THE AGE OF THE FATHERS
Roman writers have differed greatly in their view of the Patristic
evidence for Papal Infallibility. Some have found very little definite
statement in the Fathers, upon which they thought it wise, at any rate
in controversy, to rely.
Cardinal Bellarmine[12] makes but scanty appeal for this doctrine to
the Age of the Fathers. He contents himself with asserting first that
the Patriarchal Churches of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch
have been presided over by heretics, whereas Rome has been exempt from
this calamity;[13] and secondly, he observes that Popes have passed
judgment on heresies apart from any Council, and that their decisions
have been accepted. This asserted exemption of the Roman Church from
heresy he claims as identical with impossibility of heresy; and
this acceptance of decisions as an acknowledgment of Infallibility.
Bellarmine’s meagre use of the Patristic period to prove the doctrine
of Papal Infallibility is strikingly contrasted with his ample use
of the same to prove the primacy or the authority of the Roman See.
And this difference of appeal in the two cases means a capacity to
distinguish between authority and Infallibility.
[12] See _Controv._
[13] Cf. Turmel, _Hist. Théol. Positive_, p. 303.
Other writers have seen Infallibility implied in every recognition of
authority or primacy; in every judicial sentence of the Roman See.
A third section of Roman theologians has been definitely unable to
discover the doctrine anywhere in the Patristic period. Among the more
critical and historically-minded of recent Roman writers there is a
belief in the doctrine, independent of any evidence for it in the
Age of the Fathers; indeed often coupled with an acknowledgment that
the period does not yield to their scrutiny instances either of its
recognition as a principle, or of its exercise as a fact. Advancing to
the Patristic times with the definition of Infallibility as given in
the Vatican Decree, they affirm that one essential condition of its
exercise is deliberate intention to instruct the Universal Church.
All instruction not given with that express intention is entirely
outside the range of Infallibility. Evidently the great mass of
judicial decisions, appeals to Rome, recognitions of its authority,
praises of its impartiality and rectitude, assertions of the danger
of disobedience to its words, have nothing to do with the doctrine of
Infallibility; and are acknowledged by this school of Roman writers to
be no proof of the doctrine’s existence. This recent Roman attitude
involves an entirely different estimate of Patristic evidence from that
formerly prevalent among the Ultramontanes. It brings the Ultramontane
curiously round to agreement with the opposite school as to the actual
contents of the Patristic period. There is far less readiness to-day
than formerly to assume that inferences which appear to a modern
Ultramontane necessarily obviously involved in a statement or a claim,
were really actually seen and understood and accepted among the
primitive writers by whom the statement or claim was made. This is a
sign of a more historic spirit, and therefore exceedingly hopeful.
Of course the doctrine’s recognition as a theory is separable from
its exercise as a fact. Many Roman Catholic writers have not only
maintained that during the Age of the Fathers no case occurs of its
exercise; but that the principles advocated demonstrate that it was
not even recognised as a theory, since by those very principles it is
actually excluded. Roman opponents of the doctrine have also pointed
out that no profession of belief in the infallibility of the Church can
be adduced to prove belief in the infallibility of the Pope for the
simple reason that many Roman theologians who believed the former have
rejected the latter.
All that can be done in a limited space is to select the chief examples
of the Patristic teaching; and then to show how the Ultramontanes and
their opponents employed them.
* * * * *
1. A crucial instance is the famous language of St Irenæus:--
“It is within the power of all, who may wish to see the truth,
to contemplate clearly the tradition of the Apostles manifested
throughout the world in every Church; and we are able to enumerate
those whom the Apostles appointed to be Bishops in the churches, and
their successors, quite down to our time, who neither taught nor
knew anything like what these [heretics] rave about. Yet surely if
the Apostles had known any hidden mysteries, which they were in the
habit of teaching to the perfect apart and privily from the rest,
they would have taken special care to deliver them to those to whom
they were also committing the churches themselves.... But because
it would be too long in such a volume as this, to enumerate the
successions of all the churches, we point to the tradition of the
very great and very ancient and universally known Church which was
founded and established at Rome by the two most glorious Apostles,
Peter and Paul;--we point, I say, to the tradition which this Church
has from the Apostles, and to her faith proclaimed to man, which
comes down to our time through the succession of her Bishops.... For
to this Church, on account of its more influential pre-eminence, it
is necessary that every church should resort--that is to say, the
faithful who are from all quarters; and in this Church the tradition,
which comes from the Apostles, has ever been preserved by those who
are from all quarters.”[14]
[14] St Irenæus, III. iii. pp. 1–2, trans. F. Puller, p. 20.
