Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until

she controls a fully-developed railway system in Asia Minor

and Syria; until, by the extension of the Anatolian Railway to

Baghdad, she can resist an attack by England on Mesopotamia;

until her army has been increased and improved; and until

progress has been made in her general economic and financial

conditions.... The stronger Turkey becomes, the greater will be

the danger for England if, in a German-English conflict, Turkey

should be on the side of Germany; and, with Egypt for a prize,

it certainly would be worth the while of Turkey to run the risk

of fighting with Germany against England. On the other hand the

mere fact that Turkey had increased in military strength, had

improved her economic position, and had an adequate railway

system, would make England hesitate to attack Germany; and this

is the point at which Germany must aim. The policy of supporting

Turkey which is now being followed by Germany has no other

purpose than that of effecting a strong measure against the

danger of war with England.

From other directions, besides, similar testimony was forthcoming.

The Socialist _Liepziger Volkszeitung_ declared in March, 1911, that

"the new situation shortly to be created in Asia Minor would hasten the

break-up of the British Empire, which was already beginning to totter

(schwanken)."

In _Die Neue Zeit_ for June 2, 1911, Herr Karl Radek said:--

The strengthening of German Imperialism, the first success

of which, attained with so much effort, is the Baghdad Railway;

the victory of the revolutionary party in Turkey; the prospect

of a modern revolutionary movement in India, which, of course,

must be regarded as a very different thing from the earlier

scattered risings of individual tribes; the movement towards

nationalisation in Egypt; the beginning of reform in Egypt--all

this has raised to an extraordinary degree the political

significance of the Baghdad Railway question.

The Baghdad Railway being a blow at the interests of English

Imperialism, Turkey could only entrust its construction to the

German Company because she knew that Germany's army and navy

stood behind her, which fact makes it appear to England and

Russia inadvisable to exert too sensitive a pressure upon Turkey.

In the _Akademische Blätter_ of June 1, 1911, Professor R. Mangelsdorf,

another recognised authority on German policy and politics, wrote:--

The political and military power an organised railway

system will confer upon Turkey is altogether in the interest

of Germany, which can only obtain a share in actual economic

developments if Turkey is independent; and, besides, any attempt

to increase the power and ambition of England, in any case

oppressively great, is thereby effectively thwarted. To some

extent, indeed, Turkey's construction of a railway system is

a threat to England, for it means that an attack on the most

vulnerable part of the body of England's world-empire, namely

Egypt, comes well within the bounds of possibility.

These declarations and admissions render perfectly clear the reasons for

Germany's professions of friendship for Turkey and for her desire that

that country should become stronger and more powerful. They also leave

no doubt as to the real purpose the south-western branch of the Baghdad

Railway was designed to effect. The _conquest of Egypt_ by a combined

German and Turkish force was the first object to be accomplished

with the help of the railway extension to the Egyptian frontier in

one direction and to Mecca in another; but Dr. Rohrbach's suggestion

that the loss of Egypt by England would entail the loss, also, of her

possessions in Central and East Africa has a further bearing on what has

been told in the previous chapter concerning Germany's designs on Africa

as a whole. The strategical railways in German South-West Africa; the

projected extensions thereof--when circumstances permitted; the German

East African lines, _and_ the south-western branch of the Baghdad

Railway in the direction of Egypt were all to play their part in the

eventual creation of a Cape-to-Cairo German-African Empire.

If we now direct our attention to the south-eastern branch of the

Baghdad Railway, we are met by the repeated protests made by Germany

that in desiring the construction of a railway to the _Persian Gulf_

she was influenced solely by commercial considerations. Against these

protests, however, there are to be put various material facts which

leave no room for doubt that Germany's aims in this direction were

otherwise than exclusively economic, while even the economic purposes

which the Baghdad Railway would, undoubtedly, have served must have

eventually led to a strengthening of Germany's political position, this,

in turn, helping her military and strategical purposes.

As originally planned, the port of Basra (the commercial centre of

trade in Mesopotamia, situate, sixty miles from the sea, on the

Shat-el-Arab--the great river formed by the junction of the Tigris and

the Euphrates--and open to the shipping of the world) was to have been

the terminus of the Baghdad Railway; and if commercial considerations

had, indeed, been exclusively aimed at, this terminus would have

answered all requirements.

No objection was, or could be, raised by the British Government to the

construction of the Baghdad Railway, on Turkish territory, as far as

Basra. In the later developments of the scheme, however, Germany and her

Turkish partner sought to ensure the continuation of the line from its

natural commercial terminus, at Basra, to a political and strategical

terminus, at Koweit, on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The _Abendpost_

(Berlin) voiced the German view when it spoke of Koweit as "the only

possible outlet to the Baghdad Railway."

But the extension of an avowedly German line of railway to Koweit would

have been a direct challenge to the paramountcy which Great Britain

claimed over the Persian Gulf. It would have come into collision with

British policy, interests and prestige in the East. It would have

given the German and Turkish allies an excuse for creating at Koweit a

harbour, with wharves, docks, warehouses, etc., which might be converted

into a naval and military base capable of serving far different purposes

than those of trade and commerce--those, namely, of a new line of

advance on _India_. It would, in combination with the control already

exercised by the Deutsche Bank over the railways in European Turkey,

have assured to Germany the means of sending her Naval forces or her

troops, together with supplies and ammunition, direct to the Persian

Gulf, either to strengthen her fleet or to carry out any further designs

she might cherish in the domain of Weltpolitik as affecting the Far

East. It would have meant that, as far as the head of the Persian Gulf,

at least, rail-power would have rendered her less dependent on the

exercise of sea-power, on her own account, and would have enabled her to

neutralise, also, as far as the said Gulf, the sea-power of England.

What so fundamental a change in the strategical position might imply was

well expressed by so eminent and impartial an authority as A. T. Mahan,

when he said, in his "Retrospect and Prospect" (1902):--

The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of

considerable naval potentiality, a "fleet in being" there, based

upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of

Cadiz, Gibraltar and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank

all the routes to the Farther East, to India and to Australia,

the last two actually internal to the Empire, regarded as

a political system; and, although at present Great Britain

unquestionably could check such a fleet, it might well require a

detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength

of her naval position.... Concession in the Persian Gulf,

whether by positive formal arrangement, or by simple neglect

of the local commercial interests which now underlie political

and military control, will imperil Great Britain's naval

situation in the Farther East, her political position in India,

her commercial interests in both, and the Imperial tie between

herself and Australia.

One is thus led to the conclusion that Koweit, as the terminus of

the south-eastern branch of the Baghdad Railway, and within four days

of Bombay, would have been as vital a point for British interests as

the terminus of the south-western branch within about twelve hours of

Egypt; while the possession of this further advantage by Germany would

have been in full accord with the proposition laid down by Rohrbach

and others as to the line of policy Germany should adopt for "bringing

England herself into a dangerous position."

With a view to safeguarding British interests from any possible

drifting into this position, as regards the Persian Gulf, the claim

was raised, some years ago, that England should have entire control

of the railway from Baghdad to Koweit. Germany did not see her way

to assent to this proposal; but in 1911 she announced that she would

forgo her right to construct the section from Baghdad to Basra on the

understanding that this final section would be completed by Turkey.

By way of compensation for the concession thus made by her to British

views, she secured certain financial advantages and the right both to

build the Alexandretta extension and to convert Alexandretta itself into

practically a German port on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The precise value of the "concession" thus made by Germany was, however,

open to considerable doubt. If she could succeed in her long-cherished

aim of establishing a virtual protectorate over Turkey, then the fact

that the final section of the Baghdad Railway had been built by Turkey,

and not by Germany, would have become a matter of detail not likely to

affect the reality of Germany's control. The line to Basra might have

been nominally Turkish but the directing policy would have been German;

and like conditions would have arisen had Great Britain agreed to allow

Turkey--though not Germany--to continue the railway from Basra to Koweit.

In the wide scope of their aggressive purpose, the Baghdad Railway

and its associated lines can best be compared with those roads which

the Romans, in the days of their pride--the pride that came before

their fall--built for the better achievement of their own aims as

world-conquerors. Apart from the fact that the roads now in question are

iron roads, and that the locomotive has superseded the chariot, the main

difference between Roman and German is to be found in the fact that the

world which the former sought to conquer was far smaller than the one

coveted by the latter.

The programme of Weltpolitik comprised in the German schemes embraced

not only countries but continents. In addition to the aspirations

cherished as regards Europe, that programme aimed at the eventual

annexation to the German Empire of three other Empires--the Turkish,

the Indian, and a new one to be known as the German-African. It was

further to secure the means of sending troops direct from Germany via

Constantinople and the Baghdad Railway to the frontiers of Persia

for possible operations against that country in combination with the

Turkish military forces, these having first been brought under German

control. The Baghdad Railway itself was, in the same way, and with like

support, to afford to Germany the means of threatening Russian interests

both in Persia and in Trans-Caucasia. It was to nullify England's sea

power in the Mediterranean, if not, to a certain extent--through the

establishment of a new Power at the gate of India--in the Far East, as

well. It would, as Mahan showed, have flanked our communications with

Australia, giving Germany an advantage in this direction, also, had Asia

and Africa failed to satisfy her aspirations.

Regarded from the point of view of its designed effect on the destinies

of nations, on the balance of political power, and on the reconstruction

of the world's forces--all for the aggrandisement of a single

people--the full programme must be looked upon as the most ambitious and

the most unscrupulous project of world-conquest that has yet been placed

on record in the history of mankind.

For its attainment, however, it clearly depended no less upon

rail-transport than upon force of arms; and in this respect it

represented Germany's greatest attempt to apply, in practice, that

principle of rail-power to which she had devoted eight decades of

inquiry, trial and organisation.

FOOTNOTES:

[75] "Babylonien, das reichste Land in der Vorzeit und das lohnendste

Kolonisationsfeld für die Gegenwart." 128 pp. Heidelberg, 1886.

[76] Important extensions have been carried out since.

[77] Dr. Dillon, in _The Contemporary Review_, April, 1906.

CHAPTER XXI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As will have been gathered from the preceding chapters, a prolonged

period of consideration, preparation and application in many different

countries throughout the world, prior to the outbreak of the Great

War in 1914, had established certain definite facts and fundamental

principles in regard to the relations of railways to warfare in

general. These may now be brought together and summarised in four

groups or divisions, namely, (A) Advantages; (B) Conditions Essential

to Efficiency; (C) Limitations in Usefulness; and (D) Drawbacks and

Disadvantages.

A.--ADVANTAGES

Assuming (1) the provision, in advance, of a system or systems of

railways capable of meeting all the requirements of the military

situation on the outbreak of war, or (2) the possibility of constructing

military railways during the progress of hostilities, such railways

should permit of--

A mobilisation of troops and their concentration at the frontier, or

at the seat of war, with a speed that was impossible under earlier

conditions.

Simultaneous use of different routes across the national territory

for concentration either on the frontier or at a point some distance

therefrom where the concentration can be completed without fear of

interruption by the enemy.

