CHAPTER VI.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PEACE IN FRANCE.

Whenever it shall have been distinctly perceived and fully admitted that

the different classes which exist among us, and the political parties

which correspond to those classes, are natural and deeply-rooted

elements of French society, a great step will have been made towards

social peace.

This peace is impossible so long as each of the different classes and

the great political parties into which our society is divided cherishes

the hope of annihilating the others, and of reigning alone. That is the

evil which, ever since 1789, has periodically agitated and convulsed

France. Sometimes the democratic element has aimed at the extinction of

the aristocratic; at other times the aristocratic element has tried to

crush the democratic, and to regain its former predominance.

Constitutions, laws, and the administration of the government have been

by turns directed, like engines of war, to one or the other of these

ends--a war to the death, in which neither combatant believed his life

compatible with that of his rival.

This war was suspended by the Emperor Napoleon. He rallied around him

the classes which had formerly possessed, and those which actually

enjoyed, power and influence; and by the security which he offered them,

by the continual turmoil in which he kept them, or by the yoke which he

imposed upon them, he established and maintained peace.

After him, from 1814 to 1830, and from 1830 to 1848, this war was

renewed. A great progress had been made. Liberty had become real. Both

the ancient aristocratic, and the modern democratic elements acquired

strength; but though neither could succeed in suppressing the other,

each was impatient of its adversary’s existence, and eagerly strove for

the mastery.

And now a third combatant has entered the arena. The democratic party

having divided itself into two conflicting sections, the workmen are now

arrayed against their masters, or the people against the middle classes.

This new war, like the former, is a war to the death; for the new

aspirant is as arrogant and exclusive as the others can have ever been.

The sovereignty, it is said, belongs of right to the people only; and no

rival, ancient or modern, noble or bourgeois, can be admitted to share

it.

Every pretension of this kind must be withdrawn, not by one only, but by

all of the contending parties. The great elements of society among

us--the old aristocracy, the middle classes, and the people--must

completely renounce the hope of excluding and annihilating each other.

Let them vie with each other in influence; let each maintain its

position and its rights, or even endeavour to extend and improve them,

for in such efforts consists the political life of a country. But there

must be an end of all radical hostility: they must resign themselves to

live together, side by side, in the ranks of the government as well as

in civil society. This is the first condition of social peace. How, it

may be asked, can this condition be satisfied? How can the different

elements of our society be brought to tolerate each other’s existence,

and to fulfil their several functions in the government of the country?

I reply, by such an organization of that government as may assign to

each its place and functions; may concede something to the wishes, while

it imposes limits to the ambition, of all.

I am here met by an idea, perhaps the most false and fatal of all those

current in our days on the subject of constitutional organization. It is

this:--“National unity involves political unity. There is but one

people: there can exist at the head and in the name of this people, but

one power.”

This is the idea which most completely characterizes both revolution and

despotism. The Convention and Louis XIV. exclaimed alike, “L’Etat, c’est

moi.”

It is as false as it is tyrannical. A nation is not a vast aggregate of

men, consisting of so many thousands or millions, occupying a certain

extent of ground, and concentrated in, and represented by, a unit,

called king or assembly. A nation is a great organic body, formed by the

union within one country of certain social elements which assume the

shape and constitution naturally impressed upon them by the primitive

laws of God and the free acts of man. The diversity of these elements

is, as we have just seen, one of the essential facts resulting from

those laws; and is absolutely inconsistent with the false and tyrannous

unity which it is proposed to establish at the centre of government, as

representative of that society in which it never exists.

What then, it is said, must all the elements of society, all the groups

of which it is naturally composed, all the various classes, professions,

and opinions it contains, be represented in the government by powers

corresponding to each?

No, certainly: society is not a federation of professions, classes, and

opinions, which treat, by their several delegates, of the affairs which

are common to them all; any more than it is a uniform mass of exactly

similar elements, which send their representatives to the centre of

government only because they cannot all repair thither themselves, and

are compelled to reduce themselves to a number which can meet in one

place and deliberate in common. Social unity requires that there should

be but one government; but the diversity of the social elements equally

requires that this government should not be one sole power.

There is a natural process of attraction and concentration at work in

the heart of society, and among the numberless particular associations

which it contains (such as families, professions, classes, and parties),

by which all the smaller associations are successively absorbed into the

larger. The multitude of particular and different elements are thus

reduced to a small number of principal and essential elements, which

include and represent all the rest.

I do not think that these principal elements of society ought to be all

specially represented in the government of the state by several

authorities; I only maintain that their diversity is inconsistent with

the unity of the central power.

