SARATOGA.
On June 11, 1776, Howe sailed from Halifax with his army of 9,000 men,
and on July 3 occupied Staten Island without opposition. There he was
joined by the reinforcements from England, conveyed by Lord Howe, and by
Clinton and his troops, so that in August he had with him some 25,000
men, English and German. Washington's army at New York numbered about
19,000 effectives.[112] Mindful of his commission to restore
tranquillity, Lord Howe wrote to him enclosing a copy of the king's
offers. Washington would not receive the letter because the address did
not acknowledge his military rank, and observed that the powers of the
commissioners extended only to granting pardons, and that his people had
done nothing for which they needed pardon. The pacific mission of the
Howes having so far failed, the general on August 22-25 landed an army
on Long Island, which is separated from New York by the East river.
Brooklyn heights on Long Island, opposite New York, were strongly
fortified and held by the Americans. Washington, believing that a larger
British force was left in Staten Island than was really the case,
thought it necessary to keep a numerous garrison in New York to meet a
direct attack on the place, and detached only some 9,000 men under
Putnam to Long Island. They were for the most part posted so as to hold
a belt of wooded hills lying between their lines and the royal army.
During the night of the 26th Howe outflanked them and brought his main
body to a position on their rear. The next day an attack was made on
their front; they were caught between two divisions of the king's troops
and were defeated. Howe put their loss at 3,300, which is certainly an
overestimate, though he made nearly 1,100 prisoners, among them the
generals Sullivan and Lord Stirling, as the Americans called him, an
unsuccessful claimant of that earldom.[113] The British casualties were
377. The Americans retreated within their inner lines. If Howe had
allowed his troops to storm their entrenchments he would probably have
destroyed or taken the whole force on the island. He considered,
however, that the lines could in a few days be taken "at a very cheap
rate" by regular approaches, and decided not to risk the loss of any
more men.[114] He let his opportunity slip, and on the night of the 29th
Washington, helped by a fog, cleverly withdrew his troops across the
river.
[Sidenote: _NEW YORK TAKEN._]
Lord Howe took advantage of the American defeat to invite congress to
send some of its members to confer with him unofficially as to possible
terms of peace. Congress, though it refused to sanction any unofficial
negotiations, sent commissioners from its own body to confer with him.
Nothing came of the conference, for the American commissioners would not
treat except on the basis of independence. On September 15 the British
army descended on Manhattan Island, on which New York stands, and the
American militia fled in disorder. The British took possession of New
York and of sixty-six of the enemy's guns. If Howe's movements had been
more prompt he might have cut off a large number of the enemy; he is
said to have wasted time by lingering over luncheon at the house of the
mother of Lindley Murray, the grammar-writer, who detained him by her
crafty hospitality. Washington drew off his troops to Haarlem heights,
in the northern part of the island. The next day there was some
skirmishing in which the Americans held their ground. The loyalists of
New York had been shamefully treated by the dominant faction, and the
British were received with joy.[115] A few days later a large part of
the city was destroyed by fires evidently kindled by incendiaries.
Washington and other generals had wished for military reasons to burn
the place. They were prevented by congress, but the idea was taken up
by some violent revolutionists. The Americans were disheartened by their
ill-success; Washington's troops deserted in large numbers, and the
greatest disorder prevailed in his army. In England the news of Howe's
victory and his occupation of New York was received with delight, and
the king rewarded him with the Order of the Bath.
The acquisition of New York gave the army an excellent base for
operations either in the northern or southern provinces; it was easily
accessible by sea, and lay in the midst of a district where loyalism was
strong. According to the ministerial plan, Howe should have been joined
by Carleton's army, which was to have taken Crown Point and Ticonderoga,
gained possession of the upper Hudson, and invaded the province of New
York from the north. After the Americans were chased out of Canada,
Carleton's operations were stopped by the lack of a fleet to wrest the
command of Lake Champlain from the rebels. During the summer he devoted
himself with extraordinary energy to collecting and building vessels.
Ships sent out from England were taken to pieces, carried overland to
St. John's and put together again, little gunboats and transports were
built, and by the beginning of October a larger and better fleet than
that of the Americans was afloat on the lake. It engaged the enemy's
fleet, under Arnold, off Valcour island, on the 11th and again on the
13th, and utterly destroyed it; only three of their vessels
escaped.[116] Carleton occupied Crown Point, but as the season was so
far advanced did not attack Ticonderoga, or stay long enough to put
Crown Point in a defensible condition; he placed his army in winter
quarters and returned to Quebec. He might have done more. His decision
disappointed the king, and was represented to him in an unfavourable
light, for Germain had a personal grudge against Carleton, and had
already, in August, sent an order, which failed to reach him, that
beyond his province the command was to be taken by Burgoyne. George,
conscious of Carleton's signal services, at first declared himself
satisfied that he had good reason for his decision; but Germain had the
royal ear, and when the news came that Carleton had actually closed the
campaign, the king accused him of slackness.