This classic passage, says a Roman writer,[15] proves how universal
was the belief in the Sovereign Pontiff’s Infallibility. It does not
merely state a fact: it enunciates a principle. Accordance with the
traditional doctrine of the Church of Rome is here stated to be the
duty of all churches. But how could this be so, unless the Pope was
the infallible organ of Apostolic teaching? The holy martyr calls,
says another, the faithful of the entire Christian world to the Roman
Church, that they may drink in the Apostolic truth without fear of
error or misleading.[16] What else is this but infallible authority?[17]
[15] Botalla, i. p. 79.
[16] Perrone, p. 38.
[17] Cf. Bellarmine, p. 267.
On the other side a Roman historian of dogmas writes:--
“Irenæus was not contemplating the case of contradictions between
churches founded by the Apostles.... There existed at that period
complete agreement in faith and doctrine. Consequently, the Fathers
had no cause to consider a case of disagreement between Apostolic
churches.”[18]
[18] Schwane, _Histoire du Dogme_, i. p. 667.
According to the French Bishop Maret,[19] the principle laid down
by Irenæus is an appeal to tradition manifested in all the Apostolic
churches. He considers that truth is to be found in the tradition
manifested in all the Apostolic foundations. But for the sake of
brevity it is enough to consult the tradition of the Roman Church.
Maret acknowledges a primacy in the Roman Church, but cannot believe
that Irenæus would disallow the rightfulness of consulting the
tradition of the Universal Church in which Irenæus himself considers
the Truth is found.
[19] Maret, _Du Concile Général_, ii. p. 110.
Gratry, in his famous letters during the Vatican Council, goes further
than this, for he quotes the sequel to the passage of Irenæus, and
underlines the statement which shows that the principle which this
primitive writer considers Catholic is an appeal to the ancient
Churches (plural) and by no means exclusive appeal to one.
“... It is not then necessary to seek elsewhere the truth, since it
is easily found _in the Church, the Apostles_ having made _of the
Church_ a rich bank, in which they have amassed all the treasures of
truth; so that every man, whosoever will, can draw from her the water
of life.... Thus if a dispute should arise relative to a detail of
tradition, should we not have recourse to _the most ancient Churches_
(_nonne oporteret_ in antiquissimas recurrere Ecclesias, _in quibus
Apostoli conversati sunt_) in which the Apostles themselves have
lived, and learn from them immediately what is certain and clear upon
the question?”[20]
[20] Gratry’s second letter.
Upon this passage Gratry observes:--
“The reader has here before him the whole doctrine of St Irenæus upon
this subject. This doctrine is perfectly clear. It is almost the same
as that of Tertullian, who says: ‘Run over the Apostolic Churches,
in which are found the chairs of the Apostles, upon which are
seated the Bishops who succeeded them, in which are still read their
authentic letters, each echoing the voice and representing the face
of its author. Is Achaia near to thee? Thou hast Corinth. Art thou
near Macedonia? Thou hast Philippi; thou hast the Thessalonians. If
thou canst travel into Asia, thou hast Ephesus. If thou art near to
Italy, thou hast Rome, where we can find also authority at hand.’”
The thesis of St Irenæus, adds Gratry, is this:--We must bring back
heretics “to the tradition of the Apostles, which, by their successors,
is preserved in the Churches.” And “when there is any doubt, we must
have recourse to the Ancient Churches.”
* * * * *
2. In the case of St Cyprian (A.D. 250) special difficulties arise
owing to controversies on the actual text. We can only set down the
chief passage and afterwards indicate the use made of his principles by
Roman opponents of Infallibility.