To this reasoning it has often been confidently replied--that the

various elements of society are congregated, by the process of free

election, in a single assembly which represents the whole nation; and

which affords them an arena for free discussion, where they can maintain

their opinions, their interests and their rights, and exert their proper

influence over the resolutions of the assembly, and consequently over

the government of the state.

We are then to infer from this that we have discharged the claims of

the most varied, weighty, and essential social elements when we have

said, “Get yourselves elected, then give your opinion, and try to make

it the prevalent one!” Election and discussion constitute the entire

basis which is to sustain the social edifice; election and discussion

afford a sufficient guarantee for all interests, rights, and liberties!

Such a theory betrays a strange ignorance of human nature, human

society, and the French people.

I will put a single question. The interests of society are twofold;

those of stability and conservation on the one hand, and those of

activity and progress on the other. If you wanted to secure the

interests of activity and progress, would you seek this security among

the social elements in which the interests of stability and conservation

are peculiarly strong? Undoubtedly not: you would commit the interests

of activity and progress to the care of their natural and willing

protectors, and you would do well. But all these various interests have

equal wants and equal claims. There is no safety for any of them but in

its appropriate power; that is to say, in a power analogous to it in its

nature and in its relations to other powers. If the interests of

stability and conservation are committed wholly to the chances of the

composition of a single elective assembly, invested with the sole and

final decision of all questions, and to the chances of the discussions

in that assembly, be assured that sooner or later, after numerous

oscillations between tyrannies of different kinds, those interests will

be sacrificed or lost.

It is absurd to seek the principle of the political stability of

government in the mobile elements of society. The permanent elements of

society must find in the government itself, powers corresponding to

them, and offering a pledge for their security. A diversity of powers is

equally indispensable to conservation and to liberty.

It is matter of amazement that this truth should be disputed, for the

very men who dispute it have made a great step towards its admission and

application. After establishing unity of power at the head of the state,

they have admitted a division of powers lower down, on account of the

diversity of functions. They have carefully separated the legislative,

executive, administrative, and judicial powers; thus practically

acknowledging the necessity of giving guarantees to different interests,

by the separation and the different constitution of these powers. How is

it that they do not see that this necessity has a higher application,

and that the diversity of the general interests of society and of the

duties of the supreme power, imperatively requires a diversity of powers

in the highest as well as in the subordinate spheres of government?

But to constitute a real and efficient diversity of powers, it is not

enough that each should have a distinct place and name in the

government; it is also necessary that all should be strongly organized,

all fully competent to fill and to maintain the place they occupy.

It is the fashion of the day to think that harmony among the powers of

the state, and security against their excess, is to be found in their

weakness. People are afraid of every kind of authority; and in order to

prevent their destroying each other, or encroaching upon liberty, they

ingeniously endeavour to undermine them all in turn.

This is a monstrous error. Every weak power is a power doomed to perish

by extinction or by usurpation. If several weak powers conflict, either

one will become strong at the expense of the others, and will end in a

tyranny, or they will trammel and neutralize each other, and the result

will be anarchy.

What is it that has constituted the strength and success of

constitutional monarchy in England? It is that, while the royalty and

aristocracy were originally strong, the commonalty has become strong by

successive conquests of its rights from the aristocracy and the king. Of

the three constitutional powers, two retain much of their primitive

greatness, and rest firmly on their deep and primæval roots; the third

has risen to greatness, and has gradually struck its roots deeply into

the same soil. Each is fully able to defend itself against the other,

and to fulfil its peculiar mission.

When an earnest and sincere attempt was made to establish constitutional

monarchy in France, its firmest adherents desired an ancient and

historical basis for royalty; for the Chamber of Peers, an hereditary

seat in the legislature, and for the Chamber of Deputies, direct

election: not by any means in obedience to theories or precedents, but

in order that the great powers of the state might be true

powers,--efficient and living entities, not words or phantoms.

In the United States, notwithstanding the difference of names,

situations, manners, and institutions, Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson,

and Madison, when founding the Republic, recognised and acted upon the

same principles. They too thought it necessary to have different powers

at the head of the government; and in order that the difference might be

real, they gave to each of these powers--_i.e._ the two chambers and the

President--a distinct origin; as distinct as the general institutions of

the country would permit, and as different as their several functions.

Diversity of origin and of nature is one of the conditions essential to

the intrinsic and real strength of powers, and this again is the

condition indispensable to political harmony and social peace.