Sudden invasion of neighbouring territory by troops sent in a succession

of rapidly-following trains direct from various points in the interior

of the country where they might have been concentrated without the

knowledge of the enemy, this procedure being adopted in preference to

collecting at the frontier in advance a force on such a scale as would

disclose prematurely the intentions entertained.

The possibility of using promptly, for these purposes, the full strength

of the country's available resources--the railway lines in the interior

having already been adapted thereto, as well as those on or directly

connecting with the frontier--with a proportionate increase of the

offensive and defensive power of the State.

The supplementing of increased mobility and celerity by decreased

strain on the physical powers of the troops and the avoidance of such

inevitable reduction in their numbers as would result from the trials

and fatigues of prolonged marches by road (in combination with the

carrying of kits, etc.), should railway lines not be available.

A further consequent increase in the fighting strength of the army.

The possible attainment of the power of initiative through an early

concentration of large forces at points of strategic importance either

on national or on enemy's territory.[78]

The carrying out of strategical combinations on a scale or of a

character which would formerly have been impracticable.

Employment of railways for tactical purposes during the progress of

a war, including therein (_a_) movement of troops from one part of

the theatre of war to another, whether with a view to effecting big

changes of front or otherwise; (_b_) employment of the same Army Corps

on different fronts in succession, their transfer being effected in

the briefest possible interval of time; (_c_) the rapid bringing up

of reinforcements at a critical moment to some position exposed to

overpowering attack which might otherwise be lost; (_d_) surprise

attacks on the enemy; (_e_) the throwing of great masses of troops on

distant points; (_f_) strengthening weak places in the fighting line;

(_g_) strengthening threatened forts by means of troops, guns, munitions

or supplies; (_h_) relief of invested fortresses, and (_i_) retirement

by rail--when circumstances permit--of troops after defeat.

Control of a line of rail communication between the base and the

strategic centre of operations, facilitating the enormous amount of

transport in both directions which must be kept up in the rear of the

army, and for which the elements of speed, safety and regularity may be

of vital importance.

The possibility, thanks to railways, of regarding the whole interior of

the national territory as a base for the supply of requirements at the

front, dependence having no longer to be placed on a base established in

one particular district with its restricted range of possible supplies

and its collection of magazines, stores, workshops, transport parks,

etc., protected by fortresses, entrenched camps, or other means of

defence.

The establishment of supplementary, sectional or advanced bases along

the line of communication, with railway services so arranged that

supplies can be dispatched daily in such regulated quantities, and to

such points, as will serve the immediate needs of the army in the field,

without risk either of shortage or of excess.

Avoidance, under these conditions, of congestion of the railway lines

in the immediate rear of the army by trains or loaded wagons containing

a redundancy of supplies which (_a_) cannot be unloaded, (_b_) restrict

the use of the lines for other purposes, and (_c_) might have to be

abandoned to the enemy in the event of a sudden retreat.

Material benefits from the substitution of rail for road transport of

food, etc., by reason of (_a_) greater speed and regularity; (_b_)

less risk of deterioration from exposure to weather, and other causes;

(_c_) decreased cost of transport as compared with earlier conditions

involving the employment of a greater number of drivers, escort,

guards, horses and road vehicles; and (_d_) the arrival at destination

of the full quantities dispatched, the need for the consumption of an

appreciable proportion _en route_ by men and animals in a convoying

wagon train, carrying supplies for long distances by road, being

non-existent.

Reduction in the need for field ovens and other paraphernalia of the

army cook, since much of the food required--bread, for example--can

be prepared in cities or elsewhere at a distant base and forwarded

regularly by rail.

Freedom, more or less complete, from the once prevalent obligation on

the part of an advancing army that it should "live upon the country"--a

condition which the enormous increase in the size of armies to-day would

render impossible of fulfilment, even assuming that the people of the

country invaded had not withdrawn live stock, vehicles and food supplies

on their retirement before the invader.

In addition to this provision for the wants of an army in its advance

into hostile country, the safeguarding of the troops against the risk

of their becoming a band of demoralized marauders, wandering over a

wide area to seek and appropriate food whenever they can find it--as

was the case, for instance, in the Napoleonic wars--the maintenance of

discipline and the continued usefulness of the troops as a concentrated

body for the military purposes in view being further assured when both

men and leaders are relieved of anxiety as to the continuance of their

supplies.

The conduct of war at a great distance from the base by reason of the

facilities offered for the forwarding alike of troops, reinforcements,

supplies and military materials, the value of even a single line of

railway in the achievement of this purpose having been incontestably

established.

Defence of frontiers by strategical railways which may, also, become

available for general use.

Investment of cities or fortresses in occupied territory when, owing to

the lack or the deficiency of food supplies in the surrounding country,

the troops engaged are mainly if not entirely dependent on those brought

to them by rail from their own base.[79]

Victualling of cities before, and their revictualling after,

investment.[80]

Extension of lines of communication by means of quickly-constructed

narrow-gauge siege railways to be operated by motor traction, animal

power, or otherwise, including therein trench tramways for (_a_) removal

of wounded men from the trenches; (_b_) transport of siege guns to

trenches; and (_c_) supplying ammunition to battery.

Transport of heavy siege guns, mortars, ammunition and other materials

of a size or weight that would render impracticable their conveyance,

whether singly or in the aggregate, along ordinary roads, the railway

offering, in this respect, facilities for ponderous transport comparable

to those of the steamship, with the further advantage of being able, in

most instances, to take the guns, etc., to the spot or to the locality

where they are wanted.

Material aid given to expeditions to countries otherwise devoid of means

of communication, by the construction of military railways.

Employment of armoured trains which, apart from their usefulness in

defending railways against attack, may, as movable fortresses, render

important service in the operations against the enemy.

Removal of sick and wounded from the theatre of war, and the ensuring

of their distribution among hospitals in the rear or throughout the

interior, thus (_a_) avoiding alike the embarrassment to the army and

the many dangers and evils that would result from their remaining in

overcrowded hospitals on or near the battle-field; (_b_) giving the men

a better chance of effecting a speedy recovery and returning soon to

the ranks; and (_c_) adding to the fighting strength of the army by the

combination of these two advantages.

Facilities for giving a short leave to officers and men who, though

neither sick nor wounded, have been so far affected by their strenuous

exertions that they stand in need of a rest, or change, for which they

will fight all the better subsequently.

Dispatch of prisoners of war into the interior by trains which have

brought reinforcements or supplies, the army thus being speedily

relieved of what might otherwise be a hindrance to its operations.

Return of material no longer wanted at the front and constituting

impedimenta of which it is desirable to get rid as soon as possible.

Conveyance into the interior of "trophies of war"--including

plunder--taken from captured towns or cities.

Retirement of troops from occupied territory on the declaration of peace.

B.--CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO EFFICIENCY

In the matter of railway construction there should be--

i. Uniformity of gauge, together with physical connections between the

different systems or sections, in order (_a_) that the locomotives and

rolling stock on any one line can be used for military transport on

any other; (_b_) that mobilisation, concentration and the forwarding

of supplies and military material can be facilitated by the running of

through trains from any probable or possible point of dispatch; and

(_c_) that troops can readily be transferred from one front, or from one

part of the coast, to another for the purpose either of attack or of

defence.

ii. Lines linking up the interior of the country with the frontier, with

the coast, or with principal ports by different routes, transverse lines

connecting them, in turn, one with another.

iii. Double track for all lines leading direct to the frontier.

iv. In the case of single-track lines crossing continents or otherwise,

a liberal provision of passing places each capable of accommodating the

longest troop train likely to be run.

v. On all lines, and at all important stations, a sufficiency of

sidings, with provision of, or the possibility of providing speedily,

all such facilities as may be needed for the prompt and efficient

handling of military transports whenever the occasion should arise.

Preparations in advance should include--

i. The carrying out of a scheme of organisation based on recognition

of the following principles:--(_a_) That, while the railway is an

instrument capable of rendering great and even incalculable services in

the conduct of war, the working of it is a highly-skilled business only

to be entrusted to those possessed of the necessary experience; (_b_)

that interference with such working on the part of military officers

not possessing the requisite technical knowledge of the details and

limitations of railway operation may result in chaos and disaster; (_c_)

that railwaymen, in turn, are not likely to be fully acquainted with the

technicalities of military conditions and requirements, and should not,

in any case, be left with the responsibility of having to decide between

the possibly conflicting demands of various military authorities;

(_d_) that, for these reasons, there should be co-ordination of the

military and the technical railway elements, operating throughout

the whole scheme of organisation in its manifold details, avoiding

conflict of authority, ensuring harmony of working, and offering the

fullest guarantee that all military requirements will be met so far as

the capacity of the railway, together with a due regard for safe and

efficient operation, will allow; and (_e_) that effect can best be given

to these various conditions by the appointment of intermediary bodies

which, representing the dual elements, shall alone have power to give

directions, or to make demands, in respect to military rail-transport

during the continuance of war.

ii. Collection of data concerning the physical character, resources and

transport capabilities of the railways both in the national territory

and in any other country to which the war operations may extend.

iii. Study of all movements of troops, etc., likely to be necessary

on the outbreak of war; the preparation of special time-tables for the

running of troop trains, etc., and the working out of all essential

details respecting military transport in general.

iv. Creation and training of bodies of Railway Troops qualified to

undertake the construction, destruction, repair and operation of

railways in time of war.

C.--LIMITATIONS IN USEFULNESS

The usefulness of railways in war is limited by the following

considerations, among others:--

Railways are "inferior to ships in power of simultaneously transporting

heavy loads" (Von der Goltz). For this reason an overland route to

India could never compete, in respect to military transport, with

the sea route via the Suez Canal. Such overland route, also, passing

through foreign countries, would be especially liable to attack and

interruption. Where, however, the overland route goes entirely through

national territory (as in the case of the Trans-Siberian Railway), and

when the questions of time and safety, in regard to an alternative sea

route, suggest possible disadvantages, railways will be preferred to

ships in spite of the said inferiority.

Railways are inferior to roads in so far as, like rivers and canals,

they are on fixed spots. Troops depending on them are thus able to

move only in the direction in which lines have been or can quickly be

laid, whereas if they went by road they might have a greater choice of

alternative routes.

For these reasons the choice of the zone of concentration or of the

"decisive points" may depend less to-day on political, military or

geographical reasons (as in the Napoleonic wars) than on the direction,

extent and capacity of the available railways.

Great masses of troops can be entrained only at stations where

facilities for their so doing have been prepared in advance. The

provision of these facilities is even more necessary in the case of

Cavalry or Artillery than in that of Infantry. Hence the movement of

considerable bodies of troops may be restricted to certain lines, and

their entrainment or detrainment even to certain large stations. In the

case of road marching these restrictions would not apply.

Vehicles specially constructed for the purpose can alone be used on

railways. Any deficiency in their supply must needs cause delay.

During the time the troops are travelling by railway their power of

resisting attack is much more restricted than it would be if they were

marching by road, they can do little or nothing to protect the railway

lines, while if the enemy can only get to the railway he may be in a

position to prevent the train from continuing its journey, and take the

troops in it at a disadvantage.

