Sketch of Mr. McLeavy Brown—The Question of the Customs—The
suggested Loan
It is perhaps curious that the man who has held the Korean State
together, during the past few years, should be British—one of those
sons of the Empire, upon whose work the present generation looks with
satisfaction. It is nearly thirty years ago since Mr. McLeavy Brown made
his appearance in China. To-day, among Englishmen whose reputations are
associated with the problems and politics of the Far East, his name
stands out almost as prominently as that of his colleague, Sir Robert
Hart, the Inspector-General of the Imperial Maritime Customs of China.
Seconded from the Chinese Customs for special duty, Mr. McLeavy Brown
has devoted many years of his life to the financial difficulties which
beset Korea, holding at first the dual position of Treasurer-General and
Chief Commissioner of Customs. Within the last few years, Mr. McLeavy
Brown’s activity has been confined to the administration of the Customs
Service, where, though deprived of the unique and influential position
filled by him as financial adviser to the Emperor, he has succeeded in
accomplishing invaluable work for the country.
A man may be judged by the character of those who gather round him,
and when, weary of the carping and pettiness that prevail in Seoul, one
turns to the service which Mr. McLeavy Brown represents, it is to find
his colleagues animated by a quiet enthusiasm, and a spirit of generous
devotion, and loyalty to his principles and policy. Unfortunately, his
supporters are not in the capital, and he can derive no encouragement
from their sympathy. Their sphere of work lies in the treaty ports, but
he is content to remain in Seoul always fighting, in grim and stoical
silence, against the absurd extravagances of the Court, and the infamous
corruption of the officials. So long as he perseveres in this duty,
just so long will he be hampered and thwarted in all quarters. The very
opposition which he encounters, however, is no unemphatic testimony to
the exceeding and exceptional value of the work which he has already
achieved, in the face of every obstacle to systematic progress and
reform, that the craft and cunning of officialdom can devise.
[Illustration: MR. J. MCLEAVY BROWN, C.M.G., LL. D.]
The animus which prevails against Mr. McLeavy Brown occasions, to those
who are new to Seoul, sentiments of profound astonishment and dismay,
but after the first feeling of strangeness has worn off, and it becomes
possible to grasp the peculiar and complex variety of people who have
gathered in the capital of the Hermit Kingdom, the causes responsible
for the existence of such an opinion are very plainly revealed. Apart
from the Legations, there are few foreigners, not even excepting the
representatives of the very miscellaneous collection of American
missionaries, who have not come to Seoul from motives of self-interest,
which bring them into collision, directly or indirectly, with the Chief
Commissioner of the Customs in his official capacity. If no longer the
financial adviser of the Government, his counsel is sought as occasion
arises; although his advice is not necessarily followed, it frequently
happens that the influence of the Chief Commissioner of the Customs
becomes the controlling factor in the negotiations between a bewildered
and impecunious Court and an importunate concession-hunter. Moreover,
cases may occur when an upright regard for the interests of the kingdom
makes it incumbent upon Mr. McLeavy Brown to urge the rejection of
proposals, which have not come through the channels of his own office.
Such a variation of the orthodox method of application may happen any
day in Seoul. While this attempted exercise of a power of veto does
not endear him to the seeker after Ministerial “considerations,” the
impersonal spirit, in which he discharges the functions of his office,
atones for any exceptional interference he may deem necessary. Much
of the feeling which actuates foreigners and officials against Mr.
McLeavy Brown, therefore, is based upon a thoughtless disregard for the
elementary facts in his very delicate position. There is, of course,
no suggestion against his honour. In a community, accustomed to the
financial backsliding which appears to be an inevitable preliminary to
any concession, the exponent of a policy of economy and straight dealing
always provokes the strongest animosity in those about him.
A more emotional man than the Chief Commissioner would have tired of the
thankless part which he is compelled to play. Years of laborious work,
and the habit, which he has acquired in the isolated state in which
he lives, of concentrating his energies upon the subject before him,
enable him to school himself against the trials of his situation. He
treats every one with unfailing frankness and directness, but the kindly
instincts which illuminate his private life are submerged in the cares
and worry of his official position. During business hours he becomes the
cold, irresponsive machine of State; his whole imagination and ingenuity
focused upon the necessity of checking those who would incite their
Sovereign to acts subversive of the principles of financial rectitude,
which Mr. McLeavy Brown would fain see encouraged.
