THE COLONIAL REBELLION.
Scarcely had the night passed after the skirmish at Lexington before the
whole of Massachusetts was in arms. The provincial assembly voted that
an army of 30,000 men should be raised in New England, fixed on
Cambridge as its headquarters and sent to their neighbours for support.
From New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island the answer was prompt.
Numerous bands of volunteers marched to join the forces of
Massachusetts, and an army of 16,000 men soon invested Boston from the
Mystic river to Roxbury. It was an army without unity, for the troops of
each colony acted under their own leaders; and its numbers varied from
day to day, the Massachusetts volunteers, who formed its principal part,
taking leave of absence whenever they chose. Many of the provincials had
seen service against the French, and understood a soldier's work, and
many more had received some training in the militia, but the mass of the
volunteers had no military experience or discipline. Yet they were men
well used to shoot and to handle the spade and axe, implements of
first-rate importance in war; they belonged as a whole to a higher class
than the privates of the British army, they were more resourceful and
intelligent, and were able to obtain provisions and other supplies
without difficulty. Such as they were, Gage judged them too formidable
in number for him to attack. The neck of land which joins Boston to the
continent had been fortified so strongly that the provincials could not
hope to storm it, and he decided to remain behind it and await the
arrival of the reinforcements which were already on their way. He made
no effort to prevent the insurgents from shutting up his army on the
landward side, and early in May they began to form entrenchments. At the
same time they took measures to distress the beleaguered force by
clearing off the live-stock, hay, and other supplies from the islands in
the harbour. Gage tried in vain to stop them, and there were several
skirmishes in the harbour, in which the British suffered more heavily
than the provincials.
The insurgents were not content with fighting on their own ground. The
command of the line of the Hudson would prevent the British from cutting
off New England from the middle colonies, would secure New York from
attack from the north, and would open a way for an invasion of Canada.
On the north the approaches to the river were dominated by the forts of
Ticonderoga and Crown Point, which had played a conspicuous part in the
great war with France; and in them were laid up some 200 cannon, small
arms, and other military stores. Important as these forts were, no
adequate garrisons were maintained in them. Benedict Arnold, the leader
of a band of volunteers from New Haven, Connecticut, a druggist and West
India trader, was informed of their defenceless condition, and made an
offer to the Massachusetts committee of safety to capture them. His
offer was accepted, and he was authorised to raise a force. The same
plan had been formed in Connecticut; and Ethan Allen, the leader of an
association in Vermont, was sent with his followers to carry it out.
Arnold met him on the march; he refused to yield the command, and Arnold
joined his force, which included a body of Indians. At dawn on May 10
they surprised the garrison of Ticonderoga, consisting of less than
fifty men, and compelled the governor to surrender without striking a
blow. A detachment from the force seized Crown Point, and a few days
later Arnold sailed down Lake Champlain and captured St. John's, which
was recovered by the British in the course of the summer and garrisoned.
[Sidenote: _OPINION IN ENGLAND._]
In England the news of the fighting at Lexington and Concord was
received with astonishment. People were by no means distressed, for they
believed that Gage would soon take his revenge. Military men were
puzzled and provoked at the state of affairs at Boston. "How often,"
said a general at the war office to one who had held command in America,
"have I heard you American colonels boast that with four battalions you
would march through America, and now you think that Gage with 4,000 men
and forty pieces of cannon mayn't venture out of Boston."[99] However,
things would, it was expected, soon wear a different face, for about
5,500 men were on their way to Boston, and three new generals had
embarked on April 21 to serve under Gage. They were Howe, a younger
brother of Lord Howe, the admiral, a fine gentleman and a gallant
soldier, reputed to be a left-handed cousin of the king through his
mother, a daughter of the Countess of Darlington, a mistress of George
I., kindly, careless, and frivolous, who had distinguished himself at
the taking of Quebec; Clinton, who had served in Germany; and Burgoyne,
who had made a successful campaign in Portugal under Lippe Buckeburg, a
man of fashion, a dramatist, a politician, and a keen soldier, eager for
employment and promotion. North and Dartmouth were vexed at the news of
the encounter, for they had entertained strong hopes, expressed by the
king in closing parliament on May 26, that the conciliation bill would
lead to a pacification. Gage's attempt at Concord was, Dartmouth said,
fatal.
The whigs were dismayed, for they did not share the confidence of the
nation at large. Though Burke expected that the Americans would suffer
"some heavy blows," he did not believe that a war with them would be
ended quickly; and Richmond thought it probable that America would be
lost and "with it our trade and opulence".[100] In England every war
gives an opportunity to some vain and foolish persons for condemning
their own country and showing sympathy with its enemies. So it was in
1775. Wilkes, then lord mayor, and the livery of the city tried to force
the king to receive on the throne a petition which declared that an
attempt was being made to establish arbitrary power in America. They
were foiled by the king and adopted an address expressed in more decent
terms, to which he returned answer that so long as constitutional
authority was resisted he would continue to maintain it by force. The
constitutional society, of which Horne was the leading spirit, sent
Franklin L100 for, as Horne wrote in the _Evening Post_, "the widows and
orphans of our beloved American fellow-subjects inhumanly murdered by
the king's troops at or near Lexington and Concord". Horne was indicted
for this libel in 1777, and was sentenced to a year's imprisonment and a
fine of L200.