[Sidenote: _WASHINGTON'S RETREAT._]
An example of real slackness was being given by Howe at New York. He
should with the aid of the fleet have made a prompt effort to prevent
Washington from retreating from Manhattan island, and to cut off his
communications with Connecticut whence he was drawing supplies. Even
before occupying New York he might have conveyed his army by water to a
point from which White Plains, where the land begins to broaden out
rapidly, might have been reached with ease. He wasted four weeks of
precious time at New York, and did not embark his troops till October
12. Washington left his narrow position on Haarlem heights, gained White
Plains before him, and fortified his camp. Howe attacked him on the 28th
with the object of outflanking him. Although part of his army by a
frontal attack drove the American right from a strong position, this
success was fruitless as well as costly. The insurgents' centre was
weak, and if he had attacked it in force he might have crushed them
completely. He made no further attempt in that direction, and Washington
retreated to a good position behind Croton river. Howe returned to New
York. There, however, he dealt the Americans a serious blow. Fort
Washington, on Manhattan island, and Fort Lee, opposite to it on the
Jersey shore, were intended to bar the Hudson and so secure
communications with the country to the west of it. Congress, which often
interfered in military matters, ordered that Fort Washington should be
held, though in fact the forts did not prevent our ships from passing up
the river. On November 16 a well-planned attack was made upon the fort;
it was forced to surrender, and 2,858 prisoners, forty-three cannon, and
a large quantity of small arms were taken by the British.
Two days later Cornwallis took possession of Fort Lee, together with 140
cannon and stores of various kinds. He rapidly overran New Jersey.
Washington had been drawn down thither, and Lee, whom he left at the
Croton, failed to support him. He retreated hastily through New Jersey
with a force daily diminished by desertion. Cornwallis pressed upon him,
but was detained by Howe's orders for a week at Brunswick; and
Washington, who left Princeton only an hour before Cornwallis entered
it, had just time to convey his army, then reduced to some 3,300
men,[117] across the Delaware on December 8 before the British came up.
They were unable to follow him at once for no boats were left on the
eastern bank. Howe, who had joined Cornwallis, decided that no more
could be done and placed the army in winter quarters. He divided it into
small detachments, and for the sake of protecting and encouraging the
loyalists, extended his line of communication for eighty miles. The
fortunes of the insurgents were at low ebb. Not only were the loyalists
strong in New Jersey, but crowds of the rebel party, many of them men of
high standing, took advantage of the amnesty which Howe was empowered to
offer. The Delaware would soon be frozen over, and, if the British
crossed it, Washington had not a sufficient force to hinder them from
marching on Philadelphia. The town was panic-stricken, and congress
removed to Baltimore. Washington's army dwindled. The period for which
his regular troops were enlisted would end on January 1, and as for the
militia, that "destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob" as he called
them, they came and went as they pleased. "The game," he thought, "was
pretty well played out."[118] The Americans' distress was heightened by
the capture of Lee, who was on his way to join Washington. They reckoned
him their ablest general, though his insubordination and self-seeking
rendered the loss of him an actual gain. About the same time Clinton
sailed to Rhode Island with Sir Peter Parker, and occupied Newport
without opposition.
Washington's only chance lay in immediate action. The foolish
disposition of the British army gave him an opportunity. Their central
cantonments, nearest to the enemy, were weak. Trenton was held by only
1,200 Hessians; their discipline was relaxed, they were hindered by
difference of language from gaining intelligence, and they lived in
careless security. Washington was reinforced by Lee's troops and by
three regiments from Ticonderoga, which Carleton's inaction had rendered
available for service in the south. On the night of December 25 he
crossed the Delaware, and before daybreak took Trenton by surprise. The
startled garrison could make no resistance; about 200 escaped and 918
were taken prisoners. Of the Americans only two were killed and six
wounded. Cornwallis, who was on the point of embarking for England,
hastened back to the Jersey army. Washington avoided a general
engagement, defeated two regiments employed in an operation for the
defence of Princeton, and before the middle of January, 1777, compelled
the British by a series of well-conducted movements to evacuate West
Jersey and withdraw to Brunswick and Amboy, where they went into
quarters. The king's troops, British and German, committed many
excesses, plundering friends and foes alike; and the inhabitants,
indignant at their conduct, took advantage of Washington's success and
turned against them. Many joined Washington's army. The British were in
the midst of a hostile population, and though they had communication
with New York by water, were almost besieged by land, for their supplies
were constantly intercepted. The Jersey loyalists were left to the
vengeance of their neighbours and were mercilessly plundered. Many of
them fled to New York where several thousand provincial troops were
embodied. Howe remained inactive at New York until the spring, and
Washington also stayed quietly at his headquarters at Morristown.
[Sidenote: _A PARTIAL SECESSION FROM PARLIAMENT._]
Parliament was opened on October 31, 1776. An amendment to the address
referring to American affairs was defeated in the lords by 91 to 26 and
in the commons by 242 to 87. The news of the victory at Brooklyn--"the
terrible news," as Fox indecently called it--and of the occupation of
New York strengthened the ministers; and on a motion to revise the acts
by which the Americans considered themselves aggrieved, the minority in
the commons sank to 47. Depressed by the exhibition of their weakness,
the Rockingham section ceased to attend parliament except on the
occasion of private bills in which they were interested. Petulance and a
false notion of dignity led them to neglect their duty to their country
and their party. Their conduct was blamed by other whigs, and their
secession, though it occasioned discord in the opposition, did not
paralyse its efforts. Fox, by that time its most effective orator, went
off to Paris, and the king advised North to proceed with as much
business as possible in his absence.
