Boucicaut was sent as Governor to Genoa. Boucicaut was an enemy of
Milan,[118] a hater of the Turk, a man who saw in the Visconti the
secret allies of the Sultan, a man who had been a captive at Nicopolis.
A pure, devoted, honourable spirit, yet officious, yet impatient:—a
restless hero working persistently in a nervous and unquiet fashion the
thing that he believed to be the Will of God—Boucicaut is a figure as
unusual among the factions and intrigues of fifteenth-century history as
Gordon among the small surroundings of to-day. The Marshal was sent to
Genoa because that jealous and unaccountable people (“qui n’aime pas
qu’on aille leur desbauscher leurs femmes”) would no longer endure his
predecessor. They found in him the man they had prayed to have, a
sterner master. Boucicaut was as rigid as he was simple: a man soon
deceived, but swift and inflexible in the punishment of treachery. His
immaculate life, his proved authority, his skill in regulating and
organizing commercial traffic, gave him a great position in Northern
Italy, made him the man of men there, the central figure, even as before
him had been Giangaleazzo Visconti. For one reason, these two men, so
unlike in every detail, were alike in the great fact that they were
thinkers, men with a mission, inspired by an idea that ruled their lives
and to which they subordinated every consideration. The Duke of Milan
dreamed of a great United Italian Confederation, of which he should be
the head, and of which the Pope should be merely the ornament and crown:
his dream was the dream of the Emperor Napoleon III. Boucicaut, a
crusader by nature and tradition, above all things a religious spirit,
dreamed of ending the Schism, of gaining state after state to the
adherence of the true Pope at Avignon, and, _pari passu_, of extending
the dominions of his lord the King of France. The ambition of Boucicaut
was all spiritual loyalty and feudal devotion; the ambition of Visconti,
stained with crimes, was directed only to self-aggrandizement: different
stars were theirs, shining from different poles. But the men who see a
star and follow where it leads them, though they go as far apart as Hell
and Heaven, have more in common than the mere human bond which ties them
to the obscure multitude of their fellows, swaying hither and thither,
devoid of purpose, will, or way.
Footnote 118:
On October 30, 1403, he wrote to Florence and offered to take one of
the finest cities of the Milanese between Milan and Piedmont if
Florence would afford him (as indeed she offered to do) an aid of 200
lances (Florence Archives, Filza II. dei Dieci 3). Nothing appears to
have come of this arrangement, which appears to have been quite
uncountenanced by the King.
Almost the first act of Boucicaut at Genoa was to write to Florence
inviting her to assist him in capturing from the young Visconti (the
Serpent-brood) one of the finest cities between Milan and Piedmont. The
Florentines shared to the full the distrust of Boucicaut for the
children of him whom they had called “the self-dubbed Count of Virtues
(Vertus), the veritable Count of Vice.” And they consented to the
enterprise, but yet did not pursue it. For, at that moment, they had
other work to hand. There was another Visconti than the Lords of Milan
and Padua whom they must subdue. They were laying siege to Pisa “e chi
la tiene”: her master Gabriel’ Maria Visconti.
At the same moment, as we know, Orleans beyond the Alps was mysteriously
advancing southwards; his aim, no less than that of the Florentines, the
reduction of Pisa. For through his wife, Valentine Visconti,[119] he
had, as he considered, a prior claim on Pisa, and indeed on all
possessions of the dead Duke not included in the heritage of the two
legitimate sons. Gabriel’ Maria, the bastard, supported only by his
mother, besieged by the Florentine allies of France, threatened by his
brother-in-law the puissant brother of the King of France,—what hope had
he? None indeed, save in the disquiet which the news of Orleans’ coming
might inspire among his neighbours. For was it only on Pisa intent that
so great a lord was advancing on Lombardy? At this moment the young
Visconti of Milan were at open war with Boucicaut, and had declared
their intention to drive him out of Genoa and to obtain for themselves
the rich province of which the French had baulked their father. Did
Orleans also remember with rancour that disappointment of ten years ago?