For these reasons, among others, troop movements by rail at the theatre

of war, and especially in the enemy's country, are attended by a degree

of risk which may render it desirable to abandon the use of the railway

for the time being.

Railways are especially liable to destruction by the enemy, and,

although the arrangements made in advance may permit of speedy repairs

or reconstruction, the interruption of traffic for even a day or half a

day may be a matter of grave importance during the concentration of the

army or at some critical moment.

Destructions of line carried out by a retreating force, in order to

delay pursuit by the enemy, will be to the disadvantage of that force

when, after having driven back the enemy, it would itself make use of

the line it had rendered unserviceable.

Dependence on the railway for the transport of considerable bodies

of troops on short journeys--say for twenty, twenty-five or thirty

miles--is rendered inexpedient by the fact that, when allowance is made

for the time likely to be taken, not only on the journey, but in the

assembling at the station, in the entraining and detraining (perhaps at

some place devoid of adequate platform or siding accommodation), and in

the march from the arrival station to destination, it may well be found

that the troops could cover the distance in less time by road, apart

from the consideration, suggested above, as to their being in a better

position, when marching, to resist attack. Experts in all countries

have studied this question with a view to deciding, on the basis of

their national conditions, within what limit it would be better for

troops to march by road in preference to going by rail.

For reasons akin to those here stated, supplemented by the recent great

expansion of motor transport, less has been heard of late concerning the

proposed construction in this country of strategical railways along a

coast-line remarkable for its sinuosities, and presenting, therefore, an

exceptional position from the point of view of coast railways for purely

defensive purposes.

As regards long-distance journeys, whilst armies marching by road have

often been materially reduced in proportions by the number of men

falling out owing to lameness, exhaustion, or other causes, those who

reached the theatre of war, representing "the survival of the fittest,"

were better able to endure the trials and fatigues of the subsequent

campaign than if they could have made the journey by rail under

conditions involving no strain, but affording them no such exercise and

strengthening of their physical powers.[81]

Experience has further shown that exceptionally long railway journeys

may have a prejudicial effect upon troops from the point of view, also,

of maintenance of discipline.[82]

The services rendered by railways in war relate much more to strategy

than to tactics. Great masses of troops and munitions, brought from

all parts of the interior, may be conveyed readily and safely by rail

to particular points in the theatre of war; but the possibility of

effecting their transport by rail from one point to another on the

battle-field when the opposing forces are in actual contact is subject

to many restrictions and constitutes a much more difficult undertaking.

The imperative need for guarding a long line of railway communications,

more especially in occupied territory, may lead to the withdrawal of a

considerable number of men from the main army, weakening the strength of

the available fighting force proportionately.

D.--DRAWBACKS AND DISADVANTAGES

While, notwithstanding the conditions to be observed and the limitations

to be experienced, the balance of advantage conferred by railways on the

conduct of war may appear so pronounced, from a military and a political

point of view, there is a darker side to the story, as regards the world

at large, which must also be taken into account.

If railways have increased the power of defending a country against

invasion they have, also, increased enormously the power of aggression

at the command of an invader.

They offer vastly greater facilities to military Powers for the making

of sudden attacks on neighbouring countries--themselves, it may be, in a

state of more or less unpreparedness.

They afford the opportunity for overwhelming weaker Powers by means

of armies mobilised and concentrated in the interior and poured on to

or across the frontier in an endless succession of trains following

one another with such rapidity that the initial movement may, in some

instances, be carried out within the short space of twenty-four hours.

They permit of the prosecution of war at distances which, but for

the means offered for military transport by rail, would render war

impracticable.

They allow of war being carried on between a number of nations at one

and the same time, thus spreading the area over which the conflicts of

to-day may extend.

They encourage the cherishing of designs of world-power and dreams of

universal conquest.

They have added to the horrors of war by facilitating the transport and

the employment of the most terrible engines of war.

They have rendered possible the carrying off of plunder from an occupied

territory to an extent which would be impossible if the invaders had to

depend on ordinary road vehicles for their means of transport.

They have brought fresh risks and dangers upon civil populations,

the maintenance of lines of rail communication being a matter of

such paramount importance to an invader that the severest measures

may be adopted by him towards the community in general as a means of

terrorising them and ensuring the security of the railway lines.

What, in effect, count as "advantages" in one direction may be the

gravest of disadvantages in another.

* * * * *

Such, for attack or for defence, for good or for evil, is the nature,

and such are the possibilities, of that rail-power in warfare which,

after eighty years of continuous evolution, was, in the War of the

Nations imposed on mankind in 1914, to undergo a development and an

application on a wider, more impressive, and more terrible scale than

the world had ever seen before.

FOOTNOTES:

[78] Von Moltke is reported to have said on one occasion in the

Reichstag: "Our Great General Staff is so much persuaded of the

advantages to be derived from obtaining the initiative at the outset

of a war that it prefers to construct railways rather than forts. An

additional railway, crossing the whole country, makes a difference of

two days in the assembling of the army, and advances the operations

proportionately." "In the concentration of armies," says von der Goltz

in "The Conduct of War," "we reckon almost by hours."

[79] "Without railroads, it is said, the siege of Paris would have been

impossible" (Bigelow's "Principles of Strategy"). "During the siege

of Paris one railway for some time fed the [German] army of, in round

numbers, 200,000 men, brought up the siege materials and reinforcements

averaging 2,000 to 3,000 men a day, and even, at one time, fed Prince

Frederick Charles' army, as well, with very slight assistance from the

exhausted theatre of war" (Hamley's "Operations of War").

[80] During the thirty-five days preceding the investment, Paris

received by the Western Railway, alone, 72,442 tons of provisions and

67,716 head of cattle. But for these supplies she could not have endured

so long a siege. In the revictualling of Paris, after the siege, the

railways, though much restricted by the Germans, brought into the city,

in the course of twenty days, 155,955 tons of provisions and 42,580 head

of cattle.

[81] "The railways spare the troops fatigue," remarks Lieut.-Col.

Tovey, R.E., in "The Elements of Strategy"; "but it may be that when

they have to use their legs afterwards there will be more falling out

and lagging behind, in consequence." Balck, in his "Taktik," says: "It

is only in respect to the important consideration as to speed that the

rail-transport of troops is to be preferred to road-marching. The real

advantages of marching on foot--which was formerly the rule, and had

the effect of 'separating the chaff from the wheat' and of preparing

the men for the toils of fighting--are not counterbalanced by the fact

that the troops arrive at the theatre of war in their full numbers.

When time permits, marching on foot is preferable because it accustoms

the men both to their new equipment and to marching in large bodies.

After a long railway journey--on which the feet will have swollen and

the new boots will have been especially troublesome--marching becomes

particularly irksome, and the falling out of footsore men is very

considerable. It is, nevertheless, the almost invariable rule that the

troops shall begin their marching immediately they get to the end of

the rail journey, since it may be a matter of great importance that

the station at which they detrain should be cleared again as soon as

possible."

[82] In alluding to the conditions under which Russian reinforcements

were sent to Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, General Kuropatkin

writes ("The Russian Army and the Japanese War"): "In former days troops

had to make long marches in full service order before they reached the

battle-field. If properly conducted these marches hardened the men, and

enabled units to settle down; all superfluous luggage was discarded;

the weaker men were left behind; the officers and men got to know one

another. But, nowadays, with railway transport, the results are very

different. Going to the Far East, our men were crowded in railway

carriages for as long as forty days at a time, out of the control of

their officers, who were in different compartments. In the old and

well-disciplined units in particular no harm was done; but in the case

of newly-formed units ... it was most harmful."

Appendix

INDIAN FRONTIER RAILWAYS

On the north-west frontier of India the plains of the Punjab are

separated from the great central valley of Afghanistan, from the deserts

of Baluchistan, and from the Russian Empire on the north thereof, by

ranges of mountains, otherwise "a gridiron of stupendous ridges and

furrows," intersected by passes which have always been regarded as the

most vulnerable points of the Indian Empire. Through these passes from

the earliest days of recorded history there has come a long succession

of invasions instigated by that incalculable wealth of India which may

well have inspired the envy of dwellers in less favoured lands.[83]

These considerations would alone suffice to establish the need for an

effective control of the more important of the said passes by the Power

which exercises supremacy in India; but the obligation thus devolving

upon the British people as the present holders of that supremacy has

been increased in recent times by two further factors--(1) troubles

with frontier tribes; and (2) the development of that Central Asian

Question which, though now no longer acute, was, not so many years

ago, a source of great anxiety in England and India. Frontier troubles

gave rise to a number of expeditions to Afghanistan from time to time,

while the gravity of the general situation was increased by the once

steady advance of Russia towards India--whether for the purposes of

actual conquest thereof or, alternatively, for the attainment of the aim

cherished by Russia during three centuries for an outlet to a southern

sea, such outlet being sought via the Persian Gulf on her disappointment

in regard to the Dardanelles; though British interests were concerned in

either case.

This combination of circumstances, with the possibility, at one

time, that Afghanistan might become the theatre of war in a conflict

between two great European Powers, invested with special interest and

importance the provision on the north-west frontier of India of railway

lines which, whether constructed to the more important passes or going

actually through them, would form a ready means of concentrating

Anglo-Indian troops at such places on the frontier, or beyond, as

occasion might require.

From this point of view the Bolan and Khyber passes--the former leading

to Quetta and Kandahar and the latter to Kabul--have more especially had

importance attached to them as "the two gates of India."

Proposals for constructing railways through them were advanced as early

as 1857, when Mr. (afterwards Sir) W. P. Andrew, chairman of the Sind,

Punjab and Delhi Railway, acted as spokesman of a deputation which

waited on Lord Palmerston in order to urge the construction of (1) a

railway down the valley of the Euphrates, improving our communications

with India by connecting the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf;

and (2) railways through the Bolan and Khyber passes, not only, as

he urged, facilitating the movement of troops to the frontier, but

offering alternative routes by means of which the flank or the rear

of an enemy operating beyond or between the limits of the two lines

might be threatened. Mr. Andrew followed up with great earnestness and

perseverance for many years his advocacy of these views, publishing a

succession of books and pamphlets, and writing many letters to the Press

on the subject.

Such advocacy had, however, no practical issue, and, though the

arguments originally advanced in favour of the Euphrates railway lost

most of their force on the opening of the Suez Canal, the consequences

of the neglect to provide better means of communication with the

north-west frontier were well manifested in the troubles of 1878-79-80.

The refusal of the Ameer of Afghanistan--who had already accorded an

ostentatious welcome to a Russian Embassy at Kabul--to receive a British

mission led, in 1878, to an order being given for the advance of three

columns of British forces upon Afghan territory, the routes selected for

this purpose being (1) the Khyber Pass, (2) the Kuram Pass, and (3) the

Bolan Pass. At this time, however, the system of frontier railways which

had been advocated so long scarcely existed except on paper. The nearest

point of railway communication with Afghanistan was then at Sukkur, on

the Indus. An extension across the Sind desert to the entrance to the

Bolan Pass had been surveyed, and a very short section had been laid;

but in their advance on Kandahar Sir Donald Stewart and his force had to

march all the way from the Indus, experiencing great trials in crossing

the intervening desert, where many of the men lost their lives. The

work of constructing this desert railway--which presented no engineering

difficulty--was now taken actively in hand, and the line was available

for the troops on their return.