The split in the opposition was specially manifested on the introduction
of a government bill in February, 1777, for a partial suspension of the
_habeas corpus_ act, in order to secure the detention of persons charged
with high treason in America or on the high seas; Rockingham, Burke, and
others adhered to their secession, while Dunning and Fox headed the
minority in the commons. Fox warned the house not to be deceived by the
amicable professions of the French ministers, who, he said, were holding
conferences with delegates from congress while he was in Paris, and were
only delaying to take part against England until the French navy was in
good order. He declared that our losses were far greater and our
successes far smaller than they were represented by government, and
inveighed against the inhumanity with which he asserted the war was
conducted on our side. He attacked the solicitor-general, who in
answering him pointed out that if, as he asserted, France was secretly
intriguing against us the bill was specially necessary. In a personal
encounter Wedderburn was a dangerous antagonist, and Fox met more than
his match. Dunning urged an amendment to prevent any abuse of the act;
and North, always averse from violent measures, accepted his proposal.
The bill was carried by 112 to 33. Public feeling had lately been
excited on the subject of treason by incendiary fires which did much
damage in the Portsmouth dockyard and destroyed some buildings on
Bristol quay. They were found to have been the work of one James Aitken,
commonly called John the painter, who had lately returned from America,
and who stated in his confession that he had acted at the instigation of
Silas Deane, one of the emissaries of congress in Paris.[119] He was
hanged at Portsmouth on March 10.
The expenses of the war were growing. For 1777 parliament voted 45,000
seamen, including 1,000 marines. The difficulty was to get them. A
seaman's service was not continuous; when his ship was paid off he could
go whither he would. The peace establishment of the navy was
ridiculously small, and when a war broke out it was always difficult to
get men in a hurry. Many of the best seamen would have taken service on
board merchant ships and would, perhaps, be at sea; and life on the
king's ships in time of war was often so rough that it is not surprising
that men should have avoided it. The usual difficulty of manning the
fleet at the beginning of a war was increased at the present time, for
it was calculated that the revolt of the colonies deprived England of
1,800 seamen. The navy in time of war was recruited by impressment, a
system which, though recognised by common law, entailed much hardship.
Seamen were kidnapped, often after a bloody struggle, and if caught
inland were sent to the ports ironed like criminals. Men who had been at
sea for years were liable, as soon as their ships neared home, to be
taken out of them, put into a press tender and sent to sea again.
Merchant ships were stripped of their best men, and were left to be
brought into port by the master and a few lads. The press gangs looked
for trained seamen, though when a war lasted for some years they took
what they could get; landsmen were impressed, and the press was
sometimes abused as a means of getting rid of a personal enemy, a rival
in love, or an inconvenient claimant. The system was expensive; it was
stated that from 4,000 to 5,000 seamen were employed on the business,
and that every pressed man who was found to be fit for sea cost the
nation L30. High bounties were offered, but they failed to entice men to
enter a service which the press might make practically continuous, and a
proposal for a limited term of service was rejected by the commons. The
supplies for the year amounted to L12,592,534. New taxes calculated to
yield L237,000 were laid on male servants, a guinea on each, stamps,
imported glass, auctioneers, and sales by auction; and the deficiency of
L5,500,000 was met by a loan, raised at 4 per cent., with a premium of
1/2 per cent. to meet the state of the stocks.
[Sidenote: _ARREARS OF THE CIVIL LIST._]
While war was thus increasing the burden of the nation, the king again
applied to parliament for payment of the arrears of the civil list,
amounting to L618,000. The ministers exhibited accounts which failed to
satisfy the opposition. Wilkes pointed out that payments since 1769 of
L171,000 and L114,000 for secret service were each noted in a single
line, and that there was a general charge of L438,000 for pensions. As
in 1769, the arrears must be traced to an expenditure which increased
the king's influence. Wilkes said this plainly, Burke in less broad
terms, and Fox taunted North with the pledge given when he was in office
in 1769 that no such demand should be made again. Besides money
deliberately spent in corruption, vast sums were wasted on abuses in the
royal household, on sinecures, and on other useless places of profit.
One of the king's turnspits was a member of the house of commons, and
paid L5 a year to a humble deputy, and no fewer than twenty-three
separate tables were kept up, eleven for the nurses. For such abuses
George was only partially responsible. Though he lived with a frugality
which was almost meanness, he was in dire distress for money; the wages
of his menial servants were six quarters in arrear, and he owed his
coal-merchant L6,000.[120] After much discussion the money was voted,
and the civil list was increased to L900,000 a year. In presenting the
bill to the king the speaker, Sir Fletcher Norton, dwelt on the
magnificence of the gift, and added that the commons were confident that
he would apply wisely what they had granted liberally. Though the court
party in the commons declared that he had not expressed the feeling of
the house, he received a vote of thanks for his speech. Towards the
close of the session Chatham was sufficiently recovered from his long
illness again to attend parliament, and moved an address to the crown to
put an end to the war. He pointed out the danger of foreign
intervention, and declared that France was already destroying our
commerce. The idea of conquering America was absurd; America would not
be conquered by the loss of ten pitched battles. He was against American
independence, but this country, he said, was the aggressor, and "instead
of exacting unconditional submission from the colonies, we should grant
them unconditional redress". His motion was negatived by 99 votes to 28.
