Neapolitan. But, on the 10th of January, there broke out a rebellion
in Sicily, and then 'a change came over the spirit of their dream',
for there appeared no longer the same ardent desire for amity with
Naples, or lamentations that it was not possible to 'draw still closer
the bonds of friendship between the two Governments'. Now came a scene
which I have read in the mass of papers before me with feelings of
very sincere regret. I cannot easily imagine a more imbecile judgement
than presides, or a more mischievous spirit than pervades, the whole
of the diplomatic correspondence, the whole correspondence, not only
of our professional politicians, our Ministers, our Secretaries, our
Consuls, our Deputy-Consuls, but also a new class of political agents,
who appear on the scene, the vice-admirals and captains of ships of
the line, who all seem, in the waters of Sicily, to have been suddenly
transformed, as if by the potent spells of the ancient enchantress
who once presided over that coast, stripped of their natural military
form, if not into the same sort of creatures, whose form she made
men assume, yet into monsters, hideous to behold, mongrel animals,
political sailors, diplomatic vice-admirals, speculative captains of
ships, nautical statesmen, observers, not of the winds and the stars,
but of revolts: leaning towards rebels, instead of hugging the shore;
instead of buffeting the gale, scudding away before the popular
tempest; nay, suggesters of expeditions against the established
Governments of the Allies, with whom their Government lamented it
could not draw the bonds of friendship more closely--a new species,
half naval and half political, whose nature is portentous, in whose
existence I could never have believed. Mr. Temple, a prudent and
experienced Minister, is absent, unfortunately, from his post, and his
place is filled by Lord Napier, a worthy man, and an active, above
all, an active penman, a glib writer if not a great; writing,
not quite, but very nearly as well as the captains and admirals
themselves. We find this gentleman, like them, ardently hoping that
revolt may prosper, and doing his endeavour to realize his desire;
dealing out every sort of suggestion and recommendation, lecturing as
if he sat in the Foreign Office, administering rebukes like a Foreign
Secretary, telling the Neapolitan Government they had better do so and
so; if they did not, it would be the worse for them, and it would be
viewed with 'great gravity'; and yet supposing that no one but himself
was sensitive, for he takes care not to show respect by salutes, and
addresses, and those matters about which monarchs are supposed to
care a great deal; making very free in his, I will not say rude and
unmannerly, but certainly his rough treatment of others, yet all the
while excessively annoyed at the 'tone', as he calls it, of some of
the communications addressed to him. But after carefully studying the
papers, to catch what this offensive tone of the Neapolitan Minister
was, I have found it so evanescent that I really cannot discern it,
and suppose there must be something in the manner, or in Lord Napier's
state of mind at the time, which overset him.
On the 18th of January, 1848, Sir W. Parker, than whom a more able
and gallant officer could not adorn the service, but who cannot be
everything--for there are very few who, like my illustrious friend at
the table (the Duke of Wellington), or my renowned master, under whom
I first served in a diplomatic situation, the late Earl St. Vincent,
are equally great as captains and statesmen--Sir W. Parker wrote to
say that, the rebellion having broke out again, he had given general
orders to the captains of British vessels to afford protection to
individuals of either side who were flying for their political
conduct. It is easily to be seen which of the two sides these
instructions are intended to protect. Sir W. Parker concludes by
saying, 'I shall await with anxiety the result of the outbreak in
Sicily, and the effect it may produce at Naples.' Why, what had Sir
W. Parker to do with that? The truth is, he was in the hope and the
expectation that the rebellion in Sicily would extend across the Faro,
and lead to a rising of the Calabrese upon the neighbouring continent.
