By a concept of practical reason, I understand the representation to the
mind of an object as an effect possible to be produced through freedom.
The only objects of practical reason are _good_ and _evil_. For by
"good" we understand an object necessarily abhorred, the principle of
reason actuating the mind in each case.
In the common use of language we uniformly distinguish between the
"good" and the "pleasant," the "evil" and the "unpleasant," good and
evil being judged by reason alone. The judgment on the relation, of
means to ends certainly belongs to reason. But "good" or "evil" always
implies only a reference to the "will," as resolved by the law of
reason, to make something its object.
Thus good and evil properly relate to actions, not to personal
sensations. So, if anything is to be reckoned simply good or evil, it
can only be so estimated by the way of acting. Hence, only the maxim of
the will, and consequently the person himself, can be called good or
evil, not the thing itself.
The Stoic was right, even though he might be laughed at, who during
violent attacks of gout exclaimed, "Pain, I will never admit that thou
art an evil!" What he felt was indeed what we call a bad thing; but he
had no reason to admit that any evil attached thereby to himself, for
the pain did not in the least detract from his personal worth, but only
from that of his condition. If a single lie had been on his conscience
it would have humiliated his soul; but pain seemed only to elevate it,
when he was not conscious of having deserved it as a punishment for any
unjust deed.
The rule of judgment subject to the laws of pure practical reason is
this: Ask yourself whether if the action you propose were to happen by a
natural system of law, of which you were yourself a part, you could
regard it as possible by your own will? In fact, everyone does decide by
this rule whether actions are morally good or evil.
_II.--Dialectic of Practical Reason_