[Sidenote: _THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN._]
A fresh plan for obtaining the mastery of the line of the Hudson was
already in course of preparation. Burgoyne, who returned home in
December, obtained the command of the northern army, and, on February
28, laid a project of campaign before the government. He proposed to
secure Ticonderoga and the lakes, and march down the Hudson to Albany,
where he was to effect a junction with Howe, previously detaching a
small force to create a diversion by advancing from Oswego and down the
Mohawk river to Albany. The object of this plan was to open
communication between New York and Canada, cut off New England from the
southern provinces, and enable Howe to operate in the south with an
overwhelming force. He pointed out the difficulties of the proposed
march and suggested alternative schemes; but his first project was
chosen by the king, and he was ordered to carry it out. The projected
campaign, if successful, would have been disastrous to the Americans.
Its success depended on Howe's co-operation. An invasion by distinct
armies, such as Burgoyne proposed, with bases far apart and acting on
converging lines, can only be undertaken with safety when
intercommunication is secure and co-operation assured. Otherwise one of
the invading armies is liable to be crushed before it can receive help
from another, specially when, as was the case here, the enemy can act on
lines interior to those on which the invaders move. Burgoyne fell into
the error, common throughout the war, of trusting too much to loyalist
help. Apart from that, however, his project assumed that Howe would be
advancing up the Hudson in time to get between him and any large force
which might advance against him, and it failed miserably, because Howe
did not co-operate with him. Germain informed Carleton of the plan and
ordered him to resign the command of the northern army to Burgoyne; he
was to command only within his own province, keeping 3,700 men with him,
and was to forward Burgoyne's expedition. Germain reproached him for his
retirement from Ticonderoga, which, he said, gave Washington the means
of breaking the British line at Trenton. Carleton was indignant at this
unworthy treatment, and though he did what he could to help Burgoyne, he
resigned the governor-generalship.[121]
During the winter Howe formed a plan for taking Philadelphia, and on
December 20, 1776, expounded it by letter to Germain, observing that the
northern army would not reach Albany before September. Germain wrote on
March 8 approving of his plan,[122] which might have been executed
without preventing the junction contemplated by the minister. After some
unimportant operations Howe took the field in June, and on the 5th
received a copy of Carleton's instructions relating to Burgoyne's
campaign. Washington's difficulties were then somewhat relieved; he
encamped at Middlebrook in a position too strong to be forced; he would
not be enticed to a general engagement, and Howe could not leave him in
his rear and push on to Philadelphia. Time was passing, yet Howe was
still set on prosecuting his design on Philadelphia. Finally he
embarked an army of 14,000 men at Sandy Hook, and instead of remaining
to be in readiness to co-operate with Burgoyne, left Clinton with 8,500
men to garrison New York and "act as circumstances may direct," and on
July 23 sailed for the Delaware, where he considered he would be
sufficiently near to New York to act with Burgoyne, if necessary, and
yet could carry out his own main design. The naval officers were
unwilling to risk disembarkation in the Delaware, and Howe, determined
not to give up his design, sailed for Chesapeake bay. The fleet met with
contrary winds, and it was not until August 25 that his army landed at
the head of Elk river. Washington with about an equal force marched to
the north of the Brandywine to defend Philadelphia. The two armies met
on September 11. Howe, who well knew how to handle an army in the field,
out-manoeuvred him, and after some sharp fighting the American army
was defeated with a loss of over 1,400 men, killed, wounded, and taken,
and eleven guns. Congress again decamped, and on the 27th Cornwallis
took possession of Philadelphia amid the acclamations of a large part of
the inhabitants, while Howe and the main army encamped at Germantown,
five miles to the north.
[Sidenote: _HOWE'S OBJECT ATTAINED._]
In order to secure communication with New York and to supply the army,
it was all-important that the fleet should be able to pass up the
Delaware, which was strongly defended by forts, a bar, and a fleet of
little vessels; and Howe detached troops to act against the forts.
Washington lay a few miles to the north; he was joined by strong
reinforcements, and determined to take advantage of the division of the
British troops. He formed a plan for surprising and driving in their
advanced posts, cutting their force in two, crushing their right wing,
and then doubling the whole army back on the Schuylkill river where it
would be at his mercy. He attacked at daybreak on October 4 under cover
of a fog. The head of the British position was insufficiently guarded
and the 40th regiment was driven back. At this critical moment its
commander, Musgrave, and a party of his men stopped the enemy's advance
by seizing a house which stood in their way and holding it against them
until the army had time to form. His gallant conduct saved the army. The
Americans fought well until, misled by the fog, one of their brigades
fired on another. This threw them into disorder, which was increased by
the drunkenness of some of their officers and men. Cornwallis came up
from Philadelphia in hot haste and pressed upon them. They retreated
with a loss of 673 killed and wounded, and 400 taken; on the British
side the casualties were 551. Both in this action and in the battle on
the Brandywine the Americans showed that they had learned to fight with
resolution and to retreat in good order. The two engagements proved that
though they might be defeated in the field, the war would not come to a
speedy end, and this enlisted foreign sympathy and encouraged France to
intervene on their side.
For a month Howe was engaged in opening the passage of the Delaware. He
sent for 4,000 men from New York. This reduction of the garrison was
most unfortunate, for, as we shall see, it put an end to Clinton's
attempt to co-operate with Burgoyne.[123] At last the defences of the
river were destroyed, and communication was established between the army
and the fleet. Washington retreated to Valley Forge, about twenty-five
miles from Philadelphia, and there put his army into quarters. During
the winter his troops suffered terribly from lack of clothing and
provisions. By Christmas nearly 3,000 were unfit for duty because they
were "barefoot or otherwise naked". They deserted in parties, a large
number came to the British quarters, and scarcely a day passed without
the resignation of an officer. In February, 1778, there was almost a
famine in the camp, and Washington feared a general mutiny and
dispersion.[124]
Meanwhile the British were in comfortable quarters in Philadelphia.