In page 352 we have Captain Codrington, a most able officer, no
doubt, giving a long political disquisition, and many speculations,
respecting the rebellion and its effects elsewhere, in which he
predicts a rising in Calabria, and foresees the danger which would
subsequently accrue to the Neapolitan Government. The gallant captain
writes as if he were a soothsayer, sent out to foretell the effect
of the Sicilian force landing in Calabria, in shaking the Neapolitan
throne. Nay, not content with being Minister and Ambassador, as
well as naval officer, the gallant captain must needs act, at least
speculate, as a Secretary of the Treasury, or whipper-in for the
Sicilian Commons; so he proceeds to discuss the returns for the new
elections:
'Should the small Sicilian force', says he, 'recently
landed in Calabria--probably under 1,000 men--succeed
in raising the inhabitants of that part of the country
against the present Government, they may be able to
beat the 12,000 Neapolitan troops at present in Calabria,
and then by getting possession of Scylla and Reggio, the
Sicilians will gain the control of the Straits, and ultimately
so distress the citadel of Messina, by cutting off its communication,
as well as by other military operations, as to
bring on its surrender. In the meantime, the character
of the return of members to serve in the coming Parliament,
to meet in the early part of the next month, is adverse to
the present Ministry. In some places, the electors on
meeting have merely made a _procès-verbal_ affirming the
validity of their previous election, and reasserting the
candidates then chosen as their actual representatives; in
others they have proceeded to a new election; but in almost
every case the very same individuals as before have been
returned as members for the Parliament. This gives a
considerable check to the Government, and shows the state
of public opinion in the provinces. If on the meeting of
Parliament the discussions are free, we may expect strong
differences, if not collisions, between the King's Government
and the Parliament, from recent events, from present
difficulties, and above all from the want of experience
of all parties in carrying on public business. If the
Government control the discussions by force or prevent
the meeting of Parliament, or suddenly get rid of it, and
govern the country by means of the army, the provinces
will then be almost sure of rising generally, particularly
Calabria, excited by the Sicilian landing, and then not only
will Messina be gone, but Naples and the throne of Ferdinand
will be in the greatest danger. But if the King's
Government were at present to act with great prudence
and moderation, and if they believe them sincere in it,
there would be no such general rising in the provinces as to
render the Sicilian landing of importance, and then that
small body of men would be crushed by the large Neapolitan
force at present in Calabria. This would put the
King's Government in a far more commanding position
for terms in any future negotiations with Sicily, and probably
put off a final settlement by inducing claims too
exorbitant to be agreed to by Sicily.'
What had Captain Codrington to do with the going out or coming in of
the Ministry? What, in the name of Neptune and Mars, and all deities
having charge of ships of war, had a naval officer to do with the
returns to Parliament, the results of votes in that foreign House of
Commons? Observe, my Lords, the papers are selected out of the mass
of documents at the Foreign Office, and I will venture to assert very
confidently that, besides those which have been produced, there are
half a dozen times as many which the Foreign Office has not produced;
so that if we find anything in these papers showing faults to have
been committed by those who produced them or by their agents, we may
assume that, if the whole of the papers were given, not a few more
faults of the same kind would be found to have been committed.
The noble Lord opposite (Lord Minto) went from Rome to Naples, and if
he had been alone there I should have had greater confidence in the
proceedings of the Government, for I have had long experience of his
good sense, and sound judgement. But the noble Earl had a very active
and zealous man under him; and while wading through this volume I
have often had occasion to reflect upon the wise opinion of Prince
Talleyrand, who used to reckon in diplomacy that zeal in young men is
the next thing to treachery, and that sometimes it is just as bad as
treachery, for the zealous are clothed with the garb of merit, and you
have little hold over them. Well, the zeal, the honest zeal, no doubt,
of Lord Napier, moved my noble kinsman from Rome to Naples. The noble
Earl (Earl Minto) on the 2nd of February, 1848, wrote to the Foreign
Office, that he had been so urged by Lord Napier to go to Naples that
he had resolved to set off. But Lord Napier also tells us that on the
3rd of February he had an interview with the King of the Two Sicilies,
and that he got the King, out of his zeal and his address working with
it, to ask Lord Minto to go to Naples. Well, my noble friend and Lord
Napier, representing the British Government, were decidedly for the
Sicilians and against the Neapolitans. There was no attempt to hold
the balance even between the two parties, but every expression was
used, every proposal made, every captious objection taken in favour
of the Sicilians under pretence of holding even the balance. In that
country my noble kinsman and Lord Napier are what we term in the
language of this country 'Repealers'. They are all for what they call
a native and independent parliament in Sicily, just as the Repealers
are for a native and independent Parliament in College Green. The
noble Lord (Lord Minto) says, in a very vehement manner, that the
sufferings of the people of Sicily under their thirty years' tyranny
were so intolerable that the Sicilians had a much better ground for
their rebellion than we had against James II in 1688. A consul,
writing on the 24th of April, having given most flourishing accounts
of the universal insurrection of the Sicilians (accounts which differ