In America the news of the affair at Lexington called forth in every
colony a spirit of union, a determination to stand by their New England
brethren. No answers were sent to North's conciliatory proposals; all
alike agreed in referring them to the continental congress. This was
equivalent to a rejection of them, for it was well known that the
British government would hold no communication with that body. The
congress met for the second time at Philadelphia on May 10. It rejected
North's proposals and agreed that garrisons should be maintained at
Ticonderoga and Crown Point, a decision which implied an approval of the
offensive war levied against the king in the expedition against those
forts. As, however, it was expedient to lull the suspicions of the
French Canadians, who were not likely to have forgotten the religious
bitterness exhibited by the Americans with reference to the Quebec act,
it declared that no invasion of Canada would be made. The congress
assumed executive powers; in the name of the "United Colonies" it
adopted the army of New England then before Boston as the continental
army, took measures for its organisation and payment, authorised a loan,
and on June 15 chose George Washington, the colonel of the Virginia
militia, as commander-in-chief.
No wiser choice could have been made. Washington was a gentleman of
Virginia, of independent fortune, descended from an English family of
good position; he had served with distinction against the French, and as
aide-de-camp to Braddock had behaved with remarkable intrepidity in the
battle on the Monongahela river in 1755. Thoroughly unselfish, he
devoted himself with all his heart to public duty; his integrity was
above suspicion; he was free from personal ambition, and was never
swayed by jealousy. His education had been neglected, but his intellect
was clear and his judgment sound. He was naturally hot-tempered, and
when his anger was roused he was a terror to evil-doers, to the officer
who disobeyed his orders and to the rascally contractor who supplied his
army with inferior stores. Yet he habitually kept his temper under
control. Steadfast in purpose, he was never overwhelmed by misfortune
and never yielded to factious opposition. And strong as his will was, it
did not degenerate into obstinacy; he would gladly listen to the advice
of others, and in military matters was sometimes too ready to act upon
it. At first he made mistakes in generalship, but his military skill
grew with his experience. In army administration he was excellent; his
industry was unwearying; the smallest details received his personal
attention. He was conscious of the difficulties of the task which lay
before him; he believed, so he told Patrick Henry, that from the day of
his appointment his reputation would begin to decline. The congress was
an unorganised body without any constitutional status, conducting its
business by means of constantly changing and irresponsible committees,
and was utterly unfit to exercise executive functions; it had no means
of enforcing its decrees, no revenue, and no munitions of war. The army
which it adopted was little better than an assembly of armed men; many
were volunteers, and it was decided to enlist men only for seven months.
There was little discipline; the officers were for the most part
ignorant of their duties and were of the same social standing as their
men; and the New England privates, self-opiniated and obstinate, showed
little respect for their orders. Washington had not merely to command an
army in the field, he had to create one and, what was harder still, to
keep it together.
[Sidenote: _THE SIEGE OF BOSTON._]
Inside Boston life was by no means pleasant. All marketing from the
country was at an end, for the town was closely beset by land and the
islands were cleared of provisions; no fresh meat was to be had, and the
besieged lived alternately on salt beef and salt pork. Attacks from
fire-rafts and whale-boats were daily threatened, and fears were
entertained that the inhabitants might set fire to the town in order to
force the British to leave it.[101] On May 25 the three new generals
landed, and the arrival of the reinforcements raised the number of
Gage's army to about 10,000 men. Believing that the rebellion would soon
be quelled, he issued a foolish proclamation, offering pardon to all
rebels who laid down their arms, except Samuel Adams and Hancock, then
president of the congress, and threatening those who continued in arms
with punishment as traitors. As the insurgents had no ships, while the
British had floating batteries and ships of war in the harbour, they
could not hope to destroy Gage's army, or reduce it to surrender through
famine. Their object was to compel him to evacuate the place and sail
off. The peninsula on which the town stands was commanded by hills both
on the north and south-east. On the north were the hills of the
Charlestown peninsula, which was separated from Boston by the Charles
river; it had the Mystic river on its northern side, and was joined to
the mainland by a narrow neck. On the south-east it was commanded by the
hills of another peninsula called Dorchester Neck. A battery on either
the Charlestown hills or the Dorchester heights would have rendered
Gage's position untenable; for, independently of any loss which his
troops might sustain from bombardment, the British shipping would be
drawn from its anchorage, and if he remained he would be practically
imprisoned in the town and cut off from supplies. It should therefore
have been Gage's first care to shut the insurgents out from those
positions.