Howe's object was attained; but though the capture of their capital
discouraged the Americans, the loss of Philadelphia is not to be
compared with the loss of a capital of an organised state; it did not
paralyse an administrative machinery or lessen the means of resistance.
Howe's anxiety for its capture largely proceeded from his expectation
that it would be followed by a rising of the loyalists; he placed too
high a value on professions of loyalty and on loyalist support. In
itself the place was important; it was the largest of the American
towns, and it opened communication between the northern and southern
provinces, though so long as an insurgent army existed in Pennsylvania,
an invader could not safely take advantage of its position. British
officers marvelled that Howe did not attack Washington while his army
was in so miserable a state. His inactivity cannot be defended
satisfactorily. He was looking forward to be relieved of his command; he
was disgusted by the inadequate response made by the government to his
repeated demands for large reinforcements; he informed Germain that
without 10,000 more troops the war would not be ended in the next
campaign, and on October 22 wrote resigning his command. He allowed the
discipline of his army to become lax. The winter was spent in idleness
and dissipation. A bank at faro was opened, and many officers were
ruined by gambling. All ranks were demoralised, and sober townspeople
who had welcomed the arrival of the troops were disgusted by their
disorderly behaviour. The only fruit of Howe's victories during the
campaign of 1777 was the acquisition of good winter quarters at
Philadelphia, and that he purchased at the price of an appalling
disaster to a British army.[125]
Burgoyne took the field in June with 7,251 rank and file of regular
troops, of which 3,116 were Germans, 148 militia, and 503 Indians, in
all 7,902. Shortly before he left Canada a small force set out under
Colonel St. Leger to march from Lake Ontario, take Fort Stanwix, and
form a junction with him by an advance through the Mohawk valley.
Burgoyne's army was in fine order, but the arrangements for the carriage
of supplies and the making of roads were insufficient. His troops were
carried up Lake Champlain and landed at Crown Point, where he made a
speech to his Indian allies, commanding them to observe the customs of
civilised warfare and to behave with humanity. He was to find that such
orders could not be enforced. On July 6, almost as soon as he arrived at
Ticonderoga, the Americans hastily abandoned it, leaving their guns
behind them. They were promptly pursued and suffered heavy losses. The
fugitives joined Schuyler, the commander of the army in the north, at
Fort Edward; he evacuated the place and retreated southwards in the
direction of Albany. The news of Burgoyne's success caused much
rejoicing in England. George is said to have rushed into the queen's
room as soon as he heard of it crying, "I have beat them! beat all the
Americans!" For the moment the Americans were panic-struck. Men said
angrily that their troops would never hold a place until a general had
been shot, and Schuyler was superseded by Gates.
[Sidenote: _BURGOYNE IN DIFFICULTIES._]
On July 10 Burgoyne set out to march from Skenesborough to Fort Edward,
sending his artillery and stores by water to Fort George. His route,
though not more than twenty miles, was extremely difficult; it was
obstructed by trees felled by the enemy and lay through swamps and
forests, and at least forty bridges had to be constructed in its course.
He might have avoided these difficulties by returning to Ticonderoga and
conveying his army by water up Lake George; but he rejected that route
because he thought that a retrograde movement would discourage his
troops and abate the panic of the enemy. His army did not reach the
Hudson until the 30th. At Fort Edward his supplies ran short and he had
to wait there, for his means of transport were not sufficient to bring
his stores from Fort George. Garrisons had to be found for Ticonderoga
and for posts of communication, and this diminished his army. Meanwhile
the enemy was increasing in force. While at Ticonderoga he published a
foolish proclamation reminding those who persisted in rebellion that he
had it in his power to let loose the Indians upon them. Nothing would
have induced him to commit so hideous a crime, and his proclamation only
served to enrage the Americans and swell the number of their troops. The
Indians were offended by his efforts to restrain them, and deserted him;
they were no loss, for they caused more trouble than they were worth,
and some excesses which they committed, and specially the murder of a
Miss McCrae by an Indian who, it is said, was sent by her betrothed to
bring her into the British lines, excited widespread indignation.
Burgoyne was in sore need of supplies and made an attempt to seize the
insurgents' stores and horses collected at Bennington. He sent only some
500 men on this service, for he was assured that the district was
friendly. It was far otherwise. The party was surrounded on August 16,
and another detachment formed of German troops which was despatched to
help them marched so slowly that it did not come up in time. Both bodies
were defeated with a loss, perhaps, of about 500 men.