entirely from those I received from travellers in that country, as
well as from public functionaries), informed Lord Napier that the
Sicilians were going to choose the Grand Duke of Genoa as King of
Sicily. This intelligence was received in London about the 4th or
5th of May. There was not a moment's delay in acting upon the
notification, though it was only a prediction. If we were so very fond
of our Neapolitan allies, if we lamented that we could not draw more
closely the bonds of friendship between the two countries, protesting
all the while our desire to keep the two crowns on the head of
Ferdinand, it is very odd that our Minister should, on the very
instant it was known that the Grand Duke of Genoa was likely to be
chosen, and that the Sicilians intended to dethrone King Ferdinand
namely, on the 8th of May, proceed to give these instructions to my
friend, Mr. Abercrombie:
'Her Majesty's Consul at Palermo having reported that
it is understood that the crown of Sicily is to be offered to
the Duke of Genoa, I have to instruct you that if it should
come to your knowledge that such an offer has been made,
you will state to the Sardinian Government that it is of
course for the Duke of Genoa to determine whether it will
or will not suit him to accept this flattering offer, but that
it might be satisfactory to him to know that if he should
do so he would at the proper time, and when he was in
possession of the Sicilian throne, be acknowledged by Her
Majesty.'
Let it be known, said the noble Lord at the head of Foreign Affairs,
that if the Duke of Genoa accepts the offer of the Sicilians, we shall
lose no time in recognizing him, the Grand Duke of Genoa, under
the Treaty of Vienna, as the King of Sicily, and in accepting the
dethronement of our own ancient ally with whom we lament there is no
possibility of 'drawing closer the bonds of our ancient friendship'.
Oh, how easily snapped are the bonds that knit prince to prince, and
State to State! Oh, how feeble the most ancient ties of the firmest
political friendship! When the ink was hardly dry with which the
profession was made of this earnest desire to draw more closely, if it
were but possible, the bonds which united us to the King of the Two
Sicilies, that Her Majesty's Government should, behind his back, and
without a word of notice, avow their intention deliberately, but
instantly, to acknowledge the usurper upon whose head his insurgent
subjects were about to place the crown they had wrested from the brow
of their lawful King! But my noble friend (Lord Minto) is strongly
impressed with the advantages of a free constitution--not, however,
more strongly than I am. Above all the free constitutions of the
world, it is natural that the Sicilians should admire that admirable
form of the purest of all governments, which, uniting the stability
of order with the freedom of a popular constitution, which we happily
enjoy, and upon the possession of which we have reason to pride
ourselves beyond all the other bounties which a gracious Providence
has showered down upon this favoured isle. No wonder the Sicilians
should be prepared to admire and regard with reverence a constitution
which unites in itself the advantages of all other forms of
government, the freedom of democracy, the vigour of monarchy, and the
stability with the peacefulness of aristocracy. If I were to say
that I am niggardly enough to keep this blessing at all hazards to
ourselves, not to desire the extension to others of this happy form of
government, I should do injustice to my own feelings; but if I were to
say I am slow to believe that the British Constitution is of a nature
to be easily exported, and transplanted in other countries, I should
only give vent to the opinions which the wisest have held, and which
every day's experience of foreign affairs tends more deeply to root in
all reflecting minds. The British Constitution is the work of ages,
the slow growth of many centuries, and if it could be transplanted to
countries so totally unprepared for its reception, and there made to
take root, it would be as great a miracle as if we were to take a
mature plant and set it to grow on a stone pavement, or a great wooden
stick, and plant it in a fertile soil, there to bear fruit. The plant
and the soil must be of congenial natures; the constitution must fit
the nation it is to govern. The people must be prepared by their
previous experience, their habits, their second nature, their
political nature, to receive such institutions. I know not that I can
ever sufficiently express the affection I bore to my late noble friend
(Lord W. Bentinck) who, in 1812, instituted in Sicily the experiment
of transplanting thither the British Constitution. But your Lordships
now know from his experience what was the consequence of attempting
to establish our own constitution in another country. A traveller
happened to be in Sicily at the time, and I will read the account he
gave of the solemnity which he witnessed. He is speaking of the most
important of all proceedings under that transplanted system; he is
describing the conduct of the people's chosen representatives; he is
painting the scene of their legislative labours, in the temple of
freedom; he is admitting us to the grand, the noble spectacle of the
most dignified of human assemblies, the popular body making laws for
the nation in the sanctuary of its rights. See, then, this august
picture of a transplanted Parliament. Mr. Hughes says:
'As soon as the President had proposed the subject for
debate, and restored some degree of order from that confusion
of tongues which followed the announcement of the
question, a system of crimination and recrimination was
invariably commenced by the several speakers, accompanied
with such hideous contortions, such bitter taunts,
and such personal invectives, that blows generally followed,
until the Assembly was in an uproar. The President's
voice was unheeded and unheard; the whole House arose;
patriots and antagonists mingled in the fray, and the
ground was covered with the combatants, kicking, biting,
striking, and scratching each other in a true Pancratic
fray.'