“And although after His resurrection He assigns equal power to all
His Apostles, ... nevertheless, in order to make the unity manifest,
He _established one Chair and_ by His own authority appointed the
origin of that same unity beginning from one. Certainly the rest of
the Apostles were that which Peter _also_ was, endued with equal
partnership, both of honour and office, but the beginning sets out
from unity, _and Primacy is given to Peter, that one Church of Christ
and one Chair may be pointed out; and all are pastors and one flock
is shown, to be fed by all the Apostles with one-hearted accord_,
that one Church of Christ may be pointed out.... He that holds not
this unity of the Church, does he believe that he holds the faith?
He, who strives and rebels against the Church, _he who deserts the
Chair of Peter on which the Church was founded_, does he trust that
he is in the Church?”[21]
[21] Cyprian, _De Unit._ 4.
Whether the passages underlined are Cyprian’s or unauthorised
interpolations, is the critical difficulty. They appear in the earlier
printed editions, not, however, without editorial misgivings. But the
modern critical text[22] omits them. Many Roman theologians do the
same. Leo XIII. himself omits them in his Encyclical on the unity of
the Church. On the other hand, their genuineness is still asserted by
certain Protestant and Roman writers. In any case all that they affirm
is a Primacy. No modern Romanist of the historical school would quote
them as affirming infallibility. Under these circumstances perhaps
it will be best to confine attention to words whose genuineness no
one disputes. The Ultramontane emphasised Cyprian’s statements on the
Primacy: the opposing school, his statements on Episcopal equality. The
former quoted “the principal Church, whence sacerdotal unity arose”;
the latter “the episcopate is one, it is a whole, in which each enjoys
full possession”; and again, “the rest of the Apostles were that which
Peter was, endowed with equal partnership, both of honour and office.”
[22] Text of the _Vienna Corpus_, ed. Hartel.
Minority Bishops asserted in the Vatican Council, on the ground of
these two passages, that Ecclesiastical power was divinely entrusted
to Peter and to the other Apostles; and that it was derived from them
to their successors by Divine institution. Accordingly the minority
complained that the exclusive consideration of Papal authority was
irreconcilable with Catholic truth and Cyprianic principles. The
equal authority of the episcopate deserved and required an equal
exposition.[23] Cyprian’s inference from St Matt. xvi. 18 was that
“the Church should be built upon the Bishops, and that every act of the
Church should be guided by them as presidents.”[24]
[23] Friedrich, _Documenta_.
[24] _Ep._ xxxiii.
And this is the principle upon which Cyprian acts. After assembling the
local Bishops and forming their own decision, Cyprian wrote to Stephen,
Bishop of Rome, in the following terms:--
“These considerations, dear brother, we bring home to your conscience
out of regard to the office we hold in common, and to the simple
love we bear you. We believe that you, too, from the reality of
your religious feeling and faith, approve what is religious as well
as true. Nevertheless, we know there are those who cannot readily
part with principles once imbibed, or easily alter a view of their
own, but who, without hurting the bond of peace and concord between
colleagues, hold to special practices once adopted among them, and
herein we do no violence to any one and impose no law. For, in the
administration of the Church each several prelate has the free
discretion of his own will--having to account to the Lord for his
action.”[25]
[25] _Ep._ xlvii. 3.
Quoting Cyprian’s own words St Augustine repeats the passage from a
letter:--
“For neither did Peter whom the Lord chose first, and on whom He
built His Church, when Paul afterwards disputed with him about
circumcision, claim or assume anything and arrogantly to himself,
so as to say that he held the primacy, and should rather be obeyed
by newcomers. Nor did he despise Paul because he had before been a
persecutor of the Church, but he admitted the counsel of truth, and
readily assented to the legitimate grounds which Paul maintained;
giving us thereby a pattern of concord and patience, that we should
not pertinaciously love our own opinions, but should rather account
as our own any true and rightful suggestions of our brethren and
colleagues for the common health and weal.”[26]
[26] Cyprian, _Ep._ lxxi.