Did he intend to join his brothers-in-law of Milan, take Genoa first and
Pisa afterwards? It might be; and yet it were difficult to be at once
the ally of the Milanese Visconti, and the usurper of their
half-brother’s possessions. Was it possible that the King’s brother
intended to unite his army to that of the King’s lieutenant, defeat the
young Visconti before Genoa, drive them from Lombardy as well as out of
Pisa, and make for himself a great territory (Milan, Asti, Pisa)
alongside of the French protectorate of Genoa? Boucicaut was an ancient
and intimate companion of the Duke of Orleans; it was rumoured that
Orleans had frequent interviews with Pope Benedict at Beaucaire; it was
possible that the three had come to an understanding.
Footnote 119:
See the preceding chapter on Valentine Visconti.
And Orleans marched south. And Florence assailed Pisa. So late as April
17, 1404,[120] the Florentines believed that by diplomacy, if not by
force, they might secure their prey. But in the end of February or the
beginning of March the Duke of Orleans turned north in high dudgeon,
indignantly marching on Paris. And in April it was commonly known that,
on the 4th of that month, Messer Gabriel’ Maria Visconti had been
acknowledged a vassal of the Crown of France; he was “homme du Roy” and
the King’s men henceforth would support him in Pisa.
Footnote 120:
See a manuscript letter, I believe imprinted, in the Florence
Archives, Dieci di Balia, Classe x. dist. iii. No. 2, f^o. 56:
_Istruzione data a Pierotto Fidini_: “Andrai a Pisa e sarai con
Madonna Agnese e dicele che tu ciai (ci hai) referito quello chella ta
detta (ch’ella ti ha detta) e, uditolo, noi siamo contenti seguitare
il ragionemento, cioè di contrarre con lei buona pace e sicura si che
tra lei e noi non abbia da essere guerra. Ma che, per fare contento il
nostro popolo, e mostrargli come cosa sia sicura che guerra non gli
sia fatta a noi, è bisogno chella metta nelle mani del Comune nostro
quatro Castella colle loro forteze, di quelle del Terreno di Pisa che
per noi si nomineranno et vogliendo ella fare questo noi verremo alla
pace e alla concordia realmente.
“Se ella dinegasse questo volere fare, avendo tu prima provato e
riprovato chella il consento, et ella dicesse di volere mettere le
dette castelle colle forteze loro in mano di terza persona fidata a
lei ed a noi, dirai in ultimo che noi siamo contenti. E se questo ella
non movesse a te ma stessesi pure in su la negativa—di non ci volere
dare le dette castella—allora moverai tu a lei dicendo che, poi che
non le dia piacere mettere le dette castella nelle mani nostre, chella
le metta nelle mani di terza persona di lei e di noi fidata. E che a
questo ella consente e volere che tu nommassi le castella, dirai
Livorno, Librafacta, Casena e Ponteacra. E se d’alcuni di questi ella
dicesse non potere fare, saprai quali. E in scambio loro dirai Palaia
e Marti se fossino più d’uno. Se ella ti venisse a domandare chi noi
porremo per terza persona, dirai che tu non ne sei informato ma che tu
ci lo riferirai, e se ella te ne nominasse alcuno, tiengli a mente. E
poi ne vieni subito alla presentia nostra, bene informato d’ogni cosa.
Et eziandio d’ogni novettà e cosa che sentire puoi” (April 17, 1404).
Great was the wrath of Orleans, loud the remonstrance of Florence.
Orleans had scarcely arrived in Paris before the King transferred to him
all the Royal rights to Pisa (as I have already shown the reader in the
chapter on Valentine Visconti), and formally disowned the conduct of
Boucicaut, forbidding him in future to put any obstacle in the path of
his brother. Censured at home, Boucicaut was not less fervently
condemned by his allies in Italy. The Signory of Florence addressed a
most indignant letter to him,[121] accusing him of a dishonest action in
seizing from the King’s faithful allies the prey they had hunted so
long, now, in their very grasp, to be wrested from them by a friend.
“Questa non era honesta cosa.” The Florentines could easily have reduced
Pisa, but against the fief of France, their ally, they could do nothing.
They withdrew from the siege, protesting and with many murmurs.