Hitherto he had not attempted to occupy the hills on either side, but
after the arrival of the new generals it was decided to include them
within the lines. On June 13 the insurgents heard that the British were
about to occupy Dorchester heights. They determined to frustrate this
move by occupying the ridge stretching along the Charlestown peninsula,
and called by the general name of Bunker hill. Accordingly on the
evening of the 16th a detachment of 1,200 men, with six field-pieces,
was sent from Cambridge for that purpose. When they arrived at the
summit their leaders determined to advance farther and to fortify a
lower eminence of the ridge nearer Boston, which was distinguished by
the name of Breeds hill. There during the night they formed a redoubt
and breastwork. At daybreak on the 17th they were discovered from the
sloop _Lively_, and her guns roused the British army. Before long a
battery in Boston and the guns of other ships opened fire, but did
little mischief. The insurgents received a small reinforcement, and
formed a line of defence, protected by a low wall and rail, from their
redoubt northward to the Mystic, in order to secure themselves from a
flank attack. If Gage had placed a floating battery on the Mystic, which
would have taken them on the left flank, and had landed troops to the
rear of the redoubt, held the neck, and so cut them off from their main
body, he would have had them at his mercy. This would have been easy,
for by taking up a more advanced position than was laid down in their
orders, they left their rear exposed to attack. He decided, however, to
storm their works.
[Sidenote: _BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL._]
Not till midday did a detachment of British troops, grenadiers and light
infantry, begin to land on the peninsula under the command of Howe and
Pigot. They waited for reinforcements, which brought their number up to
over 2,000 men, with artillery. Hot as the weather was, the men were
burdened with knapsacks containing provisions for three days. At 3 P.M.
they advanced in two divisions, the light infantry under Howe against
the line of defence, the grenadiers under Pigot against the redoubt. At
first their advance was covered by their artillery, but the guns stuck
in the mire, and it is said that a fresh supply of ball sent from Boston
was too large for the cannon. Even if this was the case, it could have
made no difference, for the supply taken with the guns was not
exhausted.[102] Up the steep hill, through long tangled grass, the
red-coats toiled on towards the redoubt, each burdened with a weight of
some 125 pounds. With admirable coolness the Americans held their fire
until the enemy was about fifty yards from them, and then poured a
volley into their ranks. For a few minutes the men stood steady and
returned the fire, then they turned and retreated in disorder. The
attack on the fence was equally unsuccessful. While the officers were
rallying their men, the battery on Cops hill burnt the wooden houses of
the almost deserted village of Charlestown, from which the troops had
been fired upon as they advanced. Then a second attack was made, and
again the British were sent staggering back by the enemy's fire. At this
crisis Clinton came over from Boston, took command of two battalions, a
body of marines, and the 47th, and did good service in helping to rally
the troops. With fine persistency they made ready for a third attack.
More rational orders were given; the force was not divided, and only a
feint was made against the line of defence, the men laid aside their
knapsacks, advanced in column against the redoubt, and attacked with the
bayonet. The Americans, who had received little support of any kind from
headquarters, were weary, and their ammunition was almost exhausted;
they were driven from their works and retreated across the neck. Their
retreat was covered with bravery and military skill[103] by the body
stationed along the line of defence on their left, but as they passed
over the neck they suffered severely from the guns of the _Glasgow_
sloop of war. Howe would not pursue them, and at once began to fortify
the peninsula.
The victory was decisive, for it gave the English the ground for which
they fought, and enabled them to hold Boston for nine months longer. It
was dearly purchased by the loss of 19 officers and 207 men killed, and
70 officers and 758 men wounded, making a total of 1,054 casualties, an
extraordinarily large proportion of the number engaged, apparently about
2,500. This was the natural result of sending troops up a hill to
deliver a frontal attack on an earthwork held by a body of men well used
to shoot. It will be observed that the loss of officers was extremely
heavy; they fearlessly exposed themselves, as the British officer always
does, in order to encourage their men. The Americans, who for the most
part fought behind cover, stated their loss at 449. After Bunker hill,
no one whose judgment was not warped by prejudice could believe that the
Americans were cowards. They were not, so Gage wrote, the disorderly
rabble too many have supposed; he had seen enough to convince him that
the conquest of the country could only be effected by perseverance and
strong armies.[104] The behaviour of the insurgent troops greatly
encouraged their party. When Washington heard how they had fought he
declared that the liberties of the country were safe.
[Sidenote: _THE INVASION OF CANADA._]
Already some colonies were making temporary arrangements for popular
government and issuing bills for the expenses of defence, and in July
Georgia expressed its adherence to the general policy of armed
resistance. For a while, however, royal governors still remained, and
government was everywhere in a chaotic state. In New York the mob
committed many outrages on the persons and property of loyalists, and
hostilities took place with crews of the king's ships in the bay. Yet
the town was not prepared to take a decided part; and it received Tryon,
the royal governor, and Washington with the same tokens of respect. A
like incongruity marked the proceedings of congress. Besides adopting
addresses to the people of Great Britain and Ireland, it sent a petition
to the king on whom it was levying war from his "faithful subjects,"
expressing attachment to his "person, family, and government" and
beseeching him to "settle peace". At the same time, in spite of its
declaration to the contrary, it ordered an invasion of Canada. The
Americans flattered themselves that the Canadians would rise against the
British, and Allen, puffed up by his recent success, made a dash at
Montreal with only 150 men. He was defeated and taken prisoner.
