the first article of our treaty, and your Excellency's remark, that it
is sufficient, and that _we are not to expect the effect before the
cause_, permit us to observe, that by the _cause_, we suppose, is
intended the _treaty_, and by the _effect_, an acknowledgment of our
independence. We are sorry to differ from your Excellency, but,
really, Sir, we cannot consider an acknowledgment of our independence
as a subject to be treated about; for while we feel ourselves to be
independent in fact, and know ourselves to be so of right, we can see
but one cause from whence an acknowledgment of it can flow as an
effect, viz. _the existence and truth of the fact_. This cause has
long existed and still exists, and, therefore, we have a right to
expect that Great Britain will treat with us being what we are, and
not as what we are not. To treat about this matter, would be to
suppose that our independence was incomplete until they pronounced it
to be complete. But we hold it to be complete already, and that as it
never did, so it never will, or must depend in the least degree, on
their will and pleasure. To us there appears to be a wide distinction
between their acknowledging the United States to be independent, and
their renouncing their pretended, though troublesome claims; the
former being a pre-existing fact, cannot depend upon, and, therefore,
is not a proper subject for a treaty; but to renounce or not to
renounce a claim, whether good or bad, depends on the will of him who
makes and prosecutes it; and, therefore, like other matters of
interest and convenience, is a proper subject for bargains and
agreements between those who trouble their neighbors with such claims,
and their neighbors who are troubled by them; and who, for peace sake,
may choose to continue the law-suit, unless their future quiet is
secured by a quit claim."
I think it was on the 24th of September, that I was informed of the
intention of the British Court to give Mr Oswald such a new commission
as had been recommended.
On the 26th of September, I went to pay a visit to the Count de
Vergennes, at Versailles. I found the Marquis de Lafayette in the
ante-chamber, and the Ambassador of Spain shortly after entered. After
some common conversation, the Ambassador asked me when we should
proceed to do business. I told him as soon as he should do me the
honor of communicating his powers to treat. He asked me whether the
Count de Florida Blanca had not informed me of his being authorised. I
admitted that he had, but observed, that the usual mode of doing
business, rendered it proper that we should exchange certified copies
of our respective commissions. He said that could not be expected in
our case; for that Spain had not yet acknowledged our independence. I
replied, that we had declined it, and that France, Holland, and
Britain, had acknowledged it. Here the Marquis de Lafayette took up
the subject, and it continued between him and the Ambassador, till the
Count de Vergennes came in. The Marquis told the Ambassador among
other things, that it would not be consistent with the dignity of
France, for her ally to treat otherwise than as independent. This
remark appeared to me to pique the Count d'Aranda not a little.
The Count de Vergennes, on coming in, finding the conversation
earnest, inquired whether we could not agree. The Ambassador stated my
objections. The Count said I certainly ought to treat with the
_Ambassador_, and that it was proper we should make a treaty with
Spain in the same manner that we had done with France. I told him, I
desired nothing more; and that the commission to M. Gerard, and the
reason assigned by this Court to the King of Great Britain for
entering into alliance with us, pointed out both the manner and the
principles, which were observed and admitted on that occasion. The
Count did not seem pleased with my allusion to the communication made
of our alliance to England. He observed, that Spain did not deny our
independence, and he could perceive no good reason for my declining to
confer with the Ambassador about a treaty, without saying anything
about our independence, an acknowledgment of which would naturally be
the effect of the treaty proposed to be formed. I told the Count, that
being independent, we should always insist on being treated as such,
and, therefore, it was not sufficient for Spain to forbear denying our
independence while she declined to admit it, and that notwithstanding
my respect for the Ambassador, and my desire of a treaty with Spain,
both the terms of my commission and the dignity of America forbid my
treating on any other than an _equal footing_.
The Count carried the Ambassador into his cabinet, and when he
retired, I was admitted.
The Count commenced the conversation, by explaining the reason of
sending M. Rayneval to England, which he said was, that by conversing
with Lord Shelburne about peace and matters connected with it, he
might be able to judge whether a pacific disposition really prevailed
in the British Court, and, therefore, whether any dependence might be
placed in his Lordship's professions on that head; that he was
satisfied with M. Rayneval's report, and that he believed that Lord
Shelburne was sincerely desirous of peace.
A few words then passed about Mr Oswald's new commission; the Count
observing in general terms, that as it removed our former objections,
we might now go on to prepare our preliminaries.
The conversation next turned to our negotiation with Spain, and to her
claims east of the Mississippi. Nothing new passed on the first topic;
as to the latter, the Count made only some very general remarks, such
as that he hoped we should, on conferring further about the matter,
approach nearer to each other; that those limits ought to be settled,
and while they remained in contest, a treaty with Spain could not
reasonably be expected; that as soon as we should agree upon those
points, Count d'Aranda would have a further or more formal commission
to conclude the treaty, &c.
