CHAPTER XXI.

THE MOVEMENT TO THE JAMES--THE SECOND EXPEDITION--BATTLE OF

TREVILLIAN STATION--DEFEAT OF GENERAL WADE HAMPTON--MALLORY'S

CROSSROADS--SUFFERING OF THE WOUNDED--SECURING THE TRAINS--GENERAL

GREGG'S STUBBORN FIGHT.

By the 6th of June General Grant again determined to continue the

movement of the army by its left flank to the south bank of the James

River, his unsuccessful attack on the enemy's works near Cold Harbor

having demonstrated that Lee's position north of the Chickahominy

could not be carried by assault with results that would compensate

for the enormous loss of life which must follow; therefore a further

attempt to fight a decisive battle north of Richmond was abandoned.

In carrying the army to the James River the hazardous manoeuvres

would be hampered by many obstacles, such as the thick timber,

underbrush, and troublesome swamps to be met in crossing the

Chickahominy. Besides, Lee held an interior line, from which all the

direct roads to Richmond could be covered with his infantry, leaving

his cavalry free to confront our advance on the south bank of the

Chickahominy as far down as Jones's bridge, and thence around to

Charles City Court House. In view of these difficulties it became

necessary to draw off the bulk of the enemy's cavalry while the

movement to the James was in process of execution, and General Meade

determined to do this by requiring me to proceed with two divisions

as far as Charlottesville to destroy the railroad bridge over the

Rivanna River near that town, the railroad itself from the Rivanna to

Gordonsville, and, if practicable, from Gordonsville back toward

Hanover Junction also.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"June 5, 1864. 3.30 P. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Commanding Cavalry Corps.

"I am directed by the major-general commanding to furnish the

following instructions for your guidance in the execution of the duty

referred to in the order for movements and changes of position

to-night, a copy of which order accompanies this communication.

"With two divisions of your corps you will move on the morning of the

7th instant to Charlottesville and destroy the railroad bridge over

the Rivanna near that town; you will then thoroughly destroy the

railroad from that point to Gordonsville, and from Gordonsville

toward Hanover Junction, and to the latter point, if practicable.

The chief engineer, Major Duane, will furnish you a canvas

pontoon-train of eight boats. The chief quartermaster will supply you

with such tools, implements, and materials as you may require for the

destruction of the road. Upon the completion of this duty you will

rejoin this army.

"A. HUMPHREYS,

"Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."

After Meade's instructions reached me they were somewhat modified by

General Grant, who on the same evening had received information that

General Hunter, commanding the troops in West Virginia, had reached

Staunton and engaged with advantage the Confederate commander,

General Jones, near that place. General Grant informed me orally

that he had directed Hunter to advance as far as Charlottesville,

that he expected me to unite with him there, and that the two

commands, after destroying the James River canal and the Virginia

Central road, were to join the Army of the Potomac in the manner

contemplated in my instructions from General Meade; and that in view

of what was anticipated, it would be well to break up as much of the

railroad as possible on my way westward. A copy of his letter to

Hunter comprised my written instructions. A junction with this

general was not contemplated when the expedition was first conceived,

but became an important though not the paramount object after the

reception of the later information. The diversion of the enemy's

cavalry from the south side of the Chickahominy was its main purpose,

for in the presence of such a force as Lee's contracted lines would

now permit him to concentrate behind the Chickahominy, the

difficulties of crossing that stream would be largely increased if he

also had at hand a strong body of horse, to gain the time necessary

for him to oppose the movement at the different crossings with masses

of his infantry.

The order calling for two divisions for the expedition, I decided to

take Gregg's and Torbert's, leaving Wilson's behind to continue with

the infantry in its march to the James and to receive instructions

directly from, the headquarters of the army. All my dismounted men

had been sent to the White House some days before, and they were

directed to report to Wilson as they could be provided with mounts.

"COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1964.

"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER, Commanding Dept West Virginia.