Meanwhile Montgomery started from Ticonderoga in August with over 2,000
men, captured Chamblee, where he found a good supply of military stores,
and laid siege to St. John's. Canada was practically defenceless, for
Carleton had only 900 regular troops; the English-speaking Canadians
were disaffected, the French for the most part either apathetic or
hostile. He sent to Gage for reinforcements, but the admiral, Samuel
Graves, declined to transport troops to Quebec, for as it was then late
in October the voyage from Boston would have been dangerous. Carleton's
efforts to relieve St. John's were unsuccessful, and after a stout
resistance the garrison surrendered on November 13. The fall of St.
John's involved the surrender of Montreal, which was defenceless, and
Carleton hastened to the defence of Quebec.
His presence was needed there, for on September 13 a detachment of about
1,500 men under the command of Arnold was sent from the army at
Cambridge to surprise and capture the city. It was to proceed by land
and water up the Kennebec, and down the Chaudiere to the St. Lawrence.
The route, though used by trappers and Indians, was dimly traced, and
the equipment of the expedition was too cumbersome for the rough work
which lay before it.[105] Soon after leaving their transports at Fort
Western, where, fifty-eight miles from its mouth, the Kennebec ceased to
be navigable except by _bateaux_, the troops began to suffer great
hardships. Their stores were conveyed in _bateaux_, which they were
constantly forced to haul against currents and carry over land. Many of
them leaked, some were abandoned, and provisions ran short. The weather
became cold and rainy. The whole rear division, with its officers, lost
heart and turned back, taking with them a large share of food and
ammunition. The rest toiled on through swamps and mire, half-starved and
benumbed with cold. Many perished, some lost their way, and the men of
one company were reduced to eating their dogs and gnawing the leather of
their shoes. It was not until November 9 that Arnold's troops, a ragged
and shivering crowd of about 600 men, with some Indians who had joined
them, reached Point Levi. Montgomery, who was to have met them, was not
there; they crossed the St. Lawrence, and Arnold sent an absurd summons
to the garrison of Quebec. He then retreated to Pointe-aux-Trembles to
wait for Montgomery.
The defences of Quebec were in bad condition, the garrison was small,
and there was much disaffection among the inhabitants. The whole country
was in the power of the invaders, the people were on their side, and it
seemed as though the hopes of the Americans would be fulfilled. But
while Quebec remained untaken, Canada would still be unconquered, and
the defence was in good hands. The garrison was commanded by Colonel
Maclean of the 84th, or Royal Highland Emigrants, a regiment largely
raised by him from Frazer's Highlanders who had done good service under
Wolfe. Carleton soon entered the place, and while Arnold was waiting for
Montgomery, took vigorous measures for securing its safety. Montgomery
arrived at Pointe-aux-Trembles on December 1, and on the night of the
31st the rebels attempted to carry Quebec by storm. They were repulsed
with heavy loss, Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded. They
continued the siege, but were too weak either to invest the city
completely or make any offensive movement. Carleton waited quietly until
the breaking up of the ice should allow reinforcements to come up the
river. Before long the French Canadians began to transfer their
sympathies to the British. Their priests were too well satisfied with
the Quebec act to desire change. Bishop Briand published a _mandement_,
reminding his people of the benefits they received from English rule and
calling upon them to defend their province. His exhortation had a
powerful effect, for priests refused to confess men who joined the
rebels.
[Sidenote: _PAUCITY OF THE BRITISH ARMY._]
The victory of Bunker hill made no change in the position of Gage's
army, which suffered from the want of wholesome food and from other
privations. As England had command of the sea the troops could have been
removed, and the generals wrote to the government suggesting that Boston
should be evacuated and the royal forces concentrated at New York,
which was more open to communication by sea, and in every respect a
better base for future operations. The government, however, was
unwilling to give up the town, and things remained as they were, for the
generals considered that nothing was to be gained by an attack on the
enemy's lines, because their army was not supplied with the materials
necessary to move at a distance. Plans were indeed proposed for
embarrassing the enemy by sending out a detachment to make a descent on
Rhode Island;[106] but Gage did nothing, and the government, convinced
of his incapacity, recalled him to England. He sailed from Boston in
October, and Howe was appointed to the chief command. By sea there was
as little done as by land, for the naval force under Graves was so
inefficient that he was unable even to prevent the whale-boats of the
rebels from intercepting supplies and destroying lighthouses. He was
unjustly blamed for inaction, both by the army in Boston and the
government. His removal was, the king thought, "as necessary as the mild
general's".[107] This and every other matter connected with the war was
directed by the king. His industry and his knowledge of details,
military and naval, were extraordinary, and North, Dartmouth, and
Barrington, whatever their own opinions were, had no choice but to carry
out his orders.
