CHAPTER VIII

Foreign action in Korea—Exhausted Exchequer—Taxes—Budgets—Debased

currency—The Dai Ichi ginko—Dishonest officials

The events, which have led up to the present complex condition of Korean

politics, originated in the attempt of the Russians to secure control

of the Customs and Finance of the Empire in the autumn of 1897. As the

effort of the Russian Minister of that time, M. de Speyer, was only

in part successful, his immediate successor, M. Matunine, the present

representative, M. Pavloff, and his _confrère_ of the French Legation,

M. Colin de Plancy, have in the interval consistently directed their

diplomacy to the completion of the task. Their inability to force

compliance with their demands upon the Korean Government has embittered

their action towards the British Minister and the Chief Commissioner

of the Customs. In the prosecution of a work, at once discreditable and

inspired by very petty prejudices, no single diplomatic device, which

could serve their purpose, has been omitted from their policy. The

check, which the plans of the Franco-Russian-Korean party received in

consequence of British action has only retarded their development for

the moment. It does not perceptibly relieve the situation, nor make the

office of the Chief Commissioner more comfortable or the path of the

British Minister more easy to follow. Indeed, it is quite certain that

the opposition of the Russian and French Ministers to British activity

will become more vigorous in the future.

The assistance accorded by the British Government to Mr. Gubbins during

the recent crisis, has done much to dispel from the minds of the Koreans

those illusions which our past indifference had created. It is improbable

that quite identical methods will be employed in any future attempt of

the Court to oust Mr. McLeavy Brown from his position. If the Court gave

way in the face of the British demonstration, the tact and consideration

for the interests of both parties, which Mr. Gubbins subsequently

displayed, materially contributed to the restoration of the _status quo_.

Upon the other hand, the apathy of the British Government in failing to

protect Mr. McLeavy Brown when he was deprived of the Comptrollership of

the Finances at the instigation of the Russian Minister, in 1897, was of

course conducive to the late disturbances. The two offices are so closely

related, and the masterful and aggressive spirit of the Franco-Russian

policy is such, that the accession of a Russian or French nominee to

the Chief Commissionership of the Customs would imply their subsequent

fusion to the complete obliteration of British influence. This, of

course, should be impossible; and it would be, if the British Government

would awaken to the importance of maintaining unimpaired its prestige

in Korea. We have little material interest in Korea, but it must not be

forgotten that our position in the kingdom should be superior to that of

France, and equal to that of Russia. If it were not that France is the

partisan and ally of Russia in Korea, as well as elsewhere, there would

be no occasion to do aught but support benevolently the policy of Japan,

without unnecessarily endorsing the aggressiveness which distinguishes

the attitude of the Island Empire to its neighbour. But if we wish to

preserve our position we must put a little more vigour into our policy,

and, while maintaining our working agreement with Japan, proceed to

guarantee the integrity of our own interests. These would be best served

by insisting upon the retention of a British nominee in the supervision

of the Korean Maritime Customs. Our action in this respect would meet

with the unqualified approval of Japan and the United States of America,

whose trading interests, equally with our own, justify predominance in

this control.

The financial embarrassment of the Korean Government, at the present

time, is the outcome of the abnormal extravagance of the Court. Anything

which would tend to increase the load of debt with which the Emperor

encumbers the dwindling resources of the national wealth, is neither

politic nor desirable. The sources of the Imperial revenue resemble in

lesser degree those which prevail in China. There are the Land Tax, paid

no longer in grain, which returned four and a half of the seven million

yen odd, composing the total domestic revenue in 1901; a House Tax,

assessed capriciously and evaded by the practice of a little discreet

bribery; the net Customs revenue, which was returned for 1901 at more

than one million and a quarter yen (1,325,414 yen; £135,303 sterling at

exchange of 2_s._ 0½_d._), and the proceeds of the various concessions,

monopolies, mines, and mint, and the sums derived from such miscellaneous

and irregular taxation as may suggest itself to that keen-witted Minister

Yi Yong-ik.

Taxation is heavy and relentless. The list of the more important

objects, upon which an impost is levied, includes, in addition to the

land, customs and house taxes, salt, tobacco, fish, fur, lumber lands,

minerals, ginseng, minting, cargo-boats, guilds, licences, paper,

cowhides, pawnbroking, &c. In more recent times certain taxes have become

obsolete. But this list, however, does not by any means exhaust the means

by which the Emperor contrives to make his subjects “pay the piper.”

Quite subsidiary to the regular cases, but of great value in themselves,

are the donations which are sent up from various parts of the country

for the gratification of the Throne. These gifts are very comprehensive,

and embrace the fruits of the land as well as the products of the sea.