"General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning with instructions to

proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence there the

destruction of the Virginia Central railroad, destroying this way as

much as possible. The complete destruction of this road and of the

canal on James River is of great importance to us. According to the

instructions I sent to General Halleck for your guidance, you will

proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It would be of great value

to us to get possession of Lynchburg for a single day. But that

point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to

get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting into the

road or canal at all. I see, in looking over the letter to General

Halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates

that your route should be from Staunton via Charlottesville. If you

have so understood it, you will be doing just what I want. The

direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the

valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately turn east by

the most practicable road until you strike the Lynchburg branch of

the Virginia Central road. From there move eastward along the line

of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join

General Sheridan. After the work laid out for General Sheridan and

yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the Army of the Potomac

by the route laid out in General Sheridan's instructions. If any

portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in

your department, you are authorized to send it back. If on receipt

of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem it practicable to

reach that point, you will exercise your judgment about going there.

If you should be on the railroad between Charlottesville and

Lynchburg, it may be practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy

the canal. Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

Owing to the hard service of the preceding month we had lost many

horses, so the number of dismounted men was large; and my strength

had also been much reduced by killed and wounded during the same

period of activity. The effective mounted force of my two divisions

was therefore much diminished, they mustering only about six thousand

officers and men when concentrated on June 6 at New Castle ferry.

Here they were provided with three days' rations, intended to last

five days, and with two days' grain for the horses. The rations and

forty rounds of ammunition per man were to be carried on the persons

of the troopers, the grain on the pommel of the saddle, and the

reserve ammunition in wagons. One medical wagon and eight ambulances

were also furnished, and one wagon was authorized for each division

and brigade headquarters; enough canvas-covered boats for a small

pontoon-bridge were also provided.

My instructions permitting latitude in the route I should take, I

decided to march along the north bank of the North Anna River, cross

that stream at Carpenter's ford, strike the Virginia Central railroad

at Trevillian Station, destroy it toward Louisa Court House, march

past Gordonsville, strike the railroad again at Cobham's Station, and

destroy it thence to Charlottesville as we proceeded west. The

success of the last part of this programme would of course depend on

the location of General Hunter when I should arrive in the region

where it would be practicable for us to communicate with each other.

From my camp at New Castle ferry we crossed the Pamunkey, marched

between Aylett's and Dunkirk on the Mattapony River, and on the 8th

of June encamped at Polecat Station. The next day we resumed the

march along the North Anna--our advance guard skirmishing with a few

mounted men of the enemy, who proved to be irregulars--and bivouacked

on Northeast Creek, near Young's Mills. This day I learned from some

of these irregulars whom we made prisoners that Breckenridge's

division of infantry, en route to the Shenandoah Valley by way of

Gordonsville, was passing slowly up the railroad parallel to me, and

that the enemy's cavalry had left its position on the south side of

the Chickahominy, and was marching on the old Richmond and

Gordonsville road toward Gordonsville, under command of General Wade

Hampton, the information being confirmed by a scouting party sent out

to cut the telegraph wires along the railroad in the night.

Breckenridge had been ordered back to the valley by General Lee as

soon as he heard of Hunter's victory near Staunton, but now that my

expedition had been discovered, the movement of Breckenridge's troops

on the railroad was being timed to correspond with the marches of my

command till Hampton could get more nearly parallel with me.

On the 10th we resumed the march, passing by Twyman's store, crossing

the North Anna at Carpenter's ford and encamping on the road leading

along the south fork of the North Anna to Trevillian Station. During

the evening and night of the 10th the boldness of the enemy's

scouting parties, with which we had been coming into collision more

or less every day, perceptibly increased, thus indicating the

presence of a large force, and evidencing that his shorter line of

march had enabled him to bring to my front a strong body of cavalry,

although it started from Lee's army nearly two days later than I did

from Grant's. The arrival of this body also permitted Breckenridge

to pass on to Gordonsville, and from there to interpose between

General Hunter and me at either Charlottesville or Waynesboro' as

circumstances might determine.

On the night of the Loth General Hampton's division camped about

three miles northwest of Trevillian, at a place called Green Spring

Valley and Fitzhugh Lee's division not far from Louisa Court House,

some six miles east of Trevillian. Learning that I was at

Carpenter's ford, Hampton marched his division by way of Trevillian

Station toward Clayton's store, on the road from Trevillian to

Carpenter's ford, intending to attack me at Clayton's. Fitzhugh

Lee's division was to join Hampton at Clayton's store from Louisa

Court House; but on the morning of the 11th the two generals were

separated by several miles.