News came of the failure of St. Leger's expedition. On his arrival at
Oswego he was joined by Sir John Johnson and Butler with their loyalist
regiments, and by a force of Indians whom Johnson, one of their
superintendents, and the Mohawk leader, Brant, persuaded to march with
them. He besieged Fort Stanwix, and, on August 6, defeated a force sent
to relieve it. But his guns were too light for siege operations; the
garrison held out, and his Indians forced him to raise the siege. During
his retreat they mutinied; he was barely able to bring off his regular
troops, and lost his guns and stores. Burgoyne was in a dangerous
position; the country swarmed with enemies; "wherever the king's troops
point," he wrote, "militia to the number of three or four thousand
assemble in a few hours". He might have retreated to Fort Edward, where
he would have had communication with Lake George; but he held that he
was bound by his orders to advance, and on September 15, after
collecting provisions for about a month, he conveyed his force to the
western bank of the Hudson and cut himself off from communication with
the lakes. Besides artillery, he had then with him only 5,000 men under
arms.[126] On the 19th his force was partially engaged by Arnold at
Freeman's Farm. The British held their ground but lost over 500 men, and
Gates, the American commander, with 11,000 men, who did not take part in
the fight, occupied a strong position in front of them. A message came
from Clinton that he was about to attack the forts on the Hudson below
Albany, and Burgoyne sent answer that he hoped to be able to hold his
ground until October 20. He fortified his position and waited for
further news. None came to him. The insurgent forces grew to at least
16,000 men; Burgoyne's provisions were becoming exhausted and on October
3 he put his little army on half rations. Despite the overwhelming
number of the enemy, he moved forward on the 7th to ascertain whether he
could force a passage through their lines. He was defeated with heavy
loss and fell back on Saratoga.
[Sidenote: _SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE'S ARMY._]
A council of war held on the 12th decided on a retreat to Fort Edward.
It was too late; the Americans held the fords and had a strong force
encamped between Fort George and Fort Edward. Only 3,500 fighting men
were left with Burgoyne; he was completely surrounded, and on the 14th
he opened negotiations with Gates. Even then he refused to surrender
unconditionally, and the convention of Saratoga was concluded on the
17th. His troops marched out with the honours of war, and were to be
allowed to return to England on condition of not serving again in the
war. The whole number which surrendered, including camp-followers,
labourers, and detachments, was 5,762. Gates's behaviour at the
surrender was such as became an officer and a gentleman. Congress
shamefully broke the engagement. The captive troops were marched to
Boston, but when the transports called for them, they were not allowed
to embark. The paltry subterfuges by which congress defended its conduct
only throw a specially odious light on its sacrifice of honour to
policy. From the beginning of the war both sides made frequent
complaints as to the treatment of prisoners, and both apparently with
justice. Burgoyne's men were shamefully treated. He and his staff were
allowed to return home in the spring of 1778; others were exchanged from
time to time, but the mass of the army never came back. Clinton, who was
then unaware of Burgoyne's distress, did what he could to render his
position secure in case he arrived at Albany. As soon as he received
reinforcements from England, he pushed up the Hudson and on October 6
destroyed the forts which barred the passage of our ships. He could do
no more, for he was forced to send 4,000 men to Howe and could not leave
New York without a sufficient garrison. A messenger from Burgoyne at
last reached him. The way being cleared, the ships ascended the river
and burnt the batteries and town at Esopus creek. The news of Clinton's
activity doubtless secured Burgoyne more favourable terms than Gates was
at first inclined to grant.
The chief blame for this disaster must rest on Howe. His assertion that
Philadelphia was the prime object of his campaign made Germain uneasy,
and he wrote to him on May 18 that whatever he might meditate, he was
not to neglect to co-operate with the northern army.[127] This despatch
did not reach Howe until August 16, when he had made co-operation with
Burgoyne impossible. A few days later Germain wrote again; the despatch
was not ready for his signature at the time at which he wished to go
into the country, and when he came back it was forgotten. It was a piece
of gross carelessness, but an undue importance has been attached to
it.[128] Howe was well aware of Burgoyne's expedition. On June 5 he had
received a copy of a despatch from Germain which told him that Burgoyne
was ordered to "force his way to Albany" and join him with the utmost
speed.[129] Nevertheless, he persisted in pursuing his own plan. He must
have hesitated whether to reach Philadelphia by land or water. When in
June he at last made up his mind to move, he evidently tried to reach
Philadelphia by land. If he had succeeded and had swept Washington
before him, he might have kept in communication with Burgoyne and have
co-operated with him. Failing in this, he decided to go by sea, and when
he was told that he could not safely land in the Delaware, went on to
Chesapeake bay. When he gained his object by taking Philadelphia he did
so by a course which made it impossible for him to co-operate with
Burgoyne, and put Washington's army between them.