Footnote 121:
Dieci di Balia, Classe x. distinzione iii. No. 2, f^o. 58. I translate
the whole of this interesting letter, hitherto, I believe,
unpublished:
“_Istruzione data a Bonaccorso di Neri Pitti ... di quello che abbia
fare a Genova._ April 28, 1404: Andrai a Genova. E sarai al
Governatore Messer Giovanni Bouciquaut, Luogo tenente del Re. E lui
saluterai affetuosamente per parte del Comune nostro.
“Di poi gli dirai come di questo mese egli manda al nostro comune suo
Ambasciatore Maestro Piero di Nantrone, suo secretario. Il quale, per
sua parte, ci notifica come egli aveva ricevuto per vasallo e
feudatorio del serenissimo Re di Francia Messer Gabriello Maria di
Visconti colla città di Pisa e col suo terreno che possedea. Et aveva
presa la sua difesa. E che darà per censo al detto Re ogni anno uno
cavallo e uno falcone pellegrino. Secondaria, ci prega che ci piacesse
per lo avvenire non offendere la città nil (ne il) terreno di Pisa
predetto, per rispetto del Serenissimo Re predetto. Et agli aveva
preveduto che di quelli di Pisa non sarebbe fatta alcuna offesa nel
nostro terreno.
“Tertio disse che noi possiamo colle nostre mercatantie usare et
trafficare a Pisa sicuramente come a Genova e in qualunque altra terra
del Re di Francia.
“Al quale Ambasciatore fu risposto in effecto che noi ci maravigliamo
et dolevamo, come essendo noi in guerra colla dicta città di Pisa e
con chi la teneva—et essendo noi al disopra per liberare la detta
città di tirannia et avendo rispetto quanto noi siamo sempre frati, e
siamo servidori della detta Corona di Francia; et egli aveva presa la
difesa loro contro a noi; e che questa non era honesta cosa.
“Alla seconda parte—di non offender—egli fu detto, che in ciò noi
terremo tali modi come vedessimo convenirsi e che non gli darebbero
dispiacere.
“E alla terza parte, diciamo che l’usare in luogo dove avesse a fare
alcuno dei Visconti di Milano non ci fu mai sicuro, non potrebbe
essere, considerati le inimicitii e odii antichi stati da detti
Visconti al comune nostro; Conchiudendo che sopra le dette cose noi
faremo risposta più pienamente al detto Signor Boucequaut per nostri
Ambassadori.
“E poi gli direte che—se mai noi avevamo maraviglia di alcuna cosa—noi
abbiamo dello avere gli, in nome del Serenissimo Re di Francia, presa
la difesa di Pisa e di quello che gli possiede, contro a noi, figludi
devotissimi della corona di Francia stati sempre, in favore dei Pisani
che sempre sono stati inimici della detta Corona. Et maximamente
essendo noi in guerra con Pisa e con chi la tiene, non di nascosa ma
pubblicamente e non di guerra hora cominciata ma durata lungamente. Et
essendo noi con nostro esercito in punto et in ordine per esser
intorno alla città di Pisa, sperando in brevissimo tempo liberarla
della Tirannia dei Visconti. E per poter meglio e con maggiore forza
cosa fare, abbiamo fatta grandissima spesa nello apparecchio di
questo, il quale possiamo dire per cagione sua avere tutta perduta. E
con lui di questo vi direste amichevolmente, subiungnendo che noi ci
rendiamo certi che quando il Serenissimo Re di Francia e suo Consiglio
sapranno questo, essi n’avranno dispiacere come di cosa non honesta et
iniusta. Il che non fu mia usanza della Corona di Francia fare, et
come di cosa fatta contro a i suoi figluoli e divoti in favore di un
Tiranetto e d’una città stata sempre nemica della Corona di Francia. A
presso gli direte, che, per riverentia della Maestà Reale la quale
egli rappresenta (come che duro e malagevole ci paresse per le ragioni
di sopra assegante) già sono più di passati, noi facciamo
commandamento a tutta nostra gente d’arme e subditi: Che nel terreno
di Pisa non dovesseno fare alcuna offesa o cavalcata, e così è stata
observata: la qual cosa fare grava molto il nostro popolo per gli
rispetti scripti di sopra. E mai non si sarebbe creduto per nessuno
Fiorentino che Messer Bouciquaut il quale abbiamo reputato a noi e
reputiamo amico singolarissimo avesse mai fatta tale cosa contra a noi
ma pensiamo che questo sia proceduto da altri con velati colori che
gli le hanno dato a dividere; ma veramente questo che fatta ha non è
cosa punto honesta ne iusta ne utile ne honorevole per la Maestà
Reale. E per tutto il pregherate che gli piaccia, veduta la verità del
fatto, renonciare questo che ha ordinato in questa materia, ed essere
contento che noi possiamo seguitare contro a Pisa, e chi la tiene, la
nostra impresa. E questo sarà a lui honore et a noi, figluoli della
Corona, singolarissimo piacere.