At daylight of the 11th my march, to Trevillian Station was resumed

on the direct road to that point, and engaging the enemy's pickets

and advanced parties soon after setting out, we began to drive them

in. Torbert had the lead with Merritt's and Devin's brigades, and as

he pressed back the pickets he came upon the enemy posted behind a

line of barricades in dense timber about three miles from Trevillian.

Meanwhile Custer's brigade had been sent from where we bivouacked, by

a wood road found on our left, to destroy Trevillian Station. In

following this road Custer got to the rear of Hampton's division,

having passed between its right flank and Fitzhugh Lee's division,

which was at the time marching on the road leading from Louisa Court

House to Clayton's store to unite with Hampton.

Custer, the moment he found himself in Hampton's rear, charged the

led horses, wagons, and caissons found there, getting hold of a vast

number of each, and also of the station itself. The stampede and

havoc wrought by Custer in Hampton's rear compelled him to turn

Rosser's brigade in that direction, and while it attacked Custer on

one side, Fitzhugh Lee's division, which had followed Custer toward

Trevillian, attacked him on the other. There then ensued a desperate

struggle for the possession of the captured property, resulting

finally in its being retaken by the enemy. Indeed, the great number

of horses and vehicles could not be kept on the limited space within

Custer's line, which now formed almost a complete circle; and while

he was endeavoring to remove them to a secure place they, together

with Custer's headquarters wagon and four of his caissons, fell into

the hands of their original owners.

As soon as the firing told that Custer had struck the enemy's rear, I

directed Torbert to press the line in front of Merritt and Devin,

aided by one brigade of Gregg's division on their left, Gregg's other

brigade in the meantime attacking Fitzhugh Lee on the Louisa Court

House road. The effect of this was to force Hampton back, and his

division was so hard pushed that a portion of it was driven pell-mell

into Custer's lines, leaving there about five hundred prisoners. The

rest of Hampton's men did not rally till they got some distance west

of Trevillian, while, in the meantime, Gregg had driven Fitzhugh Lee

toward Louisa Court House so far that many miles now intervened

between the two Confederate divisions, precluding their union until

about noon the next day, when Fitzhugh Lee effected the junction

after a circuitous march in the night. The defeat of Hampton at the

point where he had determined to resist my further advance, and his

retreat westward, gave me undisturbed possession of the station; and

after destroying the railroad to some extent toward Gordonsville, I

went into camp.

From prisoners taken during the day, I gathered that General Hunter,

instead of coming toward Charlottesville, as I had reason to expect,

both from the instructions given me and the directions sent him by

General Grant, was in the neighborhood of Lexington--apparently

moving on Lynchburg--and that Breckenridge was at Gordonsville and

Charlottesville. I also heard, from the same source, that Ewell's

corps was on its way to Lynchburg, but this intelligence proved

afterward to be incorrect, for these troops, commanded by General

Early, did not leave Richmond till two days later.

There was no doubt as to the information about Hunter's general

location, however. He was marching toward Lynchburg, away from

instead of toward me, thus making the junction of our commands beyond

all reasonable probability. So in view of this, I made up my mind to

abandon that part of the scheme, and to return by leisurely marches,

which would keep Hampton's cavalry away from Lee while Grant was

crossing the James River. I was still further influenced to this

course by the burden which was thrown on me in the large number of

wounded--there being about five hundred cases of my own--and the five

hundred prisoners that I would probably be forced to abandon, should

I proceed farther. Besides, the recent battle had reduced my supply

of ammunition to a very small amount--not more than enough for one

more respectable engagement; and as the chances were that I would

have to fight a great deal before I could reach Hunter, now that the

enemy's cavalry and Breckenridge's infantry were between us, the

risks of the undertaking seemed too great to warrant it.