I remarked, that these claims of Spain were of recent date, for that
on my first arriving in Spain, the Count de Florida Blanca told me,
that the success of my mission would probably turn upon one single
point, viz. the cession of our rights to the navigation of the river
Mississippi; from which, as well as from their subsequent and uniform
demands on that head, it was evident, that they then considered that
river as our boundary; for it would have been very strange indeed,
that they should insist on our forbearing to navigate a river, whose
waters washed no part of our country, and to which we could not, of
consequence, have any pretence of claim.
The Count smiled, but avoided making any direct reply; he hoped we
should, nevertheless, agree, and that we must endeavor to approach and
meet each other. I told him I could not flatter myself with such
expectations, while Spain continued her claims to those countries, for
that we should be content with no boundary short of the Mississippi.
I went from the Count's to M. Rayneval's chamber, for I had not seen
him since his return from England. He gave me the same reason for his
journey, which I had just received from the Count. We then talked of
his memoir and the Spanish negotiation. He said much in favor of the
conciliatory line he had proposed, and of the advantages of placing
the Indian nations on the _west_ side of it, under the _protection_ of
Spain, and those on the _east_, under that of the United States; that
the rights of those nations would be thereby secured, and future
disputes between us and Spain avoided. I replied, that so far as our
claims might affect those Indian nations, it was a matter solely
between us and them; and that admitting them to be independent, they
certainly had a right to choose their own protectors; and, therefore,
that we could have no right, without their knowledge or consent, to
choose for them. I also made the same remark to him respecting the
recency of these Spanish claims, which I had just before done to Count
de Vergennes. He said it was a subject which Count de Florida Blanca
had not understood, and imputed their former ideas of our extending to
the Mississippi, to their ignorance respecting those matters; hence it
became evident, from whom they had borrowed their present ideas.
On the 27th of September, Mr Vaughan returned here from England with
the courier that brought Mr Oswald's new commission, and very happy
were we to see it. Copies of it have already been sent to you, so that
I will not lengthen this letter by inserting it here; nor will I add
anything further on this head at present, than to assure you, that Mr
Vaughan greatly merits our acknowledgments.
The next thing to be done, was to prepare and draw up the proposed
articles. They were soon completed and settled between us and Mr
Oswald, by whom they were sent to his Court, with letters declaring
his opinion, that they ought to be accepted and agreed to; but they
differed with him in opinion.[6]
These articles, for very obvious reasons, were not communicated to the
Count de Vergennes.
Mr Oswald did not receive any opinion from his Court relating to our
articles until the 23d of October, when letters from the Minister
informed him, that the extent of our boundaries, and the situation of
the tories, &c. caused some objections, and the Minister's Secretary
was on the way here to confer with us on those subjects.
On the 24th of October, I dined at Passy with Dr Franklin, where I
found M. Rayneval. After dinner, we were in private with him a
considerable time. He desired to know the state of our negotiation
with Mr Oswald. We told him, that difficulties had arisen about our
boundaries, and that one of the Minister's Secretaries was coming here
with papers and documents on that subject. He asked us what boundaries
we claimed. We told him, the river St John to the east, and ancient
Canada, as described in the proclamation, to the north. He contested
our right to such an extent to the north, and entered into several
arguments to show our claim to be ill founded. These arguments were
chiefly drawn from the ancient French claims, and from a clause in the
proclamation restraining governors from making grants in the Indian
country, &c.
He inquired what we demanded as to the fisheries. We answered, that we
insisted on enjoying a right in common to them with Great Britain. He
intimated that our views should not extend further than a coast
fishery, and insinuated that pains had lately been taken in the
eastern States to excite their apprehensions, and increase their
demands on that head. We told him that such a right was essential to
us, and that our people would not be content to make peace without it;
and Dr Franklin explained very fully, their great importance to the
eastern States in particular. He then softened his manner and
observed, that it was natural for France to wish better to us than to
England; but as the fisheries were a great nursery for seamen, we
might suppose that England would be disinclined to admit others to
share in it, and that for his part he wished there might be as few
obstacles to a peace as possible. He reminded us, also, that Mr
Oswald's new commission had been issued posterior to his arrival at
London.
On the 26th of October, Mr Adams arrived here, and in him I have found
a very able and agreeable coadjutor.
When I began this letter, I did not flatter myself with being able to
write this much before Captain Barney would leave us; and I now find
myself too much exhausted to proceed with further details, and must
therefore refer you to the letters you will receive from Mr Adams and
Dr Franklin.
The same reason also prevents my writing to you and Mr Morris on other
subjects by Captain Barney, and I hope the length of this letter, and
the disagreeable state of my health will apologise for my not writing
even to my own family by this opportunity.