Only those who have had experience of Korea can thoroughly appreciate
the fertility of the Korean official in inventing new schemes by which
public money may be appropriated to his private uses. If the condition
of the finances had not already made the practice of economy imperative,
this tendency would justify the determination to deny the means of
peculation to officials. Mr. McLeavy Brown has therefore brought into
accord the necessity of economy, which underlies the existence of the
Customs, with the principles of the system upon which he administers the
service. It is, in the matter of the foreign staff of the Korean Customs,
impossible for Korean officials to take exception to the standard of
payment by which the services of these foreigners are compensated. If
this all-pervading retrenchment makes employment in the Korean Customs
exceptionally unsatisfactory to its minor foreign officials, a very clear
reason for the low payment is nevertheless found in the narrow margin
which divides the total revenue from the total expenditure. Moreover, the
Chief Commissioner is himself the chief sufferer.
Mr. McLeavy Brown has long been an enigma in Seoul. Although the variety
of his gifts and the hospitable quality of his nature make him an
important element in the life of the capital, there are few who care
to study the man and his movements intelligently. Mr. McLeavy Brown
possesses many moods; and the isolation in which he is placed, by the
absence of any sympathy between himself and the people among whom he
lives, renders the circumstances of his position almost pathetic.
When, in 1896, he refused to accept any salary for the hopeless and
onerous post of Financial Comptroller of the Imperial Treasury, the
foreign community of Seoul were astounded. This refusal to burden still
further the resources of an exhausted country is, however, an index
to the guiding principles of his life. There is no dissembling in his
transactions. Although he may temper an ill wind with promises, the
continuity of his decision is maintained, and he attempts to carry out
independently and honestly anything to which he may have pledged himself.
He is indefatigable in his work; indomitable in his perseverance, cool
and determined. A barrister by profession, he devotes himself to the
minutiæ of his service with an attention which discloses his legal
training. In his estimate of a person, no less than a situation, he
seldom errs.
In his official life he represents a type of Englishman that is rapidly
disappearing from our public services. His private life reflects the
culture and the grace of an attractive personality. They say, in Seoul,
that Mr. McLeavy Brown is more skilful as a diplomatist than as an
administrator; and his brilliant conversational powers give some colour
to the assertion. Upon arrival in Seoul, newcomers are apt to hear that
“Brown is a walking encyclopædia.” He speaks, reads and writes with equal
facility French, German, Italian and Chinese. It will be remembered
that he is in the service of the Korean Government, a sphere of utility
and activity which demands fluency in yet another language. His library
attests the breadth of his culture; it numbers some 7000 volumes, and
fills the walls of the rooms and corridors of his house at Seoul from
floor to ceiling. Boxes of new books arrive by every mail. When he reads
them it is difficult to conjecture. At night, as one strolls from the
British Legation to the Station Hotel, the lights in his study window may
be seen burning brightly. He is believed to sit up with his books very
often until dawn. It would be typical of this silent self-contained man
if he found in the pleasures of his library the antidote to much which
takes place in Seoul.
When his Imperial Majesty was pleased to demand the private residence and
official premises of his Chief Commissioner of Customs, there was much
perturbation in Seoul about the disturbances, which were expected to take
place upon the expiration of the Emperor’s ultimatum. Preparations were
made for such a contingency, and four British men-of-war under Admiral
Bruce appeared at Chemulpo. The eventful day passed quietly, however,
and excitement gave place to no small amount of disappointment among the
European community. Mr. McLeavy Brown remained in possession of his usual
quarters, the whole question of a change in the location of the Customs
having been reserved by the officials of the Court. Unfortunately, the
demands of the Court could only be contested in so far as they continued
to be peremptory in their nature. When, later, due warning was given
to the Chief Commissioner and a fresh domicile appointed, as a servant
of the Crown Mr. McLeavy Brown was unable to ignore the mandate. Prior
to this notice, the Emperor had insisted, very foolishly, upon the
immediate evacuation of the Customs buildings, a demand compliance with
which was impossible, and in resistance to which Mr. McLeavy Brown
was very properly supported by Mr. J. G. Gubbins, C.M.G., then acting
Consul-General to Korea.