The morning of June 12 Gregg's division commenced destroying the

railroad to Louisa Court House, and continued the work during the

day, breaking it pretty effectually. While Gregg was thus occupied,

I directed Torbert to make a reconnoissance up the Gordonsville road,

to secure a by-road leading over Mallory's ford, on the North Anna,

to the Catharpen road, as I purposed following that route to

Spottsylvania Court House on my return, and thence via Bowling Green

and Dunkirk to the White House. About a mile beyond Trevillian the

Gordonsville road fork--the left fork leading to Charlottesville--and

about a mile beyond the fork Hampton had taken up and strongly

intrenched a line across both roads, being reinforced by Fitzhugh

Lee, who, as before related, had joined him about noon by a

roundabout march. Torbert soon hotly engaged this line, and by the

impetuosity of his first attack, gained some advantage; but the

appearance of Fitzhugh Lee's troops on the right, and Hampton's

strong resistance in front, rendered futile all efforts to carry the

position; and, although I brought up one of Gregg's brigades to

Torbert's assistance, yet the by-road I coveted was still held by the

enemy when night closed in.

This engagement, like that off the day before around Trevillian, was

mostly fought dismounted by both sides, as had also been the earlier

fights of the cavalry during the summer in the Wilderness, at Todd's

Tavern, Hawe's Shop, and Matadequin Creek. Indeed, they could hardly

have been fought otherwise than on foot, as there was little chance

for mounted fighting in eastern Virginia, the dense woods, the

armament of both parties, and the practice of barricading making it

impracticable to use the sabre with anything like a large force; and

so with the exception of Yellow Tavern the dismounted method

prevailed in almost every engagement.

The losses at Mallory's Crossroads were very heavy on both sides.

The character of the fighting, together with the day's results,

demonstrated that it was impossible to make the passage of the North

Anna at Mallory's ford without venturing another battle the next day.

This would consume the little ammunition left, and though we might

gain the road, yet the possibility of having no ammunition whatever

to get back with was too great a hazard, so I gave orders to withdraw

during the night of the 12th. We retired along the same road by

which we had come, taking with us the prisoners, and all of our

wounded who could be moved. Those who could not be transported, some

ninety in number, and all the Confederate wounded in my hands, were

left at Trevillian in hospitals, under charge of one of our surgeons,

with plenty of medical and other stores.

We recrossed the North Anna at Carpenter's ford the following

morning, and halting there, unsaddled and turned the horses out to

graze, for they were nearly famished, having had neither food nor

water during the preceding forty-eight hours. Late in the afternoon

we saddled up and proceeded to Twyman's Store, while General

Hampton's main body moved down the south bank of the North Anna, with

the purpose of intervening between me and the Army of the Potomac, in

the hope of preventing my return to it; but his movements took no

definite shape beyond watching me, however, till several days later,

near St. Mary's Church, when I was crossing the peninsula to the

James River.

On the 14th the march was continued, and we reached the Catharpen

road, upon which it was originally intended to move if we had been

able to cross at Mallory's ford, and this conducted me to Shady Grove

Church. The next day we passed over the battle-field of

Spottsylvania Court House. The marks of the recent conflicts about

there were visible on every hand, and in the neighboring houses were

found many Union and Confederate wounded, who had been too severely

hurt to be removed from the field-hospitals at the time of the

battles. Such of our wounded as were able to travel were brought

away.

On the 16th I marched from Edge Hill on the Ta River through Bowling

Green to Dr. Butler's, on the north side of the Mattapony. When I

arrived here I was unable to ascertain the position of the Army of

the Potomac, and was uncertain whether or not the base at the White

House had been discontinued. I had heard nothing from the army for

nine days except rumors through Southern sources, and under these

circumstances did not like to venture between the Mattapony and

Pamunkey rivers, embarrassed as I was with some four hundred wounded,

five hundred prisoners, and about two thousand negroes that had

joined my column in the hope of obtaining their freedom. I therefore

determined to push down the north bank of the Mattapony far enough to

enable me to send these impediments directly to West Point, where I

anticipated finding some of our gunboats and transports, that could

carry all to the North. Following this plan, we proceeded through

Walkerton to King and Queen Court House, and bivouacked in its

vicinity the night of the 18th. Next day I learned that the depot at

the White House had not yet been broken up entirely, and that

supplies were in store for me there; so after sending the wounded,

prisoners, and negroes to West Point under an escort of two

regiments, I turned back to Dunkirk, on the Mattapony, and crossed to

the south side at a place where the stream was narrow enough to

bridge with my pontoon-boats.