On the outbreak of the war the army of Great Britain was on its normal
peace establishment of about 17,000 men, besides the Irish army of
15,235, the garrison of Gibraltar 3,500, and of Minorca 2,500. It was an
amazingly small number, considering the accessions made to the empire by
the late war. George always wished for a larger permanent force; but his
ministers shrank from raising a storm by increasing the estimates or
provoking the popular jealousy of a standing army. Men were wanted at
once. The first reinforcements were obtained from Ireland, and the Irish
parliament agreed that 4,000 men should be drafted out of the country
beyond the number allowed by statute. It soon became evident that the
war required the immediate supply of a far greater number of men than
could be spared from the present establishment or could be raised
quickly. Parliament was not in session, and the king determined to
obtain the services of foreign troops. As Elector of Hanover he lent
2,355 Hanoverians to garrison Gibraltar and Minorca, and so set a
corresponding number of the British garrisons free to be employed in the
war. He sought to hire men from other sovereigns. A proposal made to
Catherine of Russia for the hire of 20,000 men was scornfully declined,
and the States-General refused to sell him their Scots brigade. With the
petty princes of Germany he was more lucky; the Duke of Brunswick, the
Landgrave and the hereditary Prince of Hesse Cassel, and the Prince of
Waldeck were happy to sell their subjects, and agreed to supply 17,742
in return for a liberal payment. These arrangements enraged the
Americans, who spoke of them as though the king was delivering a loyal
people to be massacred by foreign mercenaries. As a matter of fact they
were making war on the king, and he had as good a right to buy troops to
fight in his quarrel as he had to buy cannon. It is on the princes who
sold the blood of their subjects that the disgrace of these transactions
must rest. Frederick of Prussia expressed his disgust at their
greediness in bitter terms, and is said to have jeeringly declared that
when any of the unfortunate men whose lives they were selling passed
through his dominions he would levy toll on them at so much a head as
though they were cattle.
[Sidenote: _EVACUATION OF BOSTON._]
Nothing was gained by the recall of Gage, for Howe was equally
incompetent. Privateers were fitted out in great number in the New
England ports, which did mischief to English commerce and intercepted
the supplies sent out to the army. In order to check this privateering
business two ships-of-war sailed from Boston in October, under a
lieutenant named Mowat, with orders to burn the shipping along the
coast. Mowat exceeded his orders and destroyed the town of Falmouth.
This useless act of barbarity, which excited violent indignation among
the Americans, was reprehended by the British government. In Boston
sickness continued rife among the troops, and in November there was an
outbreak of small-pox. Washington, however, was not in a position to
attack; he had great difficulty in obtaining ammunition and not less in
raising men. The revolutionary spirit was spreading, but there was
little military ardour. In December the period of enlistment ended; his
army was disbanded, and he could not obtain quite 10,000 men to take
its place. Though Howe's army was weakened by sickness, such effective
troops as he had were well-trained soldiers. Yet he made no attempt to
force the American lines. By the beginning of March Washington was able
to take the offensive, and on the night of the 4th occupied Dorchester
heights and began to plant cannon there. It is amazing that Howe should
have neglected this important position. A storm prevented him from
sending a force across the bay to attack the Americans' works before
they were completed; their batteries rendered Boston untenable and
endangered the ships in the harbour. Howe was forced to abandon the
town, and on the 17th the British troops, about 7,600 in number,
together with nearly 1,000 loyalists, embarked for Halifax, where Howe
waited for reinforcements which would enable him to strike at New York.
If the English had abandoned Boston after the battle of Bunker hill, the
evacuation would have merely been a military movement, adopted for the
purpose of obtaining a more convenient base for future operations. The
government decided that the place should be held, and its enforced
evacuation was a moral defeat and a legitimate cause of triumph to the
Americans. Their exultation was dashed by the failure of their attempt
on Canada. Fresh troops were sent to support the invasion, but the
feelings of the people, English as well as French, were turning strongly
against the Americans. After the evacuation of Boston, congress ordered
Washington to send nearly half his effective force into Canada, and
despatched Franklin and other commissioners thither to allure the people
with promises. The Canadians turned a deaf ear to their offers. The
moment for which Carleton waited so patiently came at last. On May 6,
before the river was fully cleared of ice, three British ships made
their way to Quebec with reinforcements. He at once sallied out, and the
Americans fled in confusion, leaving their cannon and baggage behind,
and even their pots boiling, so that the king's troops sat down and ate
their dinners from them. Further reinforcements arrived from Halifax and
from Ireland, and in June Burgoyne, who had spent the winter at home,
brought over the Hessian and Brunswick troops, raising Carleton's army
to about 12,000 men. The Americans, under Sullivan, retreated from the
neighbourhood of Quebec to Sorel. A large detachment was routed at
Three Rivers, and Sullivan retreated to St. John's, leisurely pursued by
Burgoyne. There he was joined by Arnold, and the remnants of the army of
Canada, some 5,000 men, suffering severely from sickness and privation,
escaped to Isle-aux-Noix, and thence to Crown Point. Canada was
evacuated in June. Left almost defenceless by England, it was preserved
to her by Carleton's firmness and intrepidity.
By the beginning of 1776 the idea of separation from Great Britain was
daily gaining ground in the revolted colonies. It was strengthened by
the publication of a pamphlet entitled _Common Sense_ by Thomas Paine.