Nor is it only at the summit and centre of government that these

principles ought to guide the organization of power; they are equally

applicable through the whole extent of the country, in the management of

its local, no less than of its general affairs. A great deal has been

said in favour of centralization and administrative unity, and there is

no doubt that they have rendered great service to France. We shall

preserve many of their forms, regulations, maxims, and works; but the

time of their sovereignty is past. Centralization is no longer

sufficient for the chief wants and pressing dangers of society. The

struggle is no longer confined to the centre; it agitates the whole

nation. Since property, family, and all the bases of society, are

attacked everywhere, they must everywhere be vigorously defended; and

functionaries or orders which have to travel from the centre of

government will be found a very inadequate defence, even though

supported by bayonets. Landed proprietors, and heads of families, who

are the natural guardians of society, must all be enjoined and empowered

to maintain its security by conducting its affairs: they must have an

active share in the management of its local as well as its general

interests; in the administration, as well as the government of the

country: the central government ought to uphold the banner of social

order, but it cannot bear the whole burthen of it unaided.

I speak always on the presumption that I am speaking _to_ a free

country, and _of_ a free government; for it is under free governments

that the safety of society demands all these conditions: they have

evidently no application to absolute governments.

Absolute power is, however, subject to certain conditions, as well as

liberty. It is far from being always possible where it would be

submitted to, nor can it be obtained wherever it is desired.

Let the friends of freedom never forget that nations prefer absolute

power to anarchy. The first want--the first instinct--of communities, as

well as of governments or of individuals, is self-preservation. Now a

community may exist under absolute power; under anarchy, if it lasts, it

must perish.

The readiness, I might almost say the eagerness, with which nations

throw their liberties into the gulf of anarchy, in the desperate attempt

to close it, is a shameful spectacle. I know nothing more lamentable to

witness than this sudden renunciation of all the rights so noisily and

vehemently demanded. The friend of freedom and of progress who would

fall into despair of man and of the future at this humiliating sight

must withdraw into himself, and refresh and invigorate his soul at

those high and pure fountains which nourish deep convictions and

far-reaching hopes.

Let not France, whatever be her peril, reckon on absolute power to save

her. It would not justify her confidence. In her ancient society,

absolute power reposed on a principle of moderation and of permanence;

while, under the Emperor Napoleon, it contained a principle of strength,

either of which it would vainly seek for now. Popular tyranny or

military dictatorship may be the expedient of a day, but can never be a

form of government. Free institutions are now as necessary to social

peace as they are to individual dignity; and power, whatever be its

nature or origin, whether republican or monarchical, has no wiser course

to pursue than to learn to use them, for they are now its only

instruments and its only stay.

If some are tempted to seek repose in other sources, let them abandon

all such hopes. Whatever be the future destiny of France, we shall not

escape from the necessity of a constitutional government; we are

condemned, for our own salvation, to surmount all the difficulties, and

to fulfil all the conditions, with which it may be encumbered.

There is but one means of rendering ourselves equal to this mighty task,

and of complying with this imperious necessity. All the elements of

stability, all the conservative forces in the country must unite closely

and act constantly together. It is no more possible to extinguish

democracy in the nation than liberty in the government. That immense

movement which has been communicated to every country and agitates all

their deepest recesses; which is incessantly inciting every class and

every individual to think, to desire, to claim, to act, to employ his

activity in every direction,--this movement will not be stopped. It is a

fact in which we must acquiesce, whether it pleases or displeases us,

whether it awakens our fears or excites our hopes. But though we cannot

extinguish this movement, we can guide and govern it; and if it is not

guided and governed, it will throw back the whole current of

civilization, and will be the opprobrium as well as the curse of

humanity. Democracy, to be guided and governed, must form a considerable

ingredient in the state, but it must not be the sole one: it must be

strong enough to climb itself, but never to pull down others: it must

find issues, and encounter barriers on every side. Democracy is a

fertilizing, but muddy stream, whose waters are never beneficent till

the turbid and impetuous current has spread itself abroad and subsided

into calmness and purity.

The Dutch, a great people, though in a small country, whose republican

glory shone brightly even amidst the full blaze of the monarchical glory

of Louis XIV., conquered their country from the ocean, and maintained

their conquest, by cutting canals and raising dikes on every side. It

is the ceaseless care of the whole community that the canals be never

obstructed and the dikes never broken; for on this depend the prosperity

and the existence of Holland.

Let all the conservative elements of France learn from this example; let

them unite all their efforts, let them keep a common and incessant

watch, that the rising tide of democracy may always find safe channels

and indestructible barriers. On the joint and efficient action of these

depend the safety of the community, and the safety of each individual

composing it. If the conservative elements of French society know how to

combine and to form a united body, if the party spirit which prevails

among them shall give way to a large and enlightened political spirit,

then France, and the democracy of France, are saved. If the conservative

elements remain disunited and disorganized, Democracy will destroy

France, and will perish under the ruins she has made.

Democracy in France. January 1849 · 第 6 / 8 章