Success attended the expedition of 1878 so far as it led to the flight

of Shere Ali, the occupation of Kandahar by Sir Donald Stewart, the

control by the British of the three main highways between India and

Afghanistan, and the signing of the treaty of Gandamak; but the murder

of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his staff at Kabul, in September, 1879,

rendered necessary the sending of a further expedition, General Sir

Frederick (afterwards Lord) Roberts being directed to proceed with a

British force by the Kuram route to Kabul.

Thereupon the whole question of transport facilities was revived afresh,

and, although the expedition itself was a conspicuous success, delays

and commissariat difficulties arose which might have been avoided had

better railway facilities been available.[84] The terminus, at that

time, of the Punjab State Railway was at Jhelum, seventy miles from

Rawal Pindi, 180 from Peshawar, and 260 from Thal, the frontier post of

the Kuram pass; and in spite of the vigorous efforts made, between 1878

and 1880, to extend the line, Jhelum remained the actual railway base

throughout, no material assistance being gained from the twenty miles of

extension which, owing to the great engineering difficulties presented

by innumerable ravines, could alone be carried out during that period.

Commenting on the "painfully slow" progress being made by the Khyber

column, _The Times_ of October 13, 1879, remarked:--

It is now upwards of a quarter of a century since the

chairman of the Sind railway commenced to broach the idea

of connecting the Khyber and Bolan passes with the railway

system of India. For more than a quarter of a century he

has unsparingly advocated these views.... Had the views so

persistently advocated by Mr. Andrew, and so repeatedly brought

forward by us, been adopted at the commencement of the struggle

last October, as we then ventured to insist upon, vast sums

would have been spared in the hire of transport, and we should

have been spared the ignominy of feeling that a British army,

nominally on active service, has occupied five weeks in covering

less than seventy miles.

Rawal Pindi--one of the most important strategical points in India--was

not reached by the railway until October, 1880, by which time the Afghan

War of 1878-80 had been brought to a close; and the further extension of

the Indian railway system to Peshawar,--another position of the utmost

strategic importance, situate ten miles from the entrance to the Khyber

Pass, and 190 from Kabul--was effected by May, 1883.

From a military point of view, however, still greater importance was

attached, at that time, to the securing of rail communication through

the Bolan Pass to Quetta and Pishin in the direction of Kandahar, this

being the route by which, it was thought, the Russians would be certain

to attempt their invasion of India,--if they should undertake one at all.

Surveys for an extension of the Sukkur-Sibi desert line to Pishin were

made whilst that line was under construction, and early in 1880 the

Government gave directions that the extension was to be proceeded with;

though they decided that the route to be taken from Sibi should be

through the Hurnai Pass in preference to the Bolan route, the former

being regarded as preferable for the broad-gauge line (5 ft. 6 in.) with

which the "Kandahar State Railway," as it was to be called, would be

provided.

Arrangements were at once made for collecting the necessary materials

and for carrying through the work with the least possible delay; but

further progress was checked, in July, 1880, by the disaster at Maiwand.

In the following October the Gladstone Government, who had succeeded

the Beaconsfield Administration and had, apparently, resolved upon a

complete reversal of the Indian policy of their predecessors, followed

up an earlier announcement of their intention to withdraw from Kandahar

by giving orders for the cessation of the work on the Sind-Pishin

railway. Maiwand having been avenged, and some refractory tribes

subdued, Afghanistan was completely evacuated by the British at the end

of April, 1881, and the construction of frontier railways in India was

dropped, for the time being.

In the middle of 1883 came a reconsideration of the position. Russia

was then showing increased activity in the direction of Merv, and

the British Government concluded, apparently, that they had been too

hasty in ordering the abandonment of the Kandahar State Railway scheme

nearly three years before. So they gave orders that the work should be

resumed; though, in order to render this _volte face_ on their part less

conspicuous, they directed that the undertaking should now be known only

as the "Hurnai Road Improvement Scheme"; that it should be proceeded

with quietly, in order that it might not attract too much attention,

and that the suggestion of a "road improvement scheme," instead of

a railway, should be kept up by the engineers not being allowed to

have even a temporary line of rails for conveying stores, materials

for bridges, etc., from the base to the passes. This last-mentioned

stipulation meant that the stores and materials had to be either

transported on the backs of camels or dragged on wheels up stream; and

it was estimated that, in addition to the great loss of time, a sum

of not less than £1,000,000 was wasted in this way before the order

prohibiting the use of temporary rails was rescinded.

A start was made with the work in October, 1883, and the fact that

the Russians were then actually approaching Merv, and that a sudden

advance by them in force was regarded as probable, led to the laying of

great emphasis on the need for construction being pushed on with the

utmost vigour. When, in February, 1884, the Russians did occupy Merv,

the pressure brought to bear on the Engineer-in-chief became still

more acute. Then, in May, the British Government formally announced

that, owing to the encroachments of Russia, the line _would_ be built.

The fiction of a "Hurnai Road Improvement Scheme" was now abandoned.

Henceforth the line under construction was to be known as "The

Sind-Pishin State Railway."

From the very outset, however, the difficulties which crowded upon

Colonel (afterwards Sir James) Browne, R.E., an officer well experienced

in railway and engineering work who was entrusted with the carrying

out of the scheme, were unfavourable to the prospects of speed in

construction. The surveys which had already been made were found not

only worthless but misleading. The first members of his staff were

unacquainted with railway work and had to be succeeded by men brought

from England. The plant and materials previously collected, but disposed

of at scrap-iron prices when the line was abandoned in 1880, had now to

be replaced at an almost fabulous cost, owing to the urgency of the need

for them.

All these were, nevertheless, minor troubles as compared with the

physical conditions to be overcome.

Starting from an elevation, at Sibi, of 300 ft., the line was to rise

6,200 ft. in the 120 miles between Sibi and the summit level at Kach.

Then, for the greater part of the 224 miles to which the line was to

extend, the country was a wilderness of rocks and stones--a land of

barrenness and desolation, where there was no timber, no fuel, scarcely

a blade of grass, and, in places, for stretches of several miles, no

water. It was a land, too, almost devoid of inhabitants, while those

who did dwell there were described as "a savage and blood-thirsty race

of robbers," continually engaged in plunder and inter-tribal warfare,

and not growing sufficient food even for their own consumption. Almost

everything that was wanted--including supplies for from 15,000 to 30,000

workers and materials for the line--had to be imported from a distance.

Still less inviting was this inhospitable region by reason of its range

of climatic conditions. The lowlands have the reputation of being one of

the hottest corners of the earth's surface. A temperature of 124 deg.

Fahr. has been registered in the Nari valley. The highlands, in turn,

offer the alternative of Arctic cold, the temperature there falling in

winter to 18 deg. below zero. Between the lowlands and the highlands

there is a temperate zone; but here the constant pestilence was dreaded

no less than the extremes of heat and cold elsewhere.

As the result of these conditions, the work of construction could be

carried on in certain districts for part of the year only, and the

workers had to be transferred from one section of the line to another

according to the season. Such a movement of front involved the transport

of everything,--stores, tools, offices and some thousands of men. "The

management of this vast exodus," says Captain Scott-Moncrieff, R.E.,

in his paper on "The Frontier Railways of India,"[85] "was a work of

considerable anxiety and difficulty. A sudden influx of people, such

as this, into a desolate and barren land naturally caused a famine.

Everything was eaten up, and for some days the question of supplies was

the burning question of the hour.... Nine hundred camel loads of food

were consumed daily on the works." The customary load for a camel was

400 lbs., but some of the camels carried loads of 800 lbs. up the pass.

The engineering difficulties fell into four principal groups,--(1) the

Nari Gorge; (2) the Gundakin Defile; (3) the Chuppur Rift, and (4) the

Mud Gorge.[86]

The Nari Gorge, about fourteen miles in length, beginning just beyond

Sibi, has been described as "one of the most weird tracks through which

a railway has ever been carried. The hills, absolutely bare, rise above

the valley for many thousands of feet in fantastic pinnacles and cliffs.

It is a scene of the wildest desolation." The Nari river, running

through the gorge, is formed by a combination of three streams having

but little water on ordinary occasions, but becoming, in time of flood,

a raging torrent which fills up the whole gorge for miles, attains a

depth of ten feet, and has a velocity of five feet per second. Over

this river the railway had to be carried in five different places. Not

alone bridges, but heavy embankments, cuttings and tunnels were needed.

At one point there was an especially dangerous tunnel in which so many

accidents occurred, owing to roof or sides falling in, that at last no

workmen would enter it except at a wage five-fold that of the high rate

already being paid. The whole work was liable to be stopped for months

together, owing to the washing away of half-completed embankments or

bridges; though until this portion of the line had been completed no

materials could be sent to the sections beyond.

In the Gundakin Defile, eight miles long, two tunnels had to be made

through some most treacherous material, and four bridges had to be

provided.

The Chuppur Rift is a chasm three miles long in the spurs of a rocky

mountain forming an apparently insuperable barrier. In time of floods

the river attains a height of from 30 to 40 ft. The running of the

railway on a ledge along the side of the mountain being impracticable,

owing to the nature of the rock, the engineers cut a line of continuous

tunnels partly on one side of the rift and partly on the other,

connecting the two series by an iron girder bridge; but, instead of

constructing the tunnels in the usual way, from each end--a procedure

which would have taken much time--they adopted the expedient of driving

openings (adits) into the side of the cliff at various points, and then

cutting the tunnel right and left of each of these openings until the

various sections met. The only way in which the openings could be made

was by lowering men down by ropes several hundred feet from the top of

the cliff until they reached the point where the work for an opening was

to be started. They then drove crowbars into the perpendicular sides of

the cliff in order to gain the necessary support for a platform from

which the blasting operations could be carried on. Six of these openings

were made on one side of the cliff and six on the other. As a separate

gang of men could operate at each it was possible to complete the whole

work in the course of a few months. Altogether there is a collective

length of 6,400 ft. of tunnels in the rift, in addition to a viaduct

75 ft. high, with seven spans of 40 ft. each, and a bridge having an

elevation over the river of 250 ft., and consisting of a central span of

150 ft. and eight spans of 40 ft.

On the summit level, twenty-five miles in length, came the five-mile

long Mud Gorge,--a narrow valley, between precipitous mountains, filled

with a soil little better than dried mud, and of such a character that

several bad slips of road-bed, carrying away the whole of the line,

occurred.

One would think that with all these difficulties--physical, climatic and

engineering--to face, the constructors of the railway might have been

excused any more; but there were others besides.

In August and September, 1884, the troops and native labourers employed

on the work on the lower part of the line were visited by an outbreak

of fever and scurvy of a virulence almost unprecedented in Indian

experience. Large numbers of the men died. In one gang of 200 the

average number of deaths was ten a day. Of those who survived the

majority were so prostrated as to be scarcely capable of doing anything.