In returning from Trevillian, as the most of our wounded were hauled

in old buggies, carts, and such other vehicles as could be made

available in the absence of a sufficient number of ambulances, the

suffering was intense, the heat of the season and dusty roads adding

much to the discomfort. Each day we halted many times to dress the

wounds of the injured and to refresh them as much as possible, but

our means for mitigating their distress were limited. The fortitude

and cheerfulness of the poor fellows under such conditions were

remarkable, for no word of complaint was heard. The Confederate

prisoners and colored people being on foot, our marches were

necessarily made short, and with frequent halts also, but they too

suffered considerably from the heat and dust, though at times the

prisoners were relieved by being mounted on the horses of some of our

regiments, the owners meantime marching on foot. Where all the

colored people came from and what started them was inexplicable, but

they began joining us just before we reached Trevillian--men, women,

and children with bundles of all sorts containing their few worldly

goods, and the number increased from day to day until they arrived at

West Point. Probably not one of the poor things had the remotest

idea, when he set out, as to where he would finally land, but to a

man they followed the Yankees in full faith that they would lead to

freedom, no matter what road they took.

On the morning of the 20th, at an early hour, we resumed our march,

and as the column proceeded sounds of artillery were heard in the

direction of the White House, which fact caused us to quicken the

pace. We had not gone far when despatches from General Abercrombie,

commanding some fragmentary organizations at the White House,

notified me that the place was about to be attacked. I had

previously sent an advance party with orders to move swiftly toward

the cannonading and report to me by couriers the actual condition of

affairs. From this party I soon learned that there was no occasion

to push our jaded animals, since the crisis, if there had been one,

was over and the enemy repulsed, so the increased gait was reduced to

a leisurely march that took us late in the afternoon to the north

bank of the Pamunkey, opposite Abercrombie's camp. When I got to the

river the enemy was holding the bluffs surrounding the White House

farm, having made no effort to penetrate General Abercrombie's line

or do him other hurt than to throw a few shells among the teamsters

there congregated.

Next day Gregg's division crossed the Pamunkey dismounted, and

Torbert's crossed mounted. As soon as the troops were over, Gregg,

supported by Merritt's brigade, moved out on the road to Tunstall's

Station to attack Hampton, posted an the west side of Black Creek,

Custer's brigade meanwhile moving, mounted, on the road to

Cumberland, and Devin's in like manner on the one to Baltimore

crossroads. This offer of battle was not accepted, however, and

Hampton withdrew from my front, retiring behind the Chickahominy,

where his communications with Lee would be more secure.

While at the White House I received orders to break up that depot

wholly, and also instructions to move the trains which the Army of

the Potomac had left there across the peninsula to the pontoon-bridge

at Deep Bottom on the James River. These trains amounted to hundreds

of wagons and other vehicles, and knowing full well the dangers which

would attend the difficult problem of getting them over to

Petersburg, I decided to start them with as little delay as

circumstances would permit, and the morning of the 22d sent Torbert's

division ahead to secure Jones's bridge on the Chickahominy, so that

the wagons could be crossed at that point. The trains followed

Torbert, while Gregg's division marched by a road parallel to the one

on which the wagons were moving, and on their right flank, as they

needed to be covered and protected in that direction only.

The enemy made no effort to attack us while we were moving the trains

that day, and the wagons were all safely parked for the night on the

south side of the Chickahominy, guarded by General Getty, who had

relieved Abercrombie from command of the infantry fragments before we

started off from the White House.

To secure the crossing at Jones's bridge, Torbert had pushed Devin's

brigade out on the Long Bridge road, on the side of the Chickahominy

where, on the morning of the 23d, he was attacked by Chambliss's

brigade of W. H. F. Lee's division. Devin was driven in some little

distance, but being reinforced by Getty with six companies of colored

troops, he quickly turned the tables on Chambliss and re-established

his picket-posts. From this affair I learned that Chambliss's brigade

was the advance of the Confederate cavalry corps, while Hampton

discovered from it that we were already in possession of the Jones's

bridge crossing of the Chickahominy; and as he was too late to

challenge our passage of the stream at this point he contented

himself with taking up a position that night so as to cover the roads

leading from Long Bridge to Westover, with the purpose of preventing

the trains from following the river road to the pontoon-bridge at

Deep Bottom.