Upon this Augustine’s comment is:--
“Here is a passage in which Cyprian records what we also learn in
Holy Scripture, that the Apostle Peter, in whom the primacy of the
Apostles shines with such exceeding grace, was corrected by the later
Apostle Paul, when he adopted a custom in the matter of circumcision
at variance with the demand of truth....[27]
“Wherefore the holy Cyprian, whose dignity is only increased by his
humility, who so loves the pattern set by Peter as to use the words;
‘giving us thereby a pattern of concord and patience, that we should
not pertinaciously love our own opinions, but should rather account
as our own any true and rightful suggestions of our brethren and
colleagues for the common health and weal’--he, I say, abundantly
shows that he was most willing to correct his own opinion, if any
one should prove to him that it is as certain that the baptism of
Christ can be given by those who have strayed from the fold, as that
it could not be lost when they strayed.... Nor should we ourselves
venture to assert anything of the kind were we not supported by the
unanimous authority of the whole Church--to which he himself would
unquestionably have yielded, if at that time the truth of this
question had been placed beyond dispute by the investigation and
decree of a General Council. For if he quotes Peter as an example for
his allowing himself quietly and peacefully to be corrected by one
junior colleague, how much more readily would he himself, with the
Council of his Province, have yielded to the authority of the whole
world, when the truth had been thus brought to light? For, indeed, so
holy and peaceful a soul would have been more ready to assent to the
arguments of any single person who could prove to him the truth; and
perhaps he even did so, though we have no knowledge of the fact.”[28]
[27] Augustine, _De Baptismo_, II. i. 2.
[28] Augustine, _De Baptismo_, II. iv. p. 5.
To Cardinal Bellarmine, Jesuit of the sixteenth century, the persistent
refusal of Cyprian to accept the Pope’s teachings appeared very grave
indeed. Cyprian, says Bellarmine, was not a heretic, because those
who say that the Pope can err are not even yet considered manifestly
heretics. But whether Cyprian did not commit a mortal sin in disobeying
the Pope, Bellarmine is not sure. On the one hand, Cyprian sinned
in ignorance. Thinking the Pope in serious error, he was obliged to
disobey; for no man ought to go against his conscience--and a Council
of eighty Bishops agreed with him. On the other hand, he appears to
have mortally sinned, for he disobeyed an apostolic precept, and
refused to submit to the judgment of his superior.
Archbishop Kenrick’s dogmatic inference from these facts in the Vatican
Council was as follows:--
“When Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, held mistaken views as to the
rebaptism of heretics upon their return to the Church, and had
strenuously defended them against the Roman Pontiff Stephen,
Augustine considered him to be justified: because the matter in
question had not yet been elucidated by the authority of a General
Council. Thus Augustine did not regard as decisive the Roman
Pontiff’s opinion which had already condemned this error, and by
which, according to my opponents, the dispute had been already
infallibly determined. Augustine therefore was ignorant of the
doctrine of Pontifical Infallibility. Had he acknowledged it, it must
have followed that Cyprian was not only indefensible for his conduct,
but had actually incurred condemnation for heresy.”
* * * * *
3. From the writings of St Augustine probably no phrase has been more
often quoted in behalf of papal inerrancy than that in which, referring
to the Pelagian controversy, he says:--
“Already on this matter two Councils have sent to the Apostolic See,
whence also answers have been received. The cause is finished, would
that the error were also finished.”[29]
[29] St Aug. Serm. cxxii. Gaume, v. 930.
In other words, says a Roman writer,[30] Pope Innocent I. has
determined the matter. The Pontifical Decree has settled that the truth
is on Augustine’s side. Could it do so unless it were infallible? To
another writer this inference is indisputably clear.[31]
[30] Botalla, i. p. 77.
[31] Perrone, p. 43.
It is, however, more than questionable whether this exposition would
satisfy Roman critical writers of to-day. For they do not claim
Pope Innocent’s reply to the African Bishops as an exercise of
Infallibility. Thus Augustine’s criticism is no evidence of his belief
in Innocent’s inerrancy.
“St Augustine and all his century,” says a Bishop of the Roman
Church, “like the centuries before him, placed the supreme authority,
the authority which cannot fail, not in the Pope alone, but in the
Pope and the Episcopate.”[32]
[32] Maret, i. p. 161.