This Paine, a staymaker by trade, after he had failed in business in
England, and had been dismissed from employment as an exciseman for
neglect of duty, emigrated to America in 1774, and came into notice
through introductions given him by Franklin. He was bitterly hostile to
his own country, a violent advocate of revolutionary ideas, ignorant and
conceited; yet he had much shrewdness, and expressed his rude opinions
with a force and vivacity which appealed strongly to readers prepared to
assent to them. _Common Sense_ taught thousands of Americans to
recognise for the first time their own thoughts and wishes, and
encouraged others, who already knew what they wanted, to cease from
disguising their hopes by empty professions. Separation would, it was
expected in England, be opposed most vigorously in the southern
colonies. In them its cause was forwarded by violence. Lord Dunmore, the
governor of Virginia, took refuge on board a man-of-war in June, 1775,
manned a small flotilla, and attempted to reduce his province by making
descents upon the coast. He enraged the people by offering freedom to
slaves who would enlist under him, and by destroying the town of Norfolk
through setting fire to some wharfs from which his men had been shot at
while landing for water. He further engaged in a scheme for invading the
southern colonies from inland with the help of the Indians. It failed,
and the result of his proceedings was that Virginia was foremost in
urging congress to a declaration of independence.
[Sidenote: _THE ATTEMPT ON CHARLESTON._]
The governors of the two Carolinas assured the king that if a force were
sent to their provinces the loyalists would rise; the Carolinas might be
secured, Virginia coerced, and all the south recovered for the crown.
Both George and Dartmouth believed them, and, against the advice of
military men, an expedition was prepared to sail to Cape Fear. The
troops were conveyed in a squadron under Sir Peter Parker and were under
the command of Lord Cornwallis. Clinton left Boston in December to take
the command, but the expedition was long a-preparing: it did not leave
Cork until February 12, 1776; the ships met with storms; none arrived at
Cape Fear before May 3, some were even later. Meanwhile Martin, the
governor of North Carolina, stirred up the loyalist Scots settled in the
province to take arms; they marched towards the coast, expecting to meet
the royal troops, were intercepted, and utterly routed. When at last
Clinton's force was gathered together, his time for action was short,
for he was under orders to meet Howe at New York at an early date. He
and Parker decided to make an attempt on the harbour of Charleston, the
chief town of South Carolina, for the trade carried on there was an
important source of the insurgents' funds. It was not until June 4 that
the British force, about 2,000 troops, with Parker's squadron arrived at
Charleston harbour.
The entrance was commanded by Sullivan's island and there the insurgents
under Moultrie had erected a fort and mounted guns. Clinton landed his
troops on Long island, intending that at low tide they should wade
across to Sullivan's island and attack the garrison on their rear, while
the ships bombarded them in front. The attempt was made on the 28th. The
tide did not run out sufficiently to allow the troops to ford the shoals
and the engagement was simply an artillery duel. The British ships
suffered severely; one frigate which went aground was set on fire to
prevent the enemy from taking it, Parker's flagship the _Bristol_ and
the _Experiment_, both of fifty guns, were much knocked about, and some
200 men were killed or wounded. The attack failed, and on July 21
Clinton's force sailed for New York under convoy of a single frigate,
the rest of Parker's ships being forced to refit. The expedition
strengthened the party of separation and bound the south closely
together. Its failure depressed the loyalists, and for three years freed
the southern colonies from invasion, and enabled them to send help to
other quarters. Less than a week after the unsuccessful attempt on
Charleston, on July 4, the congress at Philadelphia, in which all the
thirteen colonies were represented, put forth a declaration of
independence; the colonies renounced their allegiance, and declared
themselves free and independent states, the United States of America.
The progress of the revolt during the summer of 1775 strengthened the
king's determination to subdue it by force. A proclamation was issued in
August against traitorous correspondence with the Americans, and in
September Penn, who brought over the petition of congress to the king,
was informed that no answer would be made to it. George could not have
received it without recognising congress, an unauthorised assemblage of
his subjects engaged in levying war against him. The government was
powerful in parliament, and the great majority of the nation warmly
approved the royal policy, of which the ministers were scarcely more
than the agents. Little doubt was felt as to the successful issue of the
war; public spirit was aroused, and the cause of England was generally
held to be just. The landed gentry and the professions of the Church,
the army, and the law were strongly on the king's side. Self-interest
largely decided the attitude of the mercantile class: some of its
members were opposed to the war because it injured their trade; others
were in favour of it; for trade generally was brisk and was increased by
the demands brought by war. In London and Bristol the opposition had
many supporters, but in both cities there was a strong party in favour
of the government. Among the labouring classes the war was not popular
and recruiting was difficult, for service in America entailed a long
voyage full of discomfort, and the prospect of fighting with men of the
same race and language was repellent. The evangelicals and methodists
sided with the government; the dissenters generally were against the war
and their preachers were active in encouraging their dislike to it.
Addresses approving of the king's policy were numerous and unsolicited;
they poured in from all quarters, from tory Oxford and whiggish
Cambridge, from country towns and great commercial centres like
Liverpool and Manchester. Rockingham observed that violent measures were
countenanced by a majority of persons "of all ranks, professions, or
occupations in this country". Scotland almost to a man was of the same
persuasion. In Ireland the nobles and the gentry generally upheld the
court, but with the majority of protestants, and specially with the
presbyterians of the north, the war was highly unpopular.[108]
[Sidenote: _CHANGES IN THE MINISTRY._]
The opponents of the government were not less resolute than the king.