It is to restore this grand political blessing of the 1812 Parliament
that all our late efforts have been pointed. The great object of
our negotiations has been the establishment of such a precious
representative assembly; but the result is, that those efforts have
been all thrown away. The King of Naples was said at that time to have
agreed to certain concessions; he offered the people such terms as our
negotiators thought they ought to have accepted; and, up to that time,
indeed up to this hour, Ferdinand has behaved most fairly. He did not
scruple to make such proposals for conciliation as our own negotiators
thought the insurgents ought to have accepted. But all ended in their
refusal. War broke out. Neapolitan troops were sent over. Messina was
attacked, bombarded, and, after some four or five days, was taken.
Now, to show your Lordships the tendency there was in these
negotiations to take advantage of every circumstance, accidental or
otherwise, for the purpose of blackening the conduct of the Neapolitan
Court, I will only state one particular, and that is with respect to
the continuance of the bombardment. A most indignant denial has been
given to this charge by the general officers and others engaged; and
it turned out that our consuls and vice-consuls, all animated by
the same spirit, all in favour of rebellion and against the lawful
sovereignty, all agreed in one fact as the ground of the charge,--they
all said that eight hours after the resistance had ceased the
bombardment was continued. It might naturally be supposed that, with
this continued bombardment, much blood would be spilt; and when all
our agents are dwelling on this continuance as a cruelty, every reader
must conclude that needless carnage was perpetrated, and much blood
shed. But no such thing; not one drop could be spilt, and why? Because
every creature had left the town before the eight hours had commenced
to run! But the bombardment was continued for two reasons. In the
first place, every house, as in Paris, was a fort; and, secondly,
the Neapolitan commander could not possibly trust the white flag
immediately after he had lost a whole battalion by a false flag being
hoisted to decoy them into ambush, where the ground was mined. But no
single fact of needless cruelty has been proved against the King of
Naples, though I know, from a person attached to our Navy, and in
those seas at that time, whose account I have read, as also from that
of a traveller accidentally on board of one of the Queen's ships
at the time, that there were cruelties of the most disgusting and
revolting description committed by the Sicilians, and not one word of
reference to which can be found in all the curiously selected papers
that load your table. In the mass things are to be found, indeed,
much against the wishes of the selectors, and also of their agents in
Sicily and Naples. This is owing to their clumsy design of telling
what they think will exalt the rebel and damage the loyal party,
without always perceiving that these statements cut more ways
than one. Thus, a number of consuls sign a statement that all
the inhabitants had left Messina. This is contrived to show that
resistance had ceased; but it also proves that no cruelty could be
committed by the bombardment. Again, we are told that 1,500, by one
zealous agent's account, had been slain of the King's troops: but Lord
Napier's hotter zeal is not satisfied with this number, and he makes
it 3,000. The object of putting forward this statement is to exalt the
rebel valour, and give a more formidable aspect to the revolt. But the
zeal in one direction forgets that the same parade of numbers also
shows how necessary severe measures had become on the King's part,
and how little blame could attach to the gallant troops who, thus
assailed, had imposed on them, by the duty of self-defence, the
necessity of quelling so bloody an insurrection.