My instructions required me to cross the trains over the James River

on this pontoon-bridge if practicable, and to reach it I should be

obliged to march through Charles City Court House, and then by

Harrison's Landing and Malvern Hill, the latter point being held by

the enemy. In fact, he held all the ground between Long Bridge on

the Chickahominy and the pontoon-bridge except the Tete de pont at

the crossing. Notwithstanding this I concluded to make the attempt,

for all the delays of ferrying the command and trains would be

avoided if we got through to the bridge; and with this object in view

I moved Torbert's division out on the Charles City road to conduct

the wagons. Just beyond Charles City Court House Torbert encountered

Lomax's brigade, which he drove across Herring Creek on the road to

Westover Church; and reporting the affair to me, I surmised, from the

presence of this force in my front, that Hampton would endeavor to

penetrate to the long column of wagons, so I ordered them to go into

park near Wilcox's landing, and instructed Gregg, whose division had

been marching in the morning along the road leading from Jones's

bridge to St. Mary's Church for the purpose of covering the exposed

flank of the train, to hold fast near the church without fail till

all the transportation had passed Charles City Court House.

Meanwhile, General Hampton, who had conjectured that I would try to

get the train across the James by the pontoon-bridge at Deep Bottom,

began concentrating all his troops except Lomax's brigade, which was

to confront the head of my column on the river road, in the vicinity

of Nance's Shop. This was discovered by Gregg at an early hour, and

divining this purpose he had prepared to meet it by constructing

hasty cover for his men before receiving my instructions. About 4

o'clock in the afternoon Hampton got his force in hand, and with

Fitzhugh Lee's division assailed the whole front of Gregg's line, and

his left flank with Chambliss's and Geary's brigades. For two hours

he continued to attack, but made little impression on Gregg--gain at

one point being counterbalanced by failure at another. Because of

the evident strength of Hampton, Gregg had placed all his troops in

line of battle from the first, and on discovery of the enemy's

superior numbers sent message after message to me concerning the

situation, but the messengers never arrived, being either killed or

captured, and I remained in total ignorance till dark of the strait

his division was in.

Toward night it became clear to Gregg that he could maintain the

unequal contest no longer, and he then decided to retreat, but not

until convinced that the time won had enabled all the trains to pass

Charles City Court House in safety. When he had got all his led

horses fairly on the way, and such of the wounded as could be

transported, he retired by his right flank-in some confusion, it is

true, but stubbornly resisting to Hopewell Church, where Hampton

ceased to press him.

Gregg's losses were heavy, and he was forced to abandon his dead and

most seriously wounded, but the creditable stand made ensured the

safety of the train, the last wagon of which was now parked at

Wilcox's Landing. His steady, unflinching determination to gain time

for the wagons to get beyond the point of danger was characteristic

of the man, and this was the third occasion on which he had exhibited

a high order of capacity and sound judgment since coming under my

command. The firmness and coolness with which he always met the

responsibilities of a dangerous place were particularly strong points

in Gregg's make-up, and he possessed so much professional though

unpretentious ability, that it is to be regretted he felt obliged a

few months later to quit the service before the close of the war.

Gregg's fight fully satisfied me that we could not get the trains up

to the pontoon-bridge, for of course Hampton would now throw all his

cavalry in my front, on the river road, where it could be backed up

by Lee's infantry. Meanwhile, General Meade had become assured of

the same thing, and as he was now growing anxious about the fate of

Wilson's division--which, during my absence, had been sent out to

break the enemy's communications south of Petersburg, by destroying

the Southside and Danville railroads--he sent ferryboats to cross me

over the James. During the night of the 24th, and next morning, the

immense train--which ought never to have been left for the cavalry to

escort, after a fatiguing expedition of three weeks--was moved back

through Charles City Court House to Douthard's landing, and there

ferried over the river, followed by my troops in like manner. When

General Hampton discovered this, he moved to Drury's Bluff, and

there, on the morning of the 27th, crossed the James by the

Confederate pontoon-bridge.

Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army — Complete · 第 21 / 28 章