According to the government plan the chief object of his campaign should
have been his junction with Burgoyne. The government, that is Germain,
certainly erred in not giving him precise orders, while Burgoyne had
virtually no discretionary power. Yet it was for Howe, as
commander-in-chief on the spot, to judge of the situation without
explicit instructions. According to his own statements, his view of the
situation was that Burgoyne would march through a friendly country and
encounter no enemy except the army of 4,000 men under Schuyler, that
Clinton would be able to give him any assistance which he might require,
that his own expedition to Philadelphia would divert the enemy from
Burgoyne, that he would be able to "account for" Washington, and that if
Washington gave him the slip, he would be able to follow him up and
prevent him from annoying Burgoyne.[130] These considerations may be
supposed to have satisfied him that no direct co-operation with
Burgoyne was required of him. Burgoyne had to encounter foes whom
neither he nor Howe reckoned upon, and it was Howe's duty to be at hand
to prevent their crushing him. Burgoyne made some mistakes in preparing
for and prosecuting his campaign, but he and his men exhibited splendid
courage, and he is not to be blamed for trying his fortune to the
utmost. In view of his orders, and of the risk of leaving a co-operating
force unsupported, he was bound to ascertain whether he could force his
way through the enemy. The irregular character of the American force
rendered success possible, and justified his gallant attempt of October
7. He was a fine soldier, and was regarded with confidence and affection
by his subordinates. Clinton seems to have done all that was in his
power considering the small force left with him in New York.[131]
[Sidenote: _EFFECT OF THE SURRENDER._]
The surrender of Burgoyne's army could not in itself affect the issue of
the war. Its importance lies in its effect on the policy of foreign
nations and specially of France. So far as the Americans alone were
concerned, England had good reason to expect ultimate success. They
would neither enlist in sufficient numbers to keep up a regular army nor
provide for such troops as they had. The meddlesomeness and incapacity
of congress were destroying its army; generals were intriguing against
one another, soldiers were perishing for lack of necessaries, stores
were wasted. Money was scarce and public credit bad. Early in 1778
congress had 5,500,000 paper dollars in circulation, and the value of
its paper dollar was from half to a quarter of the silver dollar. Above
all, the Americans had no fleet, and were consequently unable to protect
their sea-board. Their alliance with France and subsequently with Spain
brought them, along with other help, the sea-power without which the
issue of the struggle might well have been adverse to them. France and
Spain hoped to recoup themselves for former losses, France by conquests
in the West Indies, Spain by regaining Gibraltar, Minorca, and Jamaica.
In 1775 an agent of the French court went over to America with offers of
help, and early in 1776 the Count de Vergennes, foreign minister of
Louis XVI., proposed as a system of policy that the Bourbon kings should
give secret aid to the Americans and strengthen their own forces,
taking care, however, to persuade England that their intentions were
pacific. About the same time congress sent Deane to France as a secret
agent.
In accordance with the proposal of Vergennes the French and Spanish
courts provided money for the Americans; and Beaumarchais, the
dramatist, who masqueraded as a firm of merchants in order to conceal
the participation of his government, spent it in purchasing military
stores for them. The young Marquis de Lafayette and other Frenchmen
entered their army. So too did the Poles, Kosciusko and Pulaski, and the
Germans, Kalb and Steuben. In December Franklin went over to Paris. The
philosophic movement was then at its height in France. The _philosophes_
desired freedom of thought in religion, constitutional liberty, and the
abolition of privilege of all kinds. They speculated as to the origins
of political and social institutions and the laws of human progress. The
works of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu were eagerly studied by the
nobles and fine ladies of the court with whom _philosophisme_ was
fashionable. America they regarded as a land of freedom and primitive
simplicity; and they hailed the crude assertions of the Declaration of
Independence, issued by a body largely composed of slave-owners, that
all men are created equal and with an inalienable right to liberty, as
bringing their theories within the range of practical politics. Franklin
was received with ludicrous adulation as an embodiment of republican
virtue and philosophic thought. He busied himself in stirring up
hostility to England. Another American envoy sought help from Prussia.
Frederick showed his hatred of England by forbidding some German troops
which George had hired to pass through his dominions; but his quarrel
with Austria with reference to the Bavarian succession rendered him
unwilling to provoke Great Britain: he had no sympathy with the
Americans and would not receive their envoy.
[Sidenote: _THE INTERVENTION OF FRANCE._]
Besides the stores sent by Beaumarchais and 1,000 livres in cash, France
helped the Americans by neglecting to prevent the violation of her
neutrality by their ships. Although the Americans could not dispute with
Great Britain on the sea, they had a few ships built by congress, more
belonging to the maritime provinces, and a vast number of privateers.
These ships did much damage to British trade. Already they hovered
about the coasts of England and Ireland, and were so dangerous to our
merchant vessels that merchants embarked their goods on foreign ships to
avoid the risk of capture. By the end of 1778 nearly 1,000 merchant
ships were taken by American privateers. Some of these privateers were
fitted out in French ports, brought their prizes into them, and sailed
from them again on fresh expeditions. Our ambassador, Lord Stormont,
complained vigorously of these open breaches of neutrality, and at last
the French government took some measures to stop them. The opposition in
parliament constantly insisted that, if the war went on, France and
Spain would certainly take part with the Americans. The government could
no longer ignore, though it still strove to discredit, the danger of
foreign intervention. The king's speech at the opening of parliament on
October 20, 1777, took note of the naval preparations of the two powers
and recommended an augmentation of the navy. Tidings of Burgoyne's
disaster reached Europe on December 2. Vergennes at once informed the
American agents that his master would make a treaty with them. The
alliance was concluded on February 6, 1778; it was agreed that, in the
event of war between France and England, neither of the contracting
parties should make peace without the consent of the other or until the
independence of the United States should be assured by treaty. France
renounced all claim to Canada. If taken from England, it was to belong
to the United States, while all conquests in the West Indies were to
belong to France. Spain at this time declined to join in the alliance.
That a treaty was signed was soon generally believed in England; it was
officially declared by France on March 13. War between Great Britain and
France began in the summer.
With the intervention of France the war enters on a new phase.