Nevertheless, the passage was appealed to by the Ultramontanes in
the Vatican struggle. They assigned to St Augustine the statement:
“Rome has spoken, the cause is finished.” This was the form in which
Augustine’s sentiments were commonly quoted for centuries. Gratry’s
criticism upon it represents the opposition.
“Rome has spoken, the cause is finished. It is certain that this
formula of St Augustine possesses something decisive and absolute
about it like an axiom. It says everything. ‘Rome has spoken, the
cause is finished.’ Rome has spoken; all is said, the rest is of no
consequence.
“But the objection to this is that St Augustine never said that at
all.”
Gratry then quotes the passage as it actually occurs. To Gratry’s mind
the real words do not even imply that the judgment of Rome by itself is
everything; while the misquoted formula does.[33]
[33] Second letter.
* * * * *
4. Constantly appealed to again are the words of St Jerome.
“I know that the Roman faith praised by the Apostle’s voice does not
accept suggestion of such a kind. Although an angel taught otherwise
than that which has been once proclaimed, strengthened by the
authority of St Paul, it could not change.”[34]
[34] _Ad Rufinum_, ii.
“Upon this rock I know that the Church is builded. I entreat you,
authorise me by your letters either to assert or not to assert three
substances. I shall not fear to assert three substances if you order
me.”[35]
[35] _Ep. ad Damasum_, ii. p. 131.
Here, then, St Jerome is found affirming that the Roman Church cannot
fail, and that he who accepts its instruction cannot be misguided.[36]
[36] Perrone, p. 42.
On the other hand, Bishop Bossuet appeals to Jerome’s own account of
Pope Liberius that he was induced to endorse heresy, and that, overcome
by the weariness of exile, he subscribed to heretical error.[37] The
question, therefore, arises whether Jerome would not have feared to
follow an example which he so describes. Can he who so describes
Liberius have believed that he who accepts papal instruction cannot be
misguided?
[37] Bossuet, xxii. p. 227. Jerome, _De Script. Eccles. and Chronicon_.
* * * * *
5. Another example is the striking utterance of Pope Gelasius.
“This it is against which the Apostolic See is greatly on its
guard, that the glorious confession of the Apostle, since it is the
security of the world, should not be defiled by the least error
or contagion.[38] For if--which God avert, and we trust cannot
happen--such a misfortune should occur, how could we venture to
resist any error, or how should we be able to correct the wandering?”
[38] Bossuet, xxii. p. 277.
Gelasius teaches here, said Bellarmine, that the Apostolic See cannot
err. For since the security of the world depends upon its utterances,
if it were to err the whole world would be in error with it.[39]
[39] _Works_, ii. p. 83.
Bossuet, on the other hand, replied as follows: A Roman Synod addressed
to Bishops the question: How could they correct the error of the people
if they were in error themselves? This was not an encouragement to
think themselves infallible, but a warning to take precautions against
being deceived. Similarly Gelasius claims that consciousness of the
disastrous results which would attend its deception has deepened the
cautiousness of the Roman See. To infer, however, from the character
of the results, the impossibility of the occurrence is, says Bossuet,
the utterly illogical conclusion that what ought not will not be. The
dangerous character of the results which would follow from deception
of the Roman See do not prove the impossibility of its occurrence. All
they prove is the urgent necessity for care and deliberation. And this
is what Gelasius implies. For his language is--“which God avert, we
trust it cannot happen.” But this is the language of prayer and piety;
it is not the certainty of a truth revealed. Gelasius has every hope
that, contingently on compliance with the necessary conditions, this
disaster will not be permitted to take place. But we may not transpose
hope into fact. Tested by history, urges Bossuet, individual occupants
of the Roman See have grievously misled the Church. Liberius and
Honorius, as far as in them lay, did actually deceive the world. Yet
the world was not deceived: for other remedies exist against calamities
such as these. The language of Gelasius is one of the most magnificent
from the Roman See. But it is the language of a pious confidence, not a
dogma of the immutable faith.
* * * * *
6. The classic expression of the proper method, according to the
Ancient Church, for distinguishing Catholic Faith from falsehood, is
the famous Canon of St Vincent of Lerins. We propose to summarise his
principles, and then to record their controversial use within the Roman
Communion.