“Alla parte del trafficare et usare a Pisa i nostri cittadini e
mercatanti colle loro mercatantie, direte che niuno cittadino se ne
fiderebbe mai ne vorebbero trafficare, essendo Pisa nella mani
d’alcuno dei Visconti, come ella è. E non che ivi—ma in alcuna terra
dove alcuno dei Visconti avesse a fare, per che essi sono antichi
nostri nemici e molte volte lanno (l’hanno) dimostrato—e romperci la
fede e pace e tregua; e bene lo vedevamo dove, essendo colligati colla
Serenissima Corona di Francia, il Conte di Vertus ci ruppe la Pace e
manifestò tradimento contra Dio a vergogna della detta Corona, si che
in modo alcuno non ci potremo mai fidare in luogo done alcuno di loro
avesse a fare.”
Here the document leaves politics to defend the quarrel of private
Florentine merchants in Genoa, to complain of the conduct of the
Pisans who have made a raid on to the lands of Messer Gherardo
d’Appiano, feudatory of Florence, and to complain of the sequestration
of the goods of certain Florentine merchants of Genoa. The Ten also
state that they are sending Messer Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi and Messer
Filippo Cosimi on an embassy to France to state their case to the
King. F^o. 60 instructs us that Boucicaut liberated the sequestered
goods and that a truce was signed between Florence and Pisa for so
long as Pisa should continue subject to the King of France.
What indeed was the motive of Boucicaut? The Florentines with some
reason suspected an unseen hand pulling the strings that worked this
sudden action; “pensiamo che questo sia proceduto da altri, con velati
colori.” But what man save the King, who disowned the business, was
strong enough to dare to oppose the will of Orleans? Was Burgundy
jealous of those Italian prospects of his rival which freed him from his
neighbourhood at home? Or was it possible that the Antipope Benedict,
ill-contented with Orleans after their interview at Beaucaire, had
privately summoned Boucicaut “ce bon Chrestien” to hold Pisa in the
King’s name and not in the name of his too powerful guardian? Mysteries!
It is as likely, perhaps more likely, that Boucicaut, ever hot-headed,
wilful, and officious, asked no permission save his own to accept this
new vassal for the King of France. His brain was fired by the thought of
converting Pisa to the true obedience; and he feared that she would fall
to heretic Florence ere Orleans could pass the Alps.
Gabriel’ Maria Visconti and his mother were ill at their ease in Pisa.
He, an elegant, faithless, persuasive _Tiranetto_ (as the Tuscans called
him), was often at the Court of Boucicaut, making various negotiations,
among others handing over the Tower and Fort of Leghorn to France.[122]
Boucicaut was in high spirits notwithstanding his half disgrace; he had
persuaded the Genoese to accept the authority of Benedict XII., “the
greatest deed,” writes his biographer, “that has been done in Italy
these 200 years.” He hoped soon to convert Leghorn and Pisa; and, in
time, to induce Italy to renounce the heinous Italian Antipope.
Footnote 122:
Brit. Museum MSS. 30, 669, f. 238; a treaty between the King of France
and G.M. Visconti, Lord of Pisa. The Tower and Fort of Leghorn are to
be given to the French, the King promising that no one shall be
allowed to enter Leghorn against the will of Gabriele Maria Visconti.