Little escapes the schedule of donations, and no intervention can bring

about the discontinuation of the custom, while a failure on the part of a

prefect to attend to this matter would result speedily enough in the loss

of his office.

The Budget for the year 1901 was assessed at nine million yen odd, of

which one million yen odd was dedicated to Imperial expenditure, and a

trifle more than this sum paid to the Imperial Privy Purse. The estimated

difference between the revenue and the expenditure of the same year was

the small sum of 775 dollars. The Budget for 1902 provided for seven

and a half million yen; the estimated revenue was placed approximately

at the same figures, the balance between expenditure and revenue being

653 yen. It will be seen, therefore, that there is little reason for the

financial difficulties in which the Throne is placed. If it were not that

his Majesty frittered away his income upon the purchase of land, the

adornment of his Palaces and his person, his relatives, his women, and

the perpetual entertainment of his Court, this chronic impoverishment

of his exchequer would not exist. Moreover, at least one quarter of his

revenue is appropriated by the native officials through whose hands it

passes. Under these circumstances he has never been averse from accepting

the assistance of interested parties; but this ill-omened relief does not

free the country from its burden of mortgage and taxation.

The disbursements upon the different departments engage the revenue to a

degree which is out of all relation to the precise utility or importance

of any of these fantastic bureaux. The War Office claimed in 1901, in

round figures, more than three and one half million yen, and the Foreign

Office a quarter of a million yen, the Finance Department three-quarters

of a million yen, the Palace a little more than one million yen, and

the Home Department a little less than that amount. One million yen is

roughly £100,000. The amount paid to the War Office for 1902 was, in

round figures, very nearly three million yen; to the Foreign Office,

something in excess of a quarter of a million yen; to the Finance

Department, rather more than half a million yen. The Departments of

Law, Agriculture, Police, Education, and Communications in this highly

expensive and totally inefficient administration, all make good their

claims upon the Budget, until there is nothing left and very little to

show for this lavish distribution of the public moneys.

The Budget for 1903 I give in detail:—

The total revenue is estimated at $10,766,115. The total expenditure is

estimated at $10,765,491. This leaves a balance of $624.