[Illustration: BRITISH LEGATION, SEOUL]
After the murder of the Queen in 1895, the Korean Court fled from the
old Palace, in the least healthy part of the city, to the vicinity of
the British and American Legations, and built there a new Palace in a
safer and more pleasant locality. But the new Palace is overlooked by
the British Legation and by the residence of Mr. McLeavy Brown. The
Emperor, spurred on by his eunuchs, had cast envious glances on the
dwellings of these foreigners, and not unnaturally decided that these
properties would make a very pleasing addition to the Palace which he
is now constructing. Unhappily, there was reason to suspect that, in
turning the Chief Commissioner out of his house, the Emperor, or rather
Lady Om, who desired the house, and Yi Yong-ik, who coveted the Customs,
hoped at the same time to expel him from the country. That the attempt
to oust Mr. McLeavy Brown from his home really aimed at removing him
from office can hardly be doubted. When the house question rose, Mr.
McLeavy Brown was given exactly two days notice—from the 19th to the 21st
March—to move out. When he refused to accept such an intimation, force
was threatened, but averted by the intervention of the British _chargé
d’affaires_. In the end, Mr. McLeavy Brown’s compound was entered by a
few hangers-on of the palace, who were easily ejected by the orders of
the Chief Commissioner of the Customs. These creatures then tore their
clothes and ran crying to the Palace that they had been beaten and
otherwise shamefully ill-used. As a result, the dismissal of the Chief
Commissioner was demanded. Mr. Gubbins took the matter up with great
promptness, and agreed that, upon certain conditions, which included a
proper notice to quit and the choice of new sites, the Emperor might
acquire both the British Legation and the Customs buildings, which were
apparently necessary to the completion of the new Palace. As it happens,
the British Legation, which directly overlooks the half-finished Palace,
is far more necessary to the Emperor’s peace of mind than the Customs
buildings, which are upon a lower level. It is obvious, therefore,
that the attack was directed more against Mr. McLeavy Brown, by a
_posse_ of Court officials, than against his house. Nevertheless, it has
always been apparent, since the Emperor came over to the shelter of the
Legations, that there could be no sufficient accommodation for him in
the Foreign quarter without encroaching on the grounds of the Legations.
The Legations have a delightful situation on the only real eminence in
the central part of Seoul, and the Emperor, now that he has come, must
either be content with a malarial situation, at the feet, as it were, of
the foreigners, or absorb the Legation grounds and send their tenants
elsewhere. Already he has displaced the German Minister. Sooner or later
the British, and perhaps the American, will go too; and the Palace will
then cover the whole hill, save the site of the Russian Legation, whose
flag will still wave a little above the Imperial standard of Korea.
No sooner had a settlement been attained upon the question at issue
between the Court and the Chief Commissioner of the Customs, than there
came the announcement that a loan of five million yen had been arranged
between the Government and the Yunnan Syndicate, upon the security of
the revenue of the Customs. This at once compromised the authority of
the Chief Commissioner, who, by virtue of his office, exercises absolute
control over the revenues. It should be understood that the loan had
nothing whatever to do with the question of Mr. McLeavy Brown’s house.
The original proposals were first mooted a year before the more recent
trouble. The Yunnan Syndicate, a French company registered in London, is
supported almost wholly by French capital. It is generally understood
that the main object of the loan was to obtain a weapon by which
unlimited concessions might be extorted. The manœuvre was not altogether
successful. The Yunnan Syndicate, by the terms of the agreement, bound
itself to lend the Korean Government five million yen in gold and silver
bullion at 5½ per cent., the loan to be subject to a charge of 10 per
cent. for commission, and to be repaid in instalments stretching over
twenty-five years. In case the Korean Government were unable to repay
the money out of the ordinary sources of revenue, the Customs revenue
had been pledged as security. The agreement was signed by Pak, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Yi Yong-ik, the Minister of Finance, on
the one hand, and by M. Cazalis, agent of the company, and M. Colin de
Plancy, French Minister at Seoul, on the other. The document left many
points open. It was particularly vague in that no date was fixed for the
delivery of the gold and silver bullion at Chemulpo. It was therefore
argued, with obvious reason, that the Syndicate might turn this oversight
to account by simply refusing to deliver the money until certain
concessions had been granted.
M. Cazalis, the agent of the Yunnan Syndicate, Limited, was indignant
that he should find himself opposed both by Mr. Gubbins and Mr. McLeavy
Brown, who, according to his view, followed the Japanese lead in
suspecting Russian intrigue. There is no reason, however, to believe
that the British _chargé d’affaires_ based his objections upon any such
grounds. The scheme of the Yunnan Syndicate was quite iniquitous enough
to meet with opposition for _primâ facie_ reasons. Here are the facts
of the case as stated by the representative of the company. The Yunnan
Syndicate, without consulting the Chief Commissioner of the Customs,
the Japanese Minister, or the British Minister, secretly persuaded the
Korean Government to borrow five million yen in gold and silver bullion
at 5½ per cent., giving the Customs revenue as security. M. Cazalis
argued that it was necessary to carry the matter through with secresy,
because it would have been impossible to procure any signatures to the
document, if the affair had been conducted publicly, with the full
knowledge of the Chief Commissioner of the Customs. In other words, he
admitted that the scheme was such as would never have commended itself to
Mr. McLeavy Brown, who was absolutely impartial and without interest in
the matter.
In the meantime, it is as well to note that the loan aimed at creating
a position for French interests in Korea. In view of the attempt of
Russia to acquire an open and ice-free port for her own purposes, and
the distinct understanding existing between the French and Russian
Governments with regard to Russia’s Asiatic policy, Great Britain could
not disregard any possible development. At that moment French activity
in Korea may not have involved any direct menace to our own interests.
Nevertheless, any combination of circumstances which gave to French and
Russian influence a predominance in the administration of the country,
could scarcely fail to develop incidents, against which it is our
manifest duty to guard. And it is perhaps curious, moreover, that the man
who was the prime mover in the intrigue to dispossess Mr. McLeavy Brown
of his house should have been the very one to arrange the loan from the
Yunnan Syndicate with M. Cazalis.
If the wisdom and necessity of a loan of five millions had been assured,
there are many directions in Korea in which such a sum could be most
profitably spent. With the revenue of the Customs as the guarantee, there
would have been no difficulty in securing more advantageous conditions
than those of the contract. The terms were preposterous. Subsidiary
proposals, as to which no conclusion was then reached, further demanded
the lease of the Pyöng-yang coal-mines, the control of forty-four
additional mines, the purchase of French mining plant, the engagement
of French mining experts, and involved minor stipulations, which were
in themselves objectionable to the Court, while giving to French
interests in Korea an unwarranted and undesirable preponderance. The
uses to which it was alleged that the loan would be put were precisely
those which are actually most necessary. Unanimous support for the loan
would have been won if there had been the slightest reason to hope for
the faithful observance by the Court of its pledges. Unhappily, there
is no prospect that any very appreciable proportion of the loan will
be expended upon the objects on which such stress was laid, objects
which are potent and vital factors in the economic development of the
kingdom. The loan was handed over in bullion; in the ratio of one-third
silver and two-thirds gold, ostensibly that a National bank may be
inaugurated and the present nickel coinage replaced by gold and silver
tokens. This is eminently laudable. If the small dimensions of the
loan rendered such a thing feasible, the conversion of the national
money would be of incalculable benefit to the financial credit of the
Government and the country in general. But it must be remembered that one
of the reasons for contracting the last Japanese loan was to provide a
nickel coinage exchangeable at par with the Japanese and Mexican silver
tokens. Unhappily, this same coinage is now at a discount of 120 per
cent. for one hundred Japanese cents gold. Examination has proved that
the intrinsic value of one dollar nickel of Korean five cent pieces—at
that time the only unit struck—is only one-eighteenth of its face
value as against the Japanese gold standards of currency. The balance
was “squeezed.” It is likewise impossible to make provision for the
legitimate and honourable expenditure of this new loan. Quite recently
there has been a large issue of one-cent copper pieces. These coins
sustain a better ratio to the yen than the nickel currency; as a matter
of fact the intrinsic value of the copper coinage is so much greater than
the nickel money that there is a standard of exchange between them. At
present the nickel, compared with the copper, token is quoted at 12 per
cent. discount.
[Illustration: THE IMPERIAL LIBRARY, SEOUL]