Sixty per cent. of the Sappers were in hospital.

Fresh troops, to the extent of three Battalions of Pioneers, were

brought on to the work; but they had scarcely arrived before--in

November--there was a severe outbreak of cholera. The Afghans thereupon

"bolted to a man"; and they were followed by many skilled artisans who

had been collected from various parts of India. Additional labour had to

be obtained from the Eastern Punjab, but much time was lost.

Whilst the engineers were struggling to overcome these manifold

difficulties, the political situation was steadily becoming still more

acute. The climax seemed to be reached by the Penj-deh incident of

March 30, 1885, when a Russian force under General Komaroff seized this

important strategical position, situate near the junction of the Khushk

and Murghab rivers. On April 27, 1885, Mr. Gladstone proposed in the

House of Commons a vote of £11,000,000 for the purposes of what then

seemed to be an inevitable war with Russia. The money was voted the same

night.

So the urgency for completing the line which would now, probably, have

been available for use had it not been stopped in 1880, was greater

than ever. Orders were sent to India that the work must be continued

along all parts of the line regardless of seasons. Within a week or two,

however, of the war vote at Westminster, cholera broke out afresh among

the construction party in India. By the end of May it was spreading

among them "like a raging fire"; while to the cholera itself there was

added a heat so intense that even the most willing of workers found it

almost unendurable.

Under this combination of cholera and excessive heat, work on the lower

sections of the line was stopped altogether for a time--Government

orders and Russians notwithstanding. All possible measures were taken to

mitigate the severity of the epidemic; but the death-rate increased with

frightful rapidity. Some of the best workers, European and Asiatic--men

who could least be spared, on account of the responsible positions they

held--were carried off. During the month of June no fewer than 2,000

died out of 10,000. Of the remainder large numbers sought safety in

flight. Many of the minor Government officials, such as telegraph and

Post Office clerks, went off in a body.

Whilst sickness and disease had thus been afflicting the camps, fresh

troubles had arisen in another direction. Early in 1885 the district

was visited by a succession of floods exceeding in severity anything

known there for sixty years. In the course of three months the rainfall

amounted to 19.27 inches,--a total six times in excess of the average.

Several bridges and many miles of temporary roads were washed away;

numerous accidents were caused; camping grounds were destroyed;

communications were interrupted; food supplies became scarcely

obtainable, and great delay resulted in the prosecution of a work for

which urgency was being so persistently demanded. The floods did not

finally subside until the end of May.

Nature having done so much to impede the progress of the undertaking,

it only remained for politicians and officials to do what they could to

follow her example.

Mention has already been made of the initial prohibition of temporary

lines of rails for the conveyance of stores and materials, and the

loss of time and waste of money involved in the use of camels instead;

but to this one fact may be added another, namely, that after the

Engineer-in-Chief had made his arrangements to obtain sleepers from the

juniper forests on the north of the line--this being the only timber

available in the whole district--the Government vetoed the arrangement

on the ground that it might, possibly, lead to quarrels among the Afghan

tribes. The timber had to be procured from India, instead. Hence more

delay.

Then the original arrangement with the Engineer-in-Chief, that the

work was to be carried out under the Military Department of the Indian

Government, and that, in the interests of urgency, he should have a

free hand, was changed into one which required that the work should

be controlled by a new member of the Public Works Department, who, it

is alleged, interfered with many of the working details which should

have been left to an Engineer-in-Chief, and, by his "unskilled and

unqualified control," caused still further delay, together with much

expense and confusion. A good deal of time was lost, for instance,

before Col. Browne could get even some indispensable instruments and

survey appliances. Especially persistent, also, was Col. Browne's

immediate superior in demanding from him "detailed estimates" which,

on account of the uncertainties of the engineering work and of the

other factors in the situation, it was impossible to prepare whilst the

construction of the line was in progress.

Such, however, was the energy which had been shown, in spite of all

these difficulties and drawbacks, that the work was completed within the

two years and a half fixed by the Engineer-in-Chief at the start as the

period in which--"with money freely granted"--it could be done. On March

27, 1887, an engine ran over the line all the way from Sibi to Quetta,

and the Hurnai Railway was formally declared open for traffic.

In the meantime the apparent certainty of war with Russia, following,

especially, on her seizure of Penj-deh, had led, in April, 1885, to

an order being given for the construction of a light railway from

Sibi through the Bolan Pass to Quetta, as an alternative, more direct

and more quickly constructed route, of which use could be made for

a movement of troops to the frontier on the anticipated partial

mobilisation of the Indian Army.

The laying of this light railway constituted another notable engineering

achievement.

Running through the heart of what has been described as "some of the

boldest mountain scenery in India," the Bolan Pass has a length of about

sixty miles and a breadth ranging from one mile to a space, in places,

of only about twenty yards between the rugged mountain walls which here

convert the pass into a mere defile. The pass is, in fact, practically

the bed of the Bolan River, and is dry for the greater part of the

year, but liable to floods. The temporary narrow-gauge line was to be

laid along the river bed without interfering with the military road

constructed in 1882-84 as far as Quetta.

For the first forty miles there was a fairly good gradient; but beyond

that came a very heavy rise to the top of the pass; and here, at least,

anything more than a metre-gauge line would have been impracticable.

The possibility of constructing a line of railway through the pass at

all had long been the despair of engineers, and this was the reason why

the Hurnai route had been decided on in preference to the Bolan for the

broad-gauge line to Quetta. Unfortunately, too, the climatic were even

greater than the engineering difficulties. The heat in the lower parts

of the pass was "beyond all description," and cholera or other diseases

carried off thousands of the workers.

With these two lines at their disposal, the Government were, in the

spring of 1887, quite prepared for a concentration of British and

Indian forces in Afghanistan, had the political condition rendered such

a course necessary; but the situation had by then greatly improved,

thanks to the negotiations which had been proceeding with Russia for

the demarcation of frontiers. In April, 1877, the British and Russian

commissioners met at St. Petersburg, and, as the result of still further

negotiations, the questions at issue were settled without the appeal to

arms which had at one time appeared inevitable.

In 1892 some fifty miles of the Bolan light railway were abandoned in

favour of another route which, avoiding the first part of the pass,

allowed of a broad-gauge line being laid from Sibi through Quetta

to Bostan Junction, where it connects with what is now known as the

Hurnai-Pishin Loop. A branch ninety miles in length, from Quetta to

Mushki, on the Seistan trade route, was opened in 1905.

To-day the Sind-Pishin railway, with its two sections, via the Bolan

and the Hurnai respectively, has its terminus at New Chaman, on the

actual frontier of Afghanistan, and within seventy miles of Kandahar.

A broad-gauge line throughout, it forms part of the railway system of

India, linking up at Ruk junction with the line running thence along the

north bank of the Indus to Karachi, and, by means of a bridge across the

Indus, with a line on the south of the river which, in one direction

provides an alternative route to Karachi, and in the other connects with

Calcutta and other leading cities. The Sind-Pishin line affords, in

fact, a most valuable means for concentrating on the Afghan frontier,

within a short distance of Kandahar, and in the shortest possible time a

considerable body of troops collected from all parts of India, together

with reinforcements from Europe, landed at Karachi. As a strategical

line, therefore, the railway is of exceptional importance to India and

to British interests in general; though there can be no suggestion that

it would be used otherwise than for purely defensive purposes.

Then, in what, since 1901, has constituted the North-West Frontier

Province of India, there has been a considerable extension of frontier

railways in recent years,--all serving important strategical purposes.

From Peshawar--1,520 miles from Calcutta--there is a broad-gauge

extension, twelve miles in length, to Fort Jamrud, at the mouth of the

Khyber Pass; from Naushahra, a cantonment twenty-seven miles due east

of Peshawar, there is a narrow-gauge line to Dargai, at the foot of

the Malakand Pass; while among other lines is one to Thal, a military

outpost on the extreme limit of British territory which serves also as a

depôt for the trade with Northern Afghanistan passing through the Kurram

valley; and one to Banu, a garrison town, seventy-nine miles south of

Kohat, built on a site chosen for political reasons by Sir Herbert

Edwards in 1848.

A number of other railways on the north-west frontiers of India have

been proposed. Whatever may or may not be ultimately done in regard to

these further schemes, it is obvious that those already constructed have

made an enormous difference in our strategical position in regard to

Afghanistan and the lands beyond as compared with the military transport

conditions of 1878.

THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA

With a total area of 2,948,000 square miles, a population of less than

four and a half million, and a coast line of 11,300 miles, the continent

of Australia is peculiarly open to attack, and the possibilities of

invasion, or of attempts at invasion, have not only been much discussed

there of late years, but they have given rise to schemes of land defence

in which the building of strategical railways and the adapting of

existing lines to strategical purposes form important factors.

Under present conditions Western Australia and the Northern Territory

are isolated from the remaining States of the Commonwealth so far as

regards rail communication, and are at the mercy of any invader who

might be able to land a force there unchallenged by the British Fleet.

Since the autumn of 1912, however, there has been under construction a

railway which, starting from Kalgoorlie, the eastern terminus of the

Western Australian system, will proceed in a direct line for 1,063 miles

to Port Augusta, on the South Australian system, thus establishing

through rail connection between Perth (Western Australia) and the

farthest limit of the Queensland railway system, a total distance, that

is, of about 4,000 miles. When this, the first of Australia's proposed

trans-continental lines, is completed, it will be possible to send

troops from the Central or the Eastern States to Western Australia, not

only by rail, but by a railway laid so far inland that they will be safe

from attack from the sea. There would thus be a reasonable certainty

of the troops arriving at their destination; whereas if they had to

go by water there might be the risk of the vessels in which they were

making the journey being captured by the enemy. While, therefore, the

Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta line is expected to serve other than purely

strategical purposes, it is, in effect, the latter which claim first

consideration.

Referring to the Northern Territory, in an article contributed by him to

_The Empire Review_ for May, 1910, Mr. F. A. W. Gisborne, an authority

on Australian questions, wrote:--

This vast region embraces 523,620 square miles of land,

and lies close to Asia, the most populous of the continents.

At present it contains, exclusive of the aborigines, barely

one thousand white people and about twice as many Chinese. It

lacks railway communication with the settled parts of Australia,

and is completely isolated from them. Its magnificent harbour,

accessible to the largest vessels afloat, and constituting

the natural gateway to tropical Australia, lies, save for

the British Fleet, absolutely defenceless. Behind it extend

millions of acres of fertile plains never yet tilled, and

never likely to be cultivated by white hands. Practically no

industry flourishes in a region which could support myriads of

agriculturists and operatives.

That some of the peoples of crowded Asia may, sooner or later, seek

a settlement for their surplus millions on what, for them, would be

so desirable a land as the Northern Territory, with its magnificent

opportunities for those capable of working in a tropical climate, is a

contingency that has been fully realised in Australia, and the questions

have arisen (1) as to whether the presence of a thousand whites in a

region half a million square miles in extent constitutes such "effective

occupation" thereof as gives them a right to its exclusive possession;

and (2) whether it would be possible either to prevent Asiatics from

invading the Northern Territory, if they sought so to do, or to eject

them therefrom if they did.

The latter question raises in an especially interesting form the

problem as to the respective merits and possibilities of sea-power and

rail-power.

Sea-power would, assuredly, have to be relied upon for safeguarding

the Northern Territory against invasion, since it would be impossible

for the Commonwealth Government to station troops at every prospective

landing point along 1,200 miles of a tropical coast-line in sufficient

force to keep off any invader who might appear there at some unexpected

moment. For the checking, therefore, of such invasion, dependence would

have to be placed on the power of the British Fleet (1) to stop the

invader, (2) to cut off his connections if he should effect a landing,

or (3) to carry war into the invader's own country.

Nor, if any large Asiatic settlement--as distinct from an "invasion" in

the ordinary acceptation of that term--did take place in the Northern

Territory under conditions that might not call for the intervention of

the British Fleet, is it certain that the ejection of the settlers could

be ensured with the help even of a trans-continental line of railway.

Here the question is not that of the carrying power of a single line

of railway. The examples offered by the War of Secession, the South

African War and the Russo-Japanese War have well established the great

advantages that even single lines, extending for great distances, can

confer in the effecting of military transport. The considerations that

would arise in Australia are, rather, (1) the fact that troops arriving

at Pine Creek or Port Darwin from the south might have to make some

very long and very trying marches across the 523,000 square miles

comprising the Northern Territory before they reached the settlement

of the Asiatics whom they were to eject, while they would be dependent

for their supplies on a far-distant railway base; and (2) the doubt as

to whether Australia could spare a sufficiently large body of troops to

undertake such an expedition, having regard to the defence requirements

of her south-eastern States, the integrity of which would count as of

more vital importance than an Asiatic settlement in her Far North. So

there are those who think that if such a settlement were eventually

effected in the Northern Territory, under conditions not constituting a

_casus belli_, Australia would simply have to accept the situation, and

reconcile herself to it as best she could.

All these things may seem to reflect on the precise value, from the

rail-power point of view, of that direct communication which, more

especially for strategical reasons, Australia has hoped eventually to

obtain between north and south as well as between west and east. It

is, nevertheless, desirable to see what has already been done in this

direction.

The construction of a north-to-south trans-continental line, passing

through the very centre of the Australian mainland, and linking up

the Northern Territory with the southern and eastern States, has

been under discussion for a period of about forty years. Progress

seemed to be assured by the Acceptance Act of 1910, under which the

Government of the Commonwealth, in taking over the Northern Territory

from South Australia, agreed to build a trans-continental line

connecting Oodnadatta, the northern terminus of the South Australian

railway system, and 688 miles from Adelaide, with Pine Creek, the

southern terminus of the Northern Territory system, and 145 miles

distant from Port Darwin. This connecting link would have a length

of 1,063 miles,--the same, by a singular coincidence, as that of the

Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta line.

Since this "bargain" between the South Australia and the Commonwealth

Governments was made, there have been many advocates of an alternative,

or, otherwise, a supplementary route which, instead of going direct from

South Australia to the Northern Territory, (passing through the central

Australian desert,) would link up--on their west--with the railway

systems of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, connections with

the new line being made by these States where necessary. This "eastern

deviation route" would, it is argued, offer a greater strategical

advantage, as compared with the other route, because if troops had to

be despatched to the north, they could more readily be supplied from

Melbourne and Sydney--which, between them, contain over one-fourth of

the entire population of Australia--than from Adelaide; while to send

troops from Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria to South Australia

in order that they might start on their journey to the Northern

Territory from Oodnadatta, would involve a material delay under,

possibly, urgent conditions. Thus it is estimated that if the eastern

route were adopted, troops and travellers from Brisbane to Port Darwin

would only travel about 2,234 miles as against 3,691 miles via Sydney,

Melbourne, Adelaide and the central Australian route from Oodnadatta.

How these rival claims and contentions will be eventually settled

remains to be seen; but there has now been added to them a project for

the building of other avowedly strategical lines, establishing a more

direct connection between the Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta trans-continental

line, when it is finished, and the capitals of Victoria, New South Wales

and Queensland respectively, facilitating the mutual defence of the

eastern, southern and western States in a time of crisis. This further

scheme is, however, designed only to supplement the trans-continental

lines already mentioned.

As regards the eastern States and the "central" State of South

Australia, the question of an Asiatic invasion may be assumed not to

arise. It has, however, long been regarded as possible that if Great

Britain were at war with some non-Asiatic Power able to challenge her

supremacy on the seas, the enemy might make an attack, not on the

admittedly vulnerable Northern Territory--which he would not want

either as a colony for Europeans or as a "jumping-off" place from which

to conquer the remainder of Australia--but on some point along the

coast-line of nearly 2,000 miles which, stretching from Rockhampton,

in Queensland, to Adelaide, in South Australia, comprises (with a

Hinterland of some 200 miles) the most populous, the most wealthy and

(for non-Asiatics) the most desirable section of the whole Australian

continent.

It is true that Germany--the Power which claims first attention from

this point of view--has shown far greater desire to convert Africa into

a German Empire than she has to effect the annexation of Australia. Yet

that she has recognized the weakness of the Australian situation is

suggested by the fact that, in dealing with the defensive power of the

Commonwealth, Dr. Rohrbach, one of the exponents of German World-Policy,

and author of "Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern," among other works,

has declared that Australia could not resist if her four chief towns,

all of them near the coast, were occupied by an invader.[87]

Which of these four towns, or which particular point along the said

2,000 miles of coast-line, an invader would select for his main

attack--apart from feints elsewhere--must needs be uncertain; but this

very fact only adds to the imperative importance of those responsible

for the defence of Australia being able to move troops freely, and

within the shortest possible period, either from one State to another or

from any place to another within one and the same State, as the defence

conditions might require.

When we thus pass on to consider the question as to the use of existing

lines of railway in Australia for strategical purposes, we find that

the most noteworthy expression of opinion on this branch of the subject

is contained in the following extract from the "Memorandum" which Lord

Kitchener wrote in 1910, as the result of an investigation made by him,

at the request of the Commonwealth Government, into the "Defence of

Australia":--

Railway construction has, while developing the country,

resulted in lines that would appear to be more favourable to an

enemy invading Australia than to the defence of the country.

Different gauges in most of the States isolate each system, and

the want of systematic interior connection makes the present

lines running inland of little use for defence, although

possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would have

temporary command of the sea.

The "different gauges" undoubtedly constitute one of the most serious

shortcomings of the existing railways in Australia in regard to those

military movements with which we are here alone concerned.

Strategical considerations as applied to rail transport require, not

only that troops shall be readily conveyed, when necessary, from one

part of a country or one part of a continent to another, but that a

mobilisation of the forces shall be followed by a mobilisation of

railway rolling stock. Locomotives, carriages and trucks on lines which

are not themselves likely to be wanted for military transport should be

available for use on the lines that will be so wanted, in order that all

the rolling stock of all the railways in all parts of the country or of

the States concerned can, at a time of possibly the gravest emergency,

be concentrated or employed on whatever lines, or in whatever direction,

additional transport facilities may be needed.

The importance of this principle was first recognised by von Moltke;

but when the railways of Australia were originally planned, each State

took a more or less parochial view of its own requirements, its own

geographical conditions, or its own resources, and adopted the gauge

which accorded best therewith, regardless of any future need for a

co-ordinated system of rail-transport serving the requirements of the

Australian continent as a whole.

So we find that the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge has been adopted in Queensland,

South Australia (with a further 600 miles of 5 ft. 3 in. gauge), Western

Australia, and the Northern Territory; the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge (the

standard gauge in Great Britain and, also, of over 65 per cent. of

the world's railway mileage,) in New South Wales; and the 5 ft. 3 in.

gauge in Victoria. This means, in most cases, that when the frontier of

a State is reached, passengers, mails, baggage and merchandise must

change or be transferred from the trains on the one system to those of

the other.

Assuming that the west-to-east trans-continental railway (which is

being built with the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge) were now available for use, a

traveller by it from Perth, Western Australia, through South Australia,

Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland would require, on account

of the differences in gauge, to change trains at least five times.

This may be regarded as an extreme case; but the evils of the existing

conditions are presented to us in a concrete form by an estimate which

the Defence Department of the Commonwealth recently made as to the time

it would take to move a force of 30,000 mounted troops from Melbourne

to Brisbane. It was shown that, with the present break of gauge, this

operation would occupy no less a time than sixty-three days; whereas

if there were no break of gauge twenty-three days would suffice. Thus

the differences of gauge would mean a loss of forty days in effecting

transfers at the frontier. In this time much might happen if the enemy

had obtained temporary control of the sea. Under these conditions, in

fact, he would be able to move his own forces by sea for the still

longer distance from Adelaide to Brisbane in five days. Brisbane might

thus be captured by the enemy while the reinforcements it wanted were

still changing trains at the State boundaries.

It may be of interest here to recall the fact that at one time there

were still greater differences of gauge on the railways in the

United States; that in 1885 the American railway companies resolved

upon establishing uniformity as a means of overcoming the great

inconveniences due to these conditions; and that in 1886, after adequate

preparation, the conversion of practically the entire system of railways

in the United States to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge was effected in two

days. Strategically, therefore, the United States Federal Government

could now, not only send troops by rail from any one part of their vast

territory to another, but utilise almost the whole of the available

rolling stock for military purposes.[88]

Unification of gauge forms, however, a serious proposition for Australia

on account of the prodigious outlay which, owing to the short-sighted

policy of the past, it would now involve.[89]

The estimated cost of converting all the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge in New South

Wales and all the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge in Queensland, South Australia,

Western Australia and the Northern Territory to the 5 ft. 3 in. gauge of

Victoria is no less than £51,659,000. To convert all the 3 ft. 6 in. and

5 ft. 3 in. railways to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge of the New South Wales

lines would cost £37,164,000. To convert to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge all

the trunk lines connecting the capitals--and this without shortening the

present circuitous routes or modifying the heavy grades--would alone

cost about £12,000,000.

In addition to this still undecided "battle of the gauges" there

are in Australia other disadvantages, from a strategical standpoint,

in the existing railway system, included therein being (1) an undue

preponderance of single over double track, so that any exceptional

amount of traffic causes a congestion which is likely only to be

aggravated by new lines constructed, or extensions made, before the

carrying capacity of the trunk lines has been increased; and (2) the

building of lines which either lead nowhere or have been expressly

stopped short of the boundaries of a State in order to retain, for the

railways of that State, traffic from outlying districts which would

pass, by a much shorter journey, to the port of a neighbouring State if,

by means of through railway connexion, the residents in the districts

concerned were free to avail themselves of their geographical advantage

in respect to their nearness to such port.

In addition to the efforts she has already made, or is proposing to

make, to effect such improvement both in her railway system and in

her military transport facilities as may be practicable, Australia

has sought to provide for that effective organisation without which,

as experience elsewhere has fully shown, great and even disastrous

confusion may arise at a critical moment owing to conflicts of authority

and other troubles or difficulties in the working of such railways as

may be utilised for military movements.

The action taken in this direction is based on a further recommendation

made by Lord Kitchener, who, in the course of his Memorandum to the

Commonwealth Government in 1910 said (paragraph 85):--

Preparation for mobilisation is primarily the work of

the General Staff, who recommend the lines to be followed

and advise where, and in what quantities, the munitions of

war of the various units should be stored. Concentration can

only be satisfactorily effected when the railway and military

authorities are in the closest touch, and work in absolute

harmony. To secure this co-operation, I advise that a War

Railway Council be formed, as is the case in the United Kingdom,

composed of the Chief Railway Commissioner from each State,

under the presidency of the Quartermaster-General of the Citizen

Forces, and with an officer of the Headquarters Staff as

secretary.

A War Railway Council for the Commonwealth was duly constituted in

1911. The Council, which forms an adjunct of the Commonwealth Defence

Department, consists of the Quartermaster-General, (president,) the

senior officer of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps also created

for the railway system alike of the Commonwealth and of each State

(such senior officer being the Chief or the Deputy Commissioner of

Railways); the Consulting Military Engineer of the Commonwealth,

and two representatives of the naval and military forces, with a

military officer as secretary. The duties of the Council in time of

peace are, generally, to furnish advice to the Minister of Defence on

railway matters, and, particularly (_a_) to determine the method of

supplying information to, and obtaining it from, the different railway

departments; (_b_) to suggest regulations and instructions for carrying

out movement of troops; (_c_) to suggest the method of organising

railway staff officers in time of war to act as intermediaries between

the various railway authorities and the troops; (_d_) to consider the

question of extra sidings, loading platforms, etc.; and proposals for

unification of gauges; and (_e_) to suggest the organisation and system

of training of railway troops. In time of war the Council further

advises the Minister of defence on questions of mobilisation. The

organisation for military rail-transport in the several States follows

on the lines of the system already adopted in the United Kingdom, as

laid down in the Field Service Regulations.

FOOTNOTES:

[83] Altogether there have been twenty-six invasions of India, dating

back to about 2,000 years B.C., and of this number no fewer than

twenty-one have ended in conquest.

[84] It has been stated that the number of camels employed during the

expeditions of 1878-80 for transport purposes, in default of better

rail communication, was so great as almost to exhaust the supply of

the frontier provinces of Sind and Punjab, while from 30,000 to 40,000

of them died owing to the excessive toils and trials of the work they

were required to perform, the financial loss resulting therefrom to the

Treasury being estimated at £200,000.

[85] "Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers," Vol xi, 1885.

[86] "Life and Times of General Sir James Browne, R.E., K.C.B.,

K.C.S.I." by General J. J. McLeod Innes, London, 1905.

[87] See "The Origins of the War"; by J. Holland Rose, Litt.D.

Cambridge, 1914.

[88] In the _New York Sun_ of June 18, 1911, there was published an

article which had for its heading, "If Troops had to be Rushed, the

Railroads in this Country could move 250,000 Men a Day."

[89] The mileage of lines open, under construction, or authorised, in

the three gauges, is as follows:--5 ft. 3 in. gauge, 4,979 miles; 4 ft.

8½ in. gauge, 6,160 miles; 3 ft. 6 in. gauge, 11,727 miles.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following list of books, pamphlets and articles bearing on the

evolution and the development of rail-power down to the outbreak of

the Great War in 1914--this alone being the purpose and the scope of

the present work--was originally based on selections from a "List of

References on the Use of Railroads in War" prepared by the Bureau of

Railway Economics, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., and including items from

all the leading libraries of the United States (Library of Congress;

the libraries of the principal Universities, Colleges and learned

or technical societies; State libraries, public libraries, private

railway-libraries, and the library of the Bureau itself), together with

various foreign libraries, such as those of the Minister of Public Works

in Berlin, the International Railway Congress at Berne, and others

besides.

Much valuable help has been derived from the American list; but a large

number of its references, and especially those relating to the World-War

itself, have not here been reproduced, while so many additions have

been gathered in from other sources among which might be mentioned the

published catalogue of the War Office Library; the libraries of the

British Museum, the Royal Colonial Institute, and the Patent Office; the

_Journal_ of the Royal United Service Institution, the publications of

the Royal Engineers' Institute, and official or other publications in

Great Britain, France, etc., that the Bibliography here presented may,

perhaps, be regarded as practically a new compilation, supplementing

the excellent purpose which the list of the American Bureau of Railway

Economics will undoubtedly serve.

EARLIEST REFERENCES (1833-50).

HARKORT, FRIEDRICH WILHELM. Die Eisenbahn von Minden nach

Köln. Hagen, 1833.

[The earliest published work in which the importance and

the possibilities of railways from a military standpoint were

advocated.]

Ueber die militärische Benutzung der Eisenbahnen. Berlin,

1836.

Darlegung der technischen und Verkehrs-Verhältnisse der

Eisenbahnen, nebst darauf gegründeter Erörterung über die

militärische Benutzung derselben. Berlin, 1841.

"Pz." (CARL EDUARD POENITZ). Die Eisenbahn als militärische

Operationslinien betrachtet und durch Beispiele erläutet. Nebst

Entwurf zu einem militärischen Eisenbahnsystem für Deutschland.

Adorf [Saxony], 1842.

---- II. Aufl. Adorf, 1853.

Essai sur les Chemins de Fer, considérés comme lignes

d'opérations militaires. Traduit de l'allemand par L. A. Unger.

Paris, 1844.

[A French translation of the above-mentioned work by

Poenitz, with an introduction by the translator and a map of

Germany and Austria showing railways existing in 1842 and the

"system" projected by the German writer.]

Uebersicht des Verkehrs und der Betriebsmittel auf den

inländischen und den benachbarten ausländischen Eisenbahnen

für militärische Zwecke; nach den beim grossen Generalstabe

vorhandenen Materialen zusammengestellt. Berlin, 1848-50.

HOFFMANN, C. Amtlich erlassene Vorschriften über Anlage und

Betrieb der Eisenbahnen in Preussen. Berlin, 1849.

WARS AND EXPEDITIONS

CRIMEAN WAR (1854-55)

HAMLEY, GEN. SIR EDWARD. The War in the Crimea. London, 1891.

LUARD, R.E., CAPT. C. E. Field Railways and their general

application in war. _Journal of the Royal United Service

Institution_, Vol. XVII, 1873.

[Refers to military railway built for use in the Crimea.]

ITALIAN WAR (1859)

BARTHOLONY, F. Notice sur les Transports par les Chemins

de Fer français vers le théâtre de la guerre d'Italie. 71 pp.

Paris, 1859.

MILLAR, R.A., MAJOR, Topographical Staff. The Italian

Campaign of 1859. _Journal of the Royal United Service

Institution_, Vol. V, pp. 269-308. London, 1861.

[Introductory reference to use of railways.]

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Abhandlung über die Thätigkeit der amerikanischen

Feldeisenbahn-Abtheilungen der Nordstaaten; bei den Directionen

der Staatseisenbahnen. Durch das Königl. Ministerium in

Circulation gesetzt. Berlin.

BACON, E. L. How railroads helped save the Union.

_Railroadman's Magazine_, July, 1909.

HAUPT, HERMAN. Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt, Chief

of the Bureau of United States Military Railroads in the Civil

War. 321 pp. Illustrations. Milwaukee, Wis., 1901.

HENDERSON, LIEUT.-COL. G. F. R. Stonewall Jackson and the

American Civil War. Second edition. Two vols. London, 1899.

PORTER, W. E. Keeping the Baltimore and Ohio in Repair in

War Time was a Task for Hercules. _Book of the Royal Blue_,

June, 1907.

United States Military Railroads. Report of Brev.-Brig.-Gen.

D. C. McCallum, Director and General Manager, from 1861 to 1866.

Executive Documents, 39th Congress, 1st Session. House. Serial

number, 1251. Washington, 1866.

VIGO-ROUISSILLON, F. P. Puissance Militaire des États-Unis

d'Amérique, d'après la Guerre de la Sécession, 1861-65. IIIe

Partie; chap. viii, Transports généraux. Paris, 1866.

AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN CAMPAIGN (1866)

COOKE, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. A. C. C. Short Sketch of the

Campaign in Austria of 1866. 70 pp. Map. London, 1867.

WEBBER, R.E., CAPT. Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in

1886. Papers of the Corps of the Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol.

XVI. Woolwich, 1868.

ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION (1867-68)

WILLANS, R.E., LIEUT. The Abyssinian Railway. Papers on

Subjects Connected with the Duties of the Corps of Royal

Engineers. N.S. Vol. XVIII. Woolwich, 1870.

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR (1870-71)

BUDDE, LIEUT. H. Die Französischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege

1870-71 und ihre seitherige Entwicklung in militärischer

Hinsicht. Mit zwei Karten und zehn Skizzen im Texte. 99 pp.

Berlin, 1877.

[Gives maps of the French railway system in 1870 and 1877

respectively.]

---- Die französischen Eisenbahnen im deutschen

Kriegsbetriebe, 1870-71. 487 pp. Berlin, 1904.

ERNOUF, LE BARON. Histoire des Chemins de Fer français

pendant la Guerre Franco-Prussienne. Paris, 1874.

JACQMIN, F., Ingénieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussées. Les

Chemins de Fer pendant la Guerre de 1870-71. 351 pp. Paris, 1872.

---- 2e edition. 363 pp. 1874.

MÜLLER-BRESLAU, F. Die Tätigkeit unserer

Feldeisenbahn-Abteilung im Kriege 1870-71. Berlin, 1896.

Railway Organisation in the late War. _Edinburgh Review_,

January, 1872.

RUSSO-TURKISH WAR (1877-78)

LESSAR, P. De la construction des Chemins de Fer en temps de

guerre. Lignes construites par l'armée russe pendant la campagne

1877-78. Traduit du russe par L. Avril. 142 pp. 10 Planches.

Paris, 1879.

SALE, R.E., CAPT. M. T. The Construction of Military

Railways during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. _Journal of

the Royal United Service Institution_, Vol. XXIV. 1880.

EGYPT AND THE SUDAN (1882-99)

History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers. Vol. II. By

Maj.-Gen. Whitworth Porter, R.E. The War in Egypt, 1882-85, pp.

64-87. London, 1889.

---- Vol. III. By Col. Sir Chas. M. Watson. The Sudan

Campaigns, 1885-99, pp. 53-76. Royal Engineers' Institute,

Chatham, 1915.

Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt. Prepared

in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised edition.

London, 1908.

NATHAN, R.E., LIEUT. M. The Sudan Military Railway.

Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers. Occasional

Papers, Vol. XI. 1885.

WALLACE, R.E., MAJ. W. A. J. Railway Operations in Egypt

during August and September, 1882. Professional Papers of the

Corps of Royal Engineers, Chatham. Occasional Papers, Vol. IX.

PHILIPPINE WAR (1898)

COLSON, L. W. Railroading in the Philippine War. _Baltimore

and Ohio Employés' Magazine_, Feb., 1913.