REVENUE

Land Tax $7,603,020

House Tax 460,295

Miscellaneous 210,000

Balance from 1902 (including surplus from loan) 1,142,800

Customs Duties 850,000

Various Imposts 150,000

Mint 350,000

----------

10,766,115

EXPENDITURE

The Emperor’s private purse $817,361

Sacrifices 186,639

---------

1,004,000

THE IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD

Railway Bureau $21,980

Palace Police 118,645

Police in Open Ports 69,917

North-west Railway 22,882

Ceremonial Bureau 17,608

Mining Bureau 10,000

-------

261,022

THE OLD MAN BUREAU 24,026

BUREAU OF GENERALS 65,853

THE CABINET 38,730

THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Office 34,624

Mayor’s Office 6,144

Provincial Governments 91,862

Prefectural Governments, 2nd class 52,674

Quelpart 4,222

Prefectures 778,325

Imperial Hospital 7,632

Vaccination Bureau 3,354

Travelling Expenses 730

Prefectural Sacrifices 866

-------

980,533

THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT

Office 26,024

Superintendents of Trade 51,154

Foreign Representatives 201,020

-------

278,198

THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT

Office 53,910

Tax Collectors 141,600

Mint 280,000

Payment on Debt 989,250

Pensions 1,956

Transportation 200,000

---------

1,666,716

WAR DEPARTMENT

Office 50,651

Soldiers 4,072,931

---------

4,123,582

LAW DEPARTMENT

Office 31,603

Supreme Court 15,686

Mayoralty Court 8,162

Prefectural Courts 1,251

-------

56,702

POLICE BUREAU

Office 252,857

Seoul Prison 32,650

Policemen 51,462

Border Police, &c. 23,762

Travelling Expense, &c. 600

-------

361,331

EDUCATIONAL DEPARTMENT

Office 24,822

Calendar 6,022

Schools in Seoul 89,969

Schools in Country 22,580

Subsidies for Private Schools 5,430

Students Abroad 15,920

-------

164,943

AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT

Office 38,060

General Expense 8,240

-------

46,300

COUNCIL

Office 18,580

IMPERIAL BODY-GUARD

Office 58,099

BUREAU OF DECORATIONS

Office 20,993

TELEGRAPH AND POST

Office 23,640

General Expense 438,295

-------

461,935

BUREAU OF SURVEYS

Office 21,018

Surveys 50,000

-------

71,018

INCIDENTALS

Road and other Repairs 35,000

Repairs in Country 10,000

Arrest of Robbers 500

Relief Work 5,000

Burial of Destitute 300

Miscellaneous 480

Police at Mines, &c. 1,840

Shrinkage 3,120

------

56,240

EMERGENCY FUND 1,015,000

Steps have been taken from time to time by the Foreign Representatives to

improve the finances of the country. Upon one occasion seven reforms were

recommended, and the report subsequently presented to his Majesty. In the

course of an inquiry it transpired that, in addition to nickels which

were minted by the Government, there were more than twenty-five separate

and distinct brands of nickels then circulating in Korea. Until recent

years the counterfeiting of Korean currency has not been remunerative.

The old time cash was of such small value, and the combined cost of the

metal and work together so nearly equalled the face value of the true

token, that the risk was not commensurate with the profit. A single

nickel of the present currency, however, is equivalent to twenty-five of

the old coinage, and as the net cost of their manufacture is less than

a cent and a half a-piece, it will be seen that there is some incentive

to the production of false money. The number of counterfeit nickels is

rapidly increasing, and permits to coin were at one time freely issued by

the Government to private individuals. Nickel is openly imported through

the Customs; spurious coins in large quantities are brought by almost

every steamer from Japan and smuggled into the country. The Government

care only for the profit which they derive from their illegitimate

transaction, and, ignoring the permanent injury which they are doing

to the solvency of the country, adopt every means to circulate these

depreciated coins. Until quite lately the circulation of nickel pieces

was confined to the capital and the vicinity of two or three Treaty

ports, the old copper cash being current elsewhere. With a view to

extending their use, however, the magistrates throughout the Empire were

ordered to accept redemption of taxes only in this currency. But as wages

are generally paid in the nickel currency, and as the purchasing power of

the nickel Korean dollar is less than half it was with copper cash, while

the standard of payment remains the same, the bulk of the nation is paid

no better than formerly, while the purchasing power of their earnings is

infinitely less. There appears no prospect of any immediate improvement,

since the Government contracted for the issue of a further forty million

nickels. With this accomplished, the face value of the coinage in

circulation, as against the Japanese gold yen, will be fourteen million

yen, or nearly one million and a half pounds sterling. There is, of

course, no gold or silver reserve with which to redeem this gigantic sum.

To such a pitch has this condition of affairs attained that in Chemulpo

quotations are current for:—

(1) Government nickels;

(2) First-class counterfeits;

(3) Medium counterfeits; and

(4) Those passable only after dark.

There is little wonder, therefore, that the currency question is engaging

the earnest attention of the foreign representatives. Awakening at last

to some sense of its responsibilities in this matter, the Japanese

Government issued, on November 7th, 1902, an Imperial ordinance, which

came into force on the 15th, with a view to deterring Japanese from

making spurious coins or despatching such nickels of Japanese manufacture

to Korea. The punishment to which offenders against the ordinance are

liable is imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or a fine of

not more than 200 yen (£20 8_s._ 4_d._). This enactment gave the Japanese

customs officers power to prevent the counterfeit coins from being

shipped abroad, and enabled the Korean customs authorities to institute

proceedings against Japanese found guilty of importing nickels of this

description. From January 22nd, 1902, when the first seizure of the year

took place, until the close of December, 3,573,138 pieces (coins and

blanks), the total face value being £18,191, were confiscated by the

Chemulpo customs officers. The largest quantity taken at one time was

739,000 pieces, face value £3772, detected on August 19th aboard a Korean

junk, the second largest haul was made on September 8th in a cargo-boat,

and consisted of 530,090 pieces, with a face value of £2512.

With a view to provide a remedy against the deplorable condition of the

Korean currency, a Japanese Bank, Dai Ichi Ginko (No. I. Bank), which

is under direction of Baron Shibusawa, decided, with the support of the

Japanese Government, to undertake the issue of notes by which a promise

was made to pay the bearer on demand in Japanese currency at any of its

branches in Korea. The Dai Ichi Ginko possesses branches at all the

larger Treaty ports, as well as in Seoul, and is, perhaps, the most

important commercial agent in the country. The Japanese Consular officers

are authorised to supervise the issue and to receive statements of the

circulation and reserves twice a month. They are also entrusted with

certain discretionary powers as to limiting the number of notes in use.

The denomination of the notes are 1 yen (2_s._ 0½_d._), 5 yen (10_s._

2½_d._), 10 yen (£1 0_s._ 5_d._), and on May 10th, 1902, there appeared

the first issue of notes of 1 yen value. Those of 5 yen were put in

circulation on September 20th following. The 10 yen notes were not issued

until a later time.