“Moreover, in the Catholic Church itself all possible care must be
taken that we hold that faith which has been believed everywhere
always by all. For that is truly and in the strictest sense Catholic,
which, as the name itself and the reason of the thing declare,
comprehends all universally.
“This rule we shall observe if we follow universality, antiquity,
consent. We shall follow universality if we confess that one faith
to be true, which the whole Church throughout the world confesses;
antiquity, if we in no wise depart from those interpretations which
it is manifest were notoriously held by our holy ancestors and
fathers; consent, in like manner, if in antiquity itself we adhere
to the consentient definitions and determinations of all, or at least
of almost all priests and doctors.”[40]
[40] _Commonitorium_, ii.
Vincent’s famous Canon states the appeal to tradition in a triple form:
in relation to place and time and persons. The test of a doctrine’s
apostolic character is its universality in place and time. That which
commands a consent virtually coextensive with the Church’s existence,
across the entire world geographically, and across the entire Christian
ages historically, constitutes the Catholic Faith.
Vincent’s application of this test to several instances shows alike its
clearness and its use.
i. First Case--If the Local oppose the Universal.
“What, then, will a Catholic Christian do if a small portion of the
Church have cut itself off from the communion of the universal faith?
“What, surely, but prefer the soundness of the whole body to the
unsoundness of a pestilent and corrupt member?”
ii. Second Case--If the Modern oppose the Ancient.
“What if some novel contagion seek to infect not merely an
insignificant portion of the Church, but the whole?
“Then it will be his care to cleave to antiquity, which at this day
cannot possibly be seduced by any fraud of novelty.
“To preach any doctrine therefore to Catholic Christians other than
what they have received never was lawful, never is lawful, never will
be lawful.”
Thus according to Vincent the Christian obligation is to keep
that deposit of doctrine which is committed to our trust. And
this obligation rests in general on the Universal Church, and in
particular on the whole body of pastors whose duty it is to possess
and communicate to others a complete knowledge of religion. Vincent
considers the transmission of the Faith in its integrity the function
not exclusively of the pastors, but also of the entire community of the
Universal Church. His famous often quoted words must be quoted once
again, for it would be impossible to express his theory in better terms
than his own.
“Keep the Deposit. What is the Deposit? That which has been entrusted
to thee, not that which thou hast thyself devised: a matter not of
wit but of learning; not of private adoption but of public tradition;
a matter brought to thee, not put forth by thee, wherein thou art
bound to be not an author but a keeper, not a teacher but a disciple,
not a leader but a follower.... Let that which formerly was believed,
though imperfectly apprehended, as expounded by thee be clearly
understood. Let posterity welcome, understood through thy exposition,
what antiquity venerated without understanding. Yet teach still the
same truths which thou hast learned, so that while thou speakest
newly, thou speakest not what is new.”
Nothing can be stronger than St Vincent’s sense of the substantial
immutability of the Faith. Nor is there any finer exposition than his
of the principle of identity. What is perhaps even more remarkable,
considering the period when he wrote, is his recognition that the
principle of immutability requires to be balanced by the principle of
progress. We have in his pages the earliest statement of the principles
of theological development, drawn with a wonderful insight into its
nature and limitations.
“But some one will say, perhaps--Shall there then be no _progress_
in the Christian Church? Certainly all possible progress.... Yet on
condition that it be real progress, _not alteration_ of the Faith. For
progress requires that the subject be enlarged in itself, alteration
that it be _transformed into something else_. The intelligence, then,
the knowledge, the wisdom, as well of individual as of all, as well of
_one man_ as of _the whole Church_, ought in the course of ages and
centuries, to increase and make much and vigorous progress; _but yet
only in its own kind_; _i.e._, in the same doctrine, in the same sense,
and in the same meaning.”
Thus, according to Vincent, there may be all possible progress
consistent with substantial identity. And the method by which the
progress of the Church of the present day is safeguarded and controlled
is perpetual reversion to the primitive type; any substantial deviation
from which is a sign of variation from the truth.