I am sensible of the impression which this letter will make upon you
and upon Congress, and how it will affect the confidence they have in
this Court. These are critical times, and great necessity there is for
prudence and secrecy.
So far, and in such matters as this Court may think it their interest
to support us, they certainly will, but no further, in my opinion.
They are interested in separating us from Great Britain, and, on that
point we may, I believe, depend upon them; but it is not their
interest that we should become a great and formidable people, and
therefore they will not help us to become so.
It is not their interest that such a treaty should be formed between
us and Britain, as would produce cordiality and mutual confidence.
They will, therefore, endeavor to plant such seeds of jealousy,
discontent, and discord in it as may naturally and perpetually keep
our eyes fixed on France for security. This consideration must induce
them to wish to render Britain formidable in our neighborhood, and to
leave us as few resources of wealth and power as possible.
It is their interest to keep some point or other in contest between us
and Britain to the end of the war, to prevent the possibility of our
sooner agreeing, and thereby keep us employed in the war, and
dependent on them for supplies. Hence they have favored, and will
continue to favor, the British demands as to matters of boundary and
the tories.
The same views will render them desirous to continue the war in our
country as long as possible, nor do I believe they will take any
measures for our repossession of New York, unless the certainty of its
evacuation should render such an attempt advisable. The Count de
Vergennes lately said, that there could be no great use in expeditions
to take places, which must be given up to us at a peace.
Such being our situation, it appears to me advisable to keep up our
army to the end of the war, even if the enemy should evacuate our
country; nor does it appear to me prudent to listen to any overtures
for carrying a part of it to the West Indies, in case of such an
event.
I think we have no rational dependence except on God and ourselves,
nor can I yet be persuaded that Great Britain has either wisdom,
virtue, or magnanimity enough to adopt a perfect and liberal system of
conciliation. If they again thought they could conquer us, they would
again attempt it.
We are, nevertheless, thank God, in a better situation than we have
been. As our independence is acknowledged by Britain, every obstacle
to our forming treaties with neutral powers, and receiving their
merchant ships, is at an end, so that we may carry on the war with
greater advantage than before, in case our negotiations for peace
should be fruitless.
It is not my meaning, and therefore I hope I shall not be understood
to mean, that we should deviate in the least from our treaty with
France; our honor, and our interest are concerned in inviolably
adhering to it. I mean only to say, that if we lean on her love of
liberty, her affection for America, or her disinterested magnanimity,
we shall lean on a broken reed, that will sooner or later pierce our
hands, and Geneva as well as Corsica justifies this observation.
I have written many disagreeable things in this letter, but I thought
it my duty. I have also deviated from my instructions, which though
not to be justified, will, I hope, be excused on account of the
singular and unforeseen circumstances which occasioned it.
Let me again recommend secrecy, and believe me to be, Dear Sir, &c.
JOHN JAY.
_P. S._ I have neither seen nor heard anything of Mr Laurens, nor of
the cypher you mention to have sent by him.
FOOTNOTES:
[3] Afterwards Sir William Jones.
[4] See this warrant in the Correspondence of the Commissioners for
making Peace, under the date here mentioned.
[5] When the Treaty was made with France, M. Gerard, who negotiated it
on the part of the French Court, did not show his commission to treat
till the Commissioners met him for the last time, and just before the
signing of the Treaty. Mr Jay was more particular, however, on this
point, and seemed disinclined to commence the negotiation in any form,
till the powers had been exchanged.
[6] See these articles in the Correspondence of the Commissioners for
Peace.
* * * * *
_Observations on the above Letter by the Editor._
Although in the present work I have carefully refrained from
expressing any opinions on the contents of the letters, or views of
the writers, not feeling authorised by the resolution of Congress,
under which these papers are published, to assume the task of a
commentator or critic, yet in regard to the preceding letter I cannot
hesitate to make an exception to this rule, and for reasons which I
trust will appear obvious and satisfactory.
On the main topics of the above letter, I have read in the office of
Foreign Affairs in London the confidential correspondence of the
British Ministers with their Commissioners for negotiating peace in
Paris. I have also read in the French office of Foreign Affairs the
entire correspondence of the Count de Vergennes, during the whole war,
with the French Ministers in this country, developing the policy and
designs of the French Court in regard to the war, and the objects to
be attained by the peace. I have moreover read the instructions of the
Count de Vergennes to M. de Rayneval, when he went to London, and the
correspondence which passed between them while he remained there,
containing notes of conversations with Lord Shelburne on one part, and
Count de Vergennes' opinions on the other. After examining the subject
with all the care and accuracy, which these means of information have
enabled me to give to it, I am prepared to express my belief most
fully, that Mr Jay was mistaken both in regard to the aims of the
French Court, and the plans pursued by them to gain their supposed
ends.
1. Mr Jay conceived, that one motive of M. de Rayneval's journey was
to cause the acknowledgment of independence by Great Britain to be
deferred, till France and England should have arranged their treaty.