Lord Effingham resigned his commission in the army lest he should be
called upon to serve against the Americans, and Chatham's eldest son
took the same course in obedience to the wishes of his parents. Grafton
wrote to North in August, 1775, expressing his desire for conciliation.
On October 20 North sent him a draft of the king's speech which showed
him that the government was determined to reduce the rebellion by force
of arms. He resigned the privy seal and went into opposition. The
changes which followed proved that a vigorous policy would be carried
out. Dartmouth took Grafton's place and was succeeded as secretary of
state for the colonies by Lord George Germain, previously known as Lord
George Sackville. Germain was at this time one of North's followers, and
was appointed in order that he might help him in the commons. Violent in
his feelings against the Americans, he was acceptable to the king and
acquired influence over him. His appointment was unpopular. He had fair
ability, but as minister allowed himself to be swayed by personal
motives, and he pursued a system already adopted by the king of
directing military operations in America from London which had
disastrous consequences. Rochford retired with a pension of L2,500 and
was succeeded by Weymouth as secretary of the southern department.
The king's speech at the opening of parliament on October 26, 1775,
stated that the Americans were in rebellion and were seeking to
"establish an independent empire". Eight months had yet to pass before
the colonies declared their independence, and the effect of events which
hastened their decision, such as the employment of German troops and the
refusal to answer the petition of congress, was not yet known in
England. It will, however, scarcely be denied that between the
proceedings of congress and a formal declaration of independence the
distance was not great. The strength of the king's position lay in his
recognition of this fact and of the course which alone might have
quelled the growing spirit of rebellion without humiliation to Great
Britain. The opposition did not see facts as they really were, and
called for remedies which were either vague, of various import,
insufficient, or such as would have placed the crown in a humiliating
position. In the lords' debate on the address, Rockingham urged a vague
undertaking to adopt measures of conciliation, Grafton the repeal of the
acts relating to America since 1763, and Shelburne that the petition of
congress proved that the colonies were not "planning independence". In
the commons Burke taunted the ministers with failure; and Fox, who was
coming to the front, praised the spirit of the Americans, denied that
they were aiming at independence, and bitterly attacked North, who, said
he, had lost more in one campaign than Chatham, Frederick of Prussia, or
Alexander the Great had ever gained--he had lost a whole continent. The
address was carried in the lords by 76 to 33, and in the commons by 176
to 72.
Motions were made in both houses declaring that the employment of
Hanoverian troops within the king's dominions, at Gibraltar and Minorca,
without previous consent of parliament was unconstitutional. It was, the
opposition maintained, a violation of the bill of rights, which declared
that "the keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace,
unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law". On the
government side it was pointed out that it was not a time of peace and
that the clause did not apply to the dependencies of the kingdom. North,
however, consented to a bill of indemnity which was thrown out by the
lords, the opposition objecting to it on the ground that it asserted the
legality of the measure, the government that it was totally unnecessary.
Numerically weak as the opposition was, it maintained the fight with
spirit. Motions more or less directly aimed at the war policy of the
government were made in the lords by Grafton and Richmond, and in the
commons by Luttrell, Fox, Burke, Oliver, Hartley, Lowther, and
Sawbridge. On none of these did the minority vote stronger than 33 in
the lords and 105 in the commons. Burke, in bringing in a bill on
November 16 for composing the troubles in America, urged that the right
way was by concessions to be followed by treaty. He would maintain the
declaratory act of 1766 as necessary to the authority of parliament, and
certain acts passed since 1763 as necessary to British trade; and he
desired that parliament should enact that no tax should be levied on
the colonies other than by their voluntary grant, and should repeal
coercive acts such as that closing Boston harbour. These concessions,
while greater than the government would make, would not, it was pointed
out, have satisfied the Americans; they did not go to the root of
American discontent, which lay in the revenue laws, and dated not from
the year 1766, but reached back to 1672. After a long debate, of which
we have virtually no record, for strangers were excluded from the house,
the bill was lost by 210 votes to 105.
[Sidenote: _THE STATE OF THE NAVY._]
The government was successful in its proposals for the maintenance of
the war. Only 15,230 seamen were in pay in 1775; for 1776 the number
voted was 28,000. In the debate serious charges were brought against the
administration of the navy. Sandwich was diligent; he constantly
inspected the dockyards, an excellent custom which he instituted when
first lord in 1749, and he kept the navy board to its duties.[109] At
his office early in the morning he got through an amount of work
surprising in the case of a man who habitually spent the later part of
his day and his nights in drinking, gambling, and debauchery. The effect
of his diligence was spoilt by corrupt practices. Many abuses prevailed
in the administration of the navy before his time; money voted for
repairs was applied to other purposes, stores were paid for which were
used for private gain, sea-pay was drawn for men who existed only on
paper. Under Sandwich abuses of all kinds seem to have been carried
further than before. The navy in 1776 consisted of 317 ships of various
sizes and 49 sloops.[110] Of these 123 ships were "of the line of
battle," a term then generally restricted to the first three rates,
ships of sixty-four guns and upwards. In spite of the large sums voted
for repairs, many of the king's ships were utterly unseaworthy, and it
was alleged with truth that ships, perfectly capable of repair, were
sold as useless, while others, for which much money had been voted, had
not had a penny spent upon them. On this matter more must be said later.