The Romanist opponent of Papal Infallibility laid the greatest
stress on St Vincent’s principle, while the Ultramontane attempted
a distinction between implicit and explicit truth. Grant that the
Catholic faith must be contained in the original deposit of Revelation,
must its recognition have been explicit from the first?[41] The Canon
of St Vincent was asserted to be true in an affirmative sense, but
not in a negative. Whatever satisfies the test of universality was
undoubtedly part of the Catholic faith; but it did not follow that a
doctrine which failed to fulfil this test was therefore uncatholic.
[41] _Franzelin. De Trad._ p. 295.
This distinction carried no conviction to a very large minority in the
Roman Church, partly because the doctrine in question did not satisfy
the test of universality, even in the nineteenth century, and partly
because of the doctrine’s intrinsic character. They failed to see how
a doctrine which explicitly affirmed the Pope’s independence of the
Church’s consent could be a legitimate outcome of, and implicitly
contained within, the principle of consent, which is the negative of
that independence. Vincent placed the whole stress on universality and
consent. The Ultramontane considered the Pope’s utterance infallible
without that universality and consent. To the Roman opponents of
the Vatican view these two theories seemed mutually exclusive. They
could not reconcile the Vincentian Canon with the Vatican claim, nor
reject St Vincent’s demand that progress must retain substantial
identity. They remembered how Bishop Bossuet, intellectually the
head of the seventeenth-century Church in France, had claimed for
the Roman Catholic Church the distinctive glory of immutability--the
_quod semper_ of St Vincent--as contrasted with the variations of
Protestantism.[42]
[42] Bossuet, _Premier Avertisement aux Protestants_.
In the Vatican Council itself the Bishops appealed repeatedly to the
Canon of St Vincent as a proof that the Infallibility doctrine formed
no portion of the Catholic faith. Bishop Maret had already affirmed in
the treatise which he sent to all the members of the Council that the
principles of St Vincent can never legitimately issue in a system of
absolute Infallibility and monarchy of each individual Pope. Bishop
Hefele said that
“when differences on matters of faith arose in the primitive Church
appeal was made to the Apostolic Churches, Rome, Alexandria, Antioch;
and that only was dogmatically propounded to the faithful, which was
universally believed. None of the ancients ever imagined that an
infallible decision of controversies could be obtained by any shorter
method at the hands of any single individual. On the contrary,
Vincent said, let us follow universality, antiquity, consent.”[43]
[43] Friedrich, _Documenta_, ii. p. 121.
Another Bishop urged that according to the principle of St Vincent no
definition could be made without moral unanimity. We have no proof,
said another Bishop, least of all from the first five centuries. And
if nothing can ever be defined except that which has been believed
always everywhere and by all, by what right can we defend the Papal
Infallibility? None but the Bishops, said another, can testify whether
a doctrine is held always everywhere and by all. Consequently, he, and
others with him, demurred to the opinion that a Pope’s utterance could
be infallible without the consent of the episcopate.
More emphatic still was the statement of the American Archbishop
Kenrick:--
“The famous writer, Vincent of Lerins, in his golden treatise the
_Commonitorium_, which has been highly esteemed for the last fourteen
centuries ... gives the rule by which a believer should guide himself
when conflicting opinions arise among the Bishops: namely, that
nothing is to be considered of Catholic faith which has not been
acknowledged always everywhere and by all. When the Bishops disagree
Vincent affirms that antiquity and universality are to be followed.
He makes no reference to the Roman Pontiff whose opinion, according
to the Pontifical Party, instantly determines all controversies
of faith. This theory assuredly Vincent never heard of. And his
contemporaries entirely agreed with him.”
The authors of Janus made an equally strong appeal to St Vincent of
Lerins.
“If the view of Roman Infallibility had existed anywhere in the
Church at that time, it could not have been possibly passed over
in a book exclusively concerned with the question of the means for
ascertaining the genuine Christian doctrine. But the author keeps to
the three notes of universality, permanence, and consent, and to the
Ecumenical Councils.”[44]
[44] Janus, p. 89.