But in reality, M. de Rayneval was instructed to insist on the
independence of the United States as a _preliminary measure_. In a
letter to the Count de Vergennes, dated September 28th, 1782, he
writes, that Lord Shelburne said, "he had always been opposed to
independence, but that he perceived the necessity of ceding it, and
that this object should be granted _without condition_." And in
reporting the result of his conversations with the British Minister,
M. de Rayneval states the points discussed in their order, the first
of which is as follows.--"_Independence, this article is agreed upon;
it shall be without restriction_;" (il sera sans restriction.) So far
from recommending, therefore, to defer the recognition of American
independence, M. de Rayneval insisted on an agreement to it as _a
preliminary step_ to further discussions.
2. Mr Jay supposed again, that another purpose of M. de Rayneval's
visit to London was to interfere with the claims of the United States
respecting the fisheries and boundaries. But this supposition is
contradicted by the following extract from his instructions, viz. "As
it is possible, that the English Ministers may speak to M. de Rayneval
concerning the affairs of America and of the United Provinces, he will
declare, _that he has no authority to treat on these topics_."
Accordingly we find him writing to the Count de Vergennes in the
letter quoted above, that after discussing the subject of the
fisheries with reference to the interests of England and France, Lord
Shelburne said to him, "without doubt the Americans will also form
pretensions to the fisheries, but he trusted the king (of France)
would not sustain them." To which M. de Rayneval replied,--"that he
was ignorant of the views of Congress concerning the object in
question, but thought he might venture to say, that the king would
never support unjust demands; that he was not able to judge whether
those of the Americans were such or not; and that, besides, _he was
without authority in this respect_." Again, in the same letter, M. de
Rayneval adds; "Lord Shelburne said he had foreseen that there would
be a great deal of difficulty with the Americans, as well in regard to
boundaries, as to the fishery of Newfoundland; but he hoped that the
king would not sustain them in their demands. I answered, that I did
not doubt the earnest desire of the king to do all in his power to
restrain them within the bounds of justice and reason. As to the
extent of the boundaries, I supposed the Americans would regulate it
by their charts; but the discussion was not continued far, _because it
did not pertain to me either to uphold or weaken the pretension of
America_, with which I was unacquainted. I added only, that the
English Ministry ought to find in the negotiations of 1754, relative
to the Ohio, the limits which England, then the sovereign of America,
believed it proper to assign."
The above extracts, it must be kept in mind, are from the confidential
letters written at the time between M. de Rayneval and Count de
Vergennes. The purport of them is corroborated by testimony that might
be drawn from other sources. They show most clearly, that Mr Jay's
suspicions were in reality erroneous, on whatever grounds he might at
the time suppose them to rest. M. de Rayneval's visit to London had
nothing to do with American affairs, except to insist on unconditional
independence.
Nor is it improbable, that the change in Mr Oswald's commission was
effected in consequence of M. de Rayneval's representations; for the
agreement on the part of the British Minister to cede independence
"_without restriction_" was made before Mr Vaughan's arrival in
London, as a messenger from Mr Jay.
These facts go far to rescue the French Ministry from the censure,
which it has been usual to cast on them, respecting their supposed
policy in the negotiations for peace. Whoever will examine all the
testimony that exists on the subject will be convinced, that some
grave particulars have crept into our history, which have a slender
foundation in fact, and which bestow but scanty justice on the
motives, conduct, and policy of the first ally of the United
States.[7]
JARED SPARKS.
FOOTNOTES:
[7] For a further elucidation of this subject see the North American
Review for January, 1830, No. LXVI, p. 15. Also Mr Livingston's letter
to Mr Jay, dated January 4th, 1783, in the present volume.
* * * * *
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.
Philadelphia, November 23d, 1782.
Dear Sir,
I have before me your letters of the 25th and 28th of June. I
congratulate you on your safe arrival at Paris, where I venture to
hope your residence will on many accounts be more agreeable than it
was at Madrid. Nothing can be more pleasing to us than your
determination to write very frequently, since I am sorry to say, that
we have not yet been favored with such minute information on many
points of importance, as we have reason to expect. Both Dr Franklin
and yourself dwell so much in generals in your last letters, that had
it not been for a private letter of the Marquis to me, Congress would
have remained ignorant of points, which they have thought sufficiently
important to make them the foundation of those resolutions, which are
herewith transmitted to you.
You need be under no apprehensions, that Commissioners from the Court
of Great Britain will be allowed to negotiate with Congress; their
sentiments on this subject are sufficiently manifested in the
resolutions, that are sent to you and Dr Franklin with this. And the
case of Mr Burgess, which you will find in one of the papers of last
week, and in my letter to Dr Franklin,[8] will afford you some
evidence of the extreme caution of particular States on this head.