On February 28th, 1903, the circulation of Dai Ichi Ginko notes and the

reserves held for their redemption stood as follows:

Amount.

Branch. In circulation. Reserves.

Chemulpo 18,927 18,927

Fusan 24,568 19,701

Seoul 1,894 1,894

Mok-po 14,406 12,250

------ ------

Total 59,795 52,772

This action upon the part of the Dai Ichi Ginko gave rise to vehement

opposition from the Korean Government. Although the issue of the notes

was duly authorised by the Emperor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs

persistently obstructed the circulation of the notes. Upon September

11th, 1902, an order was issued from the Foreign Office, upon the

authority of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, prohibiting the use

of the notes by Koreans upon grounds which impugned the credit of the

entire proceeding. This order was inspired, of course, by Yi Yong-ik, and

when a few months later, on January 8th, 1903, Cho Pyöng-sik—then Foreign

Minister—removed the prohibition, Yi Yong-ik at once contrived the

dismissal of his too complaisant colleague. The Foreign Office was now

without its Chancellor, and Yi Yong-ik immediately set himself to revoke

the charter of the bank. After declaring that the Japanese paper-money

would be the ruin of the country and alleging that the compensation

claims against the Seoul-Fusan Railway Company were purposely paid in

those notes with a view to an ultimate declaration of bankruptcy upon

behalf of the bank, Yi Yong-ik summoned on January 24th a meeting of the

Pedlar’s Guild, at which he forbade their acceptance of this paper-money.

A few days later, February 1st, the Mayor of Seoul posted an edict

throughout the city giving effect to this prohibition and, at the same

time, threatening with most severe penalties any one who used the notes

or in any way assisted to circulate them. The Finance Department then

circulated the edict throughout the provinces, whereupon an immediate

run upon the bank ensued. Three days later, upon February 4th, the

Acting Japanese Minister threatened the Government with the demand of an

indemnity and a number of mining and railway concessions in compensation

for the injury occasioned the bank, unless the obnoxious measure was

withdrawn. After considerable discussion and various meetings, the Korean

authorities agreed to withdraw all obstruction and to publish throughout

the Empire their recognition of the existence of the bank. From that day

the validity of the position of the Dai Ichi Ginko has been unquestioned.

The exactions and dishonesty of the officials impose a perpetual drain

upon the national exchequer. In the removal of this one great evil,

another serious obstacle to a more flourishing financial condition

would be surmounted. Unfortunately, the drought and famine of 1901,

added to the decrease in the revenues of 1902, created a discrepancy

of five million yen. If this deficit may be considered extraordinary,

no extenuating circumstances can excuse the supplementary losses of

revenue attributable to the personal peculations of the officials.

The stringency of the financial situation created by the famine drew

attention to the very large deficits, with which many of the more

important metropolitan and chief provincial officials were debited. The

inability of any of these gentry to disgorge their ill-gotten gains

resulted in their immediate prosecution at the instigation of the Finance

Minister, Yi Yong-ik. Ministers of State, governors of provinces,

prefects and inspectors were brought sharply to account by the execution,

banishment, or imprisonment of many offenders.

In such a moment the peculiar astuteness of Yi Yong-ik becomes

conspicuous. While he visited any official who was compromised with

the full penalties of the law, he himself executed, in his capacity of

Minister of Finance, a bluff by which he netted almost half a million yen

for the Imperial Treasury at one stroke. Yi Yong-ik arranged to buy the

ginseng crop from the ginseng farmers. This is a Government monopoly, and

the price was arranged at eight dollars a pound for sixty-three thousand

pounds’ weight, dried and undried. When the time came to pay, and he had

secured possession of the ginseng, Yi Yong-ik refused to give more than

one dollar a pound, alleging that the ginseng growers had misrepresented

the condition and weight of the consignment. In the meantime the ginseng

was sold; the money was appropriated, and the balance in the Treasury

correspondingly increased.

Upon another occasion, at a time when the discount of nickel against

yen gold was very low, Yi Yong-ik was instrumental in promoting the

presentation of a gift of two million dollars Korean to the Emperor. By

careful adjustment the value of the exchange, nickel currency as against

yen gold, hardened twenty points the day after the presentation. It is,

perhaps, unnecessary to point out that Yi Yong-ik occupied the interval

in disposing of the difference to the advantage of his master.

[Illustration: A SEOUL GATE.]

Korea · 第 8 / 24 章