A bill enabling the king to embody the militia in times of rebellion met
with strong opposition on the ground that it would place a dangerous
power in the hands of the crown, and was subversive of the
constitutional idea of the militia as a purely local force to be used
only for domestic defence; it was, however, finally carried by large
majorities. On the other hand, North's proposal to extend the militia to
Scotland was defeated by 112 to 95, for the country gentlemen, who
regarded the militia system with extreme jealousy, voted against it. For
the army a vote was obtained for 55,000 men, of which 25,000 were to be
employed in America. It was easier to vote the money than to find the
men. The difficulty of recruiting was alleged by government to be a
result of the briskness of trade and such like causes. Already the Irish
army was reduced by drafts to less than the 12,000 men that by statute
were to be kept in that kingdom, and the government excited the
indignation of an independent section in the Irish parliament and of the
protestants of Ulster by obtaining leave to withdraw 4,000 men more. The
conduct of the government in this matter and in that of the hiring of
German troops was strenuously though ineffectually attacked in the
British parliament. The supplies voted for the year 1776 amounted to
L9,097,000. The land tax was raised to four shillings in the pound, and
that with other ordinary ways and means would, North calculated, bring
in L7,143,000. He proposed to make up the deficiency by borrowing
L2,000,000; the loan was to be funded, and the interest of the new stock
was provided for by new taxes on carriages and stage coaches, dice and
cards, by an additional stamp duty, and by raising the penny stamp on
newspapers to three-halfpence.
[Sidenote: _COMMISSIONERS FOR PACIFICATION._]
Acting on the ground taken up by the king's speech that the colonies
were waging a rebellious war, North, on November 20, 1775, brought in a
"prohibitory" bill, which forbade all trade and intercourse with the
Americans, provided that American ships and goods taken at sea should be
forfeited to the captors, being officers and crews of the king's ships,
and repealed certain acts as no longer appropriate in the present state
of war. It also empowered the crown to appoint commissioners to inquire
into grievances, to grant pardons to individuals, and to receive into
the king's peace any districts or colonies which would return to
obedience. North declared himself ready to repeal the tea duty and to
suspend all exercise of the right of taxation if the Americans would
bear their share of the burden of national defence. The bill was carried
after violent opposition in both houses. Fox described the war as unjust
and impracticable, and said that the bill exhibited the folly of the
ministers. It was, the opposition urged, cruel and indiscriminate in its
scope; it excited our seamen to "promiscuous rapine," and provided that
American sailors who were taken prisoners might be compelled to serve in
the British navy against their own people. Such severity, they said,
would drive the Americans to a permanent separation and would eventually
land us in a war with European powers. On the other hand it was
reasonably maintained that, as the Americans were already at war with
us, the war must be carried on as if against alien enemies. In April,
1776, the king appointed Admiral Richard Lord Howe, then about to take
the command in American waters, and his brother, General Howe, as
commissioners in pursuance of the act. Their appointment testifies to
the sincerity of the king's desire for peace, for the Howes were
friendly to the Americans and had already made efforts to bring the
quarrel to a peaceful ending; the admiral, indeed, declared in the lords
that if he were ordered to take part in the war, it would be painful to
him as a man, though he should obey as an officer. George, however, was
determined not to sacrifice any of the rights of his crown. Submission
would be rewarded with pardon, obstinacy in rebellion met by war. He
feared lest Lord Howe should concede too much, and wished that he would
decline the commission.[111] He did not decline, and sailed for America
with offers of pardon. The king's speech at the close of the session on
May 23 expressed the earnest hope that his rebellious subjects would
"voluntarily return to their duty". Peace was only to be obtained by
obedience.
FOOTNOTES:
[99] P. O. Hutchinson, _Hutchinson's Diary and Letters_, i., 461.
[100] _Burke's Correspondence_, i., 272, 274, 276.
[101] _Hutchinson's Diary and Letters_, i., 459, 469.
[102] Cp. Stedman, _History of the American War_, i., 129, and Duncan,
_History Of the Royal Artillery_, i., 303.
[103] Burgoyne to Rochfort, Fonblanque, _Burgoyne_, p. 147.
[104] Gage to Dartmouth, June 25, 1775, _Dartmouth Papers_, ii., 320.
[105] Codman, _Arnold's Expedition to Quebec_, pp. 22-25, 141.
[106] Fonblanque, _Burgoyne_, p. 195; _Dartmouth Papers_, ii., 357.
[107] The King to North, July 28, 1775, _Correspondence with North_, i.,
256.
[108] On national feeling generally see _Annual Reg._, xix. (1776),
38-39; Burke to Champion, Jan. 10, 1775, and Rockingham to Burke, Sept.
24, _Burke's Works_, i., 259 _sq._, 291-92; Lecky, _History_, iii.,
528-34.
[109] Barrow, _Life of Anson_, pp. 214-16.
[110] Progress of the Navy, MS. Admiralty, Miscell., 567, R.O.
[111] George to North, April 13, 1776, _Corr. with North_, ii., 18.