Soldiers Running a Railroad. _Railroad Telegrapher_, Sept.,

1899.

[Tells how the 20th Kansas Regiment ran four miles of the

Manila and Dagupan Railroad during the Philippine insurrection.]

SOUTH AFRICAN WAR (1899-1902)

Detailed History of the Railways in the South African War,

1899-1902. Two vols. Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, 1905.

Vol. I.--Organisation, Military Control, Working and Repair

of Cape and Natal Government Railways; Management, Engineering

and other Departments of Imperial Military Railways; Railway

Pioneer Regiment; Organisation, Equipment and Use of Armoured

Trains; Army Labour Depôts.

Vol. II.--61 Photographs and 93 Drawings.

GIROUARD, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. E. P. C., Director of Railways,

South African Field Force. History of the Railways during the

War in South Africa, 1899-1902. 149 pp. Maps. London, 1903.

HARRISON, C. W. FRANCIS. Natal: an Illustrated Official

Railway Guide and Handbook. Published by Authority. London, 1903.

[Gives a statement, on pp. 287-290, as to services rendered

by Natal Government Railways during South African War.]

History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. Compiled by

the Direction of His Majesty's Government. Vol. IV, Appendix 10,

Notes on the Military Railway System in South Africa. London,

1910.

Netherlands South African Railway Company and the

Transvaal War. Account by the Secretary, Th. Steinnetz, dated

Pretoria, April, 1900. _De Ingenieur_, July 14 and 21, 1900.

English translation in _Journal of the Royal United Service

Institution_, Jan., 1902.

_The Times_. History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902.

Vol. VI, Part II, chap. iii, The Railway Work in the War, pp.

297-331. London, 1909.

WATSON, COL. SIR CHAS. M. History of the Corps of the Royal

Engineers. Vol. III, chap. iv, The South African War, 1899-1902.

Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, 1915.

Working of Railways: Duties of Staff Officers. Pamphlet.

Published by authority. Pretoria, 1900.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-5)

KUROPATKIN, GENERAL A. N. The Russian Army and the Japanese

War. Translated by Captain A. B. Lindsay. Two vols. Maps,

Illustrations. London, 1909.

MÉTIN, ALBERT. Le Transsibérien et la Guerre. _Revue

Économique Internationale_, Oct., 1904.

Official History of the Russo-Japanese War. Prepared by the

Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. London,

1910.

"P., A." Construction et Exploitation de Chemins de Fer

à Traction animale sur le Théâtre de la Guerre de 1904-5 en

Mandchourie. _Revue du Génie Militaire_, Avril, Mai, Juin, 1909.

Paris.

Russo-Japanese War. Reports from British Officers attached

to the Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field. Vol. III.

General Report (dated March, 1905) by Col. W. H. H. Waters:

Section XXXVIII, "Railways," pp. 184-9. London, 1908.

Russo-Japanese War. The Ya-Lu. Prepared in the Historical

Section of the German General Staff. Authorised Translation by

Karl von Donat. Chaps. ii and iii. London, 1908.

VICKERS, R.E., CAPT. C. E. The Siberian Railway in War.

_Royal Engineers' Journal_, Aug., 1905. Chatham.

MEXICAN WAR (1910-13)

HINE, MAJ. CHARLES. War Time Railroading in Mexico. Paper

read before the St. Louis Railway Club, Oct. 10, 1913. The

Railway Library, 1913. Chicago.

WEEKS, G. E. How Mexican Rebels Destroy Railways and

Bridges. _Scientific American_, Sept. 13, 1913.

COUNTRIES

AUSTRALIA

ELLISON, H. K. Australia's Trans-Continental Railway.

_Journal of the Royal United Service Institution_, June, 1912.

KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, FIELD MARSHAL VISCOUNT. Memorandum

on the Defence of Australia. Government of the Commonwealth of

Australia, 1910.

Proceedings of the War Railway Council. (1) First and

Second Meetings, Feb. 14-16, 1911, and May 19, 1911. (2) Fifth

Meeting, Nov. 18 and 19, 1914. Government of the Commonwealth of

Australia.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Geschichte der Eisenbahnen der österreichisch-ungarischen

Monarchie. Unsere Eisenbahnen im Kriege. Eisenbahnbureau des K.

u. K. General-Stabes. Wien, 1898-1908.

HARE, R.E., CAPT. W. A. Organisation of the Austrian Railway

and Telegraph Corps. _Journal of the Royal United Service

Institution._ Vol. XXIX, pp. 257-79. London, 1885-6.

JESSEP, R.E., LIEUT. H. L. Railway Works in Connection

with an Army in the Field; forming the Second Division of

the Austrian Guide to Railways. Vienna, 1872 (Translation).

Professional Papers of the Royal Engineers. Chatham. Vol. O.II.

JOESTEN, JOSEF. Studien über die heutigen Eisenbahnen im

Kriegsfalle. Wien, 1892.

Leitfaden des Eisenbahnwesens, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf

den Dienst der Feldeisenbahn-Abteilungen. 2 Bände. Wien, 1872.

NOSINICH, MAJ. Das österreichisch-ungarische Eisenbahn- und

übrige Communications-System. Politisch-militärisch beleuchtet.

77 pp. Wien, 1871.

OBAUER, H., UND E. R. VON GUTTENBERG. Das

Train-Communications und Verpflegungswesen, vom operativen

Standpunkte. Wien, 1871.

PANZ, OBERST V. V. Das Eisenbahnwesen, vom militärischen

Standpunkte. Two vols. Plates. Wien, 1863.

---- Les Chemins de Fer au point de vue militaire. Traduit

de l'Allemand par Costa de Serda. Paris, 1868.

Technischer Unterricht für die K. u. K. Eisenbahn-Truppe.

Theil 3: Strassen, Eisenbahn- und Wasserbau. Theil 7:

Feldmässige Zerstörung von Brücken und Viaducten. Wien, 1898.

TLASKAL, MAJ. L. Uebersichtliche Zusammenstellung der

Grundsätze und der wesentlichen Details aus dem Strassen- u.

Eisenbahn-Baue, mit Berücksichtigung der Zerstörung und der

feldmässigen Wiederherstellung von Eisenbahnen. 90 pp. Plates.

Wien, 1877.

ZANANTONI, OBERSTLT. E. Die Eisenbahnen im Dienste des

Krieges, und moderne Gesichtspunkte für deren Ausnützung. 33 pp.

Wien, 1904.

[See Railways in War and Modern Views as to their

Employment. _Royal Engineers' Journal_, March, 1907.]

BELGIUM

BODY, M. Aide-mémoire portatif de campagne pour l'emploi des

Chemins de Fer en temps de guerre. 253 pp. Plates. Liége, 1877.

---- Les Chemins de Fer dans leurs Applications militaires.

Liége, 1867.

---- Notice sur l'attaque et la défense des Chemins de Fer

en temps de guerre. Liége, 1868.

FORMANOIR, A. DE, Capitaine d'État-Major. Des Chemins de Fer

en temps de guerre. Conférences Militaires Belges. Bruxelles,

1870.

GRANDVALLET, ANTONIN. La neutralité de la Belgique et les

Chemins de Fer français, belges et allemands. 11 pp. Paris, 1889.

FRANCE

ALLIX, G. La Mobilisation des Chemins de Fer français. _Le

Journal des Transports_, Jan. 30, 1915. Paris.

BERGÈRE, CAPITAINE C. Les Chemins de Fer et le Service des

Étapes, d'après les nouveaux règlements. _Journal des Sciences

Militaires._ Neuvième série. Tome vingt-quatrième. Paris, 1886.

BRESSON, L. Réorganisation militaire.... Chemins de Fer. 50

pp. Paris, 1881.

DANY, JEAN. Le Rôle des Chemins de Fer à la Guerre. _Revue

de Paris_, Sept. 15, 1911.

De l'Utilisation des Chemins de Fer dans la prochaine

Guerre. Paris, 1899.

EUGÈNE, J. B., Capitaine du Génie. Études sur les Chemins de

Fer et les Télégraphes Électriques, considérés au point de vue

de la défense du territoire. 2e. édition. Two vols. Paris, 1879.

"G., A." A propos des Réseaux ferrés de la France et de

l'Allemagne. 30 pp. Paris, 1884.

GRANDVALLET, ANTONIN. Les Chemins de Fer français au point

de vue de la Guerre. 85 pp. Map. Paris, 1889.

JACQMIN, F. Étude sur l'exploitation des Chemins de Fer par

l'État. 104 pp. Paris, 1878.

LANOIR, PAUL. Les Chemins de Fer et la Mobilisation. 170 pp.

Paris, 1894.

LANTY ----. Exploitation militaire des Chemins de Fer,

Opérations exécutées par le 5e Régiment du Génie à l'occasion

des grandes manoeuvres de Béance. _Revue de Génie Militaire._

Vol. XX, pp. 345-83. Paris, 1900.

LAPLAICE, A. Notions sur les Chemins de Fer, à l'usage des

officiers et sous-officiers de toutes armes. Paris, 1887.

LEROY, A. Cours Pratique de Chemins de Fer, à l'usage de MM.

les officiers et sous-officiers de toutes armes, des sections

techniques, des ouvriers du génie et des écoles spéciales. 478

pp. Plates and Illustrations. Dijon, 1881.

MARCILLE, CAPT. E. Étude sur l'emploi des Chemins de Fer

avant et pendant la guerre. 96 pp. Paris, 1874.

PARTIOT, L. Transport d'un Torpilleur effectué de Toulon à

Cherbourg par les Chemins de Fer. Paris, 1891.

PERMEZEL, H. Du Régime des Chemins de Fer en temps de

guerre. Paris, 1904.

PERNOT, CAPT. A. Aperçu historique sur le service des

transports militaires. Pp. 492. Paris, 1894.

PICARD, ALFRED. Traité des Chemins de Fer. Vol. IV, Part IV,

chap. iv, Transports militaires par chemins de fer. Paris, 1887.

PIERRON, GÉN. Les Méthodes de Guerre, etc. Tome I, Part III

(Chemins de Fer). Maps and plans. Paris, 1893.

ROVEL, CHEF D'ESCAD. J. J. Manuel des Chemins de Fer, à

l'usage des officiers. 122 pp. Plates. Paris, 1882.

WIBROTTE, LIEUT. Construction et destruction des Chemins de

Fer en campagne. 2e. edition. 40 pp. Plates, Paris, 1874.

VIGO-ROUISSILLON, F. P. Des Principes de l'Administration

des Armées. Paris, 1871.

_Official Publications_

Instruction Speciale pour le Transport des Troupes

d'Infanterie et du Génie par des voies ferrées. 6e édition.

Paris, 1899.

Organisation Générale aux Armées. I. Services de l'arrière

aux armées. Volume arrêté à la date du 8 Décembre, 1913. 171 pp.

---- II. Transports stratégiques. Tirage Novembre, 1914. 291

pp.

Organisation Générale du Service Militaire des Chemins de

Fer. Volume arrêté au 15 Juillet, 1904. 20 pp.

---- Supplément, 31 Décembre, 1912. 8 pp.