Thenceforward England had to deal with more powerful enemies than the
Americans. The war had lasted for three years and the rebellion was not
crushed. Was it too much for England to expect that she would subdue a
people of her own stock, as the Americans were then, separated from her
by 3,000 miles of sea, and spread over a vast and difficult country? Had
she trusted to her navy, as Barrington and others desired, shut the
American ports, and held the towns on the coast and the navigable
rivers, the insurgents might possibly have been driven to submission
without any severe struggle. Conquest by land was decided on. Was
Chatham right in declaring in May, 1777, that England could not conquer
the Americans? Six months later a capable French officer serving in
their army wrote to the French minister of war that, unless his country
declared war against England, the Americans would fail to obtain
independence; so little enthusiasm for the cause was there among them,
so keenly did they feel the privations of the war.[132] In our war in
South Africa of 1899-1902 the Boers showed themselves better soldiers
than the Americans, and were not less brave; they were akin to us in
race, and their country was at least as difficult as America. In both
wars our well-drilled troops constantly found their previous training
useless or worse; in both we received loyal support from numerous
colonials on the spot. While improved means of transport brought South
Africa far nearer to us than America was in the eighteenth century, the
Boers were better prepared for war than the Americans, and were a more
martial people. Yet England conquered them. So far, then, as the
Americans alone were concerned, Chatham's assertion must be denied.
[Sidenote: _ENGLAND'S CONDUCT OF THE WAR._]
Why then had England done so little in those three years? There was much
active loyalty on our side: thousands of colonials fought for the crown
during the course of the war; in the central provinces at least half the
population was for us. Everything depended on the vigour and judgment
with which force was applied. In these respects there was failure both
at home and on the spot. In the first place the effort required was
underestimated. In February, 1774, Gage thought four regiments would
keep things quiet; in 1775 it was believed that 10,000 men would be
enough; in January, 1776, Howe asked for 20,000, in November his
estimate for the next year was 35,000. Germain promised to raise his
army to that number, yet instead of 10,000 men he offered him only 7,800
rank and file. On March 26 he confessed that he could only send 2,900,
and on April 19 that he had to subtract 400 of these for Canada.[133]
The country was strong for coercion, but recruits were hard to raise; it
willed the end but not the means. The king and Germain interfered too
much with the plans of operations. To direct a war from the other side
of the Atlantic in days when letters between the secretary at war and
the commander-in-chief seem often to have been nearly two months on
their way, was to court failure.
At the outset of the war the enemy was unduly despised both by ministers
at home and soldiers in the field. As the British general in command at
Belmont is said to have rejected a proposal for turning the Boers'
position, declaring that he would "put the fear of God into them," so
Howe at Bunker hill delivered a frontal attack on the enemy's
entrenchments which cost him over 1,000 men. Then he went to the
opposite extreme of over-caution. It is needless to recapitulate the
occasions on which either from over-caution or supineness he allowed
great opportunities to slip, as notably on Long Island. He, indeed, in a
greater degree than any one else is responsible for the British failure
to bring the war to an end. Every month improved the fighting qualities
of the Americans, under the judicious handling of Washington, and at
last France and the other enemies of England saw that they might take
them seriously and might turn the war to their own profit.[134]
FOOTNOTES:
[112] Johnston, _Campaign of 1776_, p. 125.
[113] Mr. Johnston contends that the American casualties were about
1,000 (_op. cit._, pp. 202-6); they were probably about double that
number (Fortescue, _History of the British Army_, iii., 185).
[114] Howe, _Narrative of Conduct_, pp. 4-5.
[115] Johnston, _Campaign of 1776_, Documents, p. 117.
[116] Carleton to Douglas, Oct. 14, 1776, Add. MS. 21,699 (Haldimand
Papers), ff. 52-53.
[117] _Examination of Joseph Galloway_, p. 14.
[118] Washington, _Works_, iv., 203, 223, 231.
[119] _State Trials_, xx., 1365.
[120] _Parl. Hist._, xix., 103-86.
[121] Germain to Carleton, March 26, 1777, Add. MS. 21,697, f. 158; for
Carleton's reply (May 20) and Germain's rejoinder (July 25) see _Report
on Canadian Archives_ for 1885, pp. 132-37.
[122] _Hist. MSS. Comm._, _App. to Report_, vi. (Strachey Papers), p.
402.
[123] Jones, _History of New York_, i., 193, 219.
[124] Washington, _Works_, v., 193 _sqq._, 239; _Galloway's Evidence_,
pp. 21, 29.
[125] Stedman, i., 309-11, 317.
[126] Lieut. Hadden, _Journal and Orderly Books_, p. 153.
[127] Howe to Germain, Jan. 20; Germain to Howe, May 18, 1777; _Howe's
Narrative_, pp. 12-24.
[128] _Life of Shelburne_, i., 358-59.
[129] Germain to Carleton, March 26, 1777, Add. MS. 21,697, f. 161;
_Howe's Narrative_, p. 15.
[130] Howe to Carlton, April 2 and June 16, 1777, printed in _Fugitive
Pieces_, p. 126; Howe to Burgoyne, July 17, in _Evidence Concerning the
War_ (1779), pp. 77-78; _Howe's Narrative_, pp. 21-23; Howe's
_Observations on Letters_, etc., p. 61; Fonblanque's _Burgoyne_, pp.
280-81.
[131] Clinton to Burgoyne, Dec. 16, 1777, Fonblanque's _Burgoyne_, pp.
324-25; _Parl. Hist._, xix., 611.
[132] Du Portail to the Comte de St. Germain, Nov. 12, 1777, Stedman,
i., 386.
[133] Correspondence between Germain and Howe, _Hist. MSS. Comm.
Report_, vi., App., p. 402.
[134] Here, and in other passages treating of the American revolutionary
war, much valuable help has been given me by Colonel E. M. Lloyd, late
R.E.