* * * * *
7. What was the true relation of the Pope and the Council to each
other? How was it understood in primitive times? Did the Collective
Episcopate regard itself as subordinated, with no independent judgment
of its own, to decisions of the Roman authority? Or was the Council
conscious of possessing power to accept or refuse the papal utterances
brought before it?[45] Bossuet maintained that the treatment of Papal
Letters by the early General Councils afforded convincing proof against
their belief in any theory of papal inerrancy. The famous letter of Leo
to Flavian was laid before the Council of Chalcedon in the following
terms:--“Let the Bishops say whether the teaching of the 318 Fathers
[the Council of Nicea] or that of the 150 [Constantinople] agrees
with the letter of Leo.” Nor was Leo’s letter accepted until its
agreement with the standards of the former Ecumenical Councils had been
ascertained.
[45] Bossuet, _Defence_, i. p. 80.
The very signatures of the subscribing Bishops bear this out--“The
letter of Leo agrees,” says one, “with the Creed of the 318 Fathers
and of the 150 Fathers, and with the decisions at Ephesus under St
Cyril. Wherefore I assent and willingly subscribe.”[46] Thus the act
of the Episcopate at Chalcedon was one of critical investigation and
authoritative judgment, not of blind submission to an infallible voice.
The theologian, Bellarmine, and the historian, Baronius, both strong
advocates of the papal authority, contradict one another on this point.
Baronius asserts that the Bishops regarded the letter of Leo as the
rule and guide in faith which all churches must accept. Bellarmine,
however, perplexed by the episcopal investigation which undeniably
the letter endured, suggested that Leo’s letter to the Council was
not intended as a final definition, but as a general advice for the
Bishops’ assistance.
[46] _Ibid._ ii. p. 38.
Bossuet points out that this happy solution is refuted by the simple
fact that Leo wrote to Flavian before any Council was even thought
of.[47] It illustrates Bellarmine’s uncritical ingenuity. And since
Baronius acknowledges the authoritative character of Leo’s letter, and
Bellarmine the reality of its scrutiny by the Bishops, the obvious
conclusion is that both the papal authority and the consent of the
Universal Council are elements in producing a dogma of the Faith.
Accordingly, the Pope’s decision, taken by itself apart from the
consent of the Church, is not infallible. Bossuet claims that Leo’s own
teaching endorses this, for he wrote the following words: “The things
which God had formerly defined by our ministry, He confirmed by the
irreversible consent of the entire brotherhood.”
[47] Bossuet, _Defence_, i. p. 81.
To sum up the procedure of the early Church in a question of faith:
Bishop Flavian first declared what was of faith as the local Bishop.
Leo at Rome endorsed it and gave his definition. After this definition
came the examination of the question in the General Council, and
judgment was ultimately given. After the definition had been approved
by the judgment of the Bishops no further room for doubt or dispute
remained.[48]
[48] _Ibid_. ii. p. 41.
The impression made upon a Roman writer by Roman research for proof of
Infallibility in the writings of the Fathers may be gathered from the
following significant passage:
“To sum up. The defenders of the dogma of Infallibility discover
valuable hints in history. But they also encounter difficulties.
After systematising against the Gallican School the grounds of their
belief, they endeavoured to meet the difficulties which required to
be solved. These difficulties came from many sources. They came from
Councils which on various occasions constituted themselves judges of
teaching sent from Rome. They came from certain teachers who opposed
other works to the doctrinal decisions of Popes. But they came, above
all, from Popes themselves who were not always at the level required
of their mission, and at times allowed themselves to be ensnared with
error.”[49]
[49] Tunnel, _Hist. Théol. Positive_, p. 309.
Primitive evidence for Papal Infallibility is then admitted by some
Roman writers to be meagre and disappointing.[50] A curious instance
of this is found in the theologian, Melchior Cano. He says that the
quotations given by St Thomas from St Cyril of Alexandria afford a much
clearer evidence for this doctrine than that in any other patristic
writer. But when he sought for the original passages they were not to
be found. “This is the work of the heretics,” he exclaims indignantly.
“They have mutilated the writings, and erased everything that concerned
pontifical authority.” So Melchior Cano. To-day, however, it is
universally acknowledged that these passages were interpolations by
which St Thomas Aquinas was deceived. Thus Melchior Cano’s clearest
evidence is nothing else than a simple forgery.
[50] Melchior Cano, _Op._ lib. v. cap. v.