I have given one sample of the not very even-handed justice which
pervaded the correspondence. But I will proceed further. After the
battle of Messina 700 or 800 rebels escaped towards the Ionian
Islands. They were taken, and it was said by a stratagem: that by
hoisting the English flag a Neapolitan cruiser was enabled to
near them and take them. It was further alleged--and much of the
correspondence is addressed to this point--that they were taken,
contrary to the law of nations, within three miles or cannon-shot of
the Ionian Islands, and therefore within the British waters. Very
elaborate arguments are given in the correspondence to prove
that position, and a great deal of indignation is expressed; and
satisfaction was also demanded on account of the abuse of the English
flag. An elaborate argument is prepared and sent by the Foreign
Secretary to show that because the ships were first seen twenty miles
off, and in half an hour more they were more clearly perceived,
therefore at some unknown and unspecified time after the half hour,
they must have been close in with the shore. I suppose on the
principle that a sailing vessel going without steam, moves at the rate
of twenty or thirty miles in the hour. However, such is this zealous
argument to prove the favourite point that the rebels are always right
and the Government always wrong. Alas! that so much good information
and subtlety of argument should be thrown away. This able and
argumentative paper crossed on its way out another from our own
Admiral on its way homeward, in which he said he had inquired from the
Governor of the Ionian Islands, and had ascertained that the ship
was at least eight miles from the shore--so there was an end of the
argument upon distance; and that of the insult to our flag was as
shortly disposed of by a letter from our own Admiralty, stating that
it was only a stratagem which our own Navy constantly employed, freely
using the flags of other nations for its own purposes.
I rejoice to say, and your Lordships must he rejoiced to hear it, that
I am approaching the end of this subject, but I cannot abstain from
observing, to show how completely we took part with the one side
against the other, that we treated the Sicilian prisoners as if they
had been our allies, our own subjects. They were taken in rebellion,
with arms in their hands, against their lawful Sovereign. But Lord
Napier complains to Prince Cariati of his treatment of the prisoners,
and says it would be observed upon in England, would raise a strong
feeling on its exposure and publication, and that the feeling would be
such that Her Majesty's Government could scarcely fail to take notice
of it. But how? For those prisoners were guilty of municipal offence
against the municipal law of their own country. Suppose, contrary to
all probability and possibility, hostilities had ensued upon the late
attempt at rebellion in Ireland, and some of the prisoners having been
taken and sent to Bermuda or Australia, that the Ministers of France,
Holland, Belgium, or any other country had taken it into their heads
to object to our treatment of those prisoners and to say, 'Don't
treat them in that way. Give them their native Parliament on College
Green--you are acting cruelly in sending them to Bermuda or Australia.
I shall write home to France, I shall write home to Holland, I shall
write home to Belgium; and depend upon it your conduct will raise such
a ferment of execration and hatred against you, that the President of
the Republic, the King of Holland, and the King of Belgium will be
absolutely obliged to take notice of it.' How should we have received
that intimation? I think with a horse-laugh, and there was no reason
why the Neapolitan King should not receive that dispatch of Lord
Napier's in the same way, except that he, no doubt, gave it
good-naturedly a more polite and courteous reception. Now we thus
presume to interfere with the domestic affairs of Naples as neither
France nor Holland would dare interfere with ours, and as we never
durst interfere with theirs. True, we never should dream of urging the
great Republic to treat its rebellious subjects, when charged with
treason, otherwise than as its Government pleased! True, Naples is
a feebler Power than France! But is that all the ground for the
proceeding? Is that all the warrant for reading lectures such as those
we have read, for doing the things we have done, threatening the
things we have threatened, claiming the right we have asserted of
protecting criminals imprisoned for rebellion from the justice of
their lawful Sovereign? I say that to a generous nation, to a manly
feeling heart, to a person of true British honour and true British
gallantry, it is the very reverse of a reason, and makes our conduct
the less excusable as it ought to be the more hateful.