek, and the darkness prevented our doing more than to pick up some
stragglers. The next morning the pursuit was resumed, the cavalry
again in advance, the Fifth Corps keeping up with it all the while,
and as we pressed our adversaries hundreds and hundreds of prisoners,
armed and unarmed, fell into our hands, together with many wagons and
five pieces of artillery. At Deep Creek the rearguard turned on us,
and a severe skirmish took place. Merritt, finding the enemy very
strong, was directed to await the arrival of Crook and for the rear
division of the Fifth Corps; but by the time they reached the creek,
darkness had again come to protect the Confederates, and we had to be
content with meagre results at that point.
From the beginning it was apparent that Lee, in his retreat, was
making for Amelia Court House, where his columns north and south of
the Appomattox River could join, and where, no doubt, he expected to
meet supplies, so Crook was ordered to march early on April 4 to
strike the Danville railroad, between Jettersville and Burkeville,
and then move south along the railroad toward Jettersville, Merritt
to move toward Amelia Court House, and the Fifth Corps to
Jettersville itself.
The Fifth Corps got to Jettersville about 5 in the afternoon, and I
immediately intrenched it across the Burkeville road with the
determination to stay there till the main army could come up, for I
hoped we could force Lee to surrender at Amelia Court House, since a
firm hold on Jettersville would cut him off from his line of retreat
toward Burkeville.
Accompanied only by my escort--the First United States Cavalry, about
two hundred strong--I reached Jettersville some little time before
the Fifth Corps, and having nothing else at hand I at once deployed
this handful of men to cover the crossroads till the arrival of the
corps. Just as the troopers were deploying, a man on a mule, heading
for Burkeville, rode into my pickets. He was arrested, of course,
and being searched there was found in his boots this telegram in
duplicate, signed by Lee's Commissary General.
"The army is at Amelia Court House, short of provisions. Send
300,000 rations quickly to Burkeville Junction." One copy was
addressed to the supply department at Danville, and the other to that
at Lynchburg. I surmised that the telegraph lines north of
Burkeville had been broken by Crook after the despatches were
written, which would account for their being transmitted by
messenger. There was thus revealed not only the important fact that
Lee was concentrating at Amelia Court House, but also a trustworthy
basis for estimating his troops, so I sent word to Crook to strike up
the railroad toward me, and to Merritt--who, as I have said, had
followed on the heels of the enemy--to leave Mackenzie there and
himself close in on Jettersville. Staff-officers were also
despatched to hurry up Griffin with the Fifth Corps, and his tired men
redoubled their strides.
My troops too were hard up for rations, for in the pursuit we could
not wait for our trains, so I concluded to secure if possible these
provisions intended for Lee. To this end I directed Young to send
four of his best scouts to Burkeville Junction. There they were to
separate, two taking the railroad toward Lynchburg and two toward
Danville, and as soon as a telegraph station was reached the telegram
was to be transmitted as it had been written and the provisions thus
hurried forward.
Although the Fifth Corps arrived at Jettersville the evening of April
4, as did also Crook's and Merritt's cavalry, yet none of the army of
the Potomac came up till about 3 o'clock the afternoon of the 5th,
the Second Corps, followed by the Sixth, joining us then. General
Meade arrived at Jettersville an hour earlier, but being ill,
requested me to put his troops in position. The Fifth Corps being
already intrenched across the Amelia Court House road facing north, I
placed the Sixth on its right and the Second on its left as they
reached the ground.
As the enemy had been feeling us ever since morning--to learn what he
was up to I directed Crook to send Davies's brigade on a
reconnoissance to Paine's crossroads. Davies soon found out that Lee
was trying to escape by that flank, for at the crossroads he found
the Confederate trains and artillery moving rapidly westward. Having
driven away the escort, Davies succeeded in burning nearly two
hundred wagons, and brought off five pieces of artillery. Among
these wagons were some belonging to General, Lee's and to General
Fitzhugh Lee's headquarters. This work through, Davies withdrew and
rejoined Crook, who, with Smith and Gregg, was established near Flat
Creek.
It being plain that Lee would attempt to escape as soon as his trains
were out of the way, I was most anxious to attack him when the Second
Corps began to arrive, for I felt certain that unless we did so he
would succeed in passing by our left flank, and would thus again make
our pursuit a stern-chase; but General Meade, whose plan of attack
was to advance his right flank on Amelia Court House, objected to
assailing before all his troops were up.
I then sent despatches to General Grant, explaining what Davies had
done, and telling him that the Second Corps was arriving, and that I
wished he himself was present. I assured him of my confidence in our
capturing Lee if we properly exerted ourselves, and informed him,
finally, that I would put all my cavalry, except Mackenzie, on my
left, and that, with such a disposition of my forces, I could see no
escape for Lee. I also inclosed him this letter, which had just been
captured:
"AMELIA C. H., April 5, 1865.
"DEAR MAMMA:
"Our army is ruined, I fear. We are all safe as yet. Shyron left us
sick. John Taylor is well--saw him yesterday. We are in line of
battle this morning. General Robert Lee is in the field near us. My
trust is still in the justice of our cause, and that of God. General
Hill is killed. I saw Murray a few minutes since. Bernard, Terry
said, was taken prisoner, but may yet get out. I send this by a
negro I see passing up the railroad to Mechlenburg. Love to all.
"Your devoted son,
"Wm. B. TAYLOR, Colonel."
General Grant, who on the 5th was accompanying General Ord's column
toward Burkeville Junction, did not receive this intelligence till
nearly nightfall, when within about ten miles of the Junction. He
set out for Jettersville immediately, but did not reach us till near
midnight, too late of course to do anything that night. Taking me
with him, we went over to see Meade, whom he then directed to advance
early in the morning on Amelia Court House. In this interview Grant
also stated that the orders Meade had already issued would permit
Lee's escape, and therefore must be changed, for it was not the aim
only to follow the enemy, but to get ahead of him, remarking during
the conversation that, "he had no doubt Lee was moving right then."
On this same occasion Meade expressed a desire to have in the
proposed attack all the troops of the Army of the Potomac under his
own command, and asked for the return of the Fifth Corps. I made no
objections, and it was ordered to report, to him.