Also _quod absit_ should the Castle of Leghorn be taken by the enemies
of the said Gabriele Maria, or should it in any way rebel against him,
the King and his Lieutenant bind themselves to allow free passage to
any army the said Gabriele Maria may send for its subjection. The King
explicitly promises that if any of Gabriele Maria’s possessions be
lost by the treachery of guards or other means, he will make war upon
the fraudulent possessors and attempt their recovery. The King invests
Gabriele Maria, with a gold ring, in all his possessions save the
Tower and Fort of Leghorn.
Suddenly his hold over Pisa ominously slackened.
The Pisans cared little for Pope or Antipope; they were fanatic for
liberty. They detested Agnese Mantegazza and her bastard with a Tuscan
hatred for the Visconti, treacherous alike to God and man. One day in
1405, while Messer Gabriel’ Maria was absent in Genoa, some Florentine
soldiers made a raid on Pisa. The citizens, not without reason,
suspected their tyrant of selling them to the Florentines,—old
neighbours and rivals yet more odious than the Milanese. They rose as
one man fighting for death or liberty in the streets. No sooner had they
driven back the Florentines than they rushed on the Fortress, surging
through the narrow corridors, till, in the heart of the palace, they
came on Madonna Agnese. A man raised his harquebuss and shot her through
the heart. Her son was absent in Genoa. For the moment the Pisans were
quit of the Visconti.
The news of the revolt of Pisa flew swiftly to Genoa. The bereaved
Tiranetto dispossessed and orphaned, repaired to Boucicaut as to the
Lieutenant of his liege-lord, the King of France, asking aid because, as
the Chronicle reminds us, “seigneur doibt au besoing secourir son vassal
qui le requiert à son aide.”
Boucicaut was dismayed at this first result of his new acquisition. To
reduce Pisa by arms would be a ruinous affair. The Marshal comforted as
best he could the vassal of his master, and promised to go and reason
with the rebels. Forth, therefore, he went from Genoa to a very
beautiful place called Porto Venere, in the neighbourhood of Pisa. There
a deputation of the insurgents awaited him, and for a long while he
harangued them as to the virtues of the dead Madonna Agnese and the
merits of the kind and amiable young man whom they had banished.
The Pisans listened respectfully while “moult leur dict de belles
paroles,” but when the sermon was over they replied that never should
Messer Gabriel’ be their lord again, rather would every man of them be
hewn in pieces; but, they went on to say, the Marshal Boucicaut himself
should be welcomed and honoured by all the citizens of Pisa, if he would
accept her as his fief. “Never,” cried the Marshal, “could I draw such a
profit from a friend’s misfortune” (“car ce n’est mie l’usaige des
François d’user de tels tours”). And he fell again to praising Messer
Gabriel’, but all in vain, for the last word of the Pisans was that, if
the Marshal himself would not accept the city for his own, then they
prayed him to meet them at Leghorn another day, and there they would
give themselves directly to the King of France, accepting a French
governor for their waiter, even as the Genoese had done ten years
before.
Boucicaut went home, sore perplexed between his duty to his liege and
his duty to his vassal. He had gone to Porto Venere to plead the cause
of Gabriel’ Maria: and he had supplanted the young man, as it seemed. On
the other hand, since it was clear that the Pisans would never re-admit
their Tiranetto, and since the city was the fief of France, how could he
honourably forbid them to give themselves entirely to their lawful
suzerain? And the vision grew in him of a great Mediterranean State,
French, supporting French interests in the East—a terror to the Saracens
and the men of Barbary, a lamp of Christendom, faithful to the True
Obedience, reclaimed for ever from the heresy of the Elect of Rome.
Arrived in Genoa he sent for Messer Gabriel’, and told him the case; “de
quoy feult moult dolent Messire Gabriel,” who doubtless wished that he
had sent to Porto Venere, a spokesman less eloquent and less engaging.
But Boucicaut persuaded him that since he could not hope to leave the
city for himself, ’twas better to entrust it to the King of France—who
would recompense so generous a vassal with lands as good elsewhere—than
to let it fall into the power of an enemy or a neighbour. Gabriel’ Maria
agreed—as he must perforce agree—and Boucicaut set out again to meet the
rebels at Leghorn.
But the Pisans had never meant to give themselves another master. To
gain time, they had played with Boucicaut and had flattered his weak
side. They said that on second thoughts they preferred that, before they
gave themselves to the King of France, the men of Messer Gabriel’, who
were still in the strong places of Pisa, should be expelled the city,
and a garrison of French and Genoese sent thither in their stead. The
request appeared the less unreasonable as Gabriel’ Maria was himself the
King’s vassal, and the Pisans might suspect that their mutual suzerain
would only confirm the power of the rejected _Tiranetto_. Boucicaut
agreed, returned to Genoa, and arranged for the exchange of garrisons.
This done the Pisans sent to say the Fortress needed revictualling.
Boucicaut, eager to ingratiate his new subjects, despatched his nephew,
some gentlemen of his household, with many gentlemen and citizens of
Genoa; and a great galley heaped with provisions. The ship sailed down
the coast and up the Arno into Pisa; at the quay the embassy descended.
They were immediately overpowered by an ambush of Pisans, who seized
upon the welcome cargo of the ship, and carried off the crew and the
passengers into a dark and villainous prison, using their sufferings as
a means to extract higher ransom from the King’s Lieutenant.
Thus amply provisioned at Boucicaut’s expense, the Pisans began to feel
secure of liberty. They sent to Florence, offering her four of their
castles if she would help them to regain Leghorn, where at the moment
Boucicaut and Gabriel’ Maria were esconced, and to revenge themselves on
both these men. But the Florentines returned a dilatory answer, for they
were, in truth, pursuing a more fruitful negotiation.
Florence in 1405 was in the very hey-day of her wool trade, but she had
no outlet for her tides of commerce, no port from which to ship her
goods to Provence or to Barbary. It was not four Pisan castles, but Pisa
herself and the mouth of the Arno that she required. At the same time
that the Pisans proposed their bargain to the Florentine Ten, that
august body had received an ambassador from Gabriel’ Maria Visconti
offering to sell them not only Pisa, but also the frontier castles of
Sarzana and Librafatto, which, from the fastnesses of the Apennines,
guard the plain in which Pisa and Florence lie. It was worth a great
price to secure not only a port, but a fortified frontier in case of an
invasion from the north. Florence remembered her ancient terrors when
she had lain almost at the mercy of the Duke of Milan. She agreed to pay
Messer Gabriel’ the sum of four hundred thousand florins for his rights
over his revolted signory. They stipulated, however, that Boucicaut must
be acquainted with the transaction, and give it his sanction, otherwise
no bargain.
When the persuasive Gabriel’ Maria broke the news to his host, at first
the Marshal “qui toujours y avoit la dent,” emphatically refused to
consent to the alienation of a Royal fief; he even sent to Pisa to
acquaint the rebels with the designs of their ex-tyrant, hoping by this
means to induce them to declare themselves the subjects of the King. But
the Pisans went on shouting “Libertà.” Meanwhile Gabriel’ Maria and the
Florentines set the matter before the Marshal in another light. For
Messer Gabriel’—a clever person—advised the Florentines to become
vassals to the Crown of France for the fief of Pisa. The Florentines
fell in with the suggestion, which carried visible weight with the
Boucicaut. And the Marshal was left to consider the matter.
The Florentines asked Leghorn as well as Pisa, but Boucicaut was
obstinate in his hold on the nearer port. He could not yield Leghorn
without grave prejudice to Genoa. But Pisa was his only in name. Could
he not keep Leghorn, the substance, and as the price of Pisa, the
shadow, exact the fealty of the Florentines to France and to the true
Pope? Illuminated by this bright idea Boucicaut proposed the following
terms to Florence:
1. The Florentines shall have Pisa and all its lands except the Castle
of Leghorn; but they must swear not to interfere with the carrying trade
of Genoa, nor to make traffic by sea in any other ships than those of
Genoa.
2. A month after the reduction of Pisa the Florentines must declare
their adhesion to Pope Benedict XIII., and charge themselves with the
conversion of Pisa.
3. If, six months after the said reduction of Pisa, the Elect of Rome
still persist in his error, the Florentines, the French, and the Genoese
shall all make war on him together.